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Most of the contemporary literature on Turkey’s industrial relations emphasises the 
impact of globalisation in bringing about fundamental institutional changes in the 
domain of industrial relations that have resulted in diminished capability of organised 
labour to act as an independent socioeconomic actor. However, what is often 
overlooked in these accounts is the historical continuity of insecurity as an embedded 
rationale in the institutions regulating industrial relations, the roots of which can be 
traced back to the first steps towards industrialisation following the establishment of 
the Republic of Turkey. The emergence of what I call the political economy of 
insecurity in Turkey was carried out by the generations of political actors to come and 
has had two far-reaching consequences in the domain of industrial relations. First, it 
distributed power between actors in favour of capital and the state. And second, with 
an exception of a couple of years, it served as an effective tool for the political actors 
to steer the behaviours of labour in the direction of so-called social peace and order. 
Against this background, my study investigates the institutionalisation of insecurity as 
a rationale in the political economy of Turkey’s industrial relations during the 20th 
century. It highlights the centrality of the modern Turkish state in shaping the interests 
of and interactions between the socioeconomic actors in modern Turkish society and 
the economy by adopting a long historico-institutionalist perspective, beginning with 
the early years of republican period and ending with Turkey’s integration into the 
global economy. 
The overall contributions of this study can be outlined in terms of theoretical, 
empirical and methodological aspects. Theoretically, this thesis brings forth new 
comprehension of the concept of security/insecurity by analysing it in relation to its 
different facets, i.e. security as one form of power resource, as an institutional 
outcome, and as an institutional rationale. Empirically, by taking an historical-
institutionalist approach and by building on a power-sensitive perspective, the work 
investigates the formation and (re)configuration of Turkish industrial relations and 
calls attention to historically entrenched class alliances in the (re)distribution of power 
resources between the state, employers and labour, which is still an under-researched 
area. Methodologically, by examining industrial relations over a period of time as an 
institution, and by inserting power and actors at the heart of the analysis, this study 
presents a detailed and power-sensitive account of the institutional continuity, 
development and change that came into place in Turkey’s industrial relations. 
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 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1:
1.1 Introduction 
The modern day Republic of Turkey came into existence on 29th October 1923. 
Following the establishment of the Republic, the founding father of the nation, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk steered the country towards industrialisation as a part of 
his radical national development project to modernise Turkey. Amongst this 
modernization programme, the establishment of industrial relations that were to 
shape labour-capital relations in modern Turkey received substantial attention 
from the founders of the republican nation. However, despite the political actors’ 
decisive steps taken towards the institutionalisation of labour-capital relations 
earlier in the history of the Turkish republic, its importance is rather underplayed 
in the narratives of Turkish industrial relations’ literature. Indeed, for many 
scholars of Turkish industrial relations, it was only with the social, political, 
economic transformation that Turkey underwent in the early 1960s that the 
meaningful interactions between actors of industrial relations truly began.   
This thesis traces the historical trajectory of industrial relations in modern Turkey. 
It aims to make a contribution to the understanding of Turkey’s current political 
economy in the context of industrial relations by taking a much broader and long-
term historico-institutionalist perspective. Indeed, the thesis explores the role of 
long-term institutional path-dependencies, as well as critical junctures, in 
explaining the dynamic relationship between labour, capital and the state in 
modern Turkey; and, especially, the key role of labour insecurity as an 
institutional rationale and power resource in this relationship. The next section 1.2 
narrates the events in a way similar to the one that has been presented in much of 
the mainstream literature. In doing so it aims at providing – as is the case in many 
industrial relations studies that focus on the post-1980 period – a background to 
the transformations took place in the political economy of industrial relations in 
the years following the establishment of the 1980 military junta in Turkey. After 
having shortly summarised the mainstream argument that dominates the present-
day industrial relations literature on Turkey, section 1.3 addresses the place of the 
approach developed in this study within this literature by highlighting its 
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significant points that diverge from the mainstream position. Finally section 1.4 
presents the research questions and structure of the thesis.  
1.2 Turkish Industrial Relations in a Nutshell: From 1960s to 1980s 
The Republic of Turkey has had a turbulent political history, characterised by a 
series of military interventions since 1960. The military coup which was effected 
on 27 May 1960 ushered in a new era in the politico-economic history of Turkey 
and lasted until the coup d’état launched on 12 September 1980 (for a 
comprehensive overview see Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998; Zurcher, 2004). The 
period spanning from 1960 to 1980, namely the planned economy period of 
Turkey, represents the “golden age” for the Turkish labour movement for many 
observers of its industrial relations (Koc, 1979; Ketenci, 1987; Talas, 1992; 
Koray, 1994; Guzel, 1996’ Cetik and Akkaya, 1999; Mahirogullari, 2005) and a 
brief overview of the various developments that took place in the period would 
appear to provide convincing evidence to substantiate this view. Indeed, legally, 
the 1961 constitution, when compared to the previous one, provided for a more 
pluralistic and liberal democracy, afforded more protection for fundamental 
human rights, guaranteed better civil, social and economic rights for citizens, and 
for first time in the history of the republic of Turkey recognised the right to 
unionise and strike (see e.g. Tanor, 1991; Ozbudun and Genckaya, 2009). As a 
complimentary to these progressive transformations in constitutional structure, 
political actors enacted the Trade Unions’ Law (no.274) and the Collective 
Agreements, Strikes and Lock-Outs Law (no.275) in the year 1963 and in so 
doing established the institutional framework of the industrial relations for the 
coming two decades. These laws introduced the long-awaited collective 
bargaining system to the domain of industrial relations and despite their 
shortcomings (Dereli, 1968; Celik, 1974; Guzel, 1996) brought many 
improvements with regards to workers’ utilisation of their power resources 
(Dereli, 1968; Kutal, 1977; Talas, 1992; Mahirogullari, 2005; Koray and Celik, 
2007; Celik, 2010).  
However legal measures that empowered the labour vis-à-vis the state and 
employers were only one factor that formed the background for the events that 
unfolded during the 1960s and 1970s. Politically, these years witnessed an 
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unprecedented vitality in the country’s political life with new political parties 
bourgeoning and masses organising around different ideologies (Ahmad, 1993; 
Kongar, 1998). Economically, starting from the early years of the 1960s, Turkey 
entered into a period of inward-looking industrialisation, maintenance of which 
required not only new recruits to industrial establishments, but also workers’ 
integration with the internal markets as the consumers of domestic products 
(Keyder, 1987; Aydin, 2005; Unay, 2006). Socially, workers in the industrial 
sector, after long years of infancy, finally emerged as a separate social class and 
started to define and defend their class-based interests vis-à-vis employers and the 
state (Koc, 1979; Guzel, 1996; Mahirogullari, 2005).  
All these factors acting concomitantly provided the Turkish labour movement 
with a solid base to grow starting from 1963, as mentioned above, the year when 
the Trade Unions’ Law (no.274) and the Collective Agreements, Strikes and 
Lock-Outs Law (no.275) entered into force. Collective labour relations were 
developed initially in public enterprises  by the leadership of the Confederation of 
Turkish Trade Unions –Turk-Is1  in a harmonious manner as the political actors 
appeared to find offering compromises to the Turk-Is–affiliated unions an 
effective method for maintaining the social peace and order in the domain of 
industrial relations (Bianchi, 1984; Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992). Yet, it should be also 
noted that it was not only the various governments that devoted efforts towards 
maintaining harmonious relationship with the Turk-Is, for the Turkish industrial 
relations literature reveals that it, Turk-Is, starting from its establishment in the 
year 1952, stood in favour of developing good relations with them, under the 
guise of above-party politics (Kutal, 1977; Cizre Sakallioglu, 1991; Koc, 1998, 
2002b; Celik, 2010). This, as is discussed in detail in this thesis, proved highly 
instrumental in the materialisation of economic interests of its rank-and-file 
regardless of which political party held power (also see Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992; 
Celik, 2010).  
Turk-Is’ conciliatory approach towards labour-capital relations, indeed, gave its 
fruits in state sector and throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s workers of 
                                                          
1
 A detailed account of Turk-Is and its relations with governments can be obtained from e.g. Kutal, 
1977; Mahirogullari, 2005; Celik, 2010. 
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public enterprises, in return for ruling out class struggle, experienced remarkable 
improvements in their socioeconomic conditions. Nevertheless, when it came to 
private sector, Turk-Is’ benign attitude fell short of meeting the needs of its 
members (Ahmad, 1995; Guzel, 1996; Mahirogullari, 2005; Celik, 2010). A 
radical solution to this problem came again from within the Turk-Is in the year 
1967, when a number of dissident member trade unionists broke up from this 
confederation and established the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions 
(DISK) as a rival force. The DISK mostly appealed to the workers of private 
industry and it, unlike the Turk-Is, favoured class struggle, thus being inclined 
towards political unionism (see e.g. Kutal, 1977; DISK, 1978; Guzel, 1996; 
Koray, 1996; Baydar, 1999). Following the establishment of the DISK, collective 
labour relations made rapid progress in the private sector as well and members of 
DISK, as probed further in this thesis, began to reap impressive gains in their 
working and living conditions, starting from the late 1960s. However, unlike the 
Turk-Is, the DISK and its affiliated unions achieved this aim mainly through 
calling strikes, organising mass protests and demonstrations, which, at least in the 
eyes of the political actors and employers threatened social peace and order in 
industrial relations in general and in the workplace in particular (see e.g. Koc, 
1979; Aksoy, 1980; Mahirogullari, 2005).  
Against this background, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a growth in the working 
class, not only in terms of numbers, but also in relation to their political and 
economic influence. For one thing, labour having been able to voice its interests 
on more equal footing with political actors and employers thanks to the legal, 
social and political developments that took place during the period, stood as a 
powerful interest group in the domain of industrial relations from the mid-1960s 
onwards. For another, they appeared not to hesitate to mobilise their power 
resources, when necessary, which became evident for instance in the number of 
collective agreements concluded, in rising wage levels and in the number of legal 
and illegal industrial actions that took place (Koray, 1994; Guzel, 1996; 
Mahirogullari, 2005). Last but not least, labour’s mobilisation of its power 
resources appears to have heightened the fears of the political actors and 
employers’ about the disturbance of social peace and order which came out in the 
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form of increased intervention in the labour movement activities especially 
towards the end of the period. 
 However, three important factors appeared to tame the power of Turkish labour 
movement during this era. Firstly, there were shortcomings in trade unionism in 
that not only was there division between the state and private sectors, but also 
between different ideologies and organisational structures
2
 which, in the final 
analysis, significantly limited the power of labour movement (Koray and Celik, 
2007). Second, the political actors remained fiercely determined to keep the 
labour movements under control starting from the early 1970s. While they 
achieved this through offering compromises to the workers of the state sector, 
when it comes to the workers of private sector, this aim was mainly accomplished 
through making forceful interventions into workers’ mobilisation of their power 
resources (Koray, 1994, Mahirogullari, 2005). And third, it was the deep-seated 
socio-political and economic crisis Turkey underwent towards the end of the 
1970s, which by significantly reducing possibilities of workers to increase their 
incomes, posed an important obstacle for the working class in its attempts towards 
materialisation of its economic interests (Aydin, 2005; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 
2009).  
However, this crisis that Turkey faced not only diminished the power of Turkish 
trade unionism, for as further discussed below, it at the same time became one 
important factor in shaping the closure of the planned economy period. Socio-
politically this crisis found its roots in the ideological divisions and conflicts of 
interests that appeared both between extremist groups from right and left factions 
and between the political parties. These splits between people and political 
parties, as the historical accounts of the period make clear, paralysed not only the 
normal functioning of the parliamentary system (Sunar and Sayari, 2004; Zurcher, 
2004; Aydin, 2005), but also the social peace and order of daily life (Benhabib, 
1979; Ahmad, 1993’ Kongar, 1998; Zurcher, 2004). Moreover, economically, this 
                                                          
2
 The trade unions law allowed workers and employers associations to establish in the form of 
trade unions, federations and confederations. It also stipulated that establishment of these 
mentioned occupational associations was free and voluntary. This liberal approach in law, 
triggered what is widely referred as ‘trade union inflation’ in the mainstream Turkish industrial 
relations literature, as the number of trade unions, federations and confederations grew rapidly in 
the period (Mumcuoglu, 1980; Isikli, 1983; Koray and Celik, 2007).  
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crisis stemmed from Turkey’s inward-looking industrialisation strategy, which 
eventually reached an impasse that required political actors to take drastic 
measures in order to maintain Turkey’s economic development (Kazgan, 2006; 
Boratav, 2009).  
During the late 1970s, the state of socio-political turmoil that the country faced 
was a grave problem waiting for an effective solution to be adopted (for an 
overview see e.g. Tachau and Heper, 1983; Kara and Kum, 1984; Kongar, 1998). 
However, political leaders of the country appeared to find it more appropriate, 
before anything else, to alleviate the economic problems of Turkey as witnessed 
by their implementation of a neoliberal reform package in line with the 
recommendations of the experts of the IMF (Yalpat, 1984; Keyder, 1987; Yenal, 
2001) and the of interests of a group of the industrial bourgeoisie (Aydin, 2005; 
Kazgan, 2006). This economic reform package, which is widely referred as the 
‘24 January measures’, was aimed at switching Turkey’s economy from an 
inward-looking import-substitution industrialisation to an outward-oriented and 
export-led industrialization one and encapsulated, amongst other features, 
repression of workers’ wages, privatisation of state economic enterprises and 
extensive cutbacks in government expenditures (Onis, 1992; Sayari, 1996; Owen 
and Pamuk, 1998; Unay, 2006; Pamuk, 2008).  
However, implementation of this economic reform package posed some serious 
challenges to political actors, for the 1961 constitution and the various 
socioeconomic laws enacted in accordance with the provisions of this 
constitution, provided different interest groups with various rights to mobilise 
their power resources in order to express their dissent. One of these groups was 
the workers and their reaction to the 24 January measures was hostile. Indeed, the 
extent of disputes that erupted in the domain of industrial relations following the 
announcement of these measures was serious and widespread. For instance, the 
general picture of labour unrest as of September 1980 was as follows: more than 
53 thousand workers in 214 workplaces were on strike, more than two thousand 
workers were about to call a strike and more than 57 thousand workers were 
waiting for expiry of the strike postponement decisions taken by the government 
so they too could go on strike (Milliyet, 1980). What is more, in the meantime 
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around 150 thousand workers were waiting for the collective bargaining process 
to be concluded, which, at least in the eyes of the political actors, further added to 
the volatile situation that prevailed in the domain of industrial relations. 
In the autumn of 1980, political actors therefore seem to be caught between two 
fires. On the one side, there were the interests of international financial 
organisations and a group of industrialists who stood in favour of effective 
implementation of the 24 January measures, which in its final analysis were aimed 
at initiation of Turkey’s integration with the neoliberal global economic order. On 
the other, stood the interests of the workers as socioeconomic actors of industrial 
relations, who lent their full support to the maintenance of the existing 
socioeconomic order and who, in order to materialise these interests, mobilised 
their power resources. However, the political actors clearly favoured interests of 
the former, for the period of unrest came to an end with another military coup, 
which, with its anti-democratic measures, created a suitable environment for the 
implementation of the 24 January measures. Indeed, the generals leading the coup 
d'état of 1980 on 12 of September with the so-called aim of restoring law and 
order
3
, assumed power directly and thus dissolved parliament, suspended the 
constitution, closed down the political parties and ceased the activities of trade 
unions and professional associations (Sunar and Sayari, 2004; Zurcher, 2004; 
Cizre, 2008). In doing so, as repeatedly argued by many scholars, the leaders of 
the 1980 military coup provided a fertile ground for the execution of the 24 
January measures (see e.g. Yalpat, 1984; Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Ahmad, 
1993; Bugra, 1994; Owen and Pamuk, 1998; Ongen, 2004; Boratav, 2005a; 
Kazgan, 2006). The 12 September process also initiated a new politico-economic 
period in Turkey, with some severe repercussions on the economic and industrial 
relations fronts.  
Indeed, economically, the 12 September process significantly changed Turkey’s 
political and economic landscape (Keyder, 1983; Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Onis, 
1991; Yeldan, 2003). This change, for many observers was aimed at bringing the 
economic policy and practices of the country more in line with the requirements 
                                                          
3
 For the speeches made by Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 military coup and the seventh 




of the emerging era of neoliberal globalisation, thus being able to handle to the 
pressures associated with it (see e.g. Keyder, 1987; Boratav, 1990; Aydin, 2005; 
Kazgan, 2006), and again for many, served the interests of owners of big capital 
and the international financial organisations (see Koc, 1982; Cizre Sakallioglu, 
1991; Boratav, 2005a; Kazgan, 2006). When it comes to industrial relations, a 
remarkable transformation in their institutional structures occurred, which placed 
the urgent political and economic interests of the business and political actors at 
the forefront under the command of the generals who staged a coup d’état on 12 
September 1980.  
Little has changed, if anything, with regards to the policies and practices 
implemented in the domain of industrial relations by the successive governments 
after Turkey’s transition to multi-party democracy with the elections held towards 
the end of the 1983. Indeed, for one thing, in the post-1983 period the political 
actors have always remained reluctant to make any labour-friendly amendments to 
the institutional framework of the industrial relations and when these have to be 
made, the changes have remained short of achieving compliance with 
international legislation (Gulmez 2006). For another, they adopted 
uncompromising attitudes against the demands of labour and thus put it under the 
state’s firm discipline. To achieve this, they did not hesitate to mobilise all the 
possible power resources made available to them by the legal framework of 
industrial relations (see e.g. Cetik and Akkaya, 1999; Mahirogullari, 2005; Koray 
and Celik, 2007). What is more, in their determined attempts to control and limit 
the labour movements, the political actors, in contrast to the benign approach they 
pursued to the workers of state sector during the years 1960-1980, took a firm 
stand against all industrial workers in the post-1983 period.  
Yet, this was not all for Turkey witnessed notable changes in its socioeconomic 
configuration starting from the early 1980s. Amongst these, rapid growth of 
population, increasing rates of migration from rural to urban areas, and widening 
scope of informal economy played an important part in Turkey’s altering political, 
economic and social outlook in the post-1980s (TUIK, 2010). The political 
economy pursued in domain of industrial relations therefore, when coupled with 
the socioeconomic changes came into being in the post-1980 period, paved the 
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way for a remarkable transformation in domain of industrial relations in Turkey. 
Indeed, in the years following the 1980 military interregnum, the number of trade 
unions significantly decreased, trade union density notably shrank, coverage of 
collective bargaining considerably diminished, and the economic gains of labour 
dwindled both in the state and private sectors (Bulutay, 1995; Petrol-Is, 1995; 
Cetik and Akkaya, 1999).  All these constrained the possibilities of labour in 
mobilisation of its power resources and placed it in a highly disadvantaged 
position vis-à-vis the state and employers with regards to the voicing and 
materialisation of its interests.  
1.3 The Political Economy of Industrial relations in Turkey:  Investigating 
the Roots of Insecurity 
Currently, an important theme in the contemporary literature focusing on 
Turkey’s politico-economic history is the socio-economic and political 
transformation that the country underwent starting from the early years of the 
1980s which altered many parameters that modern Turkish society stood for, 
including those describing the capital-labour relationship (Yalpat, 1984, Kepenek, 
1987, Boratav, 1990, Owen and Pamuk, 1998, Aydin, 2005, Odekon, 2005, 
Kazgan, 2006, Unay, 2006, Boratav, 2009). For example according to Kazgan 
(2006), a leading expert on Turkey’s economic history, starting from the early 
years of the 1980s, efforts towards creation of social state were replaced by anti-
labour policies and in this process while employers were watched for, trade 
unions were supressed. For Boratav (2005), a renowned scholar of Turkish 
political economy, the 1980s witnessed important limitations being brought to the 
trade unions, collective bargaining and social security system all of which played 
an important role in transformation of labour-capital relations in favour of the 
latter. Similar arguments could be also seen in other scholars’ studies. For 
example according to Aydin (2005), the political actors’ efforts towards 
restructuring the state in the early years of the 1980s led to the demise of class-
based politics and placed labour at a highly disadvantageous position in industrial 
relations. Yalpat (1984: 23) has neatly summarised this change which took shape 
under the auspices of military rule as follows; 
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“The clearest manifestation of the restructuring effort is seen in 
the domain of relations between capital and labor. The military 
government has drastically reduced real wages, severely 
curtailed workers' rights to unionize and to strike, extended the 
work-week and the work-year, and legislated retractions of 
severance pay, seniority rights and social insurance benefits.” 
Much in a similar way, most of the scant number of studies on the political 
economy of Turkey’s present-day industrial relations hold to the argument that 
Turkey’s integration with the neoliberal global economy, which was initiated 
under the rule of the Military Junta that was installed in September 1980 and 
which continued from then on, necessitated a fundamental structural 
transformation in industrial relations. Subsequently, as the argument continues, 
the post-1980 period witnessed the emergence and institutionalisation of a 
different type of political economy in the domain of industrial relations as 
compared to that of the planned economy period, which through various different 
policy and practices placed labour at a highly disadvantaged position vis-à-vis 
capital and labour (Ketenci, 1987, Dereli, 1988, Talas, 1992, Koray, 1994, Cetik 
and Akkaya, 1999, Mahirogullari, 2005). Indeed for example Koray (1996), a 
leading scholar in Turkey’s industrial relations studies, argues that export-oriented 
and neoliberal economic policies have shaped and driven many economic and 
political transformations in Turkey in the post-1980 period. According to her, 
these transformations that gained pace with the military intervention of 1980 also 
brought with some important alterations in the policies governing industrial 
relations which, compared to the pre-1980 period significantly “narrowed down 
the trade unions’ power and their sphere of influence” (Koray, 1996: 260). 
Likewise Talas (1992: 256), one of the founding fathers of study of social policy 
and industrial relations in Turkey; argues that the period between 1961-1980 
represents the “golden age” for the Turkish labour movement with regards to the 
rules adopted in domain of industrial relations. For him, the policies and social 
developments came about in the post-1980 period occurred as a result of the 
political environment of the era and all these set the framework of the social 




“The policy implementations, the Constitution and the 
regulations have ignored the social policy especially the 
collective rights and freedoms aspects of this policy. Yet this is 
not all, these collective rights and freedoms were limited to a 
great extent and their influence was substantially reduced.” 
A further review of the Turkish industrial relations literature reveals that many 
authors have employed similar arguments in their exploration of the labour-capital 
relations in the post-1980 period. For instance according to Ketenci (1987: 160) 
the progress achieved and vividness experienced in the world of work in Turkey 
starting from 1960s took a different course in the 1980s as the workers became a 
“different type of target” in the economic policies. According to her, the changes 
that came into place in labour-capital relations, in work life and in labour 
legislation in this period entailed many limitations and even losses for trade 
unions and for workers. Similarly, for Mahirogullari (2005), the way that the 
Turkish trade unions operated and the legal foundations that these activities rested 
on in the pre-1980 period underwent an important transformation as a result of the 
shifts occurred in Turkey’s political structure and economic policies in the post-
1980 period. Accordingly, as Mahirogullari (2005) argues, the 1980s marks the 
beginning of a new period in Turkish labour movement as the policies adopted 
and practices implemented put Turkish trade unions under the discipline of the 
state. In a similar way, Cetik and Akkaya (1990) argue that trade unions 
experienced a glorious period of development between the years 1962-1977 as 
during this era industrialisation gained pace, high employment was able to be 
combined with high wages, and a perception of social state that is respectful to the 
rights of the working people was maintained at the political level. They neatly 
summarise the changes came into being in the post-1980 period as follows;  
 
“The 24 January 1980 economic stability measures which was 
wanted to be put into implementation before the 12 September 
1980 military intervention included those policies with the 
identifying components of export-oriented development [and] 
integration with the global economy in the long term. The state, 
in order to implement these policies and to obtain favourable 
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results, found it necessary to intervene into industrial relations 
[and thus] organisations and institutions were re-structured and 
re-regulated. The main purpose [in this process] was facilitating 
the implementation of the new economic policies” (Cetik and 
Akkaya 1990:90, brackets added). 
Two important reasons seem to come to the fore in the employment of this 
narrative by these authors. First, this approach provides a firm basis for the 
scholars to explain the shifts in the political, economic and legal structures which 
shaped post-1980’s Turkey towards a more politically authoritarian regime. And 
second it helps the authors – especially those who look at contemporary industrial 
relations – to place their argument into a historical and political context, which 
highlights the shifts that occurred in the balance of power between the actors 
involved in industrial relations.  
While there is no doubt in the credibility of this explanation that dominates the 
current scholarly literature on Turkey’s political economy in general and 
industrial relations in particular, this mainstream argument, as I posit, appears to 
miss at least three important points. First, many of these studies do not place 
enough emphasise on the rationale that has shaped and governed the political 
economy of industrial relations in Republic of Turkey since its inception and 
therefore remain incapable to provide their audience with a causal understanding 
of the reasons lying behind the way industrial relations became institutionalised in 
the years following the 1980 military junta
4
. Second, taking the planned economy 
period as the main reference point in explanation of the transformations that came 
into being in the industrial relations in the post-1980 Turkey, oversimplifies the 
complexity and dynamism witnessed in the industrial relations in Turkey in the 
years preceding the planned economy period and overlooks the historical 
continuity that occurred in the political economy pursued in domain of industrial 
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 For the studies which do not place enough emphasis to the rationale that shaped and governed the 
political economy of industrial relations in Republic of Turkey see e.g. Talas, 1992, Koc, 1998, 
Baydar, 1999, Cetik and Akkaya, 1999, Yeldan, 2003. 
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relations since the inception of the Republic of Turkey
5
. And third, many studies, 
in mentioning of the transformation of labour-capital relations in the post-1980 
period, underemphasise the historical continuity in political economy of industrial 
relations pursued in private sector (see below and see Tuna, 1969a, Dereli and 
Ekin, 1982, Talas, 1992, Koray, 1996, Cetik and Akkaya, 1999) or they do not 
support their arguments with historical evidence (see e.g. Koray, 1994, Guzel, 
1996, Buyukuslu, 1998, Koray and Celik, 2007). 
True, first of all, in explanation of the post-1980 transformations that came into 
being in political economy of industrial relations, there occurs to be an 
underemphasise about the rationale that underlies the current day rules, 
regulations and practices related to labour-capital relations, the roots of which, as 
a careful examination of historical evidence suggests, reach back to the early 
attempts towards industrialisation in republican Turkey (see the Chapter 4). 
Instead, some of the studies highlight the changes in rules and regulations in the 
post-1980 period to account for the transformations that the political economy of 
Turkish industrial relations underwent. For example, according to Talas (1992) 
the 1982 constitution and the laws enacted in 1983 to regulate rights and freedoms 
related to trade unions, pulled back the development that was achieved in this area 
with the previous legislation. According to Koc (1998) working class and labour 
movements started to lose their rights in the process that began with the 12 
September 1980 coup d’état. In a similar line, according to Yeldan (2003) the 
gains of labour have been rapidly worn down with enactment of 1982 constitution 
and the labour and association laws that followed (to follow this line of argument 
see e.g. Talas, 1992, Koc, 1998, Baydar, 1999, Cetik and Akkaya, 1999, Yeldan, 
2003). While there is little, if any doubt that there has been a big change in rules 
and regulations in the post-1980 period, and labour has experienced substantial 
economic and political losses in this process (see chapter 7), these accounts, as I 
contend, remain short of providing their audience with a clear understanding of 
the existence of a rationale i.e. protection and empowerment of capital and its 
historical continuity in political economy of industrial relations in republican 
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Turkey. Therefore, these accounts, as I contend, remain short of providing solid 
basis for understanding of a causal explanation regarding the reasons lying behind 
the way industrial relations became institutionalised in the post-1980 period. 
Some others studies, on the other hand, make mention of the rationale that 
governed the political economy of Turkish industrial relations. However, these 
either do not provide adequate historical evidence to the audience regarding how 
this rationale was established and carried forward (Koray, 1994, Guzel, 1996, 
Buyukuslu, 1998, Koray and Celik, 2007) or do not bring their narrative up to the 
post-1980 period (Makal, 1999, Makal, 2002, Celik, 2010). For example, in his 
article where he examined the trade unions in the post-1980 period, Buyukuluslu 
(1998: 67) right after asserting that “there is a rarely total break with the past” 
with regards to the practices and policies pursued in Turkish industrial relation 
and arguing that “the legacy of Ataturk’s regime and of the period of military 
interventions and transition to democracy has shaped the Turkish industrial 
relations system with an unique set of characteristics”, directly starts discussing 
impacts of the post-1980 policies on the country’s labour-capital relations. In their 
detailed study where they compared social dialogue in Turkey with the European 
Union, Koray and Celik (2007), despite having acknowledged that the 
empowerment and protection of capital in economic development process 
appeared to be an important factor in political actors’ (re)configuration of political 
economy of industrial relations since the early years of the Turkish republic, they 
derive this information through citing existing arguments in relevant literature 
regarding the continuity of the political mentality at the top political level rather 
than building it on historical evidence. On the other hand, Makal (1999, 2002) in 
his studies where he analysed Turkish industrial relations in detail in mono-party 
and multi-party periods respectively, employs a wide span of historical evidence 
and in doing so provides a vivid account of creation and maintenance of the 
rationale that shaped and governed industrial relations in Turkey during the early 
years of the republican era. Yet, he limits his analysis with the end of the multi-
party period thus does not carry this argument to the present day industrial 
relations. In a similar way, Celik (2010) in his seminal study where he 
investigated the Turkish labour movements provides his audience with a clear 
understanding of the way political economy of industrial relations was created and 
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the labour-capital relations were shaped in the early years of the republican 
Turkey. Nevertheless, Celik (2010) brings his detailed analysis until the 
establishment of the DISK in 1967 and thus does not carry on his analysis towards 
the present day industrial relations. 
Second, as has been also pointed out by Kocak (2008), there has been an 
overemphasis; in Turkey’s industrial relations literature on labour capital 
relations, in general, and on the labour movements, in particular, that evolved 
since the early 1960s following Turkey’s transition to a more pluralist democratic 
order and to an import substitution growth model (Talas et al., 1965, Kutal, 1977, 
Rozaliyev, 1979, Koc, 1987, Talas, 1992, Koray, 1994, Guzel, 1996). While there 
is no doubt that the 1960s marked the beginning of a new era in Turkey’s 
industrial relations, during which actors re-defined their interests and strengthened 
their positions vis-à-vis others, authors, by giving prominence to the post-1960 
years, as I contend, have overlooked the remarkable historical continuity with 
regards to the (i) political economy adopted in the domain of industrial relations, 
(ii) characteristics that the trade unions displayed and (iii) the strategies they 
adopted in their relationships with the state and employers (for a detailed 
discussion see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). For instance in their analysis of Turkish trade 
unionism, Talas et al. (1965) limit their discussions regarding the mono-party 
period with the lack of industrial development and of class divisions in Turkey. 
To add to this their analysis of the multi-party period does not extend beyond a 
general overview of trade union - state relationship and general activities of trade 
unions between the years 1947-1960. According to them; 
“27 May 1960 military coup represents a milestone in Turkish 
trade unionism. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that 
trade unionism has started in real sense in this period” (Talas et 
al., 1965: 66).  
Likewise Guzel (1996: 166) analyses the pre-1960 period under one chapter and 
argues that in this period “trade unions only involved in social assistance 
activities and they left out economic and political […] activities”. Much in a 
similar manner, Kutal (1977) in her study where she examines the Turkish trade 
unionism in planned economy period in depth, shortly discusses the Turkish trade 
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unionism in pre-1960 period in her introduction and finishes her examination of 
this period as follows:  
“Therefore, Turkish trade unionism could not display the 
expected development in the 1950-1960 periods, it could not go 
beyond a trade unionism which is limited in rights, extremely 
weak in finances, open to pressures coming from the political 
power and lack of any character” (Kutal, 1977: 12). 
Last but not least as Koray (1994) rightly noted, public sector workers has always 
taken the lead in establishment of trade unions and in the use of their collective 
bargaining rights in Turkey’s industrial relations system. What is more, at least 
until the final years of the 1970s, a degree of harmony was established and 
maintained in public sector industrial relations, with both the political actors and 
workers’ organisations playing an equally important role (see Bianchi, 1984; 
Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992). However, by contrast, even in the years when the trade 
union movement was at its height, that is to say during the 1970s, capital-labour 
relations in the private sector remained largely limited to certain types of workers 
and to a number of industrial establishments. To add to this, throughout the 
planned economy period during which Turkey achieved a respectful degree of 
industrialisation, industrial relations in private sector establishments were mostly 
tense, with social peace hardly ever being achieved (see Chapter 6). Given this 
situation, while the changes that came into place in the policies and practices 
governing industrial relations constrained the power resources of public and 
private sector workers equally, when talking about the transformation of labour-
capital relations in the post-1980 period, the historical continuity in political 
economy of industrial relations pursued in private sector is not adequately 
emphasised and/or the arguments are not supported with historical evidence. For 
example Talas (1992) in his textbook where he provides a detailed account of 
Turkey’s social policies in an historical context confines his explanation of 
different type of political economies pursued in private and public sector 




“While the collective bargaining system in public sector was 
successful to follow the increase in prices with the positive 
outcomes obtained, this mechanism has in a sense lost its 
efficiency in private sector. Private sector benefited from martial 
laws and the operation of labour markets in its favour and [and 
thus] left the wage increase demands of trade unions 
unanswered.” (Talas 1992: 227, brackets added). 
Koray (1996), on the other hand, in her textbook where she analysed industrial 
relations in Turkey in comparative perspective, makes no mention of the different 
types of political economies pursued in private and public sector. In another 
detailed study, however, Koray (1994), acknowledges the incompatibility between 
the public and private sector industrial relations during the planned economy 
period as follows; 
“It should not be forgotten that trade unions and [their use of] 
right to collective bargaining initially developed in public sector 
[…] When it comes to private sector, both the organisation of 
trade unions remained limited […] and when the trade unions 
initiated a serious contestation for their rights, these 
immediately led to discrepancies and conflicts [between labour 
and capital]. It is possible to witness this both in the second half 
of the 1970s and the final years of the 1980s” (Koray, 1994: 155, 
brackets added). 
In her study Koray (1994) also points out to changing conditions for public sector 
workers in the post-1980 period. According to her; 
“The circumstances appear to have worsened both for private 
and public sector trade unions with the political, economic and 
legal changes came with the 1980s” (Koray, 1994: 156). 
Nevertheless, in her analysis, Koray (1994) supports her argument neither with 
any kind of historical evidence nor she gives any explanation about how this 
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constituted a part of political economy pursued in private sector in historical 
context.  
A number of studies, on the other hand, explain this duality in political economy 
pursued in industrial relations in terms of leadership position of public sector – 
which particularly became prominent during the planned economy period – in 
determination of working and living conditions for industrial workers (see .e.g. 
Tuna, 1969, Dereli and Ekin, 1982, Dereli, 1988, Cetik and Akkaya, 1999, Koc, 
2003).  For example Koc (2003), in his book where he analysed working class and 
labour movements in Turkey in an historical perspective, argued that the rights 
that the public sector workers gained through collective agreements in the planned 
economy period became goals for the private sector workers which they deemed 
worthy to fight for. Dereli (1988), where he overviewed the collective agreement 
system in Turkey in the post-1980 period, asserted that throughout the planned 
economy period, by taking the leadership position in collective agreements the 
public sector exerted influence on the collective agreements concluded in private 
sector. While there is no, if any doubt that the state-led establishments played an 
important role in showcasing the best examples for working and living conditions 
provided to the industrial workers throughout the planned economy  period (for a 
discussion see Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992, Koray and Celik, 2007), these accounts, 
however, do not provide their audience with any explanation of the rationale that 
lied behind this dichotomy that occurred in political economy of industrial 
relations in Turkey in the pre-1980 period. 
1.4 Research Questions and Structure of the Thesis 
It is against this backdrop that this study goes beyond the confinements of the 
mainstream Turkish industrial relations literature. That is, in this thesis it is 
contended that the type of political economy pursued in industrial relations in 
Turkey in the post-1980 period has not been a by-product of neoliberal economic 
globalisation per se, but has gradually emerged as an outcome of the interplay of 
the actors, their interests as well as their ideas and their interactions with the 
institutional structures within the historical context. In other words, it is held that 
a political economy of insecurity in the domain of industrial relations has been 
created and managed by the political actors in Turkey who have assumed the role 
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of leading and shaping the country’s path to development, and this has displayed a 
remarkable historical continuity the roots of which can be traced back to the first 
steps towards industrialisation following the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey. Hence, this study investigates the creation and management of the 
political economy of insecurity in Turkey’s industrial relations during the 20th 
century. To this end, it highlights the centrality of the modern Turkish state in 
shaping the interests of, and interactions between socioeconomic actors or in other 
words the labour and capital in modern society and adopts a long historico-
institutionalist perspective, beginning with the early years of the republican period 
and ending with Turkey’s integration into the global economy. In this respect, this 
study seeks to answer the following questions: 
Q1: How can we conceptually and methodologically analyse and explain 
labour’s disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the state and capital in the post-
1980 period in the domain of industrial relations? 
Q2: How did the institutional structures of industrial relations historically 
constrain and shape the political behaviours and strategies of the state, 
capital and labour during the (re)institutionalisation of industrial relations? 
In order to address the research questions posed, this thesis comprises eight 
chapters, including theoretical and methodological divisions as well as four 
empirical ones. This opening chapter is succeeded by the chapter 2, in which a 
theoretical framework for the thesis is provided, which after explanation of the 
concept of security/insecurity by bringing it a novel understanding, incorporates 
the notion of the political economy of insecurity in the domain of industrial 
relations. That is, this chapter is designed and written with the aim of providing a 
conceptual-theoretical framework for guiding the remainder of the study. Chapter 
3 introduces and discusses historical institutionalism as the analytical tool utilised 
in this research and also briefly outlines the issues of: data sources, contribution of 
the research as well as its limitations and ethical considerations. Chapters 4, 5 and 
6 scrutinise the making of industrial relations in consecutive politico-economic 
periods of modern Turkey beginning with the early years of the republican period 
and ending with Turkey’s integration into the global economy. Chapter 4 covers 
the mono-party period, which spanned from 1923 to 1945, whereas Chapter 5 
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studies the multi-party period that extended from 1945-1960 and Chapter 6 
analyses the planned economy period which started in the year 1960 and ended in 
1980. All three chapters follow the same format in order to provide the reader 
with a clear framework for understanding the ideas, ideologies and interactions 
lying behind the political economy that steered and governed industrial relations 
in these focal periods. That is, these chapters start with a brief overview of 
political and economic climate of the era that is under the scrutiny. They then 
continue with presentation of the state, capital and labour as the actors of 
industrial relations, placing a special accent on the political and economic 
conditions in which they emerged and/or evolved. Following this, these chapters 
investigate the interests of and interactions between the actors with an aim of 
exploring the type of political economy adopted and pursued in domain of 
industrial relations in the periods in question. Chapter 7, being the final empirical 
division, concentrates on the socioeconomic and political transformations that 
played an important part in transformation of Turkish labour markets in the post-
1980 period and interests and interactions of actors in the early-1980s together 
which shaped and influenced the political economy of industrial relations in the 
period. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by bringing together findings of the 
empirical chapters and discussing its findings pertinent to the research questions. 
This chapter finishes with consideration of the contribution and limitations of the 









 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSECURITY: A CHAPTER 2:
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is aimed at explaining what I mean by political economy of 
insecurity in industrial relations and thus provides a conceptual-theoretical 
framework to the thesis. The concept of political economy is used, in this study, to 
describe the ways in which actors, systems and institutions interact with each 
other and thus, form different modes of political regulation of the socioeconomic 
sphere in general and in industrial relations in particular (see Robbins, 1976; Cox, 
1995; Clark, 1998 for more comprehensive explanations). Institutions, in the 
context of this study are defined as formal rules and procedures that structure and 
constrain the possibilities/resources of actors during their interactions (for similar 
definitions and views see North, 1990; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Peters, 1999; 
Lane and Ersson, 2000; March and Olsen, 2006). Path dependency is used to refer 
to the processes “in which preceding steps in a particular direction induce further 
movement in the same direction” (Pierson, 2000: 252), thus increasing the 
institutions’ resistance to change (ibid). The concepts of labour, capital and state, 
on the other hand, are used to refer to the actors of industrial relations who act as 
collective agents, have specific security-related interests and pursue them by 
interacting with each other in various forms through various institutions (see 
Salamon, 2000; Rose, 2004). 
Section 2.1 in this chapter scrutinises the concept of security and brings forward a 
novel argument to the literature by analysing security in relation to three different 
but interrelated aspects, namely, security as a power resource, as an institutional 
outcome and as an institutional rationale. Section 2.2 explores security in the 
domain of industrial relations by placing a special emphasis on the power 
resources of actors, on institution building and on the institutionalisation of 
security/insecurity. This section finishes with an attempt to point out the special 




2.2 Security as a Concept 
Security is often considered to be an essential human need (see Maslow, 1943; 
Cantril, 1988; Doyal and Gough, 1991) and therefore, a fundamental requisite for 
the continued existence, livelihood and dignity of people (CHS, 2002, 2003, also 
see Weisbrod, 2006). It is argued that security, when embedded in people’s lives 
brings about senses of belonging, stability and direction (ILO, 2004b) and gives 
people the power of self-control, which is necessary for real freedom and 
independence (Standing, 2002). Security is also understood in terms of national 
survival needs, i.e. protecting boundaries and citizens from external attacks (CGG, 
1995). In this regard, for many, security on its own has enough power to become 
an end in itself and many values and lives can be sacrificed to obtain it (see e.g. 
UNDP, 1994; MacFarlane and Khong, 2006).   
Security, just like many core values in human lives, reaches significance with its 
absence. Indeed, the concepts of security and insecurity are intrinsically 
interconnected and according to Dillon (1996: 33), they are both “humanity’s 
share”, needing to be explained and studied in relation to each other (see Dillon, 
1996; Vail, 1999b). Security is defined in the dictionaries as the condition of 
being protected from or not exposed to danger; freedom from fear, doubt or 
anxiety and the quality of being securely fixed or attached (Oxford, 1989; 
Meriam-Webster, 2002). Safety, confidence, assurance, certainty, stability and 
fixity are the words given in lexicons to meet the meaning of security in different 
contexts. On the other hand, the concept of insecurity is explained as condition of 
not being sure; want of assurance or confidence (Oxford, 1989); not being 
adequately guarded or sustained; not being highly stable or well-adjusted and 
being beset by fear and anxiety (Meriam-Webster, 2002). Instability, uncertainty, 
precariousness, vulnerability and unsteadiness are some of the terms given as the 
synonyms or near synonyms to the concept insecurity (Oxford, 1989; Merriam-
Webster, 2008; Thesaurus.com, 2008).  
Despite the dictionaries offering us a general understanding of what the concepts 
mean, it seems that there is no clear-cut definition of them in the academic 
context. Indeed, the term security appears to have been used in many contexts and 
for many purposes by academic specialists, governments, corporations and 
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individuals to refer to things, people, means, ends, events and feelings 
(McSweeney 1999). In this respect, for example, McSweeney (1999) delineates 
security as slippery/elusive term, resisting definition (also see Wolfers, 1968; 
Krause and Nye, 1975; Buzan, 1991). For Buzan (1991), it, as a concept, has 
never been appropriately developed although it is widely used in the academic 
literature and has a practical dimension. On the other hand, Smith (2005) argued 
that security cannot be conceptualised neutrally since any definition stands for a 
specific view of the world. Thus, Rothschild (1995: 60) portrayed security as an 
idea of social and political significance of which changes continually over time
6
. 
Given all these arguments it would not be too far-fetched to contend that security 
and insecurity are versatile concepts being perceived in accordance with the 
dominating ideas, politics and requirements of periods and people.  
Perhaps this versatility and complicacy of security/insecurity as concept stem 
from the fact that it is of vital interest to humanity (see UNDP, 1994; CHS, 2003; 
ILO, 2004b) and it appears in different aspects in our daily lives. Indeed, what I 
postulate in this thesis is critical examination of security/insecurity as a concept 
offers at least three different aspects for analysis, security as one form of power 
resource, as an institutional outcome, and as an institutional rationale. Security, 
with these three aspects, despite their addressing different phenomena, they are 
intricately intertwined and explaining them in relation to each other seems to be 
crucial in order to lay a meaningful background for understanding the concept 
within the context of industrial relations.  
2.2.1 Security as a Power Resource 
Security, being one of the fundamental human needs for a life of well-being, 
freedom and dignity, is commonly associated with power and power resources in 
the wider literature (UNDP, 1994; Krause and Williams, 1997; Buzan et al., 1998; 
Vail, 1999b; CHS, 2003; Booth, 2005; MacFarlane and Khong, 2006; Neocleous, 
2008; Williams, 2008). For example, the Commission on Human Security (2003: 
10) considered protection and empowerment necessary for the security of human 
                                                          
6
 Indeed, for example, security has been one of the most controversial subjects in political 
philosophy (see Hobbes, 1651 [1985]; Locke, 1690 [2000]; Mill, 1859 [1991]; Mill, 1861 
[2001]; Rothschild, 1995; Bilgin, 2003; MacFarlane and Khong, 2006).  
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beings and placed “freedom to take action on one’s own behalf” amongst the vital 
components of human security. In a similar vein, Williams (2008: 6) affiliated the 
concept with opportunities provided and capabilities acquired and denoted that 
“security involves the ability to pursue cherished political and social ambitions”.  
The idea that security has close links with power seems to be not a new 
phenomenon. For example Hobbes (1651 [2008]: 57) related power with the 
security of being able to sustain one’s self and claimed that “the power of a man 
[…]is his present means to obtain some feature apparent good. John Stuart Mill 
(1991 [1859]: 190) placed the notion of security at the core of human life, 
considering it as a means to/resource to survive. Thus, he argued that ‘security is 
the most vital of all interests’ and ‘no human being can possibly do without it’.  
Drawing on this continuing debate in literature, what I put forward is that security 
in its first aspect appears as one form of power resource enhancing the capabilities 
of individuals/groups in their efforts for materialising their interests. It, therefore, 
addresses various means, i.e. rules, regulations, policies or capacities that increase 
the possibilities/chances of individuals/groups to act as a social agent with distinct 
interests and agendas. In order to understand security as a power resource one 
needs to scrutinise it in relation to agency, structure, participation and 
empowerment (see ILO, 2004b for a similar approach).   
Agency in sociology is generally defined as the ability to make meaningful and 
independent choices and pursue goals. Structure, on the other hand, is used to 
indicate institutional arrangements shaping opportunities and alternatives for the 
actors (see e.g. Barker, 2005; Alsop et al., 2007; Elder-Vass, 2010). Security as 
one form of power resource appears to be closely related to agency and structure, 
because, as I posit, it shapes and legitimises the social agency of 
individuals/groups and enhances their capacity to define and pursue their interests. 
What is more, security as a power resource, by providing individuals/groups with 
social agency both opens the way for their participation in decision-making 
processes (see Pateman, 1970 for the concept of participation) and empowers 
them or in other words, increases “[p]eople’s ability to act on their own behalf – 
and on behalf of others” (CHS, 2003: 11). Empowerment that comes with 
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security as a power resource, in this way, as the ILO (2004a: 8 brackets added) 
succinctly put it: 
“disempower[s]the powerful by creating circumstances in 
which no group or individual can abuse power to control 
others.” 
Security, in sum, by equipping people with social agency and by providing them 
with suitable environments to act not only enables them to participate in the 
decision-making process, but also enhances their capabilities to influence policies 
in the direction of their own interests. Indeed, in the words of the Commission on 
Human Security (2003: 12) “[p]eople protected can exercise many choices. And 
people empowered can avoid some risks and demand improvements in the system 
of protection”. By contrast, when individuals/actors are deprived of security as a 
power resource it is highly likely that they lose control over the level of security 
they enjoy in their daily lives. “Individuals without power resources”, as Vail 
(1999b: 11) put it. “are less able to shield themselves from the debilitating effects 
of insecurity and have a much harder time finding substantive alternatives that 
allow them to minimise or escape from their predicament”. Security as a form of 
power resource in its final analysis, paves the way for the generation of security as 
an outcome in any sphere of daily life –social, economic, political– which is the 
subject of the subsection that follows.  
2.2.2  Security as an Institutional Outcome 
Security in its second aspect occurs as an institutional outcome and pertains to the 
ways institutions shape and influence people’s security related senses and 
experiences in the context of their various daily practices, both in terms of their 
individual and collective identities. The reason that security appears as an 
institutional outcome lies in the fact that people are not passive agents sensing and 
experiencing security/insecurity as they receive it. The vitality of security in 
people’s lives is likely to oblige them to enter into complex interactions or in 
other words to mobilise their power resources in order to attain, retain or increase 
the levels of it. Security, felt and experienced by individuals, therefore, is not self-
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existent; it arises as consequence of interactions between actors (see UNDP, 1994; 
Neocleous, 2008).  
Security as an institutional outcome has both individual and collective aspects. At 
the individual level, it embraces people’s feelings and experiences and refers to 
the fundamental concerns of people’s daily lives, which constitute humanity’s 
everlasting efforts towards survival, livelihood and dignity. Individual security as 
an institutional outcome, therefore, pervades many areas of human lives. For 
example, all individuals need freedom from or protection from any forms of 
violence, arbitrary punishment or false imprisonment -personal security (Orend, 
2002). Moreover, they need assurance of human rights -political security (UNDP, 
1994), they need to be able to take part in a market economy with acceptable 
conditions -economic security (Vail, 1999b) and they need minimum protection in 
the case of possibilities of income loss or requirements for income protection –
social security (see Titmuss, 1974). The list is not exhaustive, for individual 
security as an institutional outcome can be extended to any area of daily life 
where there is a threat to an individual’s integrity as a human being (see UNDP, 
1994 for further details).  
Collective security is another dimension of security as an institutional outcome 
and according to Standing (2002) is a human need concerning belongingness and 
identifying with a social group, which, as with individual security, builds on 
feelings and experiences. Regarding feelings, collective security appears to offer a 
sense of belongingness to individuals, the need of which in psychology is 
considered to be a strong, essential and inescapable human motivation and the 
lack of which imposes risks on the health and well-being of individuals 
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995). In terms of experiences, collective security in its 
various forms, such as societal, class, community or occupational group (see 
UNDP, 1994; Standing, 2002) occurs to provide people with personal control and 
identity (UNDP, 1994, ILO, 2004b), which, for Standing (2002), is instrumental 
for controlling other’s behaviour or restricting their control.  
Security/insecurity as an institutional outcome, both in its individual and 
collective aspects, reverberates to the work and working life in the form of what 
Standing (2002) entitled as “socio-economic security”. The concept of socio-
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economic security was adopted by ILO (2004b) and promoted within the scope of 
socio-economic security programme. According to Standing’s (2002: 10) 
classification, the work-related security, i.e. socio-economic security (ILO, 2004: 
14) that was pursued under the welfare state capitalism has seven forms;  
(i) Labour market security: provision of adequate employment 
opportunities through full-employment policies that were placed under 
the state’s assurance; 
(ii) Employment security: protection of labour against arbitrary or 
unjustified dismissals through rules and regulations; 
(iii) Job security: provision of a level of control to the employees over 
their jobs and  setting up career opportunities to them; 
(iv) Work security: protection of employees against any health and safety 
risks at work; 
(v) Skill reproduction security: provision of opportunities to gain and 
retain work-related skills; 
(vi) Income security: protection of income of employees with the aim of 
reduction of inequality and protection of low income groups through 
various policy and practices 
(vii) Representation security: protection of collective interest 
representation in the labour market through independent employee and 
employers’ associations that were politically and economically 
integrated into the state and were endowed with the rights such as right 
to strike. 
Amongst these various forms of security, Standing (2002) and ILO (2004) single 
out the income security and representation security as basic security, without 
which, according to this argument, working people, especially those who are more 
vulnerable to the vagaries of the job markets, cannot pursue occupation they 
desire and cannot make their voice at work heart. Indeed, according to ILO (2004: 
15); 
“These two complement each other, and together are essential 
for equal good opportunity to pursue occupation. Unless 
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representation security is ensured, the vulnerable always remain 
vulnerable to loss of other forms of security.” 
Security as an institutional outcome, indeed, appears in our daily lives in many 
different forms and in many different contexts. According to Standing (2002) and 
ILO (2004b) it reverberates to work and working life in seven different forms 
amongst which income and voice security come out as the basic economic 
security. However, security as an institutional outcome is only one aspect of what 
the concept security/ insecurity pertains to. In order to provide a robust 
background to the empirical chapters, security therefore needs to be scrutinised 
regarding one other conceptual aspect, which provides the subject of the next 
subsection.  
2.2.3 Security as an Institutional Rationale  
With regards to security as an institutional outcome, despite being one important 
need of humanity, not all the actors in a given institutional context can be 
associated with the same security needs. Indeed, one group’s needs might prevent 
satisfaction of others and thus might inflict insecurity on other group(s) (Dillon, 
1996). What is more, institutions might well be devised to “allocate scarce and 
valued resources in unequal ways” (Ferrante, 2011: 119). Security in its third 
aspect, therefore, comes out as a rationale in institutions pointing to a legitimising 
paradigm that provides not only valid grounds for the rules, regulations and 
practices formulated, but also a solid basis for creation of institutional 
opportunities/constraints for actors in materialisation of their interests. At this 
point, brief consideration of the structure of institutions from the viewpoint of the 
distribution of power and policymaking is necessary in order to provide a better 
understanding for the rest of my thesis.  
Institutions, being the “humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North, 1990: 3), as many scholars seems to agree, give structure to 
the opportunities for the actors to pursue their interests (see e.g. Hall, 1986; North, 
1990; March and Olsen, 2006). However, it appears that not all the institutions are 
designed for the creation of equal opportunities for the actors to materialise their 
interests. For example, according to March and Olsen (2006), institutions impact 
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on actors differently and therefore, empower one while disempowering others. 
This, according to them at the same time enables or disables actors in their actions 
in the framework of prescriptive rules. Ikenbery (1998-1999: 52), in the same vain 
argued that institutional arrangements exert influence on the distribution of power 
between actors within a political system, providing some with the upper hand and 
more resources, and some with less advantages and fewer alternatives.  
A brief look at the institutionalist literature also suggests that the distribution of 
power within the institutions is markedly influenced by the structure of 
policymaking in the institutions. Indeed, for instance, according to Hall (1986: 19 
brackets added):  
“The organization of policy-making [within the institutions] 
affects the degree of power that any one set of actors has over 
the policy outcomes. […] [Institutional] position also influences 
an actor’s definition of his own interests, by establishing his 
institutional responsibilities and relationship to other actors.”  
Likewise, Korpi (1985: 38 emphasis added) opined: 
 “[t]he power resource approach, […] leads us to view societal 
institutions largely as the residues of previous activations of 
power resources, often in the context of manifest conflicts which 
for the time being have been settled through various types of 
compromises. By developing institutions, bureaucracies, 
structures and rules for the making of decisions and for the 
distribution of rewards and punishments, the need to 
continuously activate power resources can be limited … 
However, the benefits of order can be unequally distributed. My 
hypothesis is that the distribution of power resources between 
the parties is reflected and ‘built into’ these institutions and 
structures and that the parties may thus have unequal gains 
from their operation.” 
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Having said that, possible reasons lying behind unequal distribution of power 
resources by institutions need to be also addressed. While there might be a 
number of convincing explanations that can be derived from the available 
literature
7
, what I posit is that, this situation, in some cases, can be explained by 
taking security/insecurity as an institutional rationale, operation of which shapes 
and steers the way policies and practices are formulated. Indeed, it is my opinion 
that protecting a group of actors or leaving them to face insecurity can appear as a 
built-in rationale in the institution building process. When this is the case, 
security/insecurity as an institutional rationale, paves the way for at least three 
policy outcomes regarding the policies and practices formulated based on it. First, 
it institutionalises a particular way of power distribution between actors. In doing 
so it would while empowering a group of actor(s), disempower other(s) and/or 
balance the distribution of power between them. Second, it would generate 
insecurity as an institutional outcome for those left with less power resources or 
security for those who were empowered vis-à-vis others. Third, it steers the 
behaviours’ of actors in desired directions and thus, may take their interests and 
interactions under control and/or align the interests of actors over the issues 
related to the supreme interests. However, to achieve all these outcomes, 
policymakers need to utilise, according to my hypothesis, at least two sets of 
policy instruments. First, they need to employ a strong logic to justify the 
necessity and importance of the way power should be distributed that was 
expected to come out when the policy and rules they designed were put into 
practice. Second, they must use the appropriate tools, i.e. rules, regulations and 
practices, to ensure that power is distributed between the actors in the way that the 
policymakers desire as an outcome.  
What is more, security/insecurity as an institutional rationale, according to my 
thesis, constitutes an important source of path dependency in the policymaking 
process. That is, it, by institutionalising the distribution of power between actors, 
both enhances the capacities of those who started with a more advantageous 
position to increase their power over time and leaves a very remote possibility that 
the less powerful actors will be able to restructure the institutions with alternative 
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 Despite my best efforts, however I could not come up with a satisfactory explanation in the 




rationales (see Pierson, 2000, 2004). These factors taken together stiffen the 
institutions’ resistance to change and enable powerful actors to increase their 
influence in the institution-building process by creating a path dependency rooted 
in policy and practices.  
Security/insecurity, when this becomes an institutional rationale in the 
policymaking process, resultantly, according to my hypothesis, gives way to the 
institutionalisation of a particular type of political economy, that is to say, one of 
security/insecurity in a given area, which produces and reproduces institutional 
opportunities/constraints for actors in mobilising their power resources and which 
institutionalises the distribution of power between them (see Figure 1 for a simple 
diagram). While one might provide many different cases to illustrate this 
argument, I contend that security in the context of industrial relations appears to 
constitute a notable incidence of this situation and this provides the focus of the 
subsection that follows.  
Figure 1: Security as an institutional rationale 
 
2.3 Political Economy of Security/Insecurity in Industrial Relations 
Security as a concept, as studied above in detail, is complex and has a character 
with different aspects. Therefore, any study focusing on it should take into 
account the context of the concept it delineates. In this thesis with industrial 
PATH DEPENDENCY 
enables the powerful actor to influence the 
institution-building process  
reinforces the institutional structures against 
changes  
POLICY OUTCOMES 
distributes power between 
actors in a particular way 
generates security/insecurity as 
an institutional outcome 
steers the behaviours of actors 
in desired directions 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS  
strong logic appropriate tools 
40 
 
relations as the main area of its study, institution building is taken as the referent 
subject. More specifically, the concept of security/insecurity with respect to the 
ways it has become an institutional rationale in Turkey’s industrial relations is 
probed in terms of the outcomes in the way power has become distributed 
between the various actor and its consequent historical implications regarding 
institution-building processes.  
At this point, it is crucial to emphasise that industrial relations, being the 
institution “within which intricate interactions between employees ... and 
employers are conducted, both collectively and individually” (Blyton and 
Turnbull, 2004: 3), appear to, as I understand it, embody security/insecurity not 
only as an outcome, but also as power resources and as a rationale. Indeed, there 
is little, if any, doubt that actors need security as an institutional outcome of 
industrial relations to protect their existence and to enhance their conditions in -
and out of- the markets. Security as an institutional outcome in the context of 
industrial relations, therefore, appears to be embedded in actors’ interests. The 
concerns of actors regarding their security can find their expression, for example, 
in labour’s demands for better income, for freedom of organisation, for enhanced 
health and safety conditions in the workplace or for skill reproduction facilities 
against increasing technological innovations (see Standing, 2002; ILO, 2004b for 
further information). Capital owners also need security as an outcome in the 
domain of industrial relations in order to function properly in the markets. Their 
security demands can cover such matters as the stability of politico-economic 
institutions or the right to manage or secure property rights (see Salamon, 2000; 
Traxler, 2002; Rose, 2004). From this equation one should not omit the interests 
of the state, for being another actor in industrial relations, it also pursues security 
related interests, such as economic growth and the maintenance of the 
socioeconomic order (see Hyman, 2008). It is for this reason that, as I contend, 
actors seek security through industrial relations and their interactions produce 
security or insecurity as an outcome in accordance with the wider institutional 
context within which they interact. 
Having said this, insecurity produced in industrial relations as one possible 
outcome of actors’ interactions should be explicitly addressed. Indeed, insecurity 
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might become an outcome in industrial relations despite the fact that all the actors 
pursue security-related interests to protect their existence and to enhance their 
conditions. To explain this, the asymmetry of power between actors i.e. the power 
of labour vs. the power of the state and employers that comes out as one key 
feature of the nature of industrial relations in capitalist societies needs to be 
highlighted (see Marshall, 1961; Hyman, 1975; Korpi, 1985; Kelly, 1998). Such 
an imbalance between the power resources of actors, accordingly, proves highly 
prone to make it possible for the more powerful actors i.e. the state and 
employers, especially in the absence of adequate protection for the vulnerable 
actors, to mobilise their power resources in order to increase their security levels 
(Hyman, 1975).  
It is in this regard that actors, especially those who possess weaker power 
resources in capitalist-democratic societies, as I contend, need to be empowered 
by policies and practices that are created in the institution-building process in 
order to be able interact with other actors on an equal footing. In other words, 
labour being the less powerful actor in a capitalist industrial relations system 
needs to be provided with security in this process, which will thus provide them 
with better power resources to act as independent actor. It is for this reason that, 
as I posit, security/insecurity, besides being an institutional outcome of industrial 
relations, also comes out as a power resources and rationale in industrial relations. 
This study therefore sees industrial relations as the humanly made structure that 
constrains and shapes possibilities and resources of actors in their search for 
security in labour markets in capitalist-democratic economies and builds 
hypothesis on the premise that industrial relations in capitalist societies embodies 
security/insecurity as a rationale in its structure that was inserted in the 
institution building process of it. Security/insecurity as an institutional rationale in 
industrial relations in this way, according to this work, becomes one major factor 
in the determination of which actor(s) are empowered and the degree of this 
empowerment. As a corollary of this view, the study approaches the industrial 
relations from a critical perspective, which considers industrial relations as 
“unequal power relation embedded in greater social and political inequalities” 
(Budd and Bhave, 2008: 92). 
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To provide a better understanding of the notion of security as an institutional 
rationale and a power resources in the context of industrial relations, in the 
following subsections I first examine its theoretical framework by scrutinising 
actors’ power resources and the way they mobilise them in industrial relations. I 
then consider the ways security/insecurity becomes an institutional rationale in 
advanced democratic-capitalist societies. Drawing on this background, I then 
attempt to place security/insecurity as a rationale in industrial relations in a 
conceptual framework by addressing the importance of the provision of a set of 
secondary power resources to labour. I conclude this section with a final 
subsection in which I posit that a capitalist state emerges as a separate actor in 
industrial relations with its distinct interests and specific security-related agendas. 
2.3.1 Power Resources of Actors in Industrial Relations: A Theoretical 
Background for Insecurity in Capitalist-Democratic Societies 
For many scholars of industrial relations, power lays the foundations of the 
industrial relationship (see Hyman, 1975; Kirkbride, 1985; Poole, 1986; Kelly, 
1998, Salamon, 2000; Lewis et al., 2003; Blyton and Turnbull, 2004; Rose, 2004, 
Korpi, 2006). Indeed, for example, according to Hyman (1975: 26), “an unceasing 
power struggle is […] a central feature of industrial relations”, for Kelly (1998: 
9) power is “a concept which lies at the heart of the industrial relations”, and for 
Salamon (2000: 78) “[t]he industrial relationship is inherently a 
‘power/authority’ relationship”. However, despite having occupied a central place 
in the study of industrial relations, very little attention seems to have been paid to 
it within the orthodox industrial relations literature (see Martin, 1992; Kelly, 
1998; Lewis et al., 2003), thus making it almost, as Kirkbride put it (1985: 44), a 
“taken for granted” concept within the discussions surrounding the phenomenon.  
One reason for this lack of attention shown to the role of power in industrial 
relations perhaps lies in the fact that power, as a concept itself, appears to be a 
contested one giving way to the emergence of many different descriptions and 
explanations across the whole spectrum of social sciences (see e.g. Kirkbride, 
1985; Korpi, 1985; Salamon, 2000; Lukes, 2005; Morgan, 2006). Any study 
basing its argument on power and power relations, therefore, should clearly point 
out the context which it is building on. This study draws upon Korpi’s (1985, 
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1998) power resources approach, in particular, and upon the radical perspective 
within industrial relations literature, in general. That is, Korpi’s (1985: 33) 
definition of power resources is borrowed, which “attributes (capacities or 
means) of actors (individuals or collectivities), which enable them to reward or to 
punish other actors”, for application to in the context of industrial relations. 
Against this background, it therefore proves crucial to have a look at the 
connotations of power resources of actors in the context of industrial relations. 
According to Korpi (1985), capital and labour power are amongst the major basic 
power resources found in capitalist democratic societies, conversion of which 
provide the actors with other such resources. For him, “physical capital” when 
taken as the ability to control the means of production, comes out as a very 
substantial power resource in capitalist societies, because the number of actors 
who are susceptible to rewards or punishments by the use of this resource is large, 
the array of activities of other actors that can be rewarded or punished by means 
of it is wide and its impact on the livelihoods of people is immense. Moreover, for 
him, physical capital has high concentration potential in that it can be easily 
accumulated in the hands of a small number of actors (ibid). 
 “Human capital” on the other hand, according to Korpi (1985), although being 
amongst the most important power resources, its sphere of influence on other 
actors in democratic capitalist societies appears not to be as wide as that of 
physical capital for the fact that the number of actors that are receptive to the 
rewards and punishments of the activation of labour power as a power resource is 
smaller, the range of activities of other actors that can be remunerated or penalised 
by means of this resource is limited, it cannot be stored for long periods of time 
and it is mostly abundant.  
In mentioning the power resources of actors, one should also consider that of the 
state. Korpi (1985), in his seminal study, nevertheless, barely touched upon this 
subject, addressing only the means of violence as one basic power resource that 
Western societies use characteristically attributed to states. Although power 
resources of the state are a complicated subject, which is outside the scope of this 
study, a brief review of the literature suggests that legislative, adjudicative, and 
enforcement powers of the state together with its role as an employer in labour 
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markets are power resources that it can utilise, thus affording it a prime position in 
industrial relations (see Blyton and Turnbull, 2004; Heery et al., 2008; Hyman, 
2008; Masters et al., 2008). 
Despite the socioeconomic actors’ power resources and disparities between them 
in capitalist democratic societies occupying a central place in a number of Korpi’s 
(1978, 1985, 1998) studies, it goes without saying that he is not the only scholar 
who pointed out inherent power imbalances and inequities in capitalist societies. 
Indeed, the available literature reveals that recognition of power disparities 
between capital and labour opened up a heated debate between scholars, 
especially those whose writings were influenced by, either implicitly or explicitly, 
Marxist thinking (see e.g. Parkin, 1971; Hyman, 1975; Block, 1980; Offe and 
Wiesenrhal, 1980; Fox, 1985). Fox (1985: 33 brackets added) neatly summarised 
the views of those who hold a radical perspective on the labour-capital 
relationship as follows: 
“Why, asks the radical, do they [trade unions] not challenge 
management on all […] issues which may clearly have major 
significance for the work experience, rewards and life destinies 
of their members? The answer he offers is twofold. First, 
employee collectives (unions and organised work groups) 
realise that while they can deploy enough economic power (that 
is the collective control of their own labour) and enjoy enough 
support from government and other sections of society to enable 
them to offer an effective challenge to management on a limited 
range of issues where their participation to decision making is 
seen as legitimate, they would need to have far more power than 
is customary at present if they were to achieve significantly 
larger aspirations. For, faced with demands which in effect 
struck at the foundations of management power, privilege, 
rationales and objectives, management would draw not only 
upon its full reserves of strength but also upon the support of 
other managements, employers’ associations and sympathetic 
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sections of society (including government), which were 
concerned to defend the status quo.”  
Fox (1985: 33) continues;  
“This leads to the second aspect of the radical’s answer. A 
mobilisation of power on this scale would require great 
resources of will, determination, confidence and aspirations. 
Why are these resources not presently available to the unions? 
Because […] to some extent they accept as valid the principles 
on which the work organisation is constructed and the 
conventions by which management operates it.” 
Exploration of inherent power imbalances and inequities in capitalist societies 
also necessitates a brief investigation of the ways the roots of these imbalances are 
explained in the literature, for many different interpretations are to be found, 
including those, which may not necessarily be counted as Marxist-inspired. 
However, despite this diversity what they seem to hold in common is the 
distinction between the structural power of capital and the agency power of labour 
in capitalist societies. Indeed, according to a prevailing consensus amongst 
scholars of political economy, capital owners enjoy structural power in capitalist 
societies, i.e. “the ability […] to influence policy without having to apply direct 
pressure on governments through its agents –the power of ‘exit’ rather than 
‘voice’ ” 8 (for a wider discussion see e.g. Parkin, 1971; Lindblom, 1977; Korpi, 
1978; Block, 1980; Offe and Wiesenrhal, 1980; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 
1988; Gough and Farnsworth, 2000). This widespread consensus also holds that 
labour possesses agency power, meaning that its numbers rather than its market 
competencies provides it with the necessary resources to materialise its interests. 
More specifically, labour needs to wield direct pressure on other actors through 
actions it takes –such as going on strike, voting for particular political parties or 
establishing networks with political power – and through representatives it is 
appointed to take part in governmental institutions – such as parliaments or 
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 (Hyman, 1975; Korpi, 1978; Engels, 1984; Kelly, 1998; 
Salamon, 2000; Streeck and Hassel, 2003; Blyton and Turnbull, 2004). 
 Offe and Wiesenrhal (1980), for example, explained power imbalances occurring 
between actors in capitalist societies in accordance with two processes. First, they 
laid stress on their ability to generate collective actions through which they define 
and defend their interests. They argued that while trade unions constitute the most 
important means of labour to mobilise workers’ power and thus to initiate 
collective action, capital possesses three different forms of collective action to 
mobilise its power resources it emerges: in the firm itself, in the informal 
cooperation that the employers are involved in and in the employers’ associations 
that are formed in accordance with legal formal structures. Second, these authors 
pointed to the structural power of capital owners’ stemming from their ability to 
control the means of production. According to them, this provides the owners with 
the opportunity of increasing the efficiency and productivity of their operations 
(ibid). By so doing, they argued, “capital can release itself partially from its 
dependence upon the supply of labour, thereby depressing the wage rate” (Offe 
and Wiesenrhal, 1980: 75-76). In their account, however, labour lacks the 
structural power stemming from the fact that it “cannot release itself from its 
dependency upon capital’s willingness to employ it, because there are next to no 
possibilities of reproducing itself more efficiently, namely on the basis of lower 
wages or even outside the labour markets ” (Offe and Wiesenrhal, 1980: 76). 
They bring further explanation to the structural power of capital as follows (Offe 
and Wiesenrhal, 1980: 78): 
“[…] superior power also means superior ability to defend and 
reproduce power. The powerful are fewer in number, are less 
likely to be divided among themselves, have a clearer view of 
what they want to defend, and have larger resources for 
organised action, all of which imply that they are likely to 
succeed in recreating the initial situation.” 
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The structural power of capital by way of explanation of power disparities 
between capital and labour also occupied a central place in Block’s (1980) study. 
According to him (1980: 231), “[c]apital has disproportionate control over 
wealth of all types” and capital owners’ control over the investment process 
creates a dependency relationship between capital and the state, the outcomes of 
which mostly favour the former’s interests. Indeed, in Block’s account (1980) in 
order to maintain high rates of economic activity, which is crucial for balancing 
the state’s budget and for stabilising the existing political order in the country, 
political actors are dependent on investments made by private capital owners. It is 
for this reason that, according to Block, (1980), political actors mostly refrain 
from making decisions that would erode business confidence in their actions. 
According to Block (1980: 31), this dependency relationship between political 
actors and capital owners sometimes even requires the former to take actions in 
order “to save capitalism from itself”, and “to increase its viability”. Even if this is 
the case, the structural power of capital can still manifest itself in different ways 
as he argued that (Block, 1980: 231): 
“[o]ne can even speak of a modal process of social reform, 
where state managers extend their regulation of the market or 
their provision of services when faced with pressures from 
subordinate groups or threat of social disorganisation. Such 
actions are often opposed by many capitalists, but once the 
reforms are institutionalised they are used by state managers in 
ways that contribute to the accumulation process and to the 
maintenance of social control.”  
The agency power that labour possesses in relation to quantitative advantage, on 
the other hand, has been traditionally regarded as the most effective power 
resource of labour in capitalist-democratic societies, mobilisation of which offers 
workers political and economic leverage in their interactions with their employers 
and the state (Hyman, 1975; Korpi, 1978; Engels, 1984; Kelly, 1998; Salamon, 
2000; Streeck and Hassel, 2003; Blyton and Turnbull, 2004). In this regard, 
Engels for instance, in his classic study the Condition of the Working Class in 
England, in a very straightforward manner called attention to workers’ 
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quantitative superiority, which is manifested through their organisation in trade 
unions. According to him (1984: 245): 
“Unions […] imply the recognition of the fact that the 
supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based wholly upon the 
competition of the workers among themselves; i.e. upon their 
want of cohesion. And precisely because the Unions direct 
themselves against the vital nerve of the present social order, 
however one-sidedly, in however narrow a way, are they so 
dangerous to this social order. The working-men cannot attack 
the bourgeoisie, and with it the whole existing order of the 
society, at any sorer point than this. If the competition of the 
workers among themselves is destroyed, if all determine not to 
be further exploited by the bourgeoisie, the rule of property is at 
an end.” 
Despite this potential overwhelming influence of workers over capital owners and 
society, agency power possessed by labour seems to be mostly outmanoeuvred by 
the structural power held by capital owners in capitalist social orders. This 
disadvantage, which in Offe and Wiesenrhal’s (1980: 87) account found its 
expression in the form of “power potential without the organisation versus power 
potential created by the organisation” and “use of power hidden and dispersed 
versus use of power open and concentrated”, was vividly depicted by Lindblom 
(1977: 176) as follows: 
 “But a sufficient degree of union organisation and ambition, it 
would seem, could at least in some circumstances put workers 
or their union leaders in a privileged position in government. It 
could happen if unions could successfully stop production, not 
simply in one firm or industry, but broadly as in a general 
strike. Ordinarily, however, a general strike – except as a 
demonstration for a few days – is impossible because it 
provokes the government […] to break the strike […] In short, 
the rules of market oriented systems, while granting a privilege 
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position to business, so far appear to prohibit the organisational 
moves that would win a comparable position for labour.”  
It is true that a further overview of the industrial relations literature also suggests 
that in capitalist democratic societies, the structural power that capital enjoys 
overrides the agency power that labour holds. “[W]ithout an organisation to 
represent them” wrote Salamon (2000: 115), “individual employees are at a 
serious power disadvantage in their relationships with management”. Thus, “[i]t 
is the acquisition of power through the collective strength of its membership”, he 
argued, “which, to a large measure, determines the success of the trade union in 
carrying out its […] functions” (Salamon, 2000: 115). A very similar position was 
advanced by Offe and Wiesenrhal (1980: 74), for according to them: 
 “In the absence of associational efforts on the part of workers, 
the conflict that is built into the capital/wage labour relationship 
is bound to remain very limited. The workers would simply have 
no bargaining power that they could use to improve their 
conditions of work or wages, because each individual worker 
who started to make such demands would risk being replaced 
either by another worker or machinery.” 
In sum, a brief review of the literature reveals that power imbalances between 
capital and labour have deeply penetrated the politico-economic structure of 
capitalist societies. This asymmetry mostly stems from the fact that while capital 
exerts control over the means of production and thus enjoys structural power, 
labour gains strength only through its agencies, that is to say, through trade 
unions, collective actions and/or vociferous representatives. The means and 
resources capital and labour built their strengths on in capitalist societies continue 
to be a great concern of capitalist states as their survival largely depends on 
private sector activities. The policy and practices that the leaders of capitalist 
states implement in order to redress or maintain the power imbalances that occur 
between capital and labour is the focal interest of the subsection that follows. 
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2.3.2 Institution Building in Industrial Relations: Rational and Practical 
Arrangements in the Organisation of Policy Making  
A thorough review of relevant literature reveals the idea of security/insecurity has 
always been in the ideational background of policies and practices driving the 
political economy of capitalist economies. Indeed, it could be said that with the 
onset of industrial capitalism and the political democracies, actors’ attempts to 
attain and retain security in socio-economic domain sparked an everlasting 
conflict of interest between them and increased the bitterness of argument within 
the literature as well as within the political domain on the place and uses of 
security/insecurity in socio-economic life.  
The champions of insecurity, in this regard, have never problematized diffusion of 
insecurity in people’s daily lives including work and employment and they argued 
in favour of the merits of non-intervention in markets for the so-called benefit of 
the economy. According to them, insecurity should be considered at individual 
level and taken as indicator of vibrant and free operating markets (see e.g. Hayek, 
1944, Mises, 1963, Galbraith, 1976, Friedman, 1977, Hutton, 1995, Barr, 2004, 
Nolan, 2008). For Friedman (1977: 171, bracets added), for example, inequality 
(and therefore insecurity) in a mobile and a dynamic society is “a sign of dynamic 
change, social mobility [and] equality of opportunity”. According to Mises (1963: 
839) lack of social protection in labour markets is the incentive for the working 
people “to keep fit, to avoid sickness and accidents, and to recover as soon as 
possible from injuries suffered”. For many neoliberal economists, likewise, 
insecurity and inequality in the labour markets would effectively discipline 
labour, eradicate tendency to the state dependency, induce potential profitable 
investments, increase wealth, capital accumulation and economic growth (see 
Hutton, 1995, Wheelock, 1999b). Insecurity, being introduced as panacea of many 
ills in economic domain, undoubtedly have found many adherents in political 
arena where it is understood as a useful means of steering behaviours of actors of 
industrial relations to the needs of markets (Barr, 2004, Harvey, 2005) 
However, ideas and policy implementations delivering insecurity to the markets 
and industrial relations have been strongly opposed by security proponents, who 
considered insecurity as a social problem, restraining exercise of individual 
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freedoms (see UNDP, 1994, ILO, 2004b, UN, 2008) and causing sheer 
dependence on market relations (Marx, 1976, Polanyi, 2001, Standing, 2002). 
According to many security adherents, insecurity in any area of human life is able 
to harm human lives and human potential, damage social justice, human dignity 
and self-respect by giving way for insufferable levels of worry, fear, desperation 
and incapacity (see Vail, 1999, ILO, 2004b). Existence of insecurity at the 
workplace according to Standing (2002: 3) makes people “oppressed/exploited, 
demoralised, demotivated, stressed” who would easily tend to “quit work or 
sabotage his/her workplace”. On the contrary, existence of security at the 
workplace according to Sengenberger (1992: 153), has a great potential to 
“influence worker motivation, productivity … worker loyalty and discipline”. It is 
existence on the macro-economic level, according to Bertola (1990) is likely 
protect the overall stability of the economy in the face of national-level economic 
crisis.  
Security in socio-economic life therefore is considered, by some, as a basis of real 
freedom, peace and wealth (see UNDP, 1994, ILO, 2004b) and has been 
passionately defended in political sphere by its advocates. In the aftermath of the 
Great Depression, for example, Roosevelt (1944) denoted that “true individual 
freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence”. In the face of 
socio-economic catastrophes that were argued to have been instigated by 
neoliberal globalisation, the UNDP (1994: 22) declared “[t]he world can never be 
at peace unless people have security in their daily lives”. Supporters of security, 
in this regard, stand up for its instrumentality in labour markets/industrial relations 
and address the exigency of alleviation of insecurity in social and economic 
institutions by inserting security to the heart of the political economy of capitalism 
(see e.g. UNDP, 1994, ILO, 2004b, UN, 2008). 
It is against this ideational background that, as a careful overview of relevant 
literature reveals, provision of security/insecurity as an institutional outcome has 
for a long time been a main concern of policy makers in democratic capitalist 
societies. In this respect, the three decades following the Second World War 
witnessed, for example, a strong commitment from many advanced capitalist 
nation states to the provision of security and material prosperity for the working 
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people (see political actors e.g. Harvey, 1990; Marglin, 1990; Pinch, 1996; 
Standing, 1999; Clark, 2000; ILO, 2004b), with the aim of, according to a widely 
held consensus in the extant literature, maintaining the capitalist system and its 
class relations (see e.g. Marglin, 1990; Armstrong et al., 1991; Clark, 2000; 
Polanyi, 2001). The advanced capitalist states’ adherence to provision of social, 
political and economic security
10
 for the wider masses of society, as could be 
expected, has had its ramifications in the domain of industrial relations. Indeed, 
workers in these countries have enjoyed greater freedom and deference as well as 
enjoying greater power than ever before in their relations with capital and state 
(see Marglin; 1990, Armstrong et al., 1991; Polanyi, 2001). The post-war period, 
accordingly, saw the emergence of a so-called social-democratic compromise 
between labour, the state and capital, the repercussions of which exerted a 
considerable impact on industrial relations in that each actor agreed to use their 
power resources responsibly in return for further security and material well-being 
(Harvey, 1990; Boyer, 1995; Fotopoulos, 1997).  
Such a concession, as the general lines of the narrative of what has been termed 
the golden age of capitalism recounts, has required the political actors to deal with 
the inherent disparities that appear between the power resources of actors. It is at 
this point that, as my argument suggests, security became an institutional rationale 
in industrial relations wielding a marked influence on the distribution of power 
resources between its actors and on the mobilisation of their power resources. 
Security as an embedded rationale in post-war industrial relations systems of 
advanced capitalist countries came with two sets of policy instruments. First, a 
strong rationale was provided to justify its necessity and importance. This seems 
to have been achieved by utilisation of the argument that security for labour is 
required, if the aim is the preservation of capitalist democracy as a socioeconomic 
order (Standing, 1999; Polanyi, 2001; Streeck and Hassel, 2003). Second, 
appropriate tools were developed and were put into practice to ensure that security 
remained as an institutional rationale in industrial relations. This was achieved, as 
an overview of the literature indicates, through expansion of welfare state 
provisions, in general and through provision of protective and pro-collective 
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labour regulations, in particular (Crouch, 1978; Lipietz, 1989; Glyn et al., 1990; 
Harvey, 1990; Marglin, 1990; Standing, 1999; Clark, 2000).  
Institutionalisation of industrial relations systems in advanced capitalist 
democracies in the post-war period, with security as an institutional rationale 
steering and shaping policy and practices paved the way for three key policy 
outcomes. First, it placed labour on an equal footing in its interactions with the 
state and employers, (Boyer, 1995 Standing, 1999). Second it created income 
security for majority of organised labour. And third, it steered the behaviours of 
actors in desired directions, in that labour recognised the managerial rights of 
capital in decisions regarding the organisation of production and investment, 
whereas capital and the state agreed that distribution of the benefits of economic 
growth should not be left to the vicissitudes of markets (Harvey, 1990; Marglin, 
1990; Armstrong et al., 1991; Boyer, 1995; Standing, 1999; Upchurch et al., 
2009).  
Embeddedness of security as a rationale in industrial relations in advanced 
capitalist democracies of post-war period also, I posit, created a path dependency 
until it was replaced by insecurity starting from the mid-1970s. Indeed, firstly, 
security as an institutional rationale, having appeared as one result of the post-war 
socioeconomic consensus steered behaviours as well as expectations of actors in 
the direction of security (Glyn et al., 1990; Harvey, 1990; Standing, 1999; 
Stanford and Vosko, 2004). “[A]ny attempt to overcome these rigidities 
[securities]”, as Harvey (1990, brackets added) succinctly put it, “ran into the 
seemingly immovable force of deeply entrenched working-class power”. Second, 
it created its own ideological agenda that allowed states to intervene in the 
markets with aims, such as: promoting economic growth, reaching full 
employment, and the redistribution of wealth (Fotopoulos, 1997). Subsequently, 
security as an institutional rationale appeared not only to increase the power of 
labour over time (Harvey, 1990; Stanford and Vosko, 2004), but also provided 
legitimate ground for the workers’ demands, both of which contributed 
significantly to the resistance of labour to change (see Hardt and Negri, 2001).  
As a result, according to my hypothesis the post-war era witnessed the pursuit of a 
political economy of security in industrial relations in advanced democratic 
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countries. Nevertheless, the years following the oil crisis of the early 1970s 
witnessed, first in the advanced democracies and then on a global scale, a gradual 
change in the ideological orientation of governments together with the policies 
and practices they implemented. A combination of many factors both domestic 
and external, such as rising inflation, increasing unemployment rates, slackening 
economic growth, ascendance of neoliberal ideology, emergence of cross-border 
financial flows, technological advances, collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, 
the changing international division of labour etc. have been held responsible for 
this transformation in the available literature (Epstein and Schor, 1990; Glyn et 
al., 1990; Armstrong et al., 1991; Standing, 1999; Gilpin, 2001). Scrutinising 
these factors is outside the scope of this study, however, what should be 
emphasised is that, as a result of all these, the interests of financial capital, big 
businesses and private property owners (Fotopoulos, 1997; Duménil and Lévy, 
2004; Harvey, 2005; McBride, 2011) started to be highly influential in the making 
of social and economic policies in many countries.  
Regarding what followed, beginning in the mid-1970s, insecurity and inequality 
started to be discernible in many people’s daily lives in many different areas (for a 
critical approach to neoliberalism and insecurity see e.g. Vail, 1999a; Wheelock, 
1999a; Standing, 2002; ILO, 2004b; Harvey, 2005; UN, 2008). That is, it is at this 
point that, as I contend, insecurity gradually became an institutional rationale in 
industrial relations. In order to embed insecurity into the policymaking process as 
a rationale, firstly, a compelling logic was provided to justify its necessity and 
importance. This was done through putting forward a so-called highly convincing 
argument that insecurity/inequality is good for economic growth and dynamism 
and is needed if the aim is to produce individual freedom and economic 
efficiency
11
 (Standing, 1999; Wheelock, 1999b). Second, appropriate tools were 
developed and put into use to ensure that insecurity as an institutional rationale 
drives and shapes industrial relations. This was achieved mainly through 
replacement of pro-collectivist and labour-friendly regulations with pro-
individualistic and business friendly ones, which, according to a good number of 
scholars, launched a full-scale attack on wage regulations and the collective power 
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2004; Nolan, 2008, and for a review also see Thompson, 2011.   
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of labour (Harvey, 1990; Boyer, 1995; Fotopoulos, 1997; Standing, 1999; 
Upchurch et al., 2009).  
The neoliberal institution building process in the domain of industrial relations, 
accordingly, displaced security as an institutional rationale and replaced it with 
insecurity. This, I posit, produced at least three policy outcomes. First, it reduced 
the power of labour and placed it at a highly disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the 
state and employers (Gall, 2011 Gavin, 2001, Munck, 2004). Second, it gradually 
generated income inequality/insecurity for workers (see Standing, 2002). And 
third, it steered the behaviours of labour in the direction of more powerful actors’ 
interests. This has been done mainly through putting into practice a series of 
social and economic reforms, which established the supremacy of free markets 
and through new attendant policy and practices, they were able to control and 
restrain the behaviours of less-powerful economic actors (see Gill, 1998; 
Wheelock, 1999a; Duménil and Lévy, 2011). Insecurity as an institutional 
rationale, in this way, therefore, turned out to be a powerful source of discipline in 
the neoliberal institution building process paving the way for a situation which 
Gill called (1995, 1998) “disciplinary neoliberalism”: a notion referring to the 
institutionalisation of market dependency in order to take control of the 
behaviours of actors (Gill, 1995, 1998).  
Insecurity, having become an institutional rationale in the industrial relations of 
many capitalist countries in the years following the break-up of the post-war 
socioeconomic consensus, as I contend, also became an important source of path 
dependency. Indeed, firstly having steered the behaviours of less powerful actors 
– namely labour – in desired directions, insecurity as a rationale made the 
institutional structures of industrial relations more resistant to change, a resistance 
which in the words of Gill (1998: 23-24) embodies: 
“not simply suppressing, but attenuating, co-opting and 
channelling democratic forces, so that they do not coalesce to 
create a political backlash against economic liberalism and 
build alternatives to this type of socioeconomic order.” 
56 
 
Second, insecurity as an institutional rationale privileged capital owners in the 
process of neoliberal institution building (Gill, 1998; Vail, 1999a; Peterson, 2003; 
Duménil and Lévy, 2004; Harvey, 2005) and in so doing provided them with 
ample opportunities to increase their power and freedom  “at the cost of”, as 
Demmers et al. (2004: 11) put it, “citizen’s political influence”. This situations 
was aptly depicted by Harvey (1990: 168, brackets added) as he argued that “to 
the degree that […] states [are forced] to become more entrepreneurial and 
concerned to maintain a favourable business climate so the power of organised 
labour and of other social movements had to be curbed”. Insecurity as an 
institutional rationale, resultantly, provided a basis for the measures to “protect 
capital from popular democracy” (Gill, 1998: 25) and appeared to ‘lock in’ the 
power of capital within institutions, including industrial relations, making them 
more resistant to change (see Fotopoulos, 1997; Gill, 1998; McBride, 2011; Gill, 
2012).  
In sum, what a brief review of relevant literature suggests is that the political 
economy of security that steered and shaped policy and practices implemented in 
the domain of industrial relations in the post-war period yielded to a one of 
insecurity starting from the mid-1970s in the advanced capitalist societies. This 
new political economy reduced the power of labour vis-à-vis capital and the state, 
put it under the discipline of markets and the rationale embedded within it helped 
more powerful actors to maintain insecurity as an outcome on a continuous basis. 
It is against this background that the next subsection considers the basic 
requirements for institutionalisation of a political economy of security in societies, 
which embrace democracy as a political system.  
2.3.3 Flexible employment arrangements and labour movements: Challenge 
or opportunity? 
So far, this chapter has discussed, in an historical-institutional context, the 
ideational background of the idea of security/insecurity, the policy outcomes of 
political economy of security/insecurity pursued in labour markets of advanced 
industrialised countries and the path-dependencies that these policy and practices 
have created. This subsection is going to overview the impact of the introduction 
and expansion of flexible forms of employment in global labour markets and their 
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impacts on labour movements. In doing so, it will question whether new 
employment arrangements provide a challenge to the organised labour and thus 
facilitate the pursuit of political economy of insecurity or bring with an 
opportunity to revive the power of trade unions.  
 
Currently, there is a widespread consensus in specialist literature that the various 
socio-economic and political transformations that came about with the onset of 
neoliberal globalisation created a shift towards flexible employment arrangements 
(Boyer, 1989, UNDP, 1994, Standing, 1999, Vail et al., 1999, Scholte, 2000, 
Stanford and Vosko, 2004, ILO, 2004c, Harvey, 2005, Fritz and Koch, 2013a). 
This change in patterns of employment, while having resulted in a significant 
increase in highly insecure, unprotected, poorly paid jobs (UNDP, 1994, 
Dasgupta, 2001, Rittich, 2006, UN, 2008), at the same time provided the capital 
with a favourable opportunity to overcome the so-called labour rigidities thus to 
quickly adapt the changing demands of the global markets (Zeytinoglu and 
Muteshi, 1999, ILO, 2000b, Dasgupta, 2001, Munck, 2002, Eyck, 2003, ILO, 
2004c).  
 
The flexible employment arrangements, which have been widely discussed in the 
scholarly literature through making use of various terms such as ‘irregular’, 
‘temporary’ ‘atypical’, ‘unprotected’ ‘contingent’, ‘casual’, ‘precarious’ or 
‘flexible’ generally refer to non-standard forms of employment (Felstead and 
Jewson, 1999, Dasgupta, 2001, Eyck, 2003). That is, these forms of employment 
remain outside the ambit of formal full-time employment arrangements which are 
traditionally regulated by statutory labour laws in capitalist states (Standing, 1999, 
Eyck, 2003) and which lack some distinctive characteristics of standard 
employment relationship (Felstead and Jewson, 1999, ILO, 2003, Kalleberg, 
2006). There are various attempts, amongst a group of authors, towards 
classification of flexible patterns of employment (see e.g. Dasgupta, 2001, 
Standing, 2002, Eyck, 2003, Kalleberg, 2006, Jarczynski, 2010). For example, 
according to Eyck (2003) labour flexibility could be categorised by making 
reference to companies’ external and internal employment strategies. In this 
respect, according to him while types of employment such as outsourcing, 
temporary and subcontracted work fall into organisations’ external strategies, 
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those such as downsizing, part-time, compressed workweeks, telecommuting, 
key-time staffing, e-working belong to the companies’ internal strategies in their 
attempts towards flexibilisation of the workforce they employ. Standing (2002) on 
the other hand, presented a more complex picture of labour related flexibility by 
defining seven forms of it. These are: organisational flexibility referring to the 
option of companies’ contracting out employment relationship; numerical 
flexibility addressing companies’ use of external labour; functional flexibility 
indicating changes brought to the functions and functionalities of the individual 
workers; job structure flexibility pointing out to the changes introduced to the 
organisation of jobs; working time flexibility indicating shifts brought to the 
patterns of working time; wage system flexibility addressing a shift from ‘fixed’ to 
‘flexible’ wages; and labour force flexibility pointing out to individual workers’ 
mobility between the sectors, jobs, occupations and to the prominence of 
individual labour relationships.  
 
Regardless of how the non-standard forms of employment is categorised, there is 
an increasing concern in the scholarly literature that flexible employment 
arrangements are on the increase on a global scale (UNDP, 1994, Tilly, 1996, 
Vail, 1999, Zeytinoglu and Muteshi, 1999, ILO, 2004c, Fritz and Koch, 2013b). 
These new forms of employment, as is widely reported, not only launch attack on 
individual workers’ traditional security arrangements related to work such as 
minimum wage mechanisms, health and safety regulations, social protection 
provisions (UNDP, 1994, Standing, 1999, Vail et al., 1999, ILO, 2000a, UN, 
2008) but also erode the basis of traditional industrial relations (ILO, 2000b, 
Munck, 2002, Stanford and Vosko, 2004, ILO, 2004d), which, during the post-
war period, was established with the aim of striking balance of power between 
actors in advanced industrialised countries (Harvey, 1990, Boyer, 1995). Indeed, 
“flexible work patterns” as ILO (2000b: 10) has rightly pointed out “make it more 
difficult to organize workers for collective representation” for according to the 
ILO (2000b: 10) “[s]ubcontracting arrangements are causing the employment 
relationship increasingly to resemble a commercial relationship, making it 
difficult to identify the real employer for the purposes of collective bargaining”. 
Yet, this is not all for various other factors such as expansion of informal 
economy (ILO, 2000b), increasing uncertainty between formal and informal work, 
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growing ambiguity between standard and non-standard patterns of employment 
(Eurostat, 2003, ILO, 2003, 2004c), escalating unemployment levels, heightening 
mobility of capital (ILO, 2004d), strategies for organisational flexibility 
(Standing, 1999) appear to have considerably weakened the power of organised 
labour vis-à-vis capital and the state (Vail et al., 1999, Gallin, 2002, Munck, 2002, 
Stanford and Vosko, 2004, ILO, 2004d). 
 
However, despite serious adverse impacts of such labour market transformations 
over the traditional trade unionism, what a careful look at the events that took 
place in the world of work since the mid-1990s together with a thorough review of 
the specialist literature suggest is that, these shifts remained short of leading to the 
demise of labour movements (Moody, 1997, Barchiesi, 2002, Gallin, 2002, 
Munck, 2002, 2007, McCallum, 2013). In his seminal work Munck (2002) 
explains the shortcomings of the literature on workers and neoliberal globalisation 
as follows: 
 
“The problem with most of the literature on labour and 
globalisation is that it tends to conceive of labour as passive 
victim of the new trends, the malleable material from which 
globalisation will construct its new world order. Capital is seen 
as an active, mobile, forward-looking player in the globalisation 
game while labour is seen as static, passive and basically 
reactive. The game has changed and labour is seen to have few 
cards.” 
 
Indeed what a cautious overview of the events that has taken place since the 1990s 
in the world of work  suggests is that, the shifts came about in labour markets 
despite having brought about formidable challenges, at the same time presented 
some suitable opportunities on a global scale for revival of a new type of labour 
movement. This new movement, dubbed as social movement unionism, has built 
its strength on the concern of tackling the common problems and issues that 
working people worldwide currently face (Moody, 1997, Barchiesi, 2002, Munck, 
2002, 2007) and based its philosophy on the idea of global solidarity (Munck, 
2002). In this respect, for instance, human rights, workers’ rights, gender and 
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environment have come to the forefront in this new type of trade unionism 
(Moody, 1997, Munck, 2002) and these concerns appeared to have helped the 
labour activists to overcome the fragmentations appear between the different types 
of workers that are employed in different industries as well as in different places 
of the world (Moody, 1997). Social movement unionism, accordingly as Moody 
put it (1997: 290) “is a perspective that embraces diversity of the working class 
that overcomes its fragmentation” and as Munck pointed out (2002: 125) has 
transcended the “economism of free collective bargaining and the tradition of 
political bargaining”. 
 
Social movement unionism that started to gain pace all over the world since the 
last two decades has placed a great emphasis on incorporation of all types of 
workers into the movement including those working in the informal sector. 
(Gallin, 2002, Munck, 2002, Sundar, 2008). “Organising workers in informal 
employment needs to be a priority of the trade union movement at both national 
and international levels” argues Gallin (2002: 531) and continues “[i]t is 
impossible to conceive at the present time of organising a majority of workers at 
world scale without serious organising in the informal sector” (ibid: 532). 
Similarly a step forward in mobilisation of workers in informal sector, according 
to Munck (2002: 117) would be “the litmus test of the continued relevance of 
trade unions to the world’s workers today”. Yet despite this potential that the 
social movement unionism holds, and despite some limited success stories it has 
been also reported that, social movement unionism has not achieved true 
representation of informal workers yet (Dibben and Wood, 2011).  
 
To conclude in the light of the discussions made above, the neoliberal 
globalisation which created a shift towards flexible employment arrangements and 
thus which significantly contributed to the erosion of power and membership base 
of trade unions globally, at the same time opened up new opportunities for trade 
unions to bring their organisational structures and activities out of the traditional 
boundaries. The social movement unionism being one of these opportunities in 
this respect currently stand as an important strategy for many trade unions to 
broaden their membership base and to restore their power vis-à-vis capital through 
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inclusion of broader political and social issues into their agenda that are of interest 
to a wider public. Thus, it could be argued that political economy of insecurity 
that currently pursued in domain of industrial relations on a global scale is not 
unrivalled.  
2.3.4 Political Economy of Security/Insecurity: Making Security/Insecurity 
an Institutional Rationale in Industrial Relations 
Security/insecurity when it becomes an institutional rationale in industrial 
relations, as argued above, asserts a considerable influence on the way power is 
distributed across individuals and actors. Having said this, this penultimate section 
deals with the question of how one can understand security/insecurity as an 
institutional rationale in a given country’s political economy of industrial 
relations. In other words, I seek to identify the minimum standards that would 
provide us with sufficient grounds to argue that the political economy of 
security/insecurity is pursued in the industrial relations of a country we are 
analysing. In order to do so, I employ a discussion that builds on both Standing’s 
(2002) basic security argument which was also espoused by ILO (2004) in its 
report on economic security and on the ILO’s declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, its core labour standards and its principles 
concerning the right to strike. 
According to Standing (2002: 199), “a just society requires policies and 
institutions that enhance self-control and basic security”. For Standing (2002: 
196); 
 
“[e]qual basic security implies that there should be equal 
freedom from morbidity, sustainable self-respect, and 
equal freedom from controls. There should be also equal 
good opportunity to develop one’s competencies”. 
 
ILO (2004b: 15), building on Standing’s (2002) basic security argument, in a 




 “[d]istributive justice requires policies and institutions 
that promote the attainment of basic needs and real 
freedom, which together constitute basic security”.  
 
A careful overview of Standing’s basic security argument which places its 
emphasis on the necessity of income security and voice representation security 
reveals that, this idea has strong connotations in the area of work and work 
relations. Indeed, according to Standing (2002: 238);  
 
“[t]he security that is required is a combination of basic 
income security, without which there is no real freedom to 
make rational choices and without which survival is 
jeopardised, and strong voice representational security, 
for without voice the vulnerable will always be in danger 
of losing their income and other freedoms.” 
 
It is against this background that, as the argument points out, dealing with the 
disparities that appear between the power resources of actors in labour markets of 
democratic capitalist societies requires provision of basic security at work for the 
less powerful actors. Indeed, according to Standing (2002: 203), a political system 
that is able to provide basic security and good opportunity underlies the 
“mechanisms to enable all groups to put pressure on the powerful to redistribute 
gains of growth.” Accordingly, what I argue is that, provision of basic security to 
the less powerful, has the power to make security an institutional rationale in the 
very structure of the labour markets where relations between employees and 
employers are established both at individual and collective levels. Such policy and 
practices, places the less powerful individuals and groups on a more equal footing 
vis-à-vis the more powerful ones in definition and protection of their interests. 
In my opinion, basic security argument with its emphasis on income and voice 
security, has also profound ramifications in industrial relations for the interests 
revolving around representation and income security constitute one of the main 
concerns raised by labour in their interactions with other actors (see Rose, 2004, 
Budd and Bhave, 2008). The vital importance of these interests were also 
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acknowledged by some of the most noticeable international human rights treaties. 




“Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable 
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence 
worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by 
other means of social protection. Everyone has the right to form 
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”  
Similarly according to the ILO’s Declaration of Philadelphia13; 
“Freedom of expression and of association are essential to 
sustained progress …  All human beings, irrespective of race, 
creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-
being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom 
and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.” 
Against this background, what I argue is that, adequate provision and protection 
of income and voice security for workers at the level of collective relations 
constitute the basic security for labour as a collective entity, as they empower 
labour as a collective actor vis-à-vis others placing the security at the heart of the 
institutional structure of industrial relations in the form of an institutional 
rationale. The minimum requirements that provides and protects the income and 
voice security for labour at collective level or in other words the required 
standards for making security an institutional rationale in industrial relations could 
be defined by making reference to the ILO’s declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, its core labour standards and its principles 
concerning the right to strike
14
.  
                                                          
12
 For full text see the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ [accessed: 18/03/2014]. 
13
 For the full text ILO Declaration of Philadelphia, 
http://www.ilocarib.org.tt/cariblex/conventions_23.shtml [accessed: 18/03/2014]. 
14
 Indeed, in my argument embedding security as a rationale in industrial relations where relations 
between labour and capital are established at collective level requires employment of different 
policy and practices. Provision of basic security in industrial relations therefore, differs from 
Standing’s (2002) and ILO’s (2004) basic economic security argument in one critical point that, 
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The ILO’s declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work was 
adopted in 1998 with the aim being to commit member states to respect and 
advocate, regardless of whether they have ratified the relevant conventions. This 
declaration promotes a series of principles and rights that included freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining (ILO, 2013a). According to the 
ILO (2004a: 2): 
“All workers and all employers have the right to freely form and 
join groups for the support and advancement of their 
occupational interests. This basic human right goes together 
with freedom of expression and is the basis of democratic 
representation and governance. People need to be able to 
exercise their right to influence work-related matters that 
directly concern them. In other words, their voice needs to be 
heard and taken into account.” 
ILO’s commitment to freedom of association and right to collective 
bargaining was further expressed in its report on social justice. According 
to ILO (2004c);  
 
“The fundamental principle of freedom of association and the 
right to collective bargaining is a reflection of human dignity. It 
guarantees the ability of workers and employers to join and act 
together to defend not only their economic interests but also civil 
liberties such as the right to life, security, integrity and personal 
and collective freedom. It guarantees protection against 
discrimination, interference and harassment. As an integral part 
of democracy, it is also key to realizing the other fundamental 
rights set out in the ILO Declaration.” 
                                                                                                                                                               
income security comes in the form of right at work, rather than coming in the form of, as 
Standing (2002) and ILO (2004) asserted, right to a basic income on grounds of citizenship.  
Indeed, what I argue is that, although right to a basic income that would take the citizenship as 
its only prerequisite would be one of the ultimate tools to embed security into institution of 
industrial relations, this reflects an ideal solution to be materialised as Standing (2002: 205) put 
it as “a long-term objective”. To add to this, industrial relations as a long-established institution, 
in my opinion, has its own principles implementation of which equip the policymakers with 




According to the ILO (2000b: viii) the principles of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining offers various advantages to the all 
actors of industrial relations as they are: 
“[G]ood for labour, since they constitute the cornerstone of 
representational security in the formal and informal economies. 
They are good for business, as they unlock the door to sound 
human resources policy and open up the high road to competing 
in the global market. And they are good for governments, 
because they pave the way for collective action that can aid 
economic growth and poverty eradication. Having a voice at 
work helps fill information gaps and lays the foundation for trust 
and cooperation in the management of change – a vital function 
of social dialogue at the national, sectoral and firm levels.”  
The ILO’s commitment to ensure that its member states promote and realise 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rendered two of ILO 
conventions, namely, Conventions 87 and 98 to be ranked amongst its core 
standards. These two conventions, which are commonly, referred to as ‘the twin 
conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining’, together lay 
down the key principles of freedom of association, protection of the right to 
organise and free and voluntary collective bargaining (ILO and ADB, 2006). 
According to Convention 87, for example, workers have the right to freely 
establish and join trade unions and higher organisations, to draw up their 
constitutions and rules, and to organise their administration and activities. 
Moreover, workers’ organisations cannot be dissolved or suspended by 
administrative authority. Whilst under Convention 98, on the other hand, workers 
have the right to enjoy adequate protection against anti-union discrimination and 
against any acts of interference by either employers or public authorities. It also 
urges ratifying states to ensure respect for the right to organise and to encourage 
and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary 
negotiation between employers or their organisations and workers’ organisations. 
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Despite the fact that the right to strike was not embraced within the ILO’s core 
labour standards, according to the Committee on Freedom of Association, which 
acts as a supervisory committee to ensure compliance with ILO conventions no 87 
and 98 in ratifying states (ILO, 2013b), striking is a right that workers and their 
organisations are entitled to enjoy and is perceived as one of the means through 
which they can enhance and defend their economic and social interests. 
Accordingly, the right to strike was affirmed in numerous resolutions adopted by 
the ILO and has been promoted by many different ILO committees and 
conferences (Gernigon et al., 1998).  
Drawing on the ILO’s core labour standards on the freedom of association and 
collective bargaining as well as its position on the right to strike, what I contend 
therefore is that, provision of freedom of association, an effective recognition of 
the right to collective bargaining and a sufficient guarantee of the right to strike 
are the minimum requirements to give voice to labour and thus equip it with the 
effective means to define and defend its interests at collective level. These 
principles and rights  when configured and implemented in a way that protects 
and empowers labour, as I posit, are highly likely to (i) distribute the power 
resources between actors in a way that places labour on a more equal footing 
mainly by providing them supremacy over formulation and management of their 
organisational and representational activities (ii) generate income security as one 
institutional outcome for workers mainly by increasing their control over their 
wage levels and (iii) align the interests of labour with the other actors over the 
issues related to so-called national interests
15
. The last but not least, they are also 
highly likely to create path-dependency in the policymaking process as they will 
enable labour to influence the institution-building process and thus will reinforce 
the institutional structures against change (see Figure 2 for a simple diagram) 
                                                          
15




Figure 2: Political economy of security in industrial relations 
 
At this point I consider it crucial to explain how freedom of association, the right 
to collective bargaining and the right to strike empower labour vis-à-vis other 
actors. Under my perspective, these principles and rights, when recognised 
properly, serve as secondary power resources for labour, thus making it possible 
to utilise its labour power and its numbers as its main power resources. Secondary 
power resources of labour, in this regard, legitimise the social agency of 
individuals, empower them in industrial relations and enhance their capabilities to 
act as an actor on equal basis. These power resources also provide labour with an 
institutional structure within which it can freely interact with other actors and can 
independently pursue distinct interests and agendas. Proper functioning of 
freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike 
therefore, I contend, indicate that security operates as an institutional rationale in 
industrial relations and this provides us with sound grounds to posit that a political 
economy of security is pursued in the focal context.  
By contrast, when freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and 
the right to strike are restricted or even worse are removed altogether from the 
PATH DEPENDENCY 
enables labour to influence the institution-building process  reinforces the institutional structures against changes  
POLICY OUTCOMES 
places labour on a more equal footing vis-
a-vis capital and state 
generates  income security as one 
institutional outcome for labour 
align the interests of labour with the 
other actors over the issues related to 
supreme national interests 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS  
Strong logic over the necessity and importance of provision and 
protection of freedom of association, right to collective 
bargaining and right to strike 
appropriate tools for provision and protection of these 
principles and rights  
68 
 
legal structures that govern industrial relations, this, it is suggested, means that 
insecurity operates as the institutional rationale in the political economy of 
industrial relations in the country in question. Indeed, in the case that workers are 
not provided with adequate and necessary rights to define and defend their 
interests, the possibilities of mobilisation of their main power resources are 
reduced and this, places them at a highly disadvantaged position vis-à-vis more 
powerful actors in industrial relations. The inadequacy or lack of labour’s 
secondary power resources in this regard, reduces its chances to act as an 
independent social agent with distinct interests and agendas. It decreases workers’ 
control over their wage levels and increases other actors influence over 
formulation and management of labour’s organisational and representational 
activities. It also makes it easier for other actors to steer their behaviours as a 
group. This situation, as I contend, further empowers the state and employers who 
are already more powerful vis-à-vis labour. In doing so, it also creates a path-
dependency in which insecurity as an institutional outcome reproduces itself. 
Lack of adequate levels of freedom of association and insufficient protection or 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining as well as the right to strike and 
the outcomes that this situation produce, therefore, in my opinion, indicate that 
insecurity operates as an institutional rationale in industrial relations. That is, 
under such circumstances, it is put forward here that this is the result of a political 
economy of insecurity being pursued (see Figure 3 for a simple diagram). 
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Figure 3: Political economy of insecurity in industrial relations 
 
Having briefly explained how one can understand whether security/insecurity 
appears as a defining feature of the political economy of industrial relations in a 
given country, I now continue with the specific role of the capitalist state in the 
institutionalisation of security as a rationale in industrial relations.  
2.3.5 Industrial Relations and the Capitalist State: The State as an Actor 
Placing Security/Insecurity within a Regulatory Framework  
So far, the chapter has discussed the relationship between security and power and 
its repercussions in the domain of industrial relations predominantly by focusing 
on labour and capital. In order to provide a more comprehensive background to 
the rest of the study, in this final subsection I place a special emphasis on the role 
of the state as an actor in industrial relations. I do this by asking two different but 
inter-related questions. First, what do the powerful actors need to do in order to 
ensure that the institutional rationale is appropriate to their interests in shaping the 
structure of industrial relations? Second, what is the role of the state in the 
institutionalisation of security/insecurity as a rationale in the domain of industrial 
relations? 
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To answer the first question, one should address the importance of political power 
and politics when it comes to placing security/insecurity within a regulatory 
framework of industrial relations. Industrial relations, as an institution – as a good 
number of industrial relations textbooks seem to agree – is an outcome of the 
policymaking process that has been shaped in line with the interests of all actors 
or, as in most of the cases, with those of the more powerful actors (see e.g. 
Hyman, 1975; Farnham, 2000; Salamon, 2000; Rose, 2004). Thus, not placing 
emphasis on the importance of politics and political power in industrial relations 
runs the risk of a one-dimensional approach to the subject that separates politics 
from economics and states from markets which, according to many scholars, are 
intrinsically interdependent (see e.g. Hall, 1986; Vogel, 1996; Amoore, 2002; 
Block, 2005; Hyman, 2008, Egan, 2009). In this regard, it is important to recourse 
to one of Polanyi’s (2001: 145) widely cited statements, where he carefully 
explained the relationship between markets and politics, stating that:  
“There was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets 
could never have come into being merely by allowing things to 
take their course. […] [L]aissez-faire itself was enforced by the 
state. […] [L]aissez-faire was not a method to achieve a thing, it 
was the thing to be achieved”.  
Hence, those seeing the labour markets from the Polanyian point of view assert 
that, as Amoore (2002: 63) succinctly put it, “labour markets are politically and 
socially produced and reproduced over time.” It is in this regard that, as I 
contend, markets and states, politics and economics are entities that are 
inextricably intertwined in the domain of industrial relations, making the political 
power, in the words of Hyman (2008: 263) an “overt feature” of it. Therefore, 
what needs to be emphasised is that powerful actors need to exert political 
influence on the decision-making processes of industrial relations – through 
employing structural and/or agency power – if their aim is ensuring that an 
institutional rationale that generates outcomes in favour of their interests is in 
operation. 
At this point, it is important to address the second question about the position of 
the state in the formation of the regulative framework of industrial relations. 
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Indeed, it is important to point out the extent to which the state emerges as an 
actor in capitalist democratic economies in terms of the processes of policy 
formation with its distinct interests and agendas in train. Having said this, it 
appears especially vital to address whether or not in a political environment where 
the powerful actors are able to participate and exert influence on decision-making 
processes with the aim of materialising their interests, the capitalist state appears 
as a passive actor performing its functions in direction of the requirements of 
powerful actors or otherwise.  To answer this question, one should firstly address 
the role of the capitalist state in structuration of industrial relations, which seems 
to have found a satisfactory explanation in Hyman’s (2008: 265) words. “Even in 
‘voluntarist’ systems (where the state supposedly ‘abstains’ from involvement in 
industrial relations”), he asserts, the capitalist state: 
“has an unavoidable role in procedural regulation. This 
typically involves defining the status, rights and obligations of 
the ‘actors’ and prescribing and enforcing the ‘rules of the 
game’. Such regulation can shape the major contours of the 
whole national system […]” 
Second, the role of the capitalist state in maintaining necessary circumstances –
both in political and economic contexts – for capital accumulation needs explicitly 
be pointed out. What overview of the literature in this regard reveals is that the 
interests of capital owners as a class and of the state as an actor in capitalist-
democratic economies do not necessarily always overlap. Indeed it is true that, as 
a good number of scholars seem to agree, capital owners enjoy special privileges 
in most of the capitalist economies, because capitalist states require maintenance 
of capital accumulation in order to perpetuate their existence (see e.g. Miliband, 
1973; O'connor, 1973; Lindblom, 1977; Jessop, 1982; Edwards, 1986; Arnason, 
2005). This privilege attributed to the capitalist class in Lindblom’s (1977: 171-
172) words found its expression as follows: 
“Corporate executives in all private enterprise systems, […] 
decide a nation’s industrial technology, the pattern of work 
organisation, location of industry, market structure, resource 
allocation and of course executive compensation and status […] 
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Businessmen thus […] exercise […] public functions 
[…]Because public functions in the market system rest in the 
hands of businessmen, it follows that jobs, prices, production, 
growth, the standard of living, and the economic security of 
everyone all rest in their hands. Consequently, government 
officials cannot be indifferent to how well business performs its 
functions”. 
However, this privileged position held by the capitalist class should not come to 
mean that capital and the state always pursue the same interests for what a careful 
review of literature suggests is that, the main role and interest of the latter is 
maintaining capitalism as an economic system, rather than performing the 
function of protecting and promoting the interests of capital owners (Miliband, 
1973; Edwards, 1986; Jessop, 1990). “Capitalist regimes have mainly been 
governed by men” as Miliband (1973: 65) once eloquently wrote: 
“who have either genuinely believed in the virtues of capitalism, 
or who, whatever their reservations as to this or that aspect of 
it, accepted it as far superior to any possible alternative 
economic and social system, and who have therefore made it 
their prime business to defend it.” 
Therefore, “if the state is to perform its functions adequately it cannot be tied 
directly to the ‘interests’ of capital” argued Edwards  (1986: 178) and continues 
“[i]t must have some real independence from capitalists”. It is in this regard that 
writers, such as Miliband  (1973) and Jessop (1990), suggested that managers of 
capitalist states often define their role and interests in terms of national interests 
and public benefits. “[T]he state is a political force concerned with the collective 
interests of capital rather than an economic agent devoted to short-term profit” 
says Jessop (1990: 185) and he continues: 
“and its role […] is one of political management rather than the 
narrow minded, short-sighted pursuit of mere economic interest. 
It is this fact that lends so much credence to the liberal and 
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conservative claim that the state represents the ‘public interest’ 
or ‘national interest.’”  
In a similar vein, according to Miliband (1973: 67 brackets added) the role of the 
capitalist state in politico-economic affairs rests on the view that political actors 
and the capitalist state are: 
 “above the battle of civil society, [are] classless, 
[are]concerned above all to serve the whole nation, the national 
interest, [are] being charged with the particular task of 
subduing special interests and class-oriented demands for the 
supreme good of all”.  
Accordingly, what could be said is that although business as an interest group 
might still need to exert pressure on the decision making process in order to 
ensure that the appropriate rationale is in operation in the domain of industrial 
relations – for the state as an actor still enjoys relative autonomous power –, the 
politico-economic context within which the state functions is built on capitalist 
principles. This comes to mean that a capitalist state is expected to provide 
appropriate conditions necessary for maintaining a capitalist system, which in its 
final analysis serves the general, although not necessarily the particular, interests 
of the capitalist class (see Miliband, 1973; Edwards, 1986; Jessop, 1990). 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that a capitalist state is likely to support 
the general interests of the capitalist system when it comes to industrial relations. 
Miliband (1973: 74 brackets added) neatly summarised this as follows: 
“Whenever governments have felt it incumbent, as they have 
done more and more, to intervene directly in disputes between 
employers and wage-earners, the result of their intervention has 
tended to be disadvantageous to the latter [labour], not the 
former [capital]. On innumerable occasions, and in all 
capitalist countries, governments have played a decisive role in 
defeating strikes, often by the invocation of the coercive power 
of the state and the use of naked violence; and the fact that they 
have done so in the name of the national interest, law and order, 
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constitutional government, the protection of ‘the public’ etc. 
Rather than simply to support employers has not made that 
intervention any the less useful to these employers.”  
In sum, what I contend is that the state in capitalist-democratic countries has 
emerged as an actor in industrial relations, pursuing particular interests and 
specific agendas in the decision-making process of industrial relations. These 
interests mostly stem from political actors’ concerns about perpetuating capitalism 
as an economic system and their materialisation also serve the broader interests of 
capital as a class.  Therefore, I put forward the view that the pursuit of a political 
economy of security/insecurity in industrial relations does not predominantly or 
necessarily revolve around the interests of labour and capital as the interests of the 
state as a separate actor need to be equally considered. The way the state, capital 
and labour define and defend their interests in the making of the political 
economy of security/insecurity will be the subject of empirical chapters that 
follow, which scrutinise Turkey’s industrial relations from a politico-historical 
perspective.  
2.4 Discussion & Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a conceptual-theoretical framework to what I mean by 
the political economy of security/insecurity in industrial relations. It has provided 
a novel understanding to the security as a concept by arguing that critical 
examination of the concept offers at least three different aspects to analyse, these 
being: security as a power resource, security as an institutional outcome and 
security as an institutional rationale. The chapter has also examined actors’ of 
industrial relations’ power resources and the way they mobilise them in industrial 
relations. Moreover, it has looked at the ways security/insecurity becomes an 
institutional rationale in advanced democratic-capitalist societies. Regarding this, 
it has been contended that the minimum requirements for making security an 
institutional rationale in capitalist-democratic societies are adequate provision of 
freedom of association, effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining 
and sufficient guarantee of the right to strike. It has been posited that the 
functioning of these freedoms and rights in favour of the interests of labour 
indicates that security is operating as the underpinning institutional rationale in 
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the industrial relations of a particular nation. By contrast, as has also been 
proffered, in the case that workers are not provided with adequate and necessary 
rights and freedoms to define and defend their interests, this empowers the state 
and employers who, by the nature of capitalist societies, already emerge as more 
powerful actors in the domain of industrial relations and provides them with 
further resources to materialise their own. Under these circumstances, insecurity 
operates as the institutional rationale in industrial relations, that is, it is the main 
subject of the political economy being pursued the country concerned. 
Having adopted this perspective, the rest of the study is intended to go beyond the 
confinements of the dominant standpoint in the extant Turkish industrial relations 
literature, which attributes a central importance to globalisation in understanding 
the current political economy of insecurity pursued in industrial relations. Instead, 
what is contended in this thesis is that, industrial relations in Turkey embody 
insecurity as an institutional rationale and its roots can be traced as far back as the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey. That is, insecurity as an institutional 
rationale has steered and governed policy and practices in the domain of industrial 
relations almost continuously as the country passed through different eras and this 
wielded a marked influence on the distribution of power between actors. In sum, 
the way insecurity pervaded the institutional structure of industrial relations in 
Turkey will be the subject of empirical chapters. However, before that the 
methodological approach, techniques and methods used in this study need to be 









 METHODOLOGY  CHAPTER 3:
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methods and techniques that were utilised in the thesis. 
Section 3.2 introduces historical institutionalism as the analytical framework of 
the study. This section firstly overviews the mainstream literature on the historical 
institutionalist approach and then critically reflects on the way this approach was 
utilised in the study
16
. The chapter continues with sections 3.3 and 3.4, which 
overview and discuss the issues of design, data sources, research limitations and 
ethical considerations. Finally, this chapter finishes with a conclusion.  
3.2 Employing Historical Institutionalism in an Industrial Relations Study 
Institutions are commonly defined as formal rules and procedures that structure 
and constrain the possibilities/resources of actors during their interactions (for 
similar definitions and views see North, 1990; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Peters, 
1999; Lane and Ersson, 2000; March and Olsen, 2006). According to North 
(1990: 3), institutions “reduce uncertainty by providing structure to everyday life” 
and for March and Olsen (2006: 3) they are “structures of resources that create 
capabilities for acting”. Institutions, indeed, according to a prevailing consensus 
among the scholars appear as instrumental for making outcomes of actors’ 
interactions more foreseeable (North, 1990; Nee, 2001; March and Olsen, 2006) 
and for shaping the opportunities for the actors to pursue their interests (Hall, 
1986; North, 1990; March and Olsen, 2006).  
Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, is an approach employed in political 
studies, which attempts to shed light on the ways historically constructed 
institutions constrain and shape political behaviours and strategies of actors during 
the policy making process (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Beland, 2005; Hall, 2010). 
That is, historical institutionalists attempt to provide causal explanations to real 
                                                          
16
 It should be noted that this study adopts a critical realist stance and in this context it attributes a 
central importance to the concept of the political economy of insecurity. It considers this concept 
as a mechanism that assists this researcher in bringing explanations to real world events, which, 
in the context of this study comes out as the institutionalisation of industrial relations in Turkey. 
That is, in this thesis the term political economy of insecurity is used as a descriptor of a 
generative mechanism that helps to explain the disadvantageous position of labour vis-à-vis 
capital and the state in the history of the industrial relations of modern Turkey. 
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world events and they have substantive agendas as they often aim to understand 
macro phenomena (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). Institutions lie at the centre of the 
historical institutionalist analyses and they are not seen as given, but considered 
products of actors’ interactions and choices (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). 
Institutions, furthermore, for many historical institutionalists appear as not only 
relatively enduring structures reflecting the historical circumstances, interests, 
ideas, goals, interactions and preferences of the initial actors (see March and 
Olsen, 2006), but also come out as the arrangements that historically shape the 
way political actors define their interests, frame their strategies and goals, 
structure their interactions and contribute to the expectations of predictability and 
order (see Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Beland, 2005; March and Olsen, 2006; 
Sanders, 2006). 
In historical institutionalist studies, institutions are not abstracted from the context 
within which they are formed and develop, therefore history and the broader 
socioeconomic and political environment, where events and processes that take 
place constitute the framework of the analyses and provide a robust background to 
the arguments that take this particular stance (see Hall, 1986; Sanders, 2006; 
Steinmo, 2008). However, history receives more emphasis than the environmental 
context in the historical institutionalist literature. Indeed, the historical 
institutionalist approach holds that “[w]ithout historical accounts, important 
outcomes will go unobserved, causal relationships will be incorrectly inferred, 
and finally, significant hypotheses may never even be noticed, even less tested” 
(Steinmo, 2008: 135). Nevertheless, it is not the ‘past’ on its own that the 
historical institutionalists are attentive towards, but rather they are interested in 
temporal dimensions of the social inquiry, i.e. paying attention to the process over 
time, as according to them “social life unfolds over time” (Pierson, 2004: 5). 
Indeed, for Pierson (2004: 2) placing the phenomena under investigation in time 
means liberating the study from the confinements of “snapshots”, which provides 
the researcher with the facility of seeing the “moving picture”.  
Historical institutionalists, by placing institutions in time and in a broader 
environmental context seek to provide causal explanation to institutional stability 
and change. Institutional stability in historical in such accounts is marked by path-
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dependence in that initial policy choices embedded in institutional structures are 
considered to have significant impact on the future policy making process (see 
Peters, 1999; Pierson, 2004). Institutional path-dependence, in this regard, is seen 
as a self-reinforcing process as each step taken forward along the same path is 
argued to increase the cost of return (Pierson, 2004). This, in turn brings with it 
the consideration of sequence of events and processes, for according to historical 
institutionalists the effects of earlier events in the sequence may be stronger than 
those of latter ones and might eliminate alternative policy choices over time 
(Pierson, 2004).  
Institutions are also subject to change over time and by placing them in historical 
context, historical institutionalist attempt to capture the temporal dimension of 
institutional change (Pierson, 2004). However, given that in historical 
institutionalist accounts institutions are considered to reproduce similar outcomes 
over time, theorising institutional change is a significant challenge for historical 
institutionalist scholars. Indeed, within the historical institutionalist tradition there 
is no one way of explaining institutional change and different scholars understand 
it in different ways (see e.g. Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Peters et al., 2005; 
Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Beland, 2009; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). 
Nevertheless, what seems to be held in common is that institutional changes come 
into place when a ‘critical juncture’ arises, which is considered as a turning point 
bringing with it new institutional arrangements that are likely to produce new path 
dependencies (see Kennedy, 2013). 
In order to shed light on the intricacy of real-life political outcomes, and to 
provide causal explanations to institutional continuity and change, historical 
institutionalists attribute great importance to the notions of actors, ideas and 
power relations in their arguments. Actors, under the historical institutionalist lens 
are understood as objects and the agents of history (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). 
Their interests, strategies, goals and interactions are taken into consideration in 
providing historical accounts of institutional formation, development, change and 
continuity (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Sanders, 2006). Ideas, on the other hand 
are considered to be amongst the major factors shaping the policy change 
(Sanders, 2006; Beland, 2009) as well as the institutional continuity, for they 
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function “as the glue that holds an administration, party, or agency together in its 
tasks, help to garner public support and provide a standard to evaluate the 
institution’s policy outcomes” (Sanders, 2006: 42).  
Power relations, for many historical institutionalist accounts, indicate the 
distributional and conflictual aspect of the institutions, for they are commonly 
understood within the mainstream historical institutionalist literature as the 
structures designed to allocate resources between actors with respect to the initial 
distribution of power amongst them (see Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Power, in 
this regard, according to Pierson (2004), is a major factor in the self-reinforcement 
process of institutions, for those actors who are in a position to create and change 
the rules are also able to enhance their power. This, in turn, according to him will 
further obstruct institutional change and increase the power asymmetries within 
the institutions.  
It is against this background that this thesis employs a historical institutionalist 
approach with the aim of providing a causal explanation to the way the legal 
framework of industrial relations distributed the power resources between the 
Turkish state, capital and labour in the post-1980 period.  That is, it places 
Turkey’s industrial relations in a historical and broader socioeconomic and 
political environment and scrutinises (re)institutionalisation of political economy 
of the country’s industrial relations in four consecutive periods: the mono-party 
(1923-1945), the multi-party (1945-1960), the planned economy periods (1960-
1980) and the post-1980 period. By doing so, it seeks to accomplish two aims. 
One, to shed light on the ways institutional structure of the industrial relations 
historically constrained and shaped the political behaviours and strategies of the 
actors of industrial relations during the policy making process in each consecutive 
period. Two, it endeavours to seek an answer as to whether or not the institutional 
changes made to the industrial relations during the military interregnum of 1980 
represents, as widely argued in Turkey’s mainstream industrial relations literature, 
what can be interpreted as “a critical juncture” in historical institutionalist terms 
in the institutional history of Turkish industrial relations.  
In adopting a historical institutionalist approach, this study rests on some key 
assumptions. First, it understands industrial relations as an institution being 
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constructed and shaped as a product of actors’ interactions and choices in a 
historical as well as a wider politico-economic and social environment. Moving 
on from this, second, the study contends that industrial relations historically shape 
the way labour, capital and state define and defend their interests, frame their 
strategies and goals as well as structuring their interactions. Third, it considers 
actors, i.e. the state, capital and labour, their ideas i.e. their interests and their 
power relations, i.e. their interactions, as the building blocks of the political 
economy of industrial relations and thus places them at the centre of its empirical 
analyses. And fourth, it is held that, as Pierson (2004: 2) aptly put it, “social life 
unfolds over time” and takes time seriously. Thus, the thesis places politics in time 
and attempts to identify the sequence of important events and processes in the 
(re)construction of Turkey’s industrial relations, with the aim of providing a 
causal understanding to those political alternatives that became unreachable with 
the passing of time (Pierson, 2004). 
However, application of a historical institutionalist approach in this study does not 
go without limitations. Indeed, firstly, by focusing solely on the making of the 
political economy of insecurity in industrial relations in consecutive historical 
periods, this work leaves out the implications of the political economy pursued in 
industrial relations in individual industrial worker’s daily live. Secondly, this 
study, with its stress on the development of the state, capital and labour as the 
actors of industrial relations in historical process, is not concerned with the 
individuals and their relations with the institutions. Rather, it takes actors as 
collective agents and does not provide any insight about the way institutions shape 
individual behaviours (see Peters, 1999).  
And last but not least, this study by employing historical institutionalism, which 
itself finds its roots in political science (Hall and Taylor, 1996, Rhodes, 2008), 
and which aims to identify and explain power and power resources on political 
level (see Hall and Taylor, 1996), locates its argument mostly at the level of 
politics, leaving the power relationship between actors of industrial relations, 
expected to be established in social and economic domains; mostly untouched. 
Indeed, it should be acknowledged that historical institutionalism as a 
methodological tool is seen politically-biased by some scholars given that it 
81 
 
places most of its emphasis on political level (see Pontusson, 1995 for a 
comprehensive overview). The emphasis of historical institutionalism on political 
level is also true for its analyses of power and power resources. Indeed as Hall and 
Taylor (1996: 941) aptly put it historical institutionalists are “more likely to 
assume a world in which institutions give some groups or interests 
disproportionate access to the decision-making process; and … they tend to stress 
how some groups lose while others win.” It is therefore important to remark that, 
individuals and groups hold different types of power resources in different 
domains of daily life and mobilise these in order to define and defend their 
interests. In what follows, disadvantages stem from the nature of actors’ power 
resources in a given context and/or restrictions placed on actors’ use of their 
power resources might not result in their total disempowerment at the level of 
politics given that they might hold different types of power resources in other 
domains (see  Korpi, 1998). Indeed as Amoore (2002: 35) rightly pointed out 
“removing union representation, though undeniably circumscribing workers’ 
political expression, does not remove the social power relations of the 
workplace”. Having said that, a final note should be made on the thesis’ emphasis 
on the issue of power and power resources at political level. This study aims at 
providing a causal explanation to the way legal framework of industrial relations 
distributed power resources between the Turkish state, capital and labour in the 
post-1980 period. To this end, it assigns analytical primacy to the political level 
and despite acknowledging the importance of power resources and power 
relations that exist at many different levels, and despite accepting their significant 
role on industrial relations; it limits much of its empirical analysis with power 
resources of actors and power relations between them at the political level.  
Besides a number of limitations that historical institutionalism itself presents, it 
goes almost without saying that adoption of a particular methodological tool in 
any study requires elimination of other potential methods/approaches. Indeed, 
having approached the issue of institution building in Turkish industrial relations; 
employment of historical institutionalism necessitated me to discard some other 
approaches within the school of new institutionalism, such as sociological 
institutionalism which would have been useful in revealing some other aspects of 
political economy of insecurity in domain of industrial relations in modern 
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Turkey. True, sociological institutionalism considers the institutions as norms and 
culture and argues that, institutions, rather than being ambitious projects of 
political actors, are autonomous units, which by wielding influence over actors’ 
choices, opinions and identities; shape the political outcome over time (Rhodes et 
al., 2006). Having found its roots in discipline of sociology (Rhodes, 2008), 
sociological institutionalism considers institutions as bodies operating at the 
supra-national level and emphasises the significance of global institutional 
structures and culture in constructing the identities and goals of nation states, 
institutions, and individuals at a global level (Schofer et al., 2012). It, what is 
more, sees actors embedded in various relationships in social, economic, and 
political domains beyond their control (see Koelble, 1995, Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Adoption of sociological institutionalism in this regard, as one can argue, might 
have helped the study to place more emphasis on the role of cultural factors in 
determining and shaping actors’ behaviours as well to put the country in a wider 
social context that the political economy of Turkey’s industrial relations has 
operated. It might have been also useful in highlighting the interdependencies and 
interrelations between industrial relations system of Turkey and wider global 
political economy.  
However, at this point it should be emphasised that employment of sociological 
institutionalism as frame of analysis would have come with its own costs. First of 
all, as was addressed by Aspinwall and Schneider (2003), studies using 
sociological institutionalism as their theoretical approach place much of their 
emphasis on cultural aspects, making the culture identical with institutions (see 
also Hall and Taylor, 1996). Such an approach, nevertheless, according to Schofer 
et al. (2012: 62), de-emphases the role of actors, their interests and their power 
relations making these factors “derivative features of wider institutional 
environment”. In this regard, having set one of its main objectives to highlight the 
centrality of the modern Turkish state in shaping the interests of and interactions 
between the socioeconomic actors in modern Turkish society and the economy, 
employment of such a theoretical framework would have played down importance 
of the role of actors, their interests, ideas and power relations in the process of 
institution-building in Turkish industrial relations (see Koelble, 1995, Schofer et 
al., 2012). Second, considering institutions operating at the supra-national level 
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and accentuating their constrains and influences on the actors at national level 
would have easily underplayed the importance of initial ideas of the policymakers, 
i.e. Kemal Ataturk and his cohorts, in institution building in earlier history of 
industrial relations in Turkey. This in turn, might have run the risk of degrading 
the institution-building process in domain of Turkish industrial relations to a mere 
outcome of institutional structures that operate at macro-level. Such an approach 
according to me, would have diminished the important role of Kemal Ataturk’s 
national development project and the ideas and interests related to it in institution-
building process of Turkish industrial relations. Third, while placing more 
emphasis on the importance of interdependencies and interrelations between 
industrial relations system of Turkey and wider global political economy might 
have added an extra dimension to the study, this might have resulted in making 
the study lengthy and puzzling. Indeed, in the first instance, this study has already 
placed the country in a wider socio-economic and political context. For example 
in the chapter on multi-party period, Turkey’s attempts to find a place in capitalist 
western world was emphasised in policymakers’ acceptance of right to establish 
associations for labour. Similarly, in the chapter on planned economy period, 
advanced capitalist democracies’ general approach to politico-economic 
institutions in the post-war period was acknowledged in Turkish policymakers’ 
efforts towards re-institutionalisation of industrial relations. Therefore, as I argue, 
further highlighting the interconnections between political economy of industrial 
relations of Turkey and wider world would have unnecessarily lengthened the 
study. Second, one of the important objectives of this study was investigation of 
creation and management of political economy of insecurity in domain of 
industrial relations. Thus, while, the role of interdependencies between politico-
economic system of Turkey and the wider world can never be ignored in 
institution-building process of industrial relations, placing more emphasis on these 
subjects, would have set back the role of national actors, their ideas and their 
interactions with institutional structures in historical process, which, in its final 
analysis, would have led to deviation of study from the main aim it pursued. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, this research builds on its strengths and 
methodologically contributes to the historical institutionalist literature. Indeed, by 
examining industrial relations over a time period as an institution, and by inserting 
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power and actors at the heart of its analysis, this study presents a detailed and 
power-sensitive historical account of institutional continuity, development and 
change as it occurred in Turkey’s industrial relations. In doing so, this study opens 
up a new dimension in understanding of institutionalisation of political economy 
of industrial relations in Turkey in that very few scholars, if any, have studied 
Turkey’s industrial relations by taking account of all the actors, their interests and 
interactions and placing them in a broader context.  
Resultantly, methodologically this thesis strives to go beyond the limitations of 
many other studies conducted in the area of Turkey’s industrial relations, which 
pay very little, if any attention to the historical continuity of the current political 
economy pursued in industrial relations (see e.g. Ketenci, 1987; Dereli, 1988; 
Ekonomi, 1988; Boratav, 1990; Talas, 1992; Koray, 1994; Cetik and Akkaya, 
1999; Aydin, 2005; Boratav, 2005b). Instead, in this thesis, it is contended that the 
roots of the current political economy pursued in the domain of industrial relations 
can be traced back to as early as the initial years of the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey. Thus the study scrutinises institutional patterns over time in 
Turkey’s industrial relations and pays attention to all the actors, their interests and 
interactions, placing them in the broader historical, socioeconomic and political 
context. In doing so, it aims to provide a causal understanding and explanation of 
what I call the political economy of insecurity pursued in the post-1980 period in 
Turkey in the industrial relations context.  
3.3 Design of the Study 
This study was designed with the aim of providing a robust structure in 
exploration and understanding of the roots of the type of political economy 
pursued in industrial relations in the post-1980 period that is widely argued in the 
mainstream literature to have emerged following the coup d’état of 1980. In order 
to achieve this an actor-centred approach has been adopted to scrutinise the 
(re)institutionalisation of Turkey’s industrial relations by placing it in a wider 
historico-political perspective, whereby a wider account of actors’ interests, their 
interactions as well their social, political, and economic circumstances in which 
they emerged and developed has been obtained.  
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Being an industrial relations study, the actors, in the context of this work, refer to 
the state, capital and labour that act as collective agents, have specific security-
related interests and pursue them by interacting with each other in various forms 
and various different levels through various institutions. Throughout the study, the 
terms ‘political actors’, and ‘political leaders’ are used to describe political elites 
who drew up the top political agenda relating to the country’s political economy 
of industrial relations. More specifically, with these phrases I am identifying the 
top level political actors, such as prime ministers, presidents and ministers of 
labour appointed as well as the spokesmen of the opposition political parties in the 
periods under scrutiny. ‘Employers’, ‘businessmen’, and ‘capital owners’ are used 
to describe those who owned and operated industrial establishments in the 
country, especially large ones. ‘Labour’, ‘working class’, ‘workers’, on the other 
hand, are used to depict those who mainly derived their livelihood from industrial 
jobs and who, with the exception of the mono-party period in which establishment 
of organisations on the basis of class interest was prohibited by law, defined and 
defended their collective interests through the agency of their trade unions. 
At this point it is considered crucial to point out that, this study focuses on 
collective level employment relations, in an historical context, established 
between those representing the interests of the industrial capital, of the state and 
of the organised labour working at the industrial establishments. In doing so, this 
study investigates and analyses employment relations in Turkey by building on a 
narrower definition of industrial relations which concentrates on employment 
relations on collective and formal level (for a discussion on the scope of IR as a 
field of study see e.g. Edwards, 2003, Kaufman, 2004, Rose, 2004, Heery et al., 
2008). Industrial relations as a field of study, indeed has a wider scope regarding 
the world of work that includes various forms of employment relationship (see 
e.g. Salamon, 2000, Edwards, 2003, Kaufman, 2004). In this regard, while one 
might argue that study’s emphasis on industrial relations rather than employment 
relations narrowed the scope of the study, thesis’ focus on collective level formal 




First, this study, aimed at providing a causal explanation to the way the legal 
framework of collective labour relations distributed the power resources between 
the Turkish state, capital and labour in the post-1980 period. It is initially in this 
regard that, labour was taken as a collective actor, placed in the context of 
collective labour relations and the interests it voiced and the interactions it went 
into with other actors at collective level was analysed from an historical-
institutionalist perspective. However this is not the sole reason of study’s focus on 
labour as a collective actor. Second, a thorough review of available resources 
suggest that, regulation and management of collective labour relations in 
republican Turkey has always constituted one important factor in country’s 
economic development strategy (see e.g. Dereli, 1968, Ahmad, 1993, Koray, 
1996, Makal, 1999, Makal, 2002). Indeed, as has been widely argued throughout 
the empirical chapters of the study, not long after foundation of the Turkish 
republic, the political elites, in alliance with the capital owners geared the 
economic policies of the country towards industrialising the economy and 
accelerating national capital accumulation. These attempts laid the foundations of 
the political economy of industrialisation in the Republic of Turkey and forged the 
national development project of the country; a plan which was expected to be 
adopted and carried out by the generations of political elites to come. The national 
development project was indeed endorsed and maintained by the succeeding 
governments in republican Turkey and this situation changed little, if any, during 
Turkey’s articulation to the neoliberal global economic order which started to take 
place in the early 1980s.  
In creation and management of this national development project, 
institutionalisation of industrial relations or in other words employment relations 
at collective level has received substantial attention both from the founders of the 
republican Turkey and from the political leaders of succeeding governments. 
According to a prevailing opinion between them, industrial relations was a crucial 
instrument in creation and maintenance of capitalist-industrial economic 
development and it should be regulated and governed in a way that would place 
the labour as a collective actor under the control and discipline of the state
17
. This 
strong rationale laid the foundations of political economy of insecurity in 
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 For a detailed discussion see the interests sections in empirical chapters.   
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industrial relations in Turkey which was carried out, as was argued in the study, 
almost on continual basis, by the generations of political actors to come.  
Therefore, despite the fact that Turkey’s articulation into neoliberal global 
economy that started in the early 1980s, brought with many different forms of 
work-related insecurities as an institutional outcome both for the organised and 
non-organised workers, what I argue is that, it changed very little, if any the 
rationale that managed and governed the collective level employment relations in 
Turkey since the early days of the republic. What this process changed according 
to the argument developed in the study has been the scope of the political 
economy of insecurity pursued. Indeed, as has been argued in details in the 
Chapter 7, the institutional outcomes that the political economy of insecurity 
generated in domain of industrial relations became more pervasive affecting a 
wider group of organised labour it has been doing previously.  
It is also important to explain the level of analysis that the study has undertaken. 
This thesis scrutinises the relations between the actors of Turkish industrial 
relations at the national level over the institutionalisation of what I call political 
economy of security/insecurity in industrial relations or in other words over the 
recognition and exercise of freedom of association, right to collective bargaining, 
and right to strike. Therefore, it takes institution building as its referent subject 
and analyses the relationship between actors by addressing; 
(i) interests of the collective actors over (re)configuration and 
implementation of rules shaping and regulating the freedom of 
association, right to collective bargaining, and right to strike; 
(ii) translation of these interests into legal framework of industrial 
relations; 
(iii) consequent historical implications of (re)institutionalisation of legal 
structures of industrial relations on distribution of power between 
actors and on actors’ utilisation of their power resources – through 
legal, illegal, official and unofficial means – with the aim of  exerting 
influence upon the ways these rules were implemented.  
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Investigation of actors’ national level interests and interactions over the issues of 
freedom of association, right to collective bargaining, and right to strike, however, 
by no means should come to mean that this study has taken the actors of industrial 
relations as equals with regards to their power resources and with regards to the 
levels at which they operated. On the contrary, throughout the empirical chapters 
of the thesis, a continuous effort was made to explain the incompatibility between 
actors’ power resources and demonstration of the different levels at which they 
operated. In this regard, empirical chapters of the study, placed a special emphasis 
on the politico-economic, legal and social circumstances that surrounded state, 
capital and labour during the politico-economic periods under scrutiny, and in 
doing so they revealed that, state emerged as the most powerful actor in industrial 
relations, it played a central role in the way labour and capital emerged and 
developed. A detailed study of the legal framework and politico-economic and 
social circumstances that enveloped Turkish industrial relations in succeeding 
periods also unveiled that all these while having provided the industrial capital 
with plenty of opportunity to develop as a socio-economic class and to gain 
economic and political power, they played an important role in maintenance of 
labour’s disadvantageous position in industrial relations with regards to its 
existence as a class and to use of its power resources.  
Building on this background, one of the main aims of the sections on interests was 
to demonstrate the different levels at which actors operated. In this regard for 
example a brief overview of all ‘interests’ sections suggests that, more often than 
not, the capital owners have been able to voice and materialise their interests over 
the recognition and exercise of freedom of association, right to collective 
bargaining, and right to strike at the highest political level via their representatives 
in Turkish parliament. Such a situation, on the contrary, has been rarely observed 
in the case of labour, for it, throughout the history of modern Turkey either 
failed
18
 to send true representatives of its interests to the Turkish parliament, or 
when this was achieved, their small number made it easy for the majority in 
parliament to ignore interests of labour in the process of (re)institutionalisation of 
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 In understanding of this failure, one should consider the political, social, economic and legal 
circumstances that surrounded the Turkish working class.  
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political economy of industrial relations
19
. Having encountered some serious 
difficulties in voicing its interests at the highest political level, labour in the 
history of Turkish industrial relations therefore mostly voiced its concerns on 
socio-economic level, through for example organising mass meetings and 
demonstrations, sending letters and telegraphs to the leaders of political parties all 
of which aimed at voicing their interests on the recognition and exercise of 
freedom of association, right to collective bargaining, and right to strike
20
. 
One of the main aims of the sections on interactions, on the other hand, was to 
address the historical consequences of the actors’ operation at different levels in 
materialisation of their interests. To do so, these sections were designed to depict 
the ramifications of actors’ mobilisation of their power resources through making 
use of legal or illegal means as well as through establishing formal or informal 
networks that were available to them. Accordingly what a thorough review of 
interactions sections of the study suggsests is that, until 1960s, political elites and 
capital owners developed a clear consensus over the issues concerning recognition 
and exercise of freedom of association, right to collective bargaining, and right to 
strike, and they established a strong alliance between them during the process of 
institution building in domain of industrial relations. Resultantly the legal 
framework of industrial relations before 1960 distributed the power resources 
between actors highly in favour of the state and capital putting the labour at a 
considerably disadvantaged position as an actor in the domain of industrial 
relations. This situation showed some improvement in favour of organised labour 
in the 1960s with the new legislation. However, despite the fact that the 1961 
constitution and the subsequent legal framework of industrial relations placed 
labour on a more equal footing vis-à-vis capital and state, labour’s use of its 
power resources that were legally provided, became more difficult in the face of a 
growing consensus between a group of political leaders and of capital owners over 
the necessity and urgency of placing labour under state’s firm control. Such an 
alliance, resultantly, entailed increasing intervention of the state in favour of 
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 One important example to this situation could be given from planned economy period  when the 
AP government attempted to close DISK under the pretext that it did not represent one third of 
the workers nation-wide (see Isikli 2005). 
20
 For a review of the ways labour voiced its interests at socio-economic level, see the chapters on 
mono-party multi-party periods and planned economy period and see Sulker, 2004a.  
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industrial capital during the 1970s. In sum, a careful overview of available 
evidence indicates that, throughout the politico-economic periods that the thesis 
analysed, actors of industrial relations did not operate with the same attributes, 
and power resources made available to organised labour did not correspond to 
those made available to state and capital especially when they forged a strong 
alliance between them.  
At this point, it is important to bring some more explanation to the way terms 
interests and interactions were employed in the study. This study approached the 
industrial relations from a critical perspective, which considers industrial relations 
as “unequal power relation embedded in greater social and political inequalities” 
(Budd and Bhave, 2008: 92). It is in this respect that this study operationalised the 
terms interests and interactions to depict the contentious relationship between the 
actors of Turkish industrial relations on the issues of political economy of 
security/insecurity. More specifically, throughout the study, the sections on 
interests, in accordance with the studies’ conceptual-theoretical framework, were 
used to provide an explanation of the channels available to the actors to voice 
their interests, and of conflicting/overlapping interests of actors in the matters 
related to freedom of association, right to collective bargaining, and right to strike. 
Given that these rights and freedoms were fully accepted and guaranteed through 
the 1961 Constitution in Turkey and then were severely restricted with the 1982 
constitution, the sections on interests dealt with different discussions between 
actors in different politico-economic periods. Indeed, while in the chapters on 
mono-party period and multi-party period, a detailed study of interests of actors 
revealed an existence of a heated discussion between them on the necessity and 
favourable/adverse outcomes of acceptance of freedom of association, right to 
collective bargaining, and right to strike; in the chapter on planned economy  
period, a comprehensive analysis of interests of actors brought out that in this 
period discussions between actors mostly revolved around the extent to which 
these rights and freedoms need to be exercised and degree and form of state 
intervention in exercise of these rights and freedoms. Finally in the chapter that 
studied post-1980 period, a careful overview of interests of actors brought to light 
that, while the interests of capital owners as well as the urgent concerns of those 
political elites who represented the interests of state called for the necessity of 
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limitation of rights and freedoms of labour in the area of collective labour rights, 
labour, under the administration and orders of the military government in the 
early 1980s, was forced to remain silent or at best, was expected to establish 
harmonious relationships with the groups holding political power.  
The ‘interactions’ sections, on the other hand, were operationalised against the 
background of the sections on actors and on interests with the aim of providing an 
explanation to the historical implications of security/insecurity as an institutional 
rationale on the way(s) actors mobilised their power resources. This was again 
done by employing the conceptual-theoretical framework of the study. 
Accordingly, in the interactions sections of chapters on mono-party period and 
multi-party period, it was argued that throughout these periods, political economy 
of insecurity was implemented in domain of industrial relations and this not only 
assisted the political elites in their zeal for elimination of the conflict between 
labour and capital but also significantly curbed the power resources of organised 
labour placing it at a highly disadvantageous position vis-à-vis state and 
employers in domain of industrial relations with regards to mobilisation of their 
power resources.  
While the political economy of insecurity pursued in the country until 1960s left a 
very limited space for occurrence of any antagonism between the actors of 
industrial relations, the legal and rhetorical changes in the context of industrial 
relations that came with the 1960 military coup as well as the political economy 
and social transformations of the period, opened a space for intensification of 
conflict of interests in domain of industrial relations. Therefore, in the interactions 
section of chapter on planned economy  period, after the repercussions of 
implementation of political economy of security on actors’ materialisation of their 
interests were discussed, a considerable attention was paid to the discussion of the 
reasons underlying the intensification of conflict of interests between actors 
during the 1970s as well as to the explanation of political elites’ and capital 
owners’ changing reactions against organised labour’s mobilisation of their power 
resources in materialisation of their interests. 
Finally the interactions section of the post-1980 period overviewed the series of 
events in the domain of industrial relations that unfolded following the military 
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takeover of September 1980; the military junta during which, according to the 
argument put forward in the study, political economy of insecurity was brought 
back to domain of industrial relations. This section argued that, the changes made 
to the legal framework of industrial relations in the beginning of the period, 
proved successful in minimising the conflict of interests between capital and 
labour mainly through placing heavy restrictions on freedom of association, right 
to collective bargaining, and right to strike. The years following Turkey’s 
transition to competitive electoral politics in the year 1983 initiated a new period 
in political economy of insecurity in industrial relations which, with its emphasis 
on provision of social peace at workplace, not only left a very limited space for 
trade unions and workers to organise and join industrial conflicts but also re-
embedded insecurity as a rationale in institutional structures of industrial 
relations.  
Methodologically, the thesis proceeds as follows. In the Chapter 1, I narrated the 
events that unfolded in the pre-1970 period in a similar way that has been 
presented in much of the mainstream literature. Following this, I posited that 
understanding the current mode of political economy adopted in Turkey’s 
industrial relations requires a deeper historical analysis that stretches as far back 
as the early years of the republican period and presented my research questions. In 
Chapter 2, which focused on the conceptual and theoretical aspects that the study 
is based on, I delineated the term “political economy of insecurity”, by placing a 
special emphasis on power resources of actors, on institution building and on the 
institutionalisation of security/insecurity in the domain of industrial relations. 
Building on this conceptual and theoretical background, in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I 
scrutinise the institutionalisation of political economy of industrial relations in 
Turkey in the three aforementioned consecutive historical periods. These three 
empirical chapters are designed almost in the same way in that I analyse the 
actors, their interests and their interactions, respectively, in each chapter and 
finalise each with a discussion and conclusion section with the aim of creating a 
basis for comparison between the periods under scrutiny.  
Regarding the analysis pertaining to the actors, I take the state, capital and labour 
separately, placing them broader socioeconomic and political context. In Chapter 
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5 on the multi-party period and Chapter 6 on the planned economy period, I 
examine the state by looking at the (i) power, the political atmosphere and the 
ideology that prevailed; (ii) the political economy of industrialisation undertaken, 
and (iii) the state’s role as a lawmaker in the domain of industrial relations in each 
period. While in the Chapter 4 on the mono-party period, the first two subsections 
remain the same, the state’s role as a lawmaker has been placed in the subsection 
on interactions given that in the mono-party period, the state rather than regulating 
industrial relations with specific laws, opted for intervening in this domain 
through the provision of broader laws, such as penal code or the law on 
associations and through various repressive actions.  
The analysis on capital and labour in Chapters 5 and 6 also slightly differs from 
that in Chapter 4. Regarding this, the subsection on capital, while in Chapters 5 
and 6, being overviewed under the subsections (i) the state of private industry and 
(ii) employers as collective entities, in the Chapter 4, there is no such division. 
Rather, I concentrate on the political actors’ endeavours directed towards the 
creation of a nascent bourgeoisie, given that the mono-party period witnessed 
neither a take-off in private sector industry nor was there any evidence of 
associational efforts being made employers. Moreover, when comes to labour, in 
Chapters 5 and 6, although I analyse this under the subsections (i) labour 
migration and urban labour markets and (ii) labour as an actor, in the Chapter 4 I 
do not go into such a division. Instead, I focus on the static structure of Turkish 
society in the period in question and the underlying reasons for this given that the 
period, similar to the case of the employers, witnessed neither a massive labour 
flow from rural to urban areas nor a rising awareness in working class 
consciousness.  
Regarding the analysis of the interests of actors, in each chapter I look at the 
predominant concerns of the political actors who represented the views of the 
governing parties and where available those of the main opposition party, the 
employers and labour, in the domains of work and production. When studying 
interactions, on the other hand, I scrutinise the ways actors mobilised their power 
resources that were made available to them through the institutional structure of 
industrial relations and the consequences for organised labour. All the empirical 
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chapters are finalised with a discussion and conclusion section where, by referring 
to my conceptual and theoretical understanding, I draw the general outline of the 
type of political economy adopted and pursued in each period. The structure of the 
empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6 could be visualised as follows:  
Figure 4: The structure of the empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6 
 
In the final empirical chapter, that is chapter 7, I briefly overviewed a series of 
events in domain of industrial relations that were unfolded following the military 
takeover of September 1980. Given that political and economic circumstances 
surrounding the state, employers and capital have already been discussed in the 
previous chapter, this chapter concentrates solely on the interests of and 
interactions between actors in the post-1980 period. Finally, in Chapter 8, I bring 
together in brief outline what I have already discussed in my empirical chapters in 
the light of my conceptual-theoretical framework and in the context of the 
historical-institutionalist approach.  Moreover, I consider the contributions of the 
research, the limitations of the study and put forward suggestions for future 
research avenues as the conclusion to the thesis.  
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3.4 Data Sources, Research Limitations and Ethical Considerations  
This study utilises documentary data sources in order to probe long-term 
developments, changes and continuities in the political economy adopted in the 
domain of industrial relations in Turkey. The main documents drawn upon were:  
(i) academic studies giving historical accounts of labour-capital struggles;  
(ii) media sources offering detailed and time-specific narratives of conflicts of 
interests between actors;  
(iii) Turkey’s individual and collective labour laws that structured the power 
resources of the actors; 
(iv) publications of trade unions and employers organisations providing 
insights into the interests of workers and employers; 
(v) parliamentary proceedings offering a first-hand account of the way 
political actors defined and voiced their interests.   
In order to gather these data sources, I visited various libraries, and archives in 
Turkey and also largely utilised the interlibrary service provided by the University 
of Bath. 
The narrative was created by combining the data derived from formal and 
informal resources. Although the main concern in data source-selection was the 
academic utility of it, from time to time it was necessary to combine these ‘formal 
sources’ with the informal resources; such as pamphlets published by trade unions 
and employers’ association to create a more comprehensive picture. 
This study’s dependence on documentary data sources did have its limitations. For 
instance, this approach led to difficulty in selection of the empirical data as the 
various sources had differing points of view primarily because of the nature of the 
different people and institutions that were responsible for them. Also, the large 
quantity of documentary sources made it a challenge to keep the argument 
coherent, for it presented an embarrassment of riches, the result of which was that 
a considerable part of the gathered data excluded from the final draft.  
This study, despite having drawn on solely documentary resources, builds its own 
strengths. Indeed, although it mainly makes use of similar resources to those used 
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in mainstream industrial relations literature, it represents a break from the 
conventional stance in that it introduces different understanding and explanations 
for the post-1980 changes that came into place in institutional structure of 
industrial relations by employing a different theoretical framework to this field. 
However, it is accepted that as an attempt to contribute to history-sensitive 
industrial relations research, further investigation making use of different data 
which could complement, support or challenge the main tenets promulgated in 
this thesis is needed. 
Finally, regarding the ethical considerations, all such aspects have been taken into 
consideration, for it was recognised that analysis of secondary data also bears 
some ethical risks (ESRC, 2012: 25). With regards to the documentary data it 
utilises, this thesis, according to the ESRC’s (2012) categorisation, falls into the 
first category in that the data used is not sensitive and there is minimum risk of 
revealing the identity of individuals. Moreover, no access was requested to any 
classified documents that may have contained sensitive information. 
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview and discussion of the methods and 
techniques employed in the thesis.  After having briefly outlined historical 
institutionalism, I have explained that this study utilises a historical institutionalist 
approach as a analytical framework, which, I opine, is highly capable of shedding 
light on some crucial causal mechanisms, such as time, actors, interests, and 
power and which, as I contend, has been highly effective in assisting me to 
provide an understanding and explanation regarding the way the political 
economy of industrial relations was institutionalised in the post-1980 period in 
Turkey. In order to carry out a historical institutionalist approach I also indicated 
that I have employed documentary analysis and discussed its possible strengths 
and downsides. In the light of the concepts and methodology, the succeeding 
chapters will analyse the institutionalisation of the political economy of industrial 




 THE MONO-PARTY PERIOD (1923-45) CHAPTER 4:
4.1 Introduction  
The Republic of Turkey was established on the 29
th
 of October 1923 under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the aftermath of the Turkish 
independence struggle of 1919-1923, which followed the defeat, and break-up of 
the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. Following the establishment of the 
republican regime, Turkey ushered in an era of comprehensive modernisation in 
the: cultural, political and economic domains. Amongst this modernization 
programme, the establishment of industrial relations received substantial attention 
from the founders of the republican nation. The early republican period, therefore, 
set the stage for the formation of the underlying characteristics of Turkey’s 
political economy of industrial relations. However, to understand how this came 
about in the first place requires a close look to the emergence of the actors 
involved in industrial relations and the politico-economic and social environment 
in which they interacted in order to materialise their interests. This chapter, 
therefore, scrutinises the political economy of industrial relations in the mono-
party period in order to place the central hypothesis of the thesis on a sound 
footing. Section 4.2 provides a background to the following sections by briefly 
outlining the legacy of the Empire. Section 4.3 scrutinises the industrial relations 
in the period under discussion through an in-depth analysis of the actors, their 
interests and the setting up of industrial relations during the focal period. Section 
4.4 concludes the chapter.  
4.2 Legacy of the Ottoman Empire: A Background 
Throughout the mono-party period the founders of the Turkish republic under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, directed much of their efforts towards 
creating a modern, secular nation state out of remnants of the Ottoman Empire. 
These endeavours, known as the Turkish Revolution, sought to carry out a 
comprehensive transformation in society’s: political, social, economic, legal and 
cultural structures, in a short time (Aybars, 2000). However, materialisation of 
revolution proved to be a somewhat difficult task to achieve as the legacy of the 
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Ottoman Empire had set formidable challenges for the founders of the Turkish 
republic in three different domains. 
First, there was the political legacy of the empire, which was still considered to be 
a threat to the republican regime by its founders. Indeed, although in appearance 
the sultanate was brought to an end with the proclamation of the republic, the new 
regime was in its infancy and needed safeguarding. To add to this, democracy, 
praised in the high speeches of the political elites was yet to be established (see 
Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998). Second, the economic legacy of the empire 
combined with the destructive economic consequences of the long years of 
warfare required comprehensive solutions. Indeed, according to studies depicting 
the economic conditions of the period, the economy was heavily indebted and 
dependent on imports (see Sarc, 1948; Ahmad, 1993; Bayar, 1996), industrial 
production was highly rudimentary (see Table 1) mostly concentrated in small 
workshops scattered around Anatolia (Makal, 1999; Tezel, 2002) and most of the 
foreign trade and a substantial part of domestic trade were concentrated in the 
hands of the non-Muslim minorities and foreigners in a few big cities.  








Textile 20,057 35,316 1.76 
Leather 5,347 17,964 3.35 
Mining 3,272 8,021 2.45 
Woodwork and 
timber 
2,067 6,007 2.91 
Food 1,274 4,491 3.52 
Cement, clay, 
pottery 
704 3,612 1.93 
TOTAL 32,721 75,411 2.30 
Source: DIE 1973: 41.  
Last but not least, as an overview of the relevant literature reveals, the political 
actors were severely short of high-skilled professionals, intellectuals and skilled 
workers (Aybars, 2000; Pentzopoulos, 2002: 102; Tezel, 2002) to assist them in 
their enthusiastic efforts for nation-building and national development. Indeed, the 
socioeconomic legacy of the Empire amalgamated with war causalities, mass 
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deportations and exchange of population
21
 left Ataturk and his friends with a 
highly diminished population, which within the borders of contemporary Turkey 
dwindled down to 13.6 million in 1927 from that of 15.8 in 1913 (DIE, 1973; 
Eldem, 1994)
22
. To make the matters worse, much of these losses came from the 
skilled and semi-skilled urban (see McCarthy, 1983: 142; Pentzopoulos, 2002) 
and the male population (Aybars, 2000; Tezel, 2002). What remained to the 
young republic to form the building blocks of its human resources as a result was, 
as illusturated by Sarc (1948), the long neglected, illiterate and conservative 
peasant society, who demonstrably failed to satisfy the requirements of an 
ambitious development movement.  
The legacy of the Ottoman heritage that was built on a more than six-centuries-old 
socioeconomic and political configuration, significantly affected the distribution 
of political power and the nature of the republican ideology in Turkey all, which 
is the main focus of this chapter.  
4.3 The Political Economy of Industry and Industrial Relations in the Mono-
Party Period 
Industry and industrialisation, starting from the early years of the republic, 
received great attention from Kemal Ataturk and his associates, who helped him 
in establishment of the Republic of Turkey. In their minds, the country had to be 
raised ‘to the level of the most prosperous and civilized nations of the world’ 
(Ataturk, 1933) and be well placed in the league of the capitalist-democratic 
Western countries. To this end, the political actors launched numerous efforts to 
boost the industrial development of the country and thus became one key type of 
actor in industrial relations. The policies they devised and practices they 
implemented set the politico-economic environment for capital and labour and 
they at the same time laid down the fundamental principles of the political 
economy of industrial relations, the repercussions of which are to be explored in 
this thesis.  
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 See Pentzopoulos (2002) for detailed information on the Lausanne Conference where the 
transfer of population between Greece and Turkey was agreed. 
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The mono-party period that lasted from 1923 to 1945, as was already stated 
above, witnessed concerted efforts by the political actors towards 
industrialisation. Whether or not the politico-economic climate and the social 
conditions of the period provided a suitable environment for state, capital and 
labour to emerge as the actors of industrial relations is scrutinised below. 
4.3.1.1 State  
The establishment of the Republic of Turkey on the remnants of a defunct Empire 
in 1923 was, without a doubt, the political success of military-bureaucratic élites 
led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. However, it was not the end of their task and a 
new battle had to be waged in the socioeconomic and political domains if their 
fortunes in the new Turkey were to go further than just a military triumph. 
According to Ataturk, independence of nations was rooted in their economic 
success. For this reason, he deemed the hard-fought victory that the Turkish 
nation achieved in the Turkish War of Independence would not be a long-lasting 
one if it was not consolidated by the country’s socioeconomic progress (Ahmad, 
1981; Bayar, 1996; Aybars, 2000). However, in the Kemalist vision, steps taken 
forward for the betterment of the economy should follow only one path; the path 
which carried capitalist–democratic Western nations to economic success and 
prosperity, i.e. the capitalist road to industrialisation. Nevertheless, the 
perspectives of the Kemalist élites regarding the new Turkey were not confined to 
its economic development, for they wanted to raise the nation to the highest level 
of civilisation, which, in their eyes, only capitalist democratic and industrialised 
economies could reach. According to them, capitalist industrialisation, rather than 
being an end in itself represented a means to an end. That is, they saw national 
industrialisation to be correspondent with civilisation and to be the antecedent 
phase that forged democracy (Ahmad, 1993), which would finally place Turkey 
within the ranks of the already industrialised democratic Western countries. 
Having built up such prospects in their minds, during most of the mono-party 
period, Ataturk and his friends geared the economic policies towards 
industrialising the economy and accelerating national capital accumulation 
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(Kazgan, 1977). These attempts laid the foundations of the political economy of 
industrialisation in the Republic of Turkey and forged the national development 
project of the country; a plan which was expected to be adopted and carried out 
by the generations of political actors to come. Yet, this was a highly challenging 
duty to fulfil for it required political power to be re-distributed, political ideology 
to be redefined and reorganisation of the economy. All of these are analysed in the 
subsections that follow. 
4.3.1.1.1 Power and Ideology 
The Republic of Turkey, from its establishment in 1923 until 1946, was ruled by 
an authoritarian and paternalist single party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
– Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. Its politics and ideology, as pointed out by numerous 
authors, formed and governed the early republican period’s politico-economic and 
socio-cultural structure to a considerable extent (Ozbudun, 1981; Kocak, 1986; 
Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998; Aybars, 2000). According to the common consensus 
amongst the scholars, the CHP was composed of a coalition between military-
bureaucratic élites or Kemalist élites/interchangeably – i.e. Kemal Ataturk and his 
close friends – and the socioeconomic elites – i.e. the large landowners, the 
merchants, Anatolian notables and industrialists and shared its political power 
with some non-party elements consisting of military and civilian bureaucrats (see 
e.g. Avcioglu, 1968; Yerasimos, 1987; Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998; Waldner, 
1999). This ‘triarchy’ was led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk; the charismatic, 
founding father of the country (Yerasimos, 1987; Sunar and Sayari, 2004), the 
ideas and projections of whom substantially reconstructed the political and 
economic structure of modern Turkey (Aybars, 2000).  
This alliance, as the general lines of the dominant narrative suggest, mostly served 
the best interests of both sides and was carried out throughout the mono-party 
period (see e.g. Kazancigil, 1981; Yerasimos, 1987; Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998; 
Sunar and Sayari, 2004). Indeed, on the one hand, according to Yerasimos (1987), 
it offered the military-bureaucratic élites a favourable politico-economic climate 
in their efforts to modernise the country with their top-to-down reforms in the 
social and economic domains. On the other, as Avcioglu (1968) pointed out, it 
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provided the socioeconomic élites with a suitable environment for exercising 
political power and accumulating capital despite their role within the government 
mostly remaining a corroborative one
23
. In this political division of labour, 
according to many historians, the republican regime, regardless of being built on 
popular sovereignty, saw the role of the rest of the society as being to convey 
legitimacy on their state power (see Kazancigil, 1981; Yerasimos, 1987; Ahmad, 
1993; Kongar, 1998; Sunar and Sayari, 2004). Resultantly, even though at the 
outset the political structure of the state represented a rupture from the Ottoman 
Empire according to Sunar and Sayari (2004: 73):  
“[t]he overall system remained similar in its structure to the 
Ottoman past. It was organised, cohesive, and closed at the top, 
with selective penetration and restricted institutional 
permeation of society. It was primordial, segmented, and 
disconnected at the bottom”. 
The Kemalist elites established and maintained this exclusionary political 
collaboration of republican regime on the grounds of a particular ideology named 
Kemalism represented by six fundamental pillars/principles, i.e. republicanism, 
populism, secularism, reformism/revolutionism, nationalism and statism (for more 
information see Karal, 1981; Aybars, 2000). Having been formulated by Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk, and built on pragmatic rather than theoretical considerations, 
these principles, according to historians, served to the political actors the 
necessary basis for fast progress towards Western-type modernisation (Ahmad, 
1993; Aybars, 2000). Amongst these, statism and populism, which underpinned 
the young republic’s socioeconomic fundamentals (see Bianchi, 1984), formed a 
basis for the ruling élites’ outlook towards a better Turkish society (Aybars, 2000) 
and together played a leading role in the making of social policy and industrial 
relations in the early republican period (see Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992; Aybars, 
2000).  
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  Yet, it should be noted that from time to time, the Kemalist élites needed to forge a compromise 
with the socioeconomic élites with whom they shared the power. Thus, for example, according to 
Avcioglu (1968), although the mono-party government was able to enact modern legislation in 
socioeconomic life, it was unable to ratify and implement an effective land reform law due to the 
opposition of the socioeconomic élites. 
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The statist pillar of the Kemalist ideology pertained to the political elites who 
exercised their power in the domain of economics underlined by the aims of 
nationalising the economy and of providing and maintaining a level of economic 
wellbeing for all. It, moreover, was blended with a nationalist ideology (Pamuk, 
1981), which reverberated in the economic domain in the form of a national 
economy, the accent of which being placed on empowerment of the national 
bourgeoisie (Makal, 1999; Kazgan, 2006: 50-60).  The populist doctrine
24
, on the 
other hand, epitomised the priority of interests of the nation as a whole and thus 
critically complemented the statist pillar of the Kemalist ideology. It advocated 
building a strong alliance between the state and society for the sake of the latter. 
For, according to this principle, if the Turkish nation was to be elevated to the 
level of most developed nations, then solidarity and united action coming from all 
elements of state and society was essential (Ahmad, 1981; Makal, 1999; Aybars, 
2000).  
The statist and populist principles of the Kemalist ideology underpinned the 
Kemalist élites’ attitudes towards social issues and became highly instrumental in 
the making of social policy and industrial relations in the early republican period. 
Indeed, as has been indicated by scholars, they  provided the political actors with 
the necessary powers and mechanisms to ensure the loyalty of capital and labour 
to the republican regime and assisted them in safeguarding the functioning of the 
national economy with the minimum level of conflict of interest possible (see 
Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992; Makal, 1999). In addition, the statist and populist 
principles appeared to have legitimised the Kemalist élites’ absolute use of state 
power in the socioeconomic domain and offered them a rhetorical basis for their 
unrivalled domination over the interests and interactions of the economic actors 
(see Boratav, 2006). In brief, the Kemalist statism and populism served to allow 
the political actors to formulate and implement social policy measures in line with 
the country’s political regime (see Bianchi, 1984) and put them in a position of, in 
the words of Ahmad “the impartial guide of the people” by making them 
accountable for delivery of “what was best for them” (Ahmad, 1981: 157) in 
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  The populist pillar of Kemalist ideology deviated significantly from the commonly held 
interpretation, for it was assigned meaning and interpreted by Ataturk himself, for an informed 
account of the concept see Taggart, 2000; for an in-depth discussion of the ideas and events 
influencing Ataturk's understanding of populism, see Makal, 1999.    
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nearly all domains of socioeconomic life, the scope of which inevitably extended 
to the realm of industrial relations.  
4.3.1.1.2 Economy  
Throughout the mono-party period, the role of the state in the economy was 
marked by its attempts to materialise the national development project devised by 
Kemal Ataturk, which found its expression in the establishment of an 
industrialised nation state, the political and cultural structures of which were to be 
compatible with those of capitalist-democratic Western nation states. To this end, 
the military-bureaucratic élites took the reins of state in hand and implemented a 
number of political economy decisions regarding industrialisation and other forms 
of economic development in the mono-party period after taking into account how 
they saw the country’s external and internal politico-economic conditions. The 
Kemalist elites launched their national development project with the 
implementation of liberal economic policies in 1923. Subsequently, market 
oriented economic policies shaped and governed their national development 
project for six years and during this time span some of the national capital started 
to accumulate in the hands of Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie
25
. Nevertheless, much 
to the disappointment of the Kemalist elites, all these efforts neither triggered an 
industrialisation movement nor paved the way for an expected increase in the 
private sector investments. Instead, the small workshops and artisanal production 
continued to be the country’s predominant modes of industrial production (see 
Avcioglu, 1968; Tezel, 2002; Boratav, 2009) leaving industrial growth, as 
illustrated by Table 2, behind that of agricultural and the GNP as a whole 
throughout the period.  
Turkey’s experience with a liberal political economy came to an end towards the 
closure of the decade, with there being the recognition of an urgent need for a new 
political economy of industrialisation
26
. The Kemalist elites, starting from early 
1930s in this respect, tightened their grasp on politico-economic issues and 
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 For a detailed account of the liberal economic policies implemented in this period see e.g. 
Keyder, 1979; Bayar, 1996; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009.  
26
 For the various reasons lying behind this change see e.g. Basar, 1945; Sarc, 1948; Karpat, 1966; 
Ahmad, 1981; Yerasimos, 1987; Bayar, 1996; Boratav, 2009. 
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gradually replaced their market-centred political economy with a statist one 
prepared in line with the Kemalist ideology (Avcioglu, 1968; Tezel, 2002; 
Kazgan, 2006). Accordingly, between the years 1930 and 1939 the state came to 
be the main actor in socioeconomic domain and directed most of its resources 
towards launching an industrialisation movement designated to catching up with 
the capitalist industrial economies and to promoting national private industrial 
ventures (Avcioglu, 1968). To these ends, as was pointed out by Boratav (2009), 
the state acted as: investor, employer, operator, rule maker and supervisor 
throughout the period. It established and ran big scale factories and farms, 
exploited mines and forests, nationalised and constructed some necessary 
infrastructure and operated ships and railways (Sarc, 1948; Avcioglu, 1968’ 
Kazgan, 1977). Moreover, with the aim of boosting the private national initiatives 
and capital accumulation, it distributed credit to the investors, raised tariff barriers 
for domestically produced goods as well as supplying the private sector with 
cheap intermediate goods and inputs
27
 (Avcioglu, 1968; Tezel, 2002).  
Thanks to the statist political economy, Turkey accelerated its industrialisation 
process, laid down some necessary infrastructure, created a group of industrial 
bourgeoisie and by the end of the 1930s came to be a less dependent country on 
imports (Avcioglu, 1968; Kazgan, 1977; Ahmad, 1993; Boratav, 2006). During 
this period, the scale of the industrial establishments grew and the average number 
of workers at them increased from 3.9 in 1927 to 46.5 in 1933 and then to 78.1 in 
1939 (Yavuz, 1995: 109). To add to this, the statist policies helped to increase the 
size of the skilled and semi-skilled workforce as well as the numbers of 
executives, managers and technicians in the country (Lewis, 1968; Tezel, 2002; 
Kazgan, 2006). Nonetheless, the statist political economy was not long-lived for it 
yielded to the war time political economy with the closure of 1930s.  
The years between 1940 and 1945 were marked by Turkey’s attempts to avoid the 
Second World War, requiring the Kemalist élites to take severe measures in the 
social and economic domains. In order to be ready for war should this occur, they 
in this respect, abandoned their ambitious state-led industrialisation project and 
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 This list of policy implementations is by no means exhaustive, for further information see 
Kerwin, 1951; Avcioglu, 1968; Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995; Tezel, 2002; Kazgan, 2006. 
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adopted a political economy that was shaped and guided by the 1940 National 
Defence Law which granted the government broad authority over the economic 
issues pertaining to work and working conditions (see Avcioglu, 1968; Boratav, 
1982). Regardless of the wartime economic order that brought with it some strict 
measures in the economic domain
28
, as was pointed out by Boratav (2006), the 
political actors, however, seem to have avoided harming private sector activities, 
allowing and even promoting the continuation of private capital accumulation in 
the hands of the national bourgeoisie. Turkey’s economic and military 
mobilisation came to an end with the conclusion of the World War II in 1945. The 
Kemalist élites’ decision to remain non-belligerent doubtlessly saved the lives of 
many millions. Yet, as a the available literature reveals, the wartime political 
economy of the country brought Turkey’s industrial leap forward almost to a 
standstill, for a sharp decrease in the level of production both in agriculture and 
industry was recorded, a substantial rise in inflation rates was seen and a 
considerable drop in real wage rates was experienced (Tezel, 2002; Kazgan, 2006; 
Boratav, 2009).  
Table 2: Sectoral shares of the gross national product during the mono-party 
period 
Years Agriculture Industry Services 
1923 43.1 10.6 46.3 
1925 44.7 8.9 46.4 
1930 46.8 10.0 43.2 
1935 38.8 15.7 45.4 
1940 44.8 14.6 40.6 
1945 39.0 15.6 45.4 
Source: TUIK, 2009: 682.  
The conclusion of the Second World War, with all its socioeconomic and political 
repercussions, foreshadowed the end of the mono-party period. The Kemalist 
élites, throughout their almost two decades of unrivalled domination, moulded an 
economy geared for capitalist industrialisation and took crucial steps in the 
creation of an indigenous Turkish bourgeoisie. Despite these efforts starting to 
yield fruits, industrialisation of the country on a full-scale level, however, was not 
achieved within the lifespan of the mono-party period and the sectoral share of 
industry of the gross national product remained fairly low compared to agriculture 
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 For a detailed account of these measures see e.g. Boratav, 1982; Tezel, 2002.  
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throughout the period (see Table 2). However, providing a full grasp of the 
political economy of industrialisation during the mono-party period also requires 
scrutinisation of capital and labour as both of these are indispensable for any 
progress to be made towards capitalist industrialisation.  
4.3.1.2 Capital 
The political actors, in the materialisation of the Kemalist national development 
project, attributed a special emphasis to the creation and empowerment of a 
national bourgeoisie, for in their point of view, as was denoted by a number of 
historians, this socioeconomic group would be the key element in maintaining the 
industrialisation/development of the economy once it was equipped with adequate 
instruments (see Avcioglu, 1968; Tezel, 2002; Boratav, 2009). What is more, the 
initiation of an overall industrialisation movement amongst the leadership of the 
national capitalist class, according to the Kemalist élites, as Ahmad (1993) 
succinctly pointed out, was the only way to catch up with Turkey’s democratic-
capitalist counterparts and a significant indicator of the success of the Turkish 
revolution. 
It was against this background of ideas that the Kemalist élites regarded capital 
owners as their major collaborator in their assiduous endeavours to build an 
industrialised capitalist nation state (McCarthy, 1983; Yerasimos, 1987; Tezel, 
2002). However, they appeared to be highly selective in their choice of nationality 
in this partnership and welcomed only the Turkish bourgeoisie-to-be (Avcioglu, 
1968; Tezel, 2002). That is, these élites saw the Turkish merchants, industrialists, 
big landowners and the notables within the Anatolian petit-bourgeoisie as the 
socioeconomic actors who would take charge of the country’s economic 
development (Tezel, 2002) regardless of their small number, insufficient capital 
and little experience and knowledge in business (Alexander, 1960; Kazgan, 2006). 
To remedy the situation, as documented by a good number of studies carried out 
on early Turkish political economy, the ruling élites in line with their national 
economic project equipped Turkish capital owners, or in other words the national 
bourgeoisie, with various opportunities throughout the period (McCarthy, 1983; 
Yerasimos, 1987; Tezel, 2002; Boratav, 2006; Kazgan, 2006) and expected them 
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to emerge as powerful stakeholders supporting the politico-economic interests of 
state. 
As the parameters of the political economy of development/industrialisation 
shifted in line with the changing economic situation of the country, favourable 
circumstances offered to the Turkish capitalists, however, empowered different 
groups within the national bourgeoisie. In the early years of the mono-party 
period and under the conditions of liberal political economy, the Kemalist élites 
had no choice but to welcome capital accumulation in any form and by any group 
within the bourgeoisie on the condition that no harm was inflicted on their 
supreme development project and they allocated all available resources to 
generate a meaningful amount of national capital in private hands (Avcioglu, 
1968; Kazgan, 2006, Boratav, 2009). Their efforts, at first sight, seemed have paid 
them back for the economic policies implemented paved the way for the 
enrichment of a group of businessmen identified by their Turkishness (Tezel, 
2002; Boratav, 2009). Nevertheless, much to the disappointment of the political 
actors, these policies solely empowered the national commercial bourgeoisie and 
thus fell short of initiating restructuration of the national economy and the 
empowerment of national industrialists (see e.g. Avcioglu, 1968; Yerasimos, 
1976; Boratav, 2005; Kazgan, 2006, see also Table 3 below). 
Table 3: Sectoral distribution of the industrial establishment employing over 50 















Textile industry 96 





51 Electrical industry 7 
Mining industry 16 Chemical industry 7 
Timber industry 29 Other 1 
                                                                              Grand total 321 
Source: DIE, 1928: 10.  
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Nevertheless, the rise of the commercial bourgeoisie from amongst the ranks of 
nascent Turkish bourgeoisie came to a standstill with the closure of the 1920s. 
Underlying this was the Kemalist élites’ implementation of a statist political 
economy with the aim of fostering a national industry and forging a national 
industrial bourgeoisie. The implementation of statist political economy
29
, which 
lasted for almost the next decade, resulted in concentration of capital in greater 
masses in the hands of national businessmen (Boratav, 2009) and the 
establishment of larger-scale industrial enterprises (see Fisek, 1969, Bugra, 1994) 
along with the rise and empowerment of a national industrial bourgeoisie in the 
politico-economic domain (see Yerasimos, 1976, Bugra, 1994). The statist 
political economy, however, could not be maintained beyond the 1930s, for with 
the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 the country’s industrialisation 
efforts yielded to wartime exigencies despite Turkey’s decision to remain out of it 
(Owen and Pamuk, 1998; Boratav, 2009).  
Turkey’s wartime precautions and preparations, indeed, induced a change in the 
Kemalist élites’ politico-economic priorities. This transformation was embodied 
in the framework of the National Defence Law, which provided the political 
actors, with supreme powers in relation to governance of the economy (see 
Avcioglu, 1968; VanderLippe, 2005; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009). During this 
period, however, despite the heavy hand of the state on the economy, the National 
Defence Law mentioned above provided the Kemalist cadre with enough leverage 
so as not to prohibit the development of the private sector and Turkification of the 
bourgeoisie. What is more, it was not only the policies and practices of the ruling 
elites had an impact, for throughout the war years, according to the historical 
accounts provided by social historians, wartime profiteers seized every single 
opportunity to reap profits and to enrich themselves by taking advantage of the 
worsening economic situation (Okte, 1950; Avcioglu, 1968; Tezel, 2002; Zurcher, 
2004; Boratav, 2006). The war years, therefore, according to a consensus in the 
literature, witnessed the most noticeable acceleration of capital accumulation in 
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 For a detailed account of the achievements of the statist political economy when working 
towards the creation of a national industrial bourgeoisie in the mono-party period, see e.g. Basar, 
1945; Kerwin, 1951; Avcioglu, 1968; Yerasimos, 1976; Bugra, 1994; Tezel, 2002.  
110 
 
the hands of the national elements since the establishment of the republic 
30
 (Okte, 
1950; Avcioglu, 1968; Boratav, 1982; Tezel, 2002). However, this ongoing 
process proved unsuccessful when it came to the materialisation of national 
economic project in the real sense, for, as reported by a number of historians, it 
was the large landowners and commercial bourgeoisie who came out of the war 
stronger (Okte, 1950; Avcioglu, 1968; Zurcher, 2004; Boratav, 2006). The 
politico-economic gains of industrial bourgeoisie, on the other hand, appeared to 
have remained limited (Tezel, 2002, Boratav, 2009). The tight control of the 
economy through the implementation of the National Defence Law, regardless of 
the fact that it benefited mostly the capital owners, weakened the alliance 
established between the military-bureaucratic and socioeconomic elites, thus 
marking the onset of a new period in Turkey’s politico-economic history, as is 
further discussed in the next chapter. 
4.3.1.3  Labour   
The Kemalist elites, while having paid significant attention to the emergence and 
development of a capitalist class in their dedicated efforts aimed at creating an 
industrialised economy, they did not accept the growth of a proletarian class in 
this process. That is, in the Kemalist view, labour needed to wait their turn in 
process of the making of a robust national economy, for according to Ataturk 
himself, there could be no working class without a developed industry’31 (Aralov, 
1967: 234). Much in consonance with this situation, while the socioeconomic 
architecture of Turkish society provided the political actors with a group of 
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 As the scholarly literature reveals, throughout the war years, capital owners, especially those 
dealing with trade and agriculture, both Muslim and non-Muslim, benefited from the wartime 
economic order by prospering on the black market and by making fortunes from skyrocketing 
wartime inflation (see Avcioglu, 1968; Boratav, 1982). In what followed, thousands of Muslim-
Turkish nouveau riches emerged in Anatolian provincial towns together with even greater 
prosperity for the non-Muslim merchants of Istanbul, which was set against a backdrop of the 
impoverished masses. In response to the drawbacks of their wartime economic policy and 
practices, the Kemalist élites introduced two wartime taxes, Wealth Tax -Varlık Vergisi- in 1942 
and Land Products Tax -Toprak Mahsulleri Vergisi- in 1943. Yet, rather than establishing a 
sense of social justice within the ranks of the society and curbing the excessive profits made by 
those exploiting the wartime conditions, the way these tax laws were formulated and 
implemented, according to historians, did nothing more than enriching and empowering the 
Muslim Turkish capital owners, for they encumbered the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the small 
peasantry with heavy taxes, which they painfully struggled to pay (for a detailed account of war 
time taxes see e.g. Bugra, 1994; Owen and Pamuk, 1998; VanderLippe, 2005).   
31
 This was Ataturk’s idea regarding the Turkish working class, which found its expression in his 
discussion with the Russian ambassador Aralov (1967: 234) during the early 1920s. 
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potential businessmen ready and eager to grasp the opportunities offered by the 
Kemalist national development project, it did not manifest itself with dispossessed 
masses who would subsequently become waged workers and threaten conflict 
with the process of capitalist industrialisation. The evolution of Turkish working 
class, in this respect, took place under somewhat disparate circumstances, 
displayed distinct traits and proceeded with a different pace than in the case of 
Turkish employers during the mono-party period.  
The Republic of Turkey inherited an urban workforce from its predecessor 
concentrated especially in the large trade centres, such as Istanbul and Izmir, 
working in modern sectors (see TIB, 1976, Snurov, 2006). These urban workers, 
the number of whom was estimated to be between 111,950 and 144,400 by the 
end of 1923 (Guzel, 1983)
32
, had more or less gained working-class consciousness 
thanks to the labour movements of the late Ottoman period (see Ekin, 1976; 
Gulmez, 1991; Karakisla, 1995). In addition, the country was not totally bereft of 
skilled and semi-skilled labour of artisan origin who could turn into waged 
workers should the need arise (see Alexander, 1960; Makal, 2002). However, 
despite this, the numbers available for the prospective third party of industrial 
relations remained quite insignificant throughout the mono-party period (see 
Yerasimos, 1976; Ahmad, 1995; Snurov, 2006). Accordingly, many scholars 
studying the social history of early republican Turkey depict labour in the mono-
party period as large masses of peasants who had very little to do with a capitalist 
economic system (see Basar, 1945; Barkin, 1946; Dincer, 1946; Seren, 1947; 
Nalbandoglu, 1948; Ozeken, 1948a; Avcioglu, 1968; Makal, 1999). 
  Table 4: Share of urban and rural population in the mono-party period 
 Urban Rural 
Years Population  Percentage  Population  Percentage 
1927 3,305,879 24.22 10,342,391 75.78 
1935 3,802,642 23.53 12,355,376 76.47 
1940 4,346,249 24.39 13,474,701 75.61 
1945 4,687,102 24.94 14,103,072 75.06 
   Source: DIE 2002: 46.  
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 There are no available official statistical data for the number of the workers in the early 
republican period and these numbers indicate the estimated number of workers living in urban 
areas based on Guzel’s (1983) study.  
112 
 
According to a prevailing consensus in Turkey’s labour historiography, the most 
striking features of the country’s peasant population was that they were Muslim 
and they formed the majority  (see Table 4). They were self-sufficient (see 
Ozeken, 1948a; Aruoba, 1982; Keyder, 1993) through cereal –in particular wheat- 
production (Ozbek, 2003; Boratav, 2009), with around 90 per cent of them having 
secure access to family land – of a small or medium size33 (DIE, 1973) – and 
cultivated mostly by employing family labour and primitive methods. Landless 
peasant households, which made up around 10 per cent of the peasant population, 
on the other hand, mostly engaged in sharecropping or worked for larger 
landowners (see Atasagun, 1941; Basar, 1945; Nalbandoglu, 1948; Avcioglu, 
1968), although migration to the cities for urban jobs, on a permanent or 
temporary basis (Zaim, 1956; Ekin, 1968), was not an ignored option for them. 
Penetration of agriculture into the socioeconomic lives of Turkish people, 
therefore, retained the share of agriculture in total employment up to 90 per cent 
(see Table 5) and seemed to have left almost no room for proletarianisation even 
in agriculture (Nalbandoglu, 1948; Ozeken, 1948a; Pamuk, 1991; Keyder, 1993) 
let alone industry during the early republican period.  
Table 5: Sectoral distribution of employment in Turkey in the mono-party period 
(for population of 12 + years of age) 
Years Agriculture Industry* Services 
1924 89.8 4.6 5.5 
1929 87.8 6.2 6.0 
1933 89.4 4.9 5.7 
1939 86.7 8.0 5.3 
1944 86.5 8.3 5.2 
* includes construction 
Source: Bulutay 1995: 189.  
The domination of traditional rural production and the availability of independent 
ways of surviving outside market relations in Turkish society, what is more, 
showed very little signs of change throughout the mono-party period and for the 
explanation of this continuity, a thorough review of the literature seems to offer 
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 Although there is a scarcity of data giving distribution of land and landownership in the early 
republican period, this can be estimated by referring to some figures. According to the 1913 
census, farmers with small to medium landholdings counted up to 87 per cent of the peasant 
families and only 8 per cent of peasant families remained landless. Yet, it should be also noted 
that the distribution of land was somewhat disproportionate and there were 50.000 families 




five major and interrelated factors. First, according to many authors, the leading 
role of the agricultural sector in Turkey’s economy, in general, and the prevalence 
of small land ownership amongst the peasantry, in particular, maintained the 
connection of the masses with the land and agricultural production throughout the 
period (see Ozeken, 1948a; Avcioglu, 1968; Ekin, 1968; Kazgan, 1977; Keyder, 
1993; Makal, 1999; Tezel, 2002). Second, the pronounced push-factors of 
migration from rural to urban areas, such as rapid population growth, 
mechanisation in agriculture
34
, and limitedness of arable lands, according to the 
historical accounts offered by authors, were not matters for discussion in those 
days (see Ekin, 1968; Makal, 1999). 
Third, although some policies and practices of the period were conducive with the 
concentration of large landholdings in the hands of a very limited number of 
people (see Avcioglu, 1968; Birtek and Keyder, 1975), this did not result in an 
enclosure-like movement as seen in England (see Tezel, 2002), which forced the 
rural population move to the urban centres, permanently. Access to land for the 
majority of the rural population, instead, appears to have brought with it a rather 
different form of relation between peasant families and urban centres, where the 
latter provided the former –those who were not able to be fully self-sufficient- 
with supplementary means of livelihood during the seasons of low labour 
requirements in the agriculture (see Ozeken, 1948a; Ekin, 1968) or when the 
family budget was in need of additional income (Ekin, 1968; Makal, 1999). This 
sort of interrelation with the urban areas and the rural population created, in turn, 
what Ekin (1968) called “the peasant-workers”, referring to the peasantry’s 
temporary migration to urban areas when there remained nothing to do to earn 
money in the villages. 
Fourth, according to an accepted opinion in academic works that set the ground 
for the Turkish labour studies literature, the interests and choices of the peasantry 
that is to say their strong affiliation to the land and agricultural life, exerted a 
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 It is estimated that there were around 2,000- 3,000 tractors in use in the pre-1929 period in 
Turkey. Yet, these vehicles, as indicated by a number of scholars, remained exclusively confined 
to the large landowners who took advantage of government subsidies for agriculture in the early 
years of the republic. What is more, mechanisation in the agriculture came to a halt with the 
onslaught of the 1929 Great Depression followed by the Second World War (see Avcioglu, 
1968; Birtek and Keyder, 1975). 
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considerable impact on the continuity of the traditional relations of production and 
life styles during the mono-party period (Barkin, 1946; Dincer, 1946; Seren, 1947; 
Ozeken, 1948a; Sarc, 1949; Ekin, 1958, 1968; Makal, 1999).  
Last but not least, the traditional socioeconomic order of Turkish society appears 
to have been so intricately entrenched in the economic functioning of the country 
and this situation seems to have suited so well the materialisation of the Kemalist 
élites’ national development project that the political actors displayed an interest 
in favour of the maintenance of the traditional architectural structure. Indeed, for 
one thing, as was pointed out in historical accounts of the period, most of the 
agricultural output was produced largely with manual labour using primitive 
methods and this displayed very little change until the end of the period (see 
Keyder, 1983; Pamuk, 2000). In order to maintain the existing agricultural 
structure, therefore, the Kemalist cadre subsidised the small and medium farmers 
throughout the period (see Birtek and Keyder, 1975; Hale, 1981; Kuruc, 1987; 
Ozbek, 2003) and in so doing, as I argue, substantially contributed to the stability 
of the socioeconomic structure of society. Yet maintenance of the agricultural 
production was not the only concern of the political actors, for equally important 
appeared to be their apprehension about a socioeconomic upheaval in society 
triggered by a mass migration movement from rural to urban areas; a considerable 
worry which let the political actors stay alert to taking every possible measure to 
prevent it (see Timur, 1971; Karaomerlioglu, 1998)
35
.  
The socioeconomic circumstances that surrounded the population engaged in 
agriculture, when combined with the economic and socio-political concerns of the 
Kemalist elites, resultantly, restrained the emergence of the working class from 
the ranks of the peasantry in the mono-party period (Dincer, 1946; Seren, 1947; 
Nalbandoglu, 1948; Ozeken, 1948b; Avcioglu, 1968; Ekin, 1968; Makal, 1999). 
However, it would be mistake to consider this period as an era completely bereft 
of the conditions necessary for the formation of a class-conscious working class. 
Indeed, in the first place, factories established thanks to the statist political 
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 According to Karaomerlioglu (1998), for example, even in the heyday of the statist period, 
reservations of the ruling élites’ regarding the socioeconomic consequences of industrialisation 
restricted the extent of their endeavours towards this. In this regard, for instance, they established 
state factories far away from the city centres and kept the workers, as much as possible, away 
from the “potential dangers of urban life”. (Karaomerlioglu 1998), 
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economy required greater numbers of workers to work in industrial sector. In fact, 
the total of employed people in the industrial sector displayed a substantial 
increase during the mono-party period, with the figures escalating from an 
estimated 145,000 in 1923 (Guzel, 1983) to 275.000
36
 in 1946 (see Table 6). 
Table 6: Estimated number of workers for the year 1946 
Workers in medium and large scale industry 275,000 
Workers in small scale industry 20,000 
Handicraft workers 100,000 
Domestic craft workers 100,000 
Sea workers 6,000 
Agricultural workers 200,000 
Total 701,000 
Source:  Makal, 1999: 463. 
Second, increase in numbers of the workforce employed in industrial sector was 
accompanied by industrial workers’ growing experiences of exploitation and 
oppression. Indeed, a brief review of historical accounts of the period reveals that 
throughout the period wages in industry mostly remained below subsistence 
levels. Moreover, almost no precautions were taken to reduce the long working 
hours, no provision made to provide adequate health and safety conditions at 
work, no initiatives were taken to establish a social security system to protect the 
workers and their families and hardly any measure was taken to improve the poor 
infrastructure of the urban areas. What is more, as is discussed further below, the 
political actors made every effort to inhibit the emergence of any kind of 
association for self-help and self-defence (see Hines et al., 1936; Ozeken, 1948a; 
Ekin, 1968; Gulmez, 1991; Makal, 1999; Snurov, 2006). Poor living and working 
conditions in the modern sector that the workers suffered, as was indicated by 
Guzel (1983, 1995), sowed the seeds of class-consciousness in the minds of the 
working population, created a sense of solidarity amongst the ordinary people and 
helped them to define and defend their interests in the years to come. However, 
the mono-party period ended before the working people gained their strength and 
the politico-economic interests of state and employers surpassed those of labour 
placing them in the position of the weakest interest group within the actors of 
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 No data are available indicating how many of these individuals were peasant-workers and how 
many of them belonged to the urbanised labour force.  
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industrial relations throughout the era. This is further analysed in the following 
subsection.  
4.3.2 Interests 
The interests that the actors of industrial relations pursued in mono-party period 
echoed their security-related concerns in the domain of work and production and 
set the framework for the way industrial relations became institutionalised. The 
political actors, given their supremacy in the politico-economic arena, emerged 
and prevailed as the most dominant interest group. Capital and labour, on the 
other hand, given the political economy and social circumstances surrounding 
them, remained mostly incapable of making their presence felt as socioeconomic 
actors and their interests remained inferior to those of the political actors 
throughout the period. 
The Kemalist elites, drawing on the experiences of already industrialised 
countries, deemed industrial relations a crucial area to be taken care of in the 
process of industrialisation and they therefore considered it to be an essential 
component of their national development project. The paramount importance they 
attributed to labour-capital relations therefore drove them to champion their own 
national interests within the area of industrial relations that is: the establishment of 
a capitalist economy, rapid accumulation of national capital and the advancement 
of industrialisation progress. Their projections for the politico-economic order of 
the country, was articulated by Kemal Ataturk as follows (Aralov, 1967: 234); 
“There is no working class in Turkey because there is no 
developed industry. We need to turn our bourgeoisie into a class 
yet”.  
In the context of such supreme interest and hegemonic ideas, the political actors 
throughout the mono-party period, assigned industrial relations the role of helping 
to establish and maintain social harmony/national solidarity (see Gulmez, 1991; 
Makal, 1999). In order to do so, as a thorough review of historical accounts 
reveals, the Kemalist elites, utilised a rhetoric which continually pointed out to the 
classless nature of the Turkish society and importance of its maintenance (see 
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Avcioglu, 1968; Aydemir, 1968; Makal, 1999). Kemal Ataturk’s inaugural speech 
made to the Izmir Economic Congress,
37
 appears to neatly illustrate dominant 
discourse employed by the political elites in the period. At the congress held even 
before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, he enunciated that:  
“Our people, rather than consisting of different classes, is made 
up of classes [sic] whose existence and works are necessary for 
each other. At the moment, my audience are peasants, artisans 
[sic], merchants and workers. Which one of these could be 
antithetical to another? Who can deny that the peasantry needs 
artisans, artisans need peasantry, the peasantry need merchants 
and […] workers?38  
Perusal of the CHP’s party programmes suggests that Kemal Ataturk’s populist 
appeal to the structure of the new Turkish society, pertaining to the view that the 
existence of one economic group rests on others’ survival, formed the ideological 
basis of the interest that the political actors pursued in the domain of industrial 
relations throughout the mono-party period. The CHP (1931: 13-15, 1935: 8-9) 
indeed repeatedly elucidated in its party programs that:  
“It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the 
Republic of Turkey not composed of different classes, but as a 
community divided into various professions in accordance with 
the division of labour required for the social and individual 
lives. The peasants, small producers, artisans, workers, 
employees, self-employed, big manufacturers, big business 
owners, merchants and large landowners are the main groups of 
professions constituting the Turkish community. With this 
principle, the main aims of the Party are to protect the social 
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 This congress was convened with the aim of determining Turkey’s new economic policy with 
the participation of four different national interest groups, i.e. farmers, workers, merchants and 
industrialists. See Finefrock, 1981 for a detailed account of the Congress. 
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 As stated by Ataturk in 17/02/1923. For the whole speech visit Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi 





order and solidarity instead of class conflicts and to establish 
harmony of interests without harming others.” 
Against this background what a thorough review of the available literature 
suggests is that the Kemalist cadres’ populist approach to industrial relations and 
their interest of maintenance of a classless, harmonious working life where all 
individuals work at their best and where none of the interests harm the others, 
carried at least three profound implications with respect to their hegemonic 
national project. First, in a classless society, they thought, all the interests would 
be defined in terms of so-called sovereign interests of the whole of society. It was 
going to be this harmony of interests, in their minds, which was to set the ground 
for the organisation of the society to achieve the paramount national interest, i.e. 
launching of a national industrialisation movement under the leadership of an 
emerging national capitalist class (cf. Avcioglu, 1968; Aydemir, 1968; Ahmad, 
1981; Makal, 1999). Second, they expected the maintenance of a classless society 
through socioeconomic and political measures to eradicate class awareness and 
antagonisms even before they came about (see Kuruc, 1987; Ahmad, 1995, Tezel, 
2002). Such a strategic manoeuvre, in turn, they believed would be the key to 
safeguarding the regime against working class militantism, which was likely to 
emerge as industrial development progressed, thus saving the country from the 
worst fear of the ruling élites, i.e. proletarian revolution (see Ahmad, 1995; 
Makal, 1999). Regarding this issue, Halil Mentese’s words, a large landowner and 
a member of parliament on the issue of legislation of the first republican labour 
code in 1935, seem to epitomise the general opinion amongst the ruling élites in a 
subtle way as he stated in his address to the parliament that (Kuruc, 1987: 78, 
brackets added): 
“[…] our country is industrialising […] a few years later from 
now, we will have factories that will bring thousands of workers 
together. For this reason, if we realise the truth [and] take 
measures beforehand, we can save the country from the 
influences of international movements […] Even today, workers 
of our country have started to be harmed by communism. 
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Third, and perhaps most important of all, the founding fathers of the Turkish 
republic associated perpetuation of national independence of the country with 
economic development, attainment of which, in the least time possible, was, 
according to them, contingent on the provision of national solidarity/social 
harmony (see Aydemir, 1968; Kuruc, 1987). “Political, military victories”, as 
Ataturk put it in Izmir Economic Congress
39
, “no matter how glorious they are, 
cannot survive and fade away in a short time if they are not crowned with 
economic victories”. For this reason, as a review of available accounts suggests, 
Mustafa Kemal saw economic achievements, just like military ones, as victories 
reached only by means of national solidarity (see Avcioglu, 1968; Ahmad, 1993). 
His speech addressed to Turkish nation on the occasion of the tenth year 
anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic in this respect provides 
one of the clearest examples of his views as he declared that (Ataturk, 1933): 
“We can never consider what we have achieved to be sufficient, 
because we must, and are determined to accomplish even more 
and greater tasks. We shall raise our country to the level of the 
most prosperous and civilized nations of the world. We shall 
endow our nation with the broadest means and sources of 
welfare […] We shall perform greater tasks in a shorter time. I 
have no doubt that we shall accomplish this [...] because the 
Turkish nation is capable of overcoming the difficulties in their 
national solidarity.”  
Nevertheless, despite the Kemalist rhetoric of national solidarity/social harmony 
and the political actors’ ideological commitment to the creation of a classless 
society, they, as a necessary part of their national project, welcomed the formation 
of a national bourgeoisie to be a distinct socioeconomic class, and made every 
effort for its development (see Avcioglu, 1968; Ahmad, 1993; Boratav, 2006). In 
return for this, as was also stated above, they expected the national bourgeoisie to 
be their major partner in the Kemalist revolution and to support them in their 
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nation-building project (McCarthy, 1983; Yerasimos, 1987; Tezel, 2002). It 
should come as no surprise that the Turkish bourgeoisie accepted the partnership 
offered by the Kemalist elites and with little hesitation, if any, voiced their 
interests in the politico-economic domain. 
One area that served the best interests of the political actors and capital owners 
had been the former’s concerted efforts towards the creation of a classless society 
and their exercising of absolute control in the area of industrial relations. The 
parliamentary discussions in this regard offer quintessential examples of the 
degree to which capital owners gave countenance to the Kemalist élites’ approach 
to industrial relations. In his speech addressed to participants of one parliamentary 
session, Halil Mentese
40
 (TBMM, 1937: 355-56 emphasis and brackets added), a 
large landowner and a member of parliament, for example, enunciated that: 
“The labour problem, today, has become one of the most 
important problems for all states of the world […] I emphasize 
this because it should teach us a lesson […] Working classes 
[sic] started tyrannising and causing trouble in these states. For 
us not to get to this point, because […] the working masses [in 
our country] are increasing in leaps and bounds each year […] 
I would like to bring forward this lesson from the history. The 
working classes’ acquisition of their rights by force 
undermines the state’s existence […]. For this reason, I advise 
[our Minister of Economy] […] to take social precautions with 
the hand of the state and to implement them with the assistance 
of capital and labour as soon as possible”.  
Much in a similar vein, during another parliamentary session Emin Sazak 
(TBMM, 1936: 31 brackets added), again a large landowner and a member of 
parliament regarding the labour law that was to come into effect said that:  
“[t]his [labour law] has many shortcomings […] If we enact 
this law as it is, we will give cause big trouble to the state. We 
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do not have a separate class as a working class in our country. 
At the end of the day workers are all peasants.”  
The Kemalist elites, however, much in contrast with their welcoming attitude 
towards formation of a capitalist class, deemed emergence of a Turkish working 
class detrimental to the progress of their national economic project (Avcioglu, 
1968; Ahmad, 1981, 1995). They, therefore, as can be inferred from their 
speeches, rather than envisioning a developed working class with its distinctive 
identity and interests, imagined a community of people ready to adopt the 
supreme national interests of the country. ‘Turkish workers’ as stated by Recep 
Peker, secretary general of the Republican People’s Party ‘will not be an element 
of fight and dissent, they will be supportive assistants to the Turkish state by 
believing wholeheartedly in its existence and perpetuity’. Kemalist proclamation 
of a classless society as a prerequisite to national solidarity, when come to labour 
in this respect, appeared to mean its unconditional subordination to the 
requirements of capitalist industrialisation proceeding under the guidance of a 
pro-capitalist political economy (see Makal, 1999).  
Nevertheless, the interests that the Kemalist élites pursued with regards to labour 
and its position in industrial relations was not easy to materialise even though the 
number of proletarianised workers, according to the estimations, did not exceed 
145,000 (see Guzel, 1983) at the beginning of the mono-party period. Indeed, it 
was almost self-evident from the beginning that there was a prevalence of interest 
awareness amongst that small minority of modern sector workers and amongst 
some intelligentsia of the young republic, spreading of which, at least according to 
the Kemalist elites, would end up with the attainment of such awareness amongst 
all of the working masses (see Ahmad, 1995; Makal, 1999). Those who had 
attained working class awareness, what is more, did not confine themselves to 
discussing their agendas in their small community and ventured into 
dissemination of their security-related interests on various occasions. For 
example, at the Izmir Economic Congress, where they were provided a platform 
on an equal footing with other economic actors to voice their interests, they came 
forward with a programme in which they demanded, amongst other things: the 
right to organise, the establishment of an eight hour working day, entitlement to 
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paid annual leave and sick leave, designation of paid weekly leave, enactment of 
maternity leave and adoption of May 1st as Labour Day
41
 (Okcun, 1997). In the 
following years, perhaps by virtue of the liberal and tolerate climate of the Izmir 
Economic Congress, labour continued to make its presence felt in politico-
economic affairs. Moreover, the mono-party governments’ numerous attempts to 
legislate a labour law, in this regard, seemed to have opened up for them a fruitful 
avenue to voice their security-related concerns. For example, in response to the 
measures of a draft labour code that came under discussion in 1927, which 
adopted a pro-business approach to labour issues, the Worker’s Advancement 
Society – Amele Teali Cemiyeti42 – issued  a memorandum, which besides 
directing attention to the shortcomings of the proposed law, recommended 
progressive amendments
43
 be made by the CHP government and this proposal was 
probably the one major reason for their closure by the CHP one year later in 1928 
(see Snurov, 2006). Besides diplomatic initiatives through which workers 
expressed their interests, strike actions which took place under very difficult 
conditions also provided workers a platform to voice their interests. Indeed, as a 
review of available literature indicates, during the strikes workers protested 
against bad working conditions, unjust dismissals, low or unpaid wages and they 
called for amongst others, the right to organisation, enactment of an eight hour 
working day, payment of delayed wages, provision of paid annual leave and the 
adoption of a weekly day of rest (TIB, 1976; Guzel, 1983; Snurov, 2006).   
However, it should be noted that despite the existence of a level of working class 
awareness within the ranks of the working people, labour pursued hardly any 
interest directed towards replacing the Kemalist regime with one that was more 
receptive to their concerns. Instead, they espoused attainment of some 
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fundamental socioeconomic security interests and remained adhered to the 
Kemalist regime (Guzel, 1983; Sulker, 1983; Makal, 1999). Although one 
plausible reason for this cautious stance of labour could be argued to be the 
Kemalists’ rigid approach towards class conflict, this was only part of the story. In 
fact, what lay behind the labour’s disadvantageous position in industrial relations 
as an actor appeared to be the shortage of the number of workers who had 
developed a meaningful degree of working class-awareness, for as mentioned 
above, the majority of urban workers were of rural origin who associated their 
socioeconomic interests largely with the agricultural sector, seeing their urban 
jobs as a temporary source of income. As a result, the number of workers who did 
not develop any class interest awareness greatly outnumbered those that had and 
articulation of these interests by handful of workers appeared was too weak to 
rival that of other actors. This limitation arguably provided both the Kemalist 
elites and capital owners with a rare opportunity to materialise their interests with 
the minimum level of organised resistance, which is investigated further below.   
4.3.3 Interactions 
A review of the available resources suggests that the Kemalist elites, having 
claimed the dominion of state interests and through exercising their supreme 
authority and legislative power, played the leading role in the making of industrial 
relations in the period in question. Their commitment to the creation of a capitalist 
nation state and to rapid industrial progress as well as their expectations from the 
actors, in this respect, shaped and steered interactions between them in the domain 
of industrial relations. Under these conditions, there remained very little room to 
manoeuvre for labour and capital and thus, while the role of the latter in the 
institution building process of industrial relations was confined to an interest 
representation, labour appears to have been completely excluded from this process 
(see Kuruc, 1987; Gulmez, 1991; Makal, 1999).   
Throughout the era, the Kemalist elites, by wielding the reins of the state 
apparatus, mobilised their power resources and not only went into coercive 
actions against labour, but also introduced some repressive measures that 
inhibited collective action by labour (Sencer, 1969; TIB, 1976; Ahmad, 1995; 
Makal, 1999; Snurov, 2006). The early interactions between labour and the state, 
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however, happened on somewhat democratic and favourable grounds. The 
Kemalist elites, for example, incorporated freedom of association in the first 
republican constitution and despite their shortcomings, the Law on Strikes dated 
1908 regulating strike actions in public services
44
 and the Law on Associations 
dated 1909 permitting trade unions in private sector
45
 continued to remain in force 
during the initial stages of this period. To add to this, with the Code of 
Obligations passed in 1926 they laid the way open for collective agreements and 
introduced some pro-labour measures for individual contracts (see Gulmez, 1991; 
Makal, 1999). Thus it would appear that the Kemalist élites’ positive approach to 
the labour issue found its way onto the agenda of labour in these years, for a 
group of urban workers initiated the earliest labour movement of the republican 
period in industrialised urban areas and were able to establish trade unions, 
organise demonstrations to raise their claims, took strike action and published left-
wing papers and journals (see Sencer, 1969; Tuncay, 1978; Sulker, 1983; Ahmad, 
1995; Sulker, 2004; Snurov, 2006; Celik, 2010).  
However, the political actors gradually introduced a repressive form to their 
interactions with labour as they came to increasingly ensure their supremacy in 
the state mechanism, and as they enframed their political economy of 
development. In the first instance, detention and persecution of leaders of the 
labour movement, prohibition of some publications aimed raising working class 
awareness, closure of workers’ organisations, especially those who had adopted 
pro-active stance and banning of their political activities, became the order of the 
day (TIB, 1976; Ahmad, 1995; Snurov, 2006). Yet, this was only the initial steps 
of the Kemalists and they further turned their political agenda into an anti-labour 
one through putting their legislative power into force. As early as 1925, they 
illegalised all class-based organisations together with any activities representative 
of class interests at a stroke with the Law for Maintenance of Order- Takriri 
Sukun Kanunu
46
, bringing the early republican labour movements to a total 
standstill (TIB, 1976; Dereli and Ekin, 1982; Bianchi, 1984; Ahmad, 1995). The 
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rule makers further emasculated the power resources of labour by making 
amendments to the Turkish Penal Code passed in 1926, borrowing them from the 
penal code of Mussolini’s Italy (Ahmad, 1993; Makal, 1999). Accordingly, the 
Kemalist elites with the amendments made to article 201 of the penal code in 
1933, sentenced those who caused work stoppages with the aim of making 
changes to wage levels or to pre-concluded working conditions up to five years of 
imprisonment (see Gulmez, 1991). They also prohibited the ‘pernicious 
propaganda’ aimed at the establishment of the domination of one social class over 
another, annihilation of one social class, infringement of society’s economic or 
social order or agitation of national feelings, by incorporating the notorious 
articles of 141-142 into the penal code in 1936. These articles imposed sentences 
of penal servitude up to 12 years
47
 against rioters venturing in these kinds of 
activities.  
In the Kemalist élites’ efforts directed towards institutionalisation of industrial 
relations, besides the general regulations mentioned above, two special laws that 
were made exclusively for the regulation of industrial relations appear to have 
played an important role. The Law on Associations –Cemiyetler Kanunu – that 
was passed in 1938, totally banned the establishment of any class-based 
organisations, whilst at the same time prohibiting the engagement of any 
association with political activities (TIB, 1976; Bianchi, 1984; Ahmad, 1995; 
Makal, 1999). The first Turkish Labour Code Law no. 3008 passed in 1936 
which, according to a prevailing opinion in the literature, was inspired from 
Italy’s fascist-corporatist labour regulation (Karpat, 1966; Makal, 1999; Parla and 
Davison, 2004), on the other hand,  made no mention of trade unions or 
employers’ associations, prohibited strikes and lockouts and imposed penalties 
should they occur. Further, the law introduced compulsory arbitration for labour 
disputes and regulated representation of workers at the workplace level with the 
mediation being undertaken by representatives elected by them (Weigert, 1937; 
Dereli and Ekin, 1982). Yet the law did not provide any protection to these 
workers’ representatives. This labour law, in sum, as Makal (1999) pointed out, 
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set its sights on protection of the Kemalist regime and the statist economic order 
of the country and as manifested by the then secretary general of the CHP, Recep 
Peker, was aimed at putting the working life “to the path of solidarity and 
harmony that the [Kemalist] regime required”  (Gulmez, 1986: 137 brackets 
added) and at assisting the Kemalist elites “to sweep away the clouds making the 
way for emergence or development of class awareness” (ibid: 138).  
When mentioning the political actors’ concerted efforts directed towards the 
institutionalisation of industrial relations, one should also refer to the Kemalist 
élites’ efforts – probably inspired by fascist Italy’s corporatist practices – towards 
the organisation of all strata of working people under similar yet single 
mechanisms acting in favour of the CHP’s policy and practices (see Ilkin, 1978; 
Varlik, 1993; Ahmad, 1995; Sulker, 2004). These organizations put together 
incompatible interests, encouraged behaviours antagonistic to working class 
awareness and constituted an impediment in front of the emergence of a genuine 
labour movement
48
 that was expected to pursue class-based interests of labour 
during this period (see Varlik, 1993; Ahmad, 1995). At this point it should be 
noted that a similar attempt was made by the political actors for organisation of 
business interests during the  period through semi-official Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, starting from 1925 (Bianchi, 1984; Makal, 1999). 
However, much in contrast with the case of workers’ organisations, the Kemalist 
élites’ initiatives to organise business, according to Celik (2010), provided the 
bourgeoning national bourgeoisie with a favourable environment to voice their 
interests in a politico-economic environment where only the national interests 
were allowed to be represented (see also Kuruc, 1987).  
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Figure 5: Changes in real wage levels in industrial sector in the mono-party period 
 
Source: Bulutay 1995: 305. 
All these rules designed and practices implemented discussed above, accordingly, 
limited the activities of labour either to illegal socialist/communist 
organisations
49
, unauthorised strikes and demonstrations or to social assistance 
and mutual aid organisations established under the surveillance of state (TIB, 
1976; Dereli and Ekin, 1982; Celik, 2010). What is more, the Kemalist elites 
operationalized most of their measures by putting them into force through the 
coercive power of police and soldiers. In what followed, the mono-party period 
witnessed very few occasions of labour movement actions which did not exceed 
thirty five in number (Sulker, 1983). What is more, almost all this organised 
resistance, much to the disappointment of labour, ended with deaths, detentions 
and dismissals (TIB, 1976; Sulker, 1983; Snurov, 2006).  
Consequently, I contend that the policies designed and practices implemented in 
the domain of industrial relations generated at least three policy outcomes for 
labour. First, by totally inhibiting freedom of association, the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to strike, they institutionalised the distribution of power 
between actors in favour of the state and employers, thus placing labour in a 
highly disadvantageous position in industrial relations. While one important 
repercussion of this came into place in the form of suppression of labour 
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movements, another emerged in the form of increasing influence of state over 
formulation of labour’s interests organisational activities in the period. Second, 
political economy implemented in domain of industrial relations in the era 
generated income insecurity for labour and one indicator of this has been the wage 
levels of industrial workers. Indeed, as the Figure 5 indicates, considerable 
fluctuations occurred in the wage levels throughout the period. And third, by 
effectively restraining the labour movements of the period, they steered behaviour 
of labour towards what was aimed at, namely a so-called social harmony in the 
domain of industrial relations. All these policy and practices together with their 
outcomes laid the foundations of the political economy of insecurity pursued in 
the period, the connotations of which are discussed in the conclusion and 
discussion section that follows. 
4.4 Discussion & Conclusion 
The mono-party period came to an end with the conclusion of the Second World 
War. Throughout this period, the political actors, under the leadership of Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk, embarked on a massive modernisation project with the aim of 
creating an industrialised country that was compatible with its capitalist-
democratic Western counterparts. In this national project the accent was placed on 
the national capital owners, for according to Mustafa Kemal, their dominance in 
Turkish economy was an indication of a sovereign and powerful economic 
structure that the young republic was in need of to maintain its full independence. 
To add to this, the launch of a comprehensive industrialisation movement under 
the leadership of the national capitalist class, according to the founding fathers of 
Turkey, was the only way to place the country in the league of capitalist-
democratic Western countries.  
With this aim in mind, throughout the mono-party period that spanned from 1923 
to 1945, political actors aimed at the creation of a powerful national capitalist 
class from the ranks of the socioeconomic élites of the country and gave their best 
efforts for the establishment of a national industry. In consonance with this 
situation, the policy makers came across with a group of potential businessmen 
ready to seize the opportunities offered by the national development project. 
Much in contrast to their favourable attitudes towards capital, the Kemalist élites 
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took a somewhat hostile stand against labour and they appeared to deem any signs 
of class awareness that emerged amongst working masses as a possible threat to 
the republican regime and to their national development project. Again in 
consonance with this, the socioeconomic architecture of Turkish society did not 
challenge the political actors with large numbers of dispossessed who would 
subsequently become waged workers forming a pool of a politicised proletariat 
wishing to embark on conflict with the process of capitalist industrialisation.  
Against the backdrop of these circumstances and ideas, the political actors, in 
their attempts towards materialisation of the national development project, 
considered industrial relations to be one of its essential components and attributed 
it a substantial role in their politics. It is at this point that the political economy of 
industrial relations started to be shaped with Kemal Ataturk’s idea that there could 
be no working class without a developed industry and therefore priority should be 
given to the creation and empowerment of a national industry and a national 
bourgeoisie. With this perspective in mind, the political actors assigned industrial 
relations the role of helping to maintain national solidarity/social harmony within 
the economy and deemed industrial relations an important instrument to forestall 
the class struggles, which were likely to occur as industrialisation gained apace. 
Materialisation of Kemalist national development project, therefore, necessitated 
Turkish workers to be an element of national solidarity; to be compliant partners 
of the state in the achievement and preservation of social harmony in the domain 
of industrial relations. 
In order to implement the political economy that the political actors saw fit for the 
country’s industrial relations, they employed a strong logic and put into use 
appropriate tools. The logic they espoused, the concept of national 
solidarity/social harmony, proved to be of great use in the articulation of their 
interests. According to this national solidarity argument, feelings of national 
solidarity between capital and labour were required to replace class conflict and 
antagonisms, which would, in turn, lead to the establishment of social order and 
harmony in industrial relations. In order to back this argument, the strong logic 
that the ruling élites employed in the area of industrial relations embraced the idea 
of a classless society, whereby Turkey, rather than being divided into 
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socioeconomic classes, entertained a division of labour composed of various 
professions, the presence and services of which were necessary for the existence 
of the others. In order to materialise their ideas, the political actors, by mobilising 
all the available power resources of the state, put into use various policy tools and 
by means of these went into coercive action against labour, introducing repressive 
regulations that totally outlawed collective action throughout the remainder of the 
mono-party period. The strong logic and policy tools that the political actors 
employed produced at least two policy outcomes. They, in the first instance, 
institutionalised the distribution of power between the actors in such a way that it 
placed labour in a highly disadvantageous position vis-à-vis capital and the state. 
Second, it steered the behaviours of labour towards a so-called social harmony.  
The political economy that the Kemalist elites adopted and pursued in the domain 
of industrial relations in the mono-party period, resultantly, enabled them to 
emerge as the most powerful actor in the period, thus influencing the institution-
building process in the direction of their own interests. At this point it is 
contended here that being in favour of the creation of a strong capitalist class and 
a robust national capitalist economy, materialisation of the interests of the 
Kemalist cadre necessitated the embeddedness of insecurity as a rationale in the 
institution-building process of industrial relations. That is, insecurity as a rationale 
steered and governed policy and practices in labour-capital relations, forged a 
strong cooperation between the political actors and capital owners in the issues 
concerning industrial relations as well as curbing the power resources of labour 
and in doing so, paved the way for institutionalisation of a political economy of 
insecurity in industrial relations in the mono-party period.  
The political alliance established between the Kemalist and socioeconomic elites 
however, began to disintegrate as the Second World War came to a close. One 
important factor that brought the mono-party period to an end was capital’s 
emergence as a powerful social class, its acquirement of more self-assurance and 
its power claim on its own. However, the gradual emergence of the working class 
and the rising discontent of the vast populace against the mono-party regime at 
home and ascendance of democratic regimes abroad also rendered the 
maintenance of hegemony by the CHP unsustainable. The period that succeeded, 
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therefore, witnessed shifting balances of power between the ruling classes, rise of 
political awareness amongst masses and a change to the politico-economic and 
social circumstances that underpinned the mono-party period. Whether or not the 
change in the balance of power between actors altered the course of the Kemalist 
national development project and whether or not the vast populace when they 
attained a level of political awareness challenged the political economy pursued in 

















 THE MULTI-PARTY PERIOD (1945-1960) CHAPTER 5:
5.1 Introduction 
The end of the Second World War, with the overwhelming defeat of fascism and 
emergence of the superpowers, witnessed some major political, economic, and 
social transformations in many countries and Turkey was not an exception. 
Immediately after the War, the country entered into an era of change, which 
brought with it considerable changes in the aforementioned domains. Politically, 
the ruling circles took steps towards democratisation and became more receptive, 
at least in principle, to the socioeconomic and political demands of the masses. 
Economically, the political actors decided to leave aside the Kemalist inward-
looking, pro-industrial national development project and they replaced it with a 
more liberal market-based development strategy. Socially, increasing levels of 
rural-to-urban migration gradually led to the emergence of a modern working 
class. All these changes, which took place almost simultaneously, brought politics 
and policy makers closer to the people, introduced greater dynamism and growth 
to the economy and prompted a shift in the ways people earned their livings. As a 
result of all these developments, re-institutionalisation of industrial relations came 
out as a vital issue to be reconsidered and hence, the multi-party period marked 
the beginning of a new era in industrial relations.  
 This chapter deals with the changes that occurred in the roles and positions of the 
state, capital and labour in politico-economic domain, generally and in industrial 
relations, in particular, through analysis of the way the political economy of 
industrial relations was institutionalised in the multi-party period. Section 5.2 
examines the political economy of industrial relations in detail, by scrutinising the 
key actors, namely, the state, capital and labour and probing the specific political, 
economic and social conditions under which they were transformed.  Following 
this, the section investigates the interests of these actors and their interactions 
during the focal period. Section 5.3 concludes the chapter with discussion on how 
the actors, interests and ideas of the multi-party period impacted upon the 




5.2 The Political Economy of Insecurity in Industrial Relations 
The multi-party period witnessed changes in power, politics and ideology together 
with a rising political awareness amongst the masses. Faced with a broad diversity 
of opinions and interests, the political actors were therefore challenged to function 
within a more complex environment than previously. Understanding the political 
economy of industrial relations pursued in the multi-party period in this respect 
requires a thorough investigation of the actors, their interests and the actual 
process of institutionalisation of industrial relations all of which are investigated 
in the subsections that follow. 
5.2.1 Actors 
The multi-party period saw the emergence of labour as a separate socioeconomic 
actor and escalation of capital’s politico-economic power. Consequently, the 
actors of industrial relations in the era voiced their interests and engaged in 
interaction with each other in an atmosphere of political, social and economic 
dynamism, which was remarkably different when compared to the mono-party 
period. The subsections that follow consider the actors of industrial relations, 
separately, placing them in a wider politico-economic and socio-historical 
context, with the aim of forming a sound understanding of the nature of their 
interests and interactions in the process of institutionalisation of insecurity in post-
war industrial relations.  
5.2.1.1 State  
The multi-party period was marked with a profound change in the distribution of 
power across the political élites and in their visions of politics and ideology 
regarding the trajectories of the country’s modernisation process (Karpat, 1966; 
Avcioglu, 1968; Ahmad, 1977; Erogul, 1987; Timur, 1991). This remarkable 
transformation was instigated by some domestic factors and was made historically 
inevitable as a result of the emergence of a number of major factors related to the 
external affairs. Domestically, in the first place it was the CHP’s loss of its 
alleged reputation of being a party representative of all interests in the community 
together with the growing political resentment of almost all strata of Turkish 
society against the its rule a single party, which necessitated an urgent response to 
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emerging social groups’ demands for a more politically inclusive society (Lewis, 
1951; Karpat, 1966; Erogul, 1990; Timur, 1991; Makal, 2002). To add to this, 
democratic political order was an integral part of the republican philosophy of 
westernisation that had laid the foundations of the Kemalist nation making project 
and in the minds of Kemalist political actors it needed to be set in motion when 
the time was deemed appropriate (Ellis, 1948; Karpat, 1966; Erogul, 1987; 
Saribay, 1991; Ahmad, 1993).  
Turkey’s mono-party regime was also challenged by some external circumstances. 
Amongst these, destruction of the authoritarian mono-party regimes in Italy and 
Germany stood out as an important international factor, for it appears that these 
events seriously challenged the legitimacy of single-party regimes in the eyes of 
Kemalist political actors and lent support to the democratic ideals of the Kemalist 
revolution (see e.g. Karpat, 1966; Ahmad, 1977; Erogul, 1990; Timur, 1991; 
Kongar, 1998). However, perhaps the most propelling factor for Turkey’s 
transition to a multi-party system was the USSR’s aggressive attitudes towards the 
nation following its emergence as the superpower in the region after the war. 
Indeed, the Soviet Russia right after the conclusion of the Second World War 
abandoned its friendship policy with Turkey and started to threaten its sovereignty 
by demanding bases in the Bosphorus and territories in Eastern Turkey. In 
response to this, the political leaders of Turkey found it necessary to abandon their 
policy of neutrality and turn the country to face the democratic-capitalist western 
world in order to seek a secure a place within it (Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 1968; 
Ahmad, 1977; Hale, 1981; Erogul, 1987; Hale, 2000).  
It was mainly against this background of events that President Ismet Inonu 
granted permission for the establishment of opposing political parties in 1945 
(Timur, 1991; Ahmad, 1993) and following this, fifteen opposing parties 
mushroomed within just a few months. Yet, as Saribay (1991) noted, it was the 
establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) – Demokrat Parti – in January 1946, its 
leadership structure and the way it set its face against the CHP hegemony over the 
country’s politics that epitomised Turkey’s transition to a multiparty system. 
Indeed, for one thing, the DP was established directly by the socioeconomic elites 
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that had broken away from the CHP
50
, who represented the interests of the 
commercial bourgeoisie and large landowners in the Turkish Parliament and it set 
its sights, from the very beginning, on voicing and safeguarding capital owners’ 
interests (Lewis, 1951; Avcioglu, 1968; Lewis, 1968; Yerasimos, 1976; Cavdar, 
1985; Erogul, 1990; Timur, 1991). In addition, regardless of what the DP’s raison 
d'être was, its establishment appeared to evoke considerable public sympathy. 
Behind this public positive interest, laid the CHP’s loss of reputation amongst vast 
numbers of the populace (see Karpat, 1966; Yerasimos, 1976; Erogul, 1990; 
Timur, 1991) and the DP leaders’ successful exploitation of the notion of 
democracy against the former (see Erogul, 1990; Timur, 1991). Accordingly, the 
DP leaders, despite having espoused the advocacy of commercial and landed 
interests, came to be able to mobilise the support of a large majority of the 
Turkish population against the supremacy of the single party mentality and in a 
short time their cause gained the support of: the press, business circles and the 
intelligentsia as well as broad segments of the population, such as poor peasants, 
the working class and civil servants, even the socialists (see Lewis, 1951; 
Avcioglu, 1968; Harris, 1970; Erogul, 1990; Timur, 1991; Kongar, 1998; Sunar 
and Sayari, 2004; Yildirmaz, 2008).  
The DP, after remaining for about four years in opposition following its entry into 
the Grand Assembly after the 1946 elections, came to power by winning 408 of 
the 487 seats in the general election that took place in May 1950 (Erogul, 1990; 
Timur, 1991). Throughout the decade following its victory in the elections it 
became the main source of political power in Turkey’s political life, with Adnan 
Menderes as prime minister and Celal Bayar as the president (see Karpat, 1966; 
Lewis, 1968; Ahmad, 1977; Cavdar, 1985; Erogul, 1990; Timur, 1991). The 
CHP’s handing over of power to the DP marked the shift of political power from 
military-bureaucratic élites to socioeconomic élites and according to a general 
consensus amongst authors gave the interests of national bourgeoisie even further 
precedence in the policy making process (see Yerasimos, 1976; Ahmad, 1977; 
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 The four ex-CHP deputies who turned out to be the core cadre of the DP were: Celal Bayar, 
banker, economist and a fierce defender of the Kemalist revolution and the last prime minister of 
Ataturk; Fuat Koprulu, professor of history and a distinguished personality in Turkey’s 
intellectual circles, Adnan Menderes, a lawyer and a large landowner and Refik Koraltan a 
lawyer and an experienced CHP deputy (Lewis, 1951; Erogul, 1990; Ahmad, 1993). 
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Keyder, 1979; Cavdar, 1985; Erogul, 1990; Sunar, 2004a). Nevertheless, despite 
this shift of power, the new political leaders’ approach to politics and democracy 
displayed somewhat similar characteristics to those displayed in the mono-party 
period. The share of power, nature of politics and aspects of political ideology in 
the period are the subjects of the section that follows. 
5.2.1.1.1 Power, the Political Atmosphere and Ideology in the Era 
The multi-party period that lasted from 1946 to 1960 possessed five key 
characteristics in terms of the share of political power, political atmosphere and 
ideology. The first significant feature was the institutionalisation of political 
competition, mainly between two parties, the CHP and the DP, and their 
maintenance of a single party mentality once they ascended to power as opposed 
to their fierce defence of democratic rights and freedoms when in opposition (see 
Sunar and Sayari, 2004). This situation started with the DP’s entry into the Grand 
Assembly as the major oppositional party in 1946 and followed almost exactly the 
same course throughout the period (see Karpat, 1966; Lewis, 1968; Ahmad, 1977; 
Erogul, 1990; Timur, 1991). 
The second notable feature of the multi-party period was the political actors’ 
replacement of Ataturk’s economic modernisation project that put equal emphasis 
on national industry and the national bourgeoisie, with liberal development 
strategies, the accent of which was placed on: foreign capital acquisition, private 
initiatives and agricultural capitalism (Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 1968; Yerasimos, 
1976; Ahmad, 1977; Erogul, 1990). This new policy of development, which is 
investigated further below, according to scholars, forged a strong consensus 
between the political leaders of the multi-party period, promoted the interests of 
the bourgeoisie even more specifically and as Avcioglu (1968) pointed out, made 
the two competing parties the advocates of large landlords and the commercial 
bourgeoisie (also see Yerasimos, 1976; Ahmad, 1977; Timur, 1991).  
Concomitant to this marked shift in Turkey’s economic development policies and 
in the words of Ahmad (1977: 389) as a “logical step arising out of domestic 
policy”, comes the third key feature of the period, that is, the political actors’ 
consensus on a pro-Western foreign policy and their concerted attempts towards 
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seeking a secure place in the Western bloc, with the primary aim of safeguarding 
the country’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty (see Karpat, 1966; 
Avcioglu, 1968; Hale, 2000). To this end, both the CHP and the DP governments 
somewhat desperately sought a closer relationship with the leader of the Western 
block, the United States, and in doing so they did not to hesitate to draw back 
from Ataturk’s philosophy of total independence in the country’s foreign policy 
(see Hale, 1976; Erogul, 1987).  
The fourth distinctive feature of use of the politics and power in the multi-party 
period was the political actors’ general agreement on the exclusion of left-wing 
viewpoints from the political arena and in words of Erogul (1987: 104) their 
“confinement of ‘democracy’ solely to the right wing of the political spectrum”. 
As a natural result of this, the DP and the CHP, when in opposition, rather than 
including defence of the continuity of left-wing activities into their demands of 
democracy and freedom, bestowed endless political support upon the ruling 
party’s anti-leftist activities51 (Ahmad, 1977; Erogul, 1987, 1990; Timur, 1991). 
The final salient feature of the period regarding the political arena was the 
discernible reorientation of the populist and statist principles of the Kemalism
52
. 
Regarding statism, both of the parties seemed to have found it more appropriate to 
re-interpret it to the changing needs of the time and this alteration brought with it 
a more pro-business approach to this principle aimed at turning it into a beneficial 
tool for the expansion of private sector (see Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 1968; 
Ahmad, 1977; Timur, 1991; Boratav, 2009). When its come to populism, as is 
further discussed in the subsection on the interests, both of the parties, despite 
having rejected sharp class divisions, began to accept, especially when in 
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 Therefore, the multi-party period witnessed, amongst other things, the closure of socialist parties 
and trade unions, detention of many leftist intellectuals and political leaders, dismissal of some 
prominent leftist academics from their posts in universities, tightening of anti-communist 
legislation and the burning of books that were deemed to promote communism. All of these, as 
historical evidence reveals, happened under the watchful eyes and mutual consent of those in 
power and the main opposition (for details see e.g. Avcioglu, 1968; Ahmad, 1977; Erogul, 1990; 
Timur, 1991). 
52
 It should be noted that it was not only the populist and statist principles of the Kemalism that 
underwent a shift in their orientations. However, the changes that came into place in relation to 
other pillars of the Kemalist ideology are outside the scope of this study. For a detailed account 
of the changes to the principles of Kemalism see Karpat (1966). 
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opposition and/or in theory the right to strike and collective bargaining as labour’s 
vital power resources in a democratic society (Karpat, 1966; Sunar, 2004b).  
In sum, the transition to multi-party politics, although marking a new era in 
Turkey’s political life, remained short of bringing democratic values, progressive 
attitudes and competing political and economic philosophies to the realm of 
politics. Indeed, throughout the period, regardless of existence of political 
competition, a single party siege mentality, which was authoritarian in terms of 
political function and narrow-minded towards oppositional movements prevailed. 
All these aspects of power, politics and ideology set the stage for the behaviour of 
the key actors and (re)construction of labour-capital relations during this era. 
However, before scrutinising these, it is important to have a brief look at the 
political economy of development, which is the subject of the following 
subsection.  
5.2.1.1.2 Political Economy of Economic Development 
Turkey’s transition to multi-party politics represented a turning point, not only for 
the country’s political life, but also for its development strategies. This 
transformation in the political economy of development came in the form of 
economic liberalisation that put the accent on foreign assistance, specialisation in 
agriculture, agricultural reform
53
 and private sector-led industrial development 
(see Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995; Kazgan, 2006; Unay, 2006; Boratav, 2009) and 
started as early as 1947 when the power still resided in the hands of the CHP 
(Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 1968; Timur, 1991; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009).  
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 This was achieved in line with the proposals of the Marshall Plan, which envisaged Turkey’s 
transformation into a reservoir of food and raw materials for the war-ravaged European 
countries’ recovery (see Avcioglu, 1968; Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995; Aydin, 2005; Kazgan, 
2006). In this regard, starting from the early years of the multi-party period, the CHP initiated a 
rapid process of agricultural reform backed by American aid and credits. In this regard the CHP 
started to import tractors and to grant credits to farmers and assigned a high priority to highway 
construction and inaugurated a far-reaching road building program in the country (for various 
versions of the narrative see Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 1968; Timur, 1991; Kepenek and Yenturk, 
1995; Kazgan, 2006; Unay, 2006). 
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as % of 
GNP 
Industry 




1948 37,065 16,437 4,753 15,875 44.3 12.8 42.8 
1950 38,506 15,761 5,054 17,691 40.9 13.1 45.9 
1955 56,642 21,235 8,333 27,074 37.5 14.7 47.8 
1960 70,869 26,591 11,100 33,178 37.5 15.7 46.8 
Source: TUIK, 2010: 647, 682. 
The Democrats, when they assumed power in 1950, basically followed the steps 
of the Republicans by resuming the politico-economic transformation of the 
country in the direction of agricultural specialisation and private sector 
participation. As a result, they maintained the agricultural reform that was already 
initiated by the CHP
54
 (Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 1968; Yerasimos, 1976) and like 
their predecessors directed all available resources at the promotion of private 
initiatives and attraction of foreign investment. Despite the DP displaying 
concerted efforts towards the development of private enterprise through 
investment, it also pioneered state-led industrialisation in the country (Keyder, 
1979; Pamuk, 1981; Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995; Aydin, 2005; Kazgan, 2006; 
Unay, 2006; Boratav, 2009). Subsequently, especially starting from the second 
quinquennium of the 1950s, the state sector grew parallel to private sector
55
 and a 
considerable proportion of new investments was undertaken by the state in the 
domain of industry (see Yerasimos, 1976; Hale, 1981; Kepenek and Yenturk, 
1995; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009).  
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 The DP, therefore, imported tractors and other agricultural machinery on a large scale, provided 
cheap credit to farmers, abolished agricultural taxation, subsidized agricultural prices above 
world market levels, distributed land to farmers and undertook an extensive road building 
programme to integrate the villages with the trade centres (for a wider account of DP’s 
agricultural policy and practices see e.g. DPT, 1963; Simpson, 1965; Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 
1968; Yerasimos, 1976; Keyder, 1979; Hale, 1981; Erogul, 1990; Bayar, 1996) 
55
 It should be noted that during the period the DP also contributed to the development of the 
private sector’s industrial activities through, for example, establishing partnerships between state 
and private sector, providing private sector with cheap intermediary goods and maintaining and 
expanding physical infrastructural investments (for similar explanations see Sunar, 1983; 
Hershlag, 1988; Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995; Aydin, 2005; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009).  
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Table 8: Number of manufacturing establishments employing 10 or more people 




Annual average number of employees 
 State Private Total State Private 
Total     Number % Number % 
1950 103 2,515 2,618 76,033 47 86,826 53 162,859 
1951 111 2,636 2,747 83,871 47 90,959 53 174,830 
1952 115 2,911 3,026 82,115 45 99,741 55 181,856 
1953 149 3,355 3,504 86,331 41 120,879 59 207,210 
1954 146 3,704 3,850 86,161 38 139,160 62 225,321 
1955 156 4,106 4,262 94,473 40 139,729 60 234,202 
1956 167 4,443 4,610 105,520 43 136,058 57 241,578 
1957 183 4,449 4,632 110,799 42 153,136 58 263,935 
1958 195 4,926 5,121 117,852 40 172,689 60 290,541 
1959 214 5,205 5,419 123,144 41 178,491 59 301,635 
1960 219 5,284 5,503 127,988 43 168,001 57 295,989 
Source: TUIK, 2010: 249, 250, 251. 
As a result of the post-war period’s political economy of development, 
agriculture’s share in the GNP significantly exceeded that of industrial sector (see 
Table 7). This period, as illustrated in Table 7, also witnessed a steady growth in 
industrial production, the value of which almost tripled from 1948 to 1960. 
However, despite this respectable growth achieved in industrial production, its 
share in the country’s GNP still remained far below that of the agricultural sector 
given that the period saw a considerable growth both in the GNP and agricultural 
production. When it comes to the structure of industrial sector, it appears that 
political actors’ efforts towards private sector participation in industry gave its 
fruits, for as displayed by the Table 8, the number of manufacturing 
establishments in the private sector employing 10 or more employees showed 
more than a twofold increase in the period. Table 8, however, also indicates that 
the number of state-owned industrial establishments demonstrated a remarkable 
increase in the period, growing from 103 in 1950 to 219 in 1960. Subsequently, as 
also evidenced by Table 8, the state employed more than 40 per cent of the 
workers in manufacturing sector throughout nearly all of the focal period.  
Against this background of the political economy of development and its 
outcomes, it should come as no surprise that the period witnessed a renewed 
interest amongst political actors towards re-regulation of labour-capital relations. 
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The state’s role as a rule maker in the domain of industrial relations is examined 
in the subsection that follows.  
5.2.1.1.3 The State as a Rule Maker in Industrial Relations 
The CHP and the DP throughout the period with the aim of drawing out a political 
economy of industrial relations in line with their strategy of economic 
development and therefore with their interests, utilised the state’s legislative 
power to shape the regulatory framework of industrial relations. The first step that 
these political actors took to re-institutionalise industrial relations was lifting of 
the ban on the establishment of associations on class-based interests in 1946
56
, 
which had been brought in with the Law on Associations in 1938
57
 (see Karpat, 
1966: Bianchi, 1984; Ahmad, 1993: 223; Celik, 2010b). This action, which 
provided Turkish labour with the freedom to establish and join trade unions was 
followed by the lawmakers’ enactment of the Trade Unions Act no. 5018 – The 
Law on Employees and Employers’ Organisations and Associations of Trade 
Unions
58
 – in 1947.  
The Trade Unions Act defined the trade unions as associations established for the 
purpose of mutual assistance as well as for the protection and representation of 
employees and employers’ common interests (Article 1). It stipulated that only 
employees and employers, definition of whom was given in labour law, could 
become members of trade unions employers’ associations (Article 2). Moreover, 
the law made union membership voluntary (Article 9) and permitted more than 
one membership for those workers who engaged in different types of work 
(Article 3). Further, the law allowed trade unions and employers’ organisations to 
engage in a range of activities, such as: entering into collective agreements that 
were binding for their members; presenting opinions on labour disputes to the 
arbitration board and to other authorities along with sending representatives to the 
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 For the full text in Turkish see “Cemiyetler kanununun bazi maddelerinin degistirilmesine dair 
kanun”, Official Gazette, 10/06/1946, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/6329.pdf&
main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/6329.pdf [accessed 01/02/13]. 
57
 See the previous chapter for the introduction of this law. 
58
 For the full text in Turkish see, Official Gazette, 26/02/1947, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/6542.pdf&
main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/6542.pdf [accessed 25/04/12]. 
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commissions established in accordance with various acts (Article 4). However, the 
law banned all trade unions and employers’ organisations from engaging in 
politics, political propaganda and publications of a political nature. It also 
prohibited them to act as an instrument for the activities of political organisations 
(Article 5). The law, what is more, banned trade unions from performing any 
activities which were against national interests (Article 5). In addition, the statute 
stated that trade unions and employers’ organisations could belong to any kind of 
international organisations, but this action was subject to the consent of the 
Council of Ministers (Article 5). Moreover, the law maintained the illegal status 
of strike action and lockout practices that was already set forth by the Labour Law 
enacted in 1936 and stipulated up to one year of closure for those unions 
supporting such actions (Article 7). In addition to the Trade Unions Law, the CHP 
made an amendment
59
 to the Labour Law in January 1950 that provided unions 
with right to initiate collective disputes (see Tuna, 1966).  
In addition to enacting the Trade Unions Act which has been widely considered as 
restrictive and repressive in Turkey’s industrial relations literature (Rosen, 1962, 
Dereli, 1968, Tuna, 1969, Dereli, 1974 Gulmez, 1995, Makal, 2002), the CHP 
took further coercive measures in order to maintain its control over trade unions. 
To achieve so, throughout their five years in office in the post-war era, the leaders 
amended articles 141-142 in the penal code
60
 twice and as well as widening their 
scope to cover more associational actions that were allegedly dangerous to the 
economic, social and political order of the country, they increased the sentences of 




                                                          
59For the full text in Turkish see “Is kanunun bazi maddelerinin degistirilmesi hakkinda kanun”, 
Official Gazette, 31/01/1950, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/7420.pdf&
main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/7420.pdf [accessed 29/04/12].  
60
 See the chapter on the mono-party period for the introduction and provisions of these acts. 
61
 These amendments were passed in 1946 and 1949 and full texts are accessible in Turkish 
Official Gazette’s website: 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/6336.pdf&
main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/6336.pdf [accessed 28/04/12], 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/7234.pdf&
main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/7234.pdf [accessed 28/04/12].  
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In its ten years of tenure in office, the DP also took some steps for the re-
institutionalisation of industrial relations. One of these came with an amendment
62
 
made to the Labour Law in 1954, which led to the inclusion of representatives of 
labour and capital on arbitration boards (Tuna, 1966; Makal, 2002). Another 
measure came with a further amendment to the labour law made in 1959, with the 
aim of harmonisation of the provisions of the Turkish labour code with the ILO 
Convention No. 98 – Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, dated 1949 – 
that was ratified by Turkey in 1951. This having been passed, as the parliamentary 
proceedings reveal,  so as to meet the demands of the ILO before the 1959 





stipulated protection for workers and their representatives when they were 
dismissed or were harmed by reason of union membership or because of 
participation in union activities. It also barred workers and employers from acts of 
interference in each others’ associations, as well as providing protection for 
workers and employers against acts which obliged them to join a union or 
relinquish union membership. 
Despite these positive steps, the DP throughout its time in office also took some 
coercive measures, which increased its control over the way workers utilised their 
collective rights. For example, it amended the notorious articles 141 and 142 in 
the Turkish penal code in 1951
65
 and while having introduced even heavier 
sentences for so-called dangerous associational activities, at the same time 
instituted death penalty for those in charge of those associations. What is more, 
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 For the full text in Turkish see “Is Kanununun bazı maddelerinin değiştirilmesi hakkında Kanun 
no 6298”, Official Gazette 08/03/1954, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/8652.pdf&
main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/8652.pdf [accessed 29/04/12]. 
63
 This issue was brought forward to the Grand Assembly with the then acting minister of Labour 
Haluk Saman’s resolution asking the members of the Turkish Parliament to discuss urgently 
amendments in order to make it ready for the International Labour Conference, which was to 
meet on the 3
rd
 of June 1959 (TBMM, 1959: 259).  
64
 For the full text in Turkish see “5018 Sayili Kanuna Ek Kanun”, Official Gazette, 01/06/1959, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10219.pdf
&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10219.pdf [accessed 29/04/12]. 
65
 For the full text in Turkish see “Turk Ceza Kanununun 141 ve 142 nci maddelerinin 
değiştirilmesi hakkında Kanun”, Official Gazette 11/12/1951 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/7979.pdf&
main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/7979.pdf [accessed 29/04/12]. 
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the party enacted a law on meetings and demonstrations in 1956
66
 – Toplantilar ve 
Gosteri Yuruyusleri Hakkinda Kanun –, which subjected all meetings and 
demonstrations to the permission of the civilian authorities, obliged organisers of 
meetings and demonstrations to submit a written statement to the authorities 
reporting place and time of the activity and which authorised police to disperse 
unauthorised meetings and demonstrations with firearms when necessary.  
The regulatory framework of industrial relations set by the ruling parties, in sum, 
laid out the ground rules for the way industrial relations were to be 
institutionalised in the period, exerted a profound effect on the way actors’ voiced 
their interests and drew strict lines for actors’ mobilisation of their power 
resources. In so doing, the laws laid down in the period provided the political 
actors with some necessary tools to shape the political economy of industrial 
relations in the period, details of which are further discussed below. However 
before this, the state of private industry and employers as collective entities will 
be overviewed which makes the subject matter of the subsection that follows. 
5.2.1.2 Capital 
The political economy pursued in the multi-party period resulted in the emergence 
of a strong industrialist capitalist class, whose politico-economic interests were 
deeply embedded in the maintenance and strengthening of the capitalist economic 
order in the country. What is more, capital owners gained even further strength 
throughout the time the DP held office. (see e.g. Avcioglu, 1968; Yerasimos, 
1976; Ahmad, 1977; Pamuk, 1981; Cavdar, 1985; Keyder, 1987; Erogul, 1990; 
Timur, 1991). In saying this, however, the difference of multi-party politics from 
that of the previous period should be made clear, for as stated above, on several 
occasions the advancement of capitalism and materialisation of capital owners’ 
interests were already entrenched in the development agenda of political actors 
right from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The major alteration in 
the development strategies of multi-party period, in this regard, could be said to 
have appeared in the way ruling circles approached the country’s ever-present 
                                                          
66
 For the full text in Turkish see “Toplantılar ve gösteri yürüyüşleri hakkında Kanun”, Official 
Gazette, 30/06/1956, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/9346.pdf&
main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/9346.pdf [accessed 29/04/12]. 
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problem of formation and empowerment of the capitalist class. As Avcioglu aptly 
put it (1968: 328 brackets added): 
“while in the early years of the republican period the aim was 
the creation of a national capitalist class, [in the years of the 
multi-party period] this turned out to be the nurturing of a 
capitalist class whose interests were linked to big foreign 
companies and foreign countries”. 
Having provided this brief background, the rest of this subsection will analyse 
particularities of the industrial development and of the industrial bourgeoisie 
during the multi-party period. Five distinctive characteristics could be attributed 
to the aforementioned in the multi-party period. First, although both the state and 
private sector invested in industry and grew alongside each other throughout the 
period, private sector focused its investments largely on consumer goods (Aydin, 
2005; Kazgan, 2006), whereas the state concentrated most of its efforts on areas 
requiring large capital investment, such as: energy, sugar, cement, and coal 
(Boratav, 2009). Second a vast majority of private enterprises engaged in 
manufacturing activities was of small scale employing less than ten people. These 
small-scale production units, which made 98 per cent of the enterprises within the 
national manufacturing industry, employed 30 per cent of all industrial workers 
(DIE, 1968). However, dominance of small-scale manufacturing should never 
come to mean that there was no place for large-scale production, for as pointed 
out by other scholars (Bugra, 1994, Unay, 2006), and as can be concluded from 
the Table 10, the political and economic context of 1950s added many new 
establishments to the ranks of the large-scale industrial production (see Table 9 
and Table 10). 
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Table 9: Large and small 







 number % number % 
Large  3,012 1.9 298,965 69.4 
Small  157,759 98.1 131,736 30.6 
Total 160,771 100 430,701 100 
 
Table 10: Number of private and state-
led large establishments  
 
number of establishments 
State Private Total 
1950 103 2,515 2,618 
1952 115 2,911 3,026 
1954 146 3,704 3,850 
1956 167 4,443 4,610 
1958 195 4,926 5,121 
  1960 219 5,284 5,503 
 
Sources: For Table 9 DIE, 1968: XVII; for Table 10, TUIK, 2010, 249-251.  
Third, foreign investment flows proved highly influencial on private domestic 
initiatives (Avcioglu, 1968; Kazgan, 2006), which, in the words of Ahmad (1977: 
132), “resulted in the dwarfing of local capitalism by the stronger and more 
developed partner” and paved the way for the “establishment of a relationship of 
dependence which continued to grow thereafter” (Ahmad, 1993: 120). Fourth, 
national capital ownerswho invested in industry, mostly preferred short term gains 
over future profits (Forum, 1960; Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 1968; Bugra, 1994; 
Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995), stood ready to compromise with foreign interests 
(Avcioglu, 1968, Erogul, 1990) and largely disregarded business ethics, such as 
their social responsibility to the wider society (Forum, 1960; Karpat, 1966; Bugra, 
1994).  
And last but not least, despite the ban on the formation of class-based association 
being lifted in 1946, industrial employers showed little interest in collective action 
during the period
67
. Accordingly, while, the number of employers’ associations 
remained very low (Lok, 1966; Esin, 1974) at the same time, most of those which 
were active, as reported by Lok (1966), engaged in activities irrelevant to 
industrial relations, such as supplying their members with inputs or materialising 
their commercial interests. Subsequently, despite the fact that the employers 
emerged as one powerful actor in the domain of industrial relations in the period, 
their organisations played a very minor, if any, role in the process of the 
institutionalisation of industrial relations. Different channels through which 
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 For a detailed account of employers’ associations in the period see e.g. ILO, 1950; Gider, 1952; 
Lok, 1966; Esin, 1974. 
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employers voiced their interests and interacted with other actors are discussed 
further later in the study. 
5.2.1.3 Labour 
The socioeconomic structure of Turkish society, as discussed in previous chapter, 
remained mainly static throughout the mono-party period despite the number of 
waged workers displaying a constant increase in the industrialised areas of the 
country and despite the pervasive sense of insecurity that started to be felt by 
many industrial workers. Turkey’s transition to competitive electoral politics in 
this regard carries considerable implications on its industrial relations, because the 
social, economic and political transformations of the era which built on legacies 
of the previous period seemed to have laid a more solid basis for the gradual 
emergence of a modern working class. This section, therefore, by mostly drawing 
on historical accounts available in the scholarly literature, considers rural 
workers’ access to urban labour markets and labour’s emergence as a 
socioeconomic actor in industrial relations during the multi-party period. 
Table 11: Sectoral distribution of employment in Turkey in the mono-party and 
multi-party periods 
Years Agriculture Industry* Services 
1923 89.9 4.3 5.8 
1925 89.3 5.0 5.7 
1930 87.5 6.4 6.1 
1935 87.9 6.4 5.7 
1940 86.0 8.8 5.2 
1945 85.4 8.9 5.7 
1950 84.3 8.7 7.0 
1955 77.2 11.4 11.4 
1960 74.1 11.8 14.1 
*Includes construction 
  Source: Calculated from TUIK, 2010: 136. 
5.2.1.3.1 Labour Migration and Urban Labour Markets in the Post-War 
Period 
Even though the multi-party period marked a turning point in the history of the 
Turkish labour, its socioeconomic structure displayed hardly any difference from 
that of mono-party period until the early years of the 1950s. Indeed, from 1945 to 
up until this time the agricultural sector supplied more than 40 per cent of GNP 
(see Table 7), more than 80 per cent of the total labour force was engaged in 
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agricultural work (see Table 11) and around 75 per cent of population remained 
rural (see Table 12). To add to this, much the same as in the preceding period, 
throughout the post-war era the majority of peasant families had access to land 
(Kanbolat, 1963) and smallholding family farms dominated agricultural 
production (Celebican, 1970).  
Table 12: Share of urban and rural population in the mono-party and multi-party 
periods 
 Urban Rural  
Years Population Percentage Population Percentage Total 
1927 3,305,879 24.22 10,342,391 75.78 13,648,270 
1935 3,802,642 23.53 12,355,376 76.47 16,158,018 
1940 4,346,249 24.39 13,474,701 75.61 17,820,950 
1945 4,687,102 24.94 14,103,072 75.06 18,790,174 
1950 5,244,337 25.04 15,702,851 74.96 20,947,188 
1955 6,927,343 28.79 17,137,420 71.21 24,064,763 
1960 8,859,731 31.92 18,895,089 68.08 27,754,820 
Source:  DIE, 2002: 46. 
Despite the majority of the rural population remaining in the rural sector, as the 
economic opportunities expanded, in particular, in urban areas (see Ongor, 1965; 
Tumertekin, 1968; Keyder, 1987; Icduygu et al., 1998) and transportation 
facilities improved (see Robinson, 1958; Tumertekin, 1968; Keles, 1978; Keyder, 
1987; Icduygu et al., 1998) outmigration to urban areas
68
 from rural districts 
progressively turned into a more attractive option for some rural households
69
. 
Accordingly, the 1950s witnessed a substantial shift from rural to industrialised 
urban areas (see Turkay, 1957; Tumertekin, 1968; Keles, 1970; Icduygu et al., 
1998; Tekeli, 2007), which in turn guaranteed the much needed source of labour 
supply for the developing urban economy (see Kiray, 1972; Keles, 1978; Keyder, 
1987; Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995’ Icduygu et al., 1998; Makal, 2002; Tekeli, 
2007). Despite the statistical data gathered in this period being pitifully 
inadequate, in particular, regarding the true structure of the labour markets (see 
Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995; Boratav, 2009), according to that which is available, 
the total number of waged-workers recorded a respectable increase in the period 
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 The period also witnessed rural to rural migration. For a detailed account see AUSBF, 1954; 
Karpat, 1960; Kanbolat, 1963; Ekin, 1968; Tumertekin, 1968; Tekeli, 1978; Yildirmaz, 2009. 
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 For a wider account of the socioeconomic transformation that paved the way for rural-to-urban 
migration see e.g. AUSBF, 1954; Helling and Helling, 1958; Hirsch and Hirsch, 1963; Kanbolat, 




and grew from 1,624,303 in 1955 to 2,437,137 in 1960. In a similar manner, 
workers working within the scope of the labour law, that is to say, workers 
employed by enterprises with ten or more employees operating in services and 
industry, both in the private and public sectors, rose from 604,295 in 1955 and to 
824,881 in 1960 (Makal, 2002). The total number of waged workers in the public 
sector also displayed a respectable increase, with a change from 254,496 in 1955 
to 292,026 in 1960 that amounted to 14 per cent of growth. Table 13 below offers 
a summary of the changes in the labour markets in the multi-party period. 
Table 13: Summary of the labour markets in the multi-party period  
 
Total number of 
waged workers 
Workers working in 
public sector 
Workers working in 
scope of labour law 
1955 1,624,303 254,496 604,295 
1960 2,437,137 292,026 824,881 
Source: Makal, 2002: 155, 165. 
Nevertheless, the numbers given above should not mislead the audience, because 
behind these somewhat optimistic figures lay the realities of the urban labour 
market, which many labour migrants were often subject to. Indeed, as can be 
worked out from Table 13, despite the number of waged workers increasing by 
812,834 in a five year period, workers working within the scope of the labour law 
only grew by 220,586. What is more, historical evidence reveals that those 
working in the industrial sector mostly encountered rather poor living and 
working conditions, with: wage rates lagging behind the cost of living, long 
working hours, very restricted organisational rights and very little attention paid to 
health and safety protection (for a general overview see ILO, 1950; Zaim, 1956; 
Makal, 2002; Ozturk, 2006). Even so, migrant workers holding industrial jobs in 
formal sector could still be considered fortunate, for according to the numbers in 
Table 14 below and according to the historical narratives provided by the 
scholarly literature, most of the new arrivals found jobs either in construction 
industry, which provided very little security, if any (see Karpat, 1976) or 
completely remained outside the modern sector and engaged in low-income, low-
productivity and socioeconomically insecure activities related to the service 
sector, such as street vending, petty trade, and portage, which are commonly 
known as marginal jobs (see Kiray, 1972; Keyder, 1987; Makal, 2002; Boratav, 
2009; Yildirmaz, 2009). The precarious position of the migrant workers’ in the 
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urban labour markets inevitably exerted a significant impact on their attitudes as 
socioeconomic actors in the domain of industrial relations, which is the subject of 
the subsection below.  
Table 14: Sectoral distribution of the workforce in non-agricultural activities in 
the multi-party period 
Years Manufacturing Construction Services Total 
1945 490,000 121,000 441,000 655,000 
1950 482,000 195,000 626,000 1,303,000 
1955 667,000 407,000 1,205,000 2,279,000 
1960 791,000 390,000 1,602,000 2,783,000 
Source:  TUIK, 2010: 136. 
5.2.1.3.2 Labour as an Actor in Industrial Relations  
According to scholars of Turkish labour history, for most of the period migrant 
workers in the same way as the peasant migrants of the previous period, remained 
as peasant-workers, retained their rural values and revealed a low level of working 
class consciousness (Saymen, 1948; Ekin, 1968; Makal, 2002). Therefore, 
subsequent post-war migration that brought thousands of migrant workers of rural 
origin into the urban sector was not conducive with proletarianisation that would 
lead to the establishment of a modern working class with its own ideologies and 
interests fundamentally set apart from those of capital (see Makal, 2002; Koc, 
2003). 
Three important factors serve to explain this situation. First, as already discussed 
above, many of these new urbanites had to remain outside the industrial sector, 
which as Kiray (1972) pointed out, prevented many migrant workers in the urban 
labour markets from developing a meaningful class identity as workers. Second, 
even those who could secure a job in the formal industrial sector, were new 
arrivals from rural areas with no or very little relation with the left-wing and pro-
labour movements as well as lacking the skills and working experience that an 
ordinary urbanized industrial worker would be expected to have. They were, in 
fact, in words of the ILO (1950: 14), unable to  
“easily be transformed into a factory worker possessing the 
outlook, the ambitions, the skill, the persistence and the 
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occupational conscience that should characterise industrial 
workers in a technological society.” 
Third, those who sought jobs in the modern sector, according to Icduygu et al. 
(1998), competed with their cheap labour in the urban labour markets 
continuously against workers that were organised (also see Zaim, 1956). All these 
factors when taken together, resultantly, retarded labour’s proletarianisation 
process and thus exerted a profound negative influence on its emergence as an 
actor in the domain of industrial relations. 
However, this should not come to be interpreted that workers did not show any 
interest towards their political position and socioeconomic conditions in labour 
market, for the multi-party period witnessed labour’s gradual discovery of its own 
power and its power resources and this period, as Kocak (2008: 91 brackets 
added) succinctly put it, “represents [both] a hopeful rupture from previous 
periods and the formation of early experiences for the rise of [working class 
movements] in the 1960’s”. In labour’s realisation of its own power, trade unions 
played a leading role by means of which workers exercised their legal rights and 
stepped up interactions with other actors (for a wider review see e.g. Rosen, 1962; 
Talas et al., 1965; Guzel, 1996; Mahirogullari, 2005; Celik, 2010b). Indeed, 
following the ban on the establishment of class-based associations being lifted in 
1945, the workers started to organise around trade unions (see Figure 6), which 
firstly appeared in industrial centres and then spread across the country (Rosen, 
1962; Bianchi, 1984; Makal, 2002; Celik, 2010b)
70
. Workers’ efforts to organise 
around the unions culminated in the establishment of a national confederation, the 
Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions, known as Turk-Is,–Turkiye Isci 
Sendikalari Birligi- in 1952 and this marked the beginning of a new era for 
workers’ representation at the national level (Kutal, 1977; Makal, 2002; Celik, 
2010b). 
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 The initial trade union movements, as the historical resources reveal, gathered around the 
socialist parties following the rescinding of the ban. However these left-leaning labour 
movements proved to be rather short lived for their activities were suspended by the CHP, 
indefinitely, just six months after this action (see Karpat, 1966; Guzel, 1983; Ozturk, 2006, 
Celik, 2010b). However, trade unions flourished once more following the passage of the Trade 
Unions Law in 1947 
152 
 
Figure 6: An overview of the trade union structure and trade union membership in 
the multi-party period 
  
Source:  Makal 2002: 276. 
Labours’ organisation around trade unions although at the first sight appearing to 
be a forward step towards empowerment of labour as an actor, was not without its 
shortcomings. Indeed, for one thing the Trade Unions Law, by allowing the 
formation of two or more trade unions in one branch of activity, paved the way for 
the establishment of a large number of weak and rival unions (see Figure 6), each 
representing small amount of members (Talas, 1954; Bianchi, 1984; Akkaya, 
2002; Makal, 2002; Celik, 2010b). Second, workers’ efforts directed towards 
gathering around unions, were constantly subjected to the guidance and 
supervision of the political powerbrokers, namely by the CHP and the DP (see 
below and Rosen, 1962; Isikli, 2005; Celik, 2010b). This situation paved the way 
for the establishment of some close and informal links between the trade unions 
and the CHP or the DP, which as aptly put by Isikli (2005: 488, brackets added) 
“divided [trade unions] into two groups in such a way that made them the 
instruments of activities of the political organisations”. 
Third, the characteristics and socioeconomic backgrounds of union members and 
leaders stood as important obstacles to the development of meaningful working 
class awareness.  Regarding members, many of them were either peasant-workers 






















































































who had very little, if any, experience of industrial work and urban life
71
. 
Accordingly, the majority of them were ill-educated, even illiterate and patriarchal 
values seemed to prevail in their attitudes towards work and the employment 
relationship. When it comes to the leaders of union movements, it appears that 
their characteristics and socioeconomic backgrounds resembled that of their 
members’ in many respects, for most of the trade unions leaders were also first 
generation workers, with low levels of education and their affiliation with the 
unions and labour movement was new (for a wider review see e.g. Rosen, 1962; 
Koc, 1999b, 1999a; Makal, 2002).  
Fourth, trade unions’ financial positions remained weak throughout the period. 
The key reasons for this were the low rates of union dues, difficulties in collection 
of these fees and their prevention from engaging in any profit-yielding activities 
appear (see Rosen, 1962; Dereli, 1968; Isikli, 2005; Celik, 2010b). The financial 
difficulties that the unions faced, resultantly, on the one hand restricted the range 
of activities that they could undertake (Rosen, 1962) and on the other, rendered 
them more vulnerable to the political parties’ intervention, for the financial 
support given to them by the political parties constituted an important element in 
their revenues (Rosen, 1962; Talas et al., 1965; Isikli, 2005; Celik, 2010b). 
Fifth, trade unions faced with many difficulties with regards to their recognition 
as representatives of the working class during the focal period. One aspect of this 
difficulty appears to have stemmed from workers’ worries about losing their jobs 
or being flagged up as ‘communist’, because of the trade union membership (see 
Koc, 1999b). Another aspect of this difficulty seems to have been related to the 
unions’ de facto recognition by the other actors, which was often not forthcoming 
(Koc, 2002; Kocak, 2008; Celik, 2010b). Indeed, for example according to Rosen 
(1962: 291) most trade unions were “excluded from any effective role, particularly 
in their dealings with private employers”. Similarly the Turk-Is, the association 
authorised to represent workers at the highest political level nationally, 
encountered a considerable recognition problem in the period, for as Bianchi 
(1984: 124) stated:   
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 In this regard, for a wider perspective see Koc’s (1999a, 1999b) interviews with former trade 
unionists as they offer a rich account of backgrounds and experiences of workers and trade union 
leaders in the multi-party period. 
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 “The national labour confederation, Turk-Is, was never able to 
establish itself as the recognized spokesman for the labour 
movement. Its leaders were told by several ministers of labour 
that the government had no need for ‘intermediate channels’ to 
address workers.”  
The social, political and economic circumstances that labour was faced with as a 
group in the process of turning into a socioeconomic class, inevitably exerted a 
significant impact on the way workers formulated and voiced their interests and 
on the way they engaged in interactions with other actors.  These are focus of the 
subsections that follow.  
5.2.2 Interests 
The interests of the actors of Turkish industrial relations during the multi-party 
period, as was the case with the previous era, mirrored their security related 
concerns in the spheres of work and production and formed the basis for the way 
industrial relations was institutionalised. This subsection scrutinises the interests 
of the political actors, the capital owners and labour in this period, respectively. 
5.2.2.1 State 
A thorough review of available literature suggests that the political actors of the 
multi-party period followed the steps of the ruling cadres of the mono-party 
period and devoted considerable attention to industrial relations. However, the 
interests they pursued in this area differed in important ways from those pursued 
by the Kemalist political actors in the previous period. The reasoning behind this 
change, in the first place, seems to be the political leaders’ decision to forge 
stronger ties with the Western world, one fundamental requirement of which 
turned out to be promotion of more political freedom for workers’ organisations 
(see e.g. Talas et al., 1965; Karpat, 1966; Tuna, 1969; Ekin, 1976; Makal, 2002). 
Attempts by the political actors to introduce freedom of association with the 
political impetus of securing Turkey’s place in capitalist bloc were expressly put 
into words in the speech of the then Minister of Labour Sadi Irmak during the 
parliamentary debate on the draft Trade Unions Act no 5018 held in February 
1947, as he stated that (TBMM, 1947: 301 brackets and emphasis added): 
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“Dear colleagues, [in our day] establishment of trade unions 
comes to our agenda as one of the fundamental rights of the new 
society. These rights alongside being written into the 
constitutions of several countries [were incorporated] into the 
International Labour Organisation’s Constitution, which 
qualifies as an international constitution and also were affirmed 
in this Organisation’s meetings, which we attended. We agreed 
with all these decisions [that were made in these meetings][…] 
Accordingly, recognition of trade unions both accommodates 
with our national requirements, our understanding of law and 
with our international commitments” 
However, the political actors’ changing interests in the domain of industrial 
relations cannot be solely attributed to Turkey’s desire to participate in the 
Western bloc, for domestic factors equally need to be considered. Therefore in the 
second place came the political actors’ increasing interest over protection of 
capitalist economy and empowerment of the national bourgeoisie as ends to 
themselves rather than as means to build a well-developed industrialised capitalist 
nation state (see e.g. Avcioglu, 1968; Ahmad, 1977; Erogul, 1990). Accordingly, 
it should come as no surprise that, “protection and perpetuation of capitalist 
industrialisation within the multi-party system” appeared as the overarching 
interest sought by the political actors throughout the period regarding industrial 
relations. The parliamentary proceedings of the period, when critically reviewed, 
reveal that the pursuit of this interest manifested itself in two distinctive 
discourses. First, the political actors’ commitment to the creation of a working 
class away from the ideologies of left-wing politics, especially from the ideals of 
proletarian internationalism, remained the same. Second, the way they justified 
state intervention in the domain of industrial relations drifted apart from the 
Kemalist rhetoric of perpetuation of national independence and maintenance of 
solidarity between different classes.  
The CHP’s Minister of Labour Sadi Irmak’s address to parliament during the 
budgetary discussions in 1946 provides some subtle clues that the ruling circles 
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were maintaining their single-minded determination to keep labour away from 
Marxist influences, when he stated that (TBMM, 1946: 738 brackets added): 
“Dear colleagues, we all know that industrialisation brings with 
it many social problems. Yet, these are not unbeatable obstacles. 
We can solve these problems if we benefit enough from the 
troubles experienced by the [nations of] the world and from the 
mentality of the Turkish regime. It is observed that wherever 
there is a group of working people, international [communist] 
agents try to influence them. These agents try to instil the 
working masses with proletarian feelings. Then they 
indoctrinate them with the idea of joining hands with all 
proletarians around the world. For this reason, we will pay the 
maximum attention in order to prevent the occurrence of 
proletarian feelings amongst our workers.” 
Samet Agaoglu’s address to the parliament as a Minister of State and Vice Prime 
Minister in the DP’s term of office offers an additional insight into the continuity 
of ruling circles’ commitment to keeping the working masses away from left-wing 
ideals. In his speech, Samet Agaoglu justified the government’s decision 
regarding the prevention of a workers’ demonstration being held by a trade union 
in order to “protest against the unfair practices of employers” as follows (TBMM, 
1952: 100, brackets added, triple dots without brackets were exported from 
original); 
 “Dear friends, now I am going to read you a few lines from the 
manifesto [written for the meeting]: “citizen worker, … the 
employers who fired you without any reason by exploiting your 
labour”, “we cannot anymore condone those employers who 
insist on violating the rights given us by laws and who want to 
reap profits […] by exploiting us”. Here it is dear friends, after 
having read these lines, we are rightly asking: Where are we 
going? Are we on the road to the class struggle? Are we going 
to meet in the public squares [and] start a fight between capital 
and labour?”  
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Although the political leaders of the multi-party period remained highly dedicated 
to channelling the Turkish labour movement away from Marxist or communist 
influences, which in a sense implied a continuity of the elite interests in industrial 
relations as pertained to the mono-party period, not every aspect of the previous 
period was carried forward. Indeed, the post-war period, regardless of which party 
was in power, saw the political actors’ construction of a new and distinct 
discourse regarding state intervention in the domain of industrial relations. That 
is, in this new rhetoric a tendency towards association of public interests with 
“development for capitalist growth” rather than “development as a means for the 
perpetuation of national independence” occurred amongst the political actors.  
One speech by a CHP deputy, Hulusi Oral, delivered in a parliamentary meeting 
that was held to discuss the draft Trade Unions Act provides persuasive evidence 
that the political actors started to view the public interest as lying in the concerns 
over “development for capitalist growth”, rather than in the Kemalist concerns 
over the “development as a means for the perpetuation of national independence”. 
Indeed, regarding the “ban on strikes” in the draft Trade Unions Act, he stated 
that (TBMM, 1947: 315, brackets added): 
“Is strike a right or coercion, an oppression to claim 
someone’s rights? […] This, directly from the viewpoint of 
public interest […] as much as being against the [interests of] 
public economic enterprises, consistently damages the existing 
circumstances of individuals, of the capitalists whom we call 
employers (sic) [and] poses dangers up to such a degree that it 
undermines all their [capitalist’s] interests together with the 
public interest. 
An excerpt from a speech of Mumtaz Tarhan, one of the DP’s Ministers of Labour 
also offered an intriguing example illustrating how the ruling circles of the period 
associated the notion of public interest with the “development for capitalist 
growth”. In his address to parliament on February 1956, Tarhan, after asking, 
“[w]hy did not we realise the right to strike until now” answered his question as 
follows (TBMM, 1956: 1128): 
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“[f]irst of all we do not have a developed industry to organise 
strikes. Our industry has been a baby in a bundle. We could not 
have killed this industry with a dispute resolution mechanism, 
with the most extreme dispute resolution mechanism of all, like 
strikes, while it was still in its bundle.”  
The political actors’ interests regarding industrial relations seemed to have largely 
overlapped with those of the capital owners, whose political and economic power 
was in the ascendant as multi-party system progressed, with interests being the 
subject of the subsection that follows.  
5.2.2.2 Capital 
A careful overview of the scholarly literature reveals that capital emerged as an 
important and powerful actor in the politico-economic domain of the post-war 
period, with the goal perpetuation of a democratic-capitalist politico-economic 
order which would give prominence to their capitalist interests (see e.g. Karpat, 
1966; Avcioglu, 1968; Yerasimos, 1976; Ahmad, 1977; Erogul, 1990). In this 
respect they, in the words of Esin (1974: 140), “shared the same prospects in the 
domain of the economy with those political parties capable of riding to power and 
they forged alliance with them”. Their attitudes could be exemplified through 
addressing two strong interests they championed in domain of industrial relations. 
The first interest that the capital owners continuously voiced has been 
diminishment of state intervention into economy as throughout the period they 
sought to gain their political and economic independence from the state. The 
inaugural speech delivered at the Turkey Economic Congress
72
 organised by the 
Association of Istanbul Traders in the early years of the multi-party period in this 
context offers a striking example of the independence claims of capital. In the 
speech, which centred its criticisms on statist economic policies, it was stated that 
(DPT, 1997: 5, emphasis added): 
“Statism in countries like ours, which are in need of 
reconstruction of practically everything, should be a founding, a 
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 For further information about the Congress see Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 1968; Esin, 1974; 
Kazgan, 2006.  
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breeding sort of statism just like as a mother breeding, raising 
up her child. […] Nevertheless, with the statist system we have 
maintained so far, we wanted our children to be our subjects, to 
be our servants and to obey us. […] We could never admit that 
our children became grown-ups […] and even became superior 
to us. This period of tutelage should soon be brought to an 
end.”  
This ‘period of tutelage’ for capital, indeed, was soon brought to an end, at least 
to a large extent, with the ruling elites’ adoption of a looser approach to statist 
economic policies (for further details see above and Karpat, 1966; Avcioglu, 
1968; Timur, 1991). Nevertheless, the employers’ struggle for freedom from the 
state’s tutelage appeared to be a goal that was articulated only to protect their own 
interests. Indeed, political tutelage, especially when the political actors’ single-
minded determination of the maintenance of the ban on the right to strike came 
into question, seemed to have turned into a mere “practical necessity” that served 
the democratic capitalist politico-economic order of the country. Therefore, the 
second interest that the capital owners fiercely promoted has been the state’s 
intervention into industrial relations in favour of employers. The right to strike in 
this regard could be cited as one example illustrating how the employers, in 
general, deemed state tutelage essential when it came to labour-capital relations. 
Etem Izzet Benice, the owner of several newspapers and a printing house 
(TBMM, 2010: 334), newspaper columnist and an ex-deputy of the CHP, wrote in 
one of his newspapers that (Benice, 1949, cited by Sulker, 2004: 101, brackets 
and emphasis added):  
“Turkey’s [decision to] settle labour-capital relations with an 
arbitration system and its attachment of [labour capital 
relations] to the assurance that was put under the responsibility 
of the state [sic] were appreciated even in the United States and 
became a subject of [their] investigation [sic]. For that reason, 
we do not anticipate the DP […] to accept the right to strike. We 




Another capital owner, Habip Edip Torehan’s words, published in his own 
newspaper provides further intriguing insight into how the employers viewed the 
ban on strikes as a mere “practical necessity” serving the democratic capitalist 
politico-economic order of the country, as he stated that (Torehan, 1953 cited by 
Sulker, 2004: 113, brackets added):  
“We cannot understand the purpose of [those who wish] for the 
right to strike to spread [in our country]. It is the most explicit 
right that employees […] receive recompense for their work. It 
is possible to settle this in accordance with [wage] scales, with 
quality of service given and especially with skill levels. In such 
cases, it is always possible for employer and employee to come 
to terms with each other through negotiations. 
Despite all these possibilities, if one insists on going on strike […] 
then […] this would form an opinion about existence of a destructive 
tendency [sic].  
The republican and democratic children of the country of the 
Turks now live in a period of re-construction not destruction [of 
their country], which was ruined many times with the shocks it 
was exposed to for many hundred years. In this period, actions 
which are carried out with consideration and wisdom rather 
than with coercion will unfailingly yield positive results. This 
will be worked out not with leaving work through strike action, 
but with sticking to work and duty heart and soul.” 
However, it seems that maintenance of the ban on strikes was not the only 
concern of employers in the period for an overview of available resources 
suggests that they also resisted any kind of pro-labour legislation to avoid 
lowering of their profits. This pattern of behaviour was implied in the words of 
Karpat (1966: 304) as a “lack of social responsibility on the part of the new 
entrepreneurial class” and was almost openly manifested at the 1951 Industrial 
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Congress with the report being approved by the participants
73
. This report, which 
was prepared by the Association of Istanbul Traders –Istanbul Tuccar Dernegi- 
(Esin, 1974: 149), with regards to the so-called tax burden imposed on industry, 
amongst its other suggestions, emphasised that “the labour legislation which is of 
a particular concern to industry started to turn into a kind of tax with the 
obligations it imposes on industry” and asked the government (Kucukdemirkol, 
2006: 58): 
“to make the burdens such as insurance of occupational 
accidents, maternity, sickness, pensions, severance pay, each of 
which constitute the subject of different payments, more 
moderate and to seek a balance between their burden on the 
industrialists and possibilities and degrees of workers benefiting 
from them.” 
The powerful position of capital owners in the domain of politics and economics 
and their strong alliance with the state seem to have exerted a significant impact 
on the ways labour defined and defended its interests in the period, which are 
scrutinised in the next subsection.  
5.2.2.3 Labour  
The development of interest representation on the part of labour displayed 
peculiar characteristics during most of the multi-party period. That is, Turkish 
labour, rather than having formulated and expressed this on its class-based 
concerns, was forced to shape them under the supervision and command of the 
political powers that be (Agrali, 1967; Sulker, 2004a, 2004b; Ozturk, 2006; Celik, 
2010b). Accordingly, as is further contended below, labour as an actor remained, 
at least until the mid-1950s, unable to pursue independent initiatives pertaining to 
further rights for collective representation. The years following this, however, 
witnessed a growing dissatisfaction with the political actors and with their 
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 Although the congress was held with the participation of all actors in economy, it is worth 
noting that labour was represented by only four members, while merchants and industrialists had 
more than 300 participants each in attendance. It is also interesting to see that great interest was 
shown in the congress on the part of the political actors, such as the prime minister, the president 
of the Turkish Parliament and many ministers and 38 deputies actually participated. For more 
information on the see Ekonomi ve Ticaret Bakanligi, 1951. 
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politico-economic agendas amongst labour and marked the beginning of its 
independent interest representation, manifested in its struggle to secure collective 
labour rights.  
According to historical accounts, the interest representation of labour became a 
matter of political rivalry in post-war Turkey (see e.g. Agrali, 1967; Guzel, 1983; 
Ozturk, 1996; Sulker, 2004a, 2004b; Ozturk, 2006; Celik, 2010b), which paved 
the way for the establishment of close, but informal links, between the political 
parties and the trade unions. Thus, “[t]he result has been” as Rosen (1962: 259) 
clearly highlighted “a serious impairment of the unity and coherence of the 
unions, and division of individual unions as well as union organizations into 
partisan cliques.” 
Despite having been divided between the parties, the interests of trade unions, 
however, whether they be political or economic, displayed remarkable similarities 
throughout the period. One striking similarity they shared in this respect was their 
political stance against communist ideals. To this end, trade unions, throughout 
the period organised public meetings to condemn this ideology and in these 
meetings unionists made vigorous statements to demonstrate that they had no 
interest in becoming involved in such activities
74
. For example, at a meeting 
organised to condemn communism in 1950, a leader of one of the participating 
trade unions stated (Milliyet, 1950: 7):  
“We, the Turkish workers who have a long and clean history, 
feel the urge of placing national interests on top of everything 
[…]. There is no life to communists in these lands where 
thousands of martyrs lay underneath each border stones of it” 
[sic].  
Likewise, in another meeting convened by some of the Istanbul based trade 
unions to condemn communism, as reported by a popular daily newspaper 
Milliyet (1953), speakers vehemently rounded on it by denoting that it was “an 
abominable regime which does not recognise rectitude, honour, dignity”. 
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 For a more detailed analysis of trade union and unionists’ anti-communist stance see e.g. 
Mahirogullari, 2005; Celik, 2010a.  
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Moreover, during the meeting, which was attended by about 5,000 workers, it was 
also opined that (Milliyet, 1953 brackets added): 
“We are Kemalists and are loyal to its principles and ideals. 
You dignified worker! […] Neither right, nor left, the way we 
will walk is the true path. […] Let us swear in front of the 
spiritual presence of Ataturk. Communism will be crushed 
everywhere it appears.” 
Another striking similarity amongst trade unions, regardless of their political 
allegiance were the economic interests they pursued. Indeed, throughout the 
period, trade unions, regardless of the political orientation of the party they were 
controlled by, spent most of their time and resources representing the economic 
interests of their members, which were clustered around including’ but not limited 
to, higher wages, adoption of a minimum wage law, shorter working hours, better 
treatment at the workplace,  a fairer arbitration mechanism, extension of the 
labour law provisions to a wider range of workers and improvement of social 
insurance facilities (see Talas, 1954; Talas et al., 1965; Guzel, 1996; Koc, 1999b, 
1999a; Sulker, 2004a; Ozturk, 2006; Akin, 2009).  
In spite of common perspective between the trade unions in the formulation of 
their interests, it seems that not all of these overlapped. Indeed, their views on the 
necessity and urgency of the right to strike differed considerably especially in the 
first half of the period. For example, in a meeting organised by the coal miners of 
Zonguldak on the 26 January 1950 in order to record their protest against the 
advocates of the right to strike (see Sulker, 2004b), one of the workers stated that 
(Isci Sendikasi, 1950: 1, cited by Celik, 2010: 157 brackets added):    
“We do not want [the right to] strike. Because we do not believe 
that we can derive benefits from it. Because we are not so blind 
as not to see and not so ungrateful as not to appreciate 
everything that this state has done and is doing for us. [...] We 
do not want [the right to] strike. Because we believe and witness 
that our interests can be materialised without a strike, without 
doing any harm to our country and our nation.” 
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However, not long after this meeting, on the 1 February 1950, as reported by 
Sulker (2004b), seven trade unions based in Istanbul held a meeting with the 
participation of their presidents and representatives, where they decided to voice 
their opinions on the right to strike in a letter addressed to the Minister of Labour, 
the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and to the presidents of the 
political parties. In the telegram prepared they stated that (Sulker, 2004b: 73): 
“Except for Soviet Russia, which does not guarantee freedom of 
conscience and does not recognise any civil rights of its citizens, 
all civilised countries in the world recognise right to strike for 
their workers and have written it into the top of their 
constitutions. For this reason, there cannot be any intentional 
unfairness more than being reluctant to giving this right to us. 
[…] A strike, unlike some people’s interpretations that it is an 
outdated weapon, is a weapon for defence that preserves its 
power and capability, which will never go out of date”.    
Nevertheless, the available literature reveals that especially beginning from the 
mid-1950s, there appeared a broad consensus amongst trade unions on the 
necessity of the right to strike (Rosen, 1962; Sulker, 2004b). For example, in a 
meeting held by the Association of Istanbul Trade Unions
75
 on the 31 January 
1955 to discuss right to strike, the president of one labour organisation, Sureyya 
Birol enunciated that (Sulker, 2004b: 85, brackets added):  
“We were against the right to strike during the years 1948-
1949. […] By not wanting the right to strike maybe we made a 
mistake maybe we acted right. We tried to serve the interests of 
labour even if just a bit. Today we are of the opinion that the 
right to strike is necessary.”  
At the same meeting, trade unionist Celal Beyaz stated that (Sulker, 2004b: 85): 
                                                          
75
 The Association of Istanbul Trade Unions, as reported by Barkin (1949a), was directly 
established with the CHP’s support. However, as stated by Celik (2010), during the DP’s term of 
office it also maintained good relations with the government.  
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“We want the right to strike, because the circumstances require 
this. […] We want the right to strike in order [to prevent] 
exploitation of our labour.” 
Again, in the same meeting, Nuri Beser, opined (Sulker, 2004b: 87): 
“Let us forget the past and act in concert in order to ask for the 
recognition of the right to strike. We need to gain the right to strike 
against some egoist employers. Let us ask for recognition of the 
right to strike to use it when it is needed.” 
Indeed, what the available material reveals is that, through to the end of the multi-
party period, most trade unions and unionists, arrived at a clear consensus on the 
necessity and urgency of the right to strike. Nuri Beser’s speech as the president 
of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is), in this regard is worth 
citing as his comments provide a quintessential example regarding the rising 
consensus amongst labour of the necessity of the right to strike. That is, at the 
annual congress of the Turk-Is he enunciated that (Milliyet, 1959: 1, 3):  
“Denying recognition of the right to strike for Turkish workers 
means disbelieving its political maturity […] A system of free 
collective bargaining cannot be established in our country 
without recognition of the right to strike.” 
Labour’s revised politico-economic position vis-à-vis the employers and the state 
inevitably had repercussions regarding their subsequent interactions and these are 
the subject of the subsection that follows.  
5.2.3 Interactions  
The multi-party period witnessed, as has been already mentioned above, fierce 
competition between the CHP and the DP in order to win the support of trade 
unions and to take them under control (see e.g. Guzel, 1996; Makal, 2002; Sulker, 
2004a; Isikli, 2005; Mahirogullari, 2005; Celik, 2010b). It appears that this 
competition was initiated by the CHP in the early years of the era (Guzel, 1996; 
Sulker, 2004a; Celik, 2010b) and was aimed at, according to an archival 
166 
 
document, “attracting votes from the workers” (Barkin, 1949: 1) and “protecting 
them from communist appeals” (CHP, 1948,  cited by Barkin, 1949: 3). This 
political manoeuvre, which was carried out particularly to establish control over 
the trade unions representing the state sector workers (Koc, 1992; Guzel, 1996; 
Akkaya, 2002; Celik, 2010b), soon appealed to the DP leaders as well.  
Consequently, an intense rivalry grew between the CHP and the DP, with aim of 
establishing informal networks with the trade unions representing state sector 
workers. By means of these arrangements they provided those organised labour 
and their leaders that favoured their side with the political and economic benefits 
they could not derive through the mobilisation of legal collective rights (Rosen, 
1962; Bianchi, 1984; Guzel, 1996; Sulker, 2004a; Celik, 2010b; Makal, 2010). 
Amongst those practices employed in order to offer economic and political 
benefits to organised labour, the most common were the provision of financial 
assistance, nomination of trade union leaders as candidate deputies on party lists, 
promises for better working and living conditions if power was retained or when 
acquired, supporting trade union leaders who remained loyal to them, granting of 
privilege in application of rules, allocation of material rewards to the rank and file 
and the settlement of individual work-related problems (Talas et al., 1965; Guzel, 
1996; Koc, 2000; Akkaya, 2002; Mahirogullari, 2005; Celik, 2010b). 
In contrast to the close and cooperative relations developed between labour and 
the state, which laid the foundations for the establishment of harmonious 
interactions in state-led industrial establishments, those between labour and 
employers in the private sector grew somewhat strained. Indeed, private sector 
employers’ attitudes towards trade unions and collective actions differed from that 
of the political actors in that the former, unlike the latter, expected very little, if 
any, political benefit from their interactions with the workers. Therefore, they 
seem to have displayed very little hesitation to showing aggressive attitudes and in 
using discriminatory practices in their dealings with organised labour. Amongst 
these hostile actions the most common practices were: accusing workers who 
developed a degree of working class awareness of being communist sympathisers 
or anarchists; dismissal of unionised workers; discrimination against union 





 (Ersoy, 1954; Talas et al., 1965; Koc, 1999b; Makal, 2002; Sulker, 
2004a; Mahirogullari, 2005). At this point it should be noted that there exists 
anecdotal evidence that some employers maintained good relations with trade 
unions (Rosen, 1962) and put into practice various measures in order to provide 
their employees with better working conditions, at least to a degree (see Ersoy, 
1954; Baydar and Dincer, 1999). Nevertheless, their significance seems to have 
born little weight when compared to prevailing attitude and punitive 
implementation of the aforementioned measures amongst the employers (Saymen, 
1960; Rosen, 1962; Makal, 2002). Resultantly, as one observer noted during the 
focal period:  
“The majority of the employers do not look favourably on the 
trade unions, exhibit outrageous behaviours against them, watch 
for an opportunity to damage them, even do not want unions to 
be established” (Saymen, 1960: 51 brackets added). 
Employers’ attitudes – both in the state and private sectors – towards trade unions 
and collective actions, when combined with the shortcomings of trade unions in 
the period, appeared to impose some significant limitations on the workers’ 
interactions with other actors. Indeed, throughout this time, workers mostly 
remained within the confines of the legal and practical boundaries established by 
the political actors, and tended to materialise their interests through resources 
made available to them via both formal and informal channels. Amongst the 
formal channels resorted to were: the initiation of collective labour disputes 
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 Newspapers, periodicals, academic studies, journals of unions and reports published in the 
period are imbued with the narratives of unjust practices of employers against organised 
workers. To name a few, for example, as reported by Talas et al. (1965), members of the Union 
of Workers of the Ayancik Metal and Wood Industries -Ayancik Maden ve Agac Sanayii Iscileri 
Sendikasi- were subjected to oppression of their employers and were fired in groups of 40 to 60. 
In another incident, 22 workers working in the Tarsus Sadi Eliyesil Factory were laid off without 
any reason following their initiation of collective labour dispute in 1949 (Makal, 2002: 347). In a 
similar fashion, in 1959, at a textile factory, a foreman was dismissed after having been 
nominated as the workers’ representative in favour of the nominee supported by the employer 
(Makal, 2002: 346). 
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through the compulsory arbitration boards
77
 (Rosen, 1962; Dereli, 1968; Makal, 
2002; Kocak, 2008), conclusion of collective agreements
78
 (Talas, 1976; Makal, 
2002) relations with the American unions
79
 (Celik, 2010b, 2010a), publications 
(see Kocak, 2008; Akin, 2009) and fund-raising activities
80
 (Rosen, 1962; 
Akkaya, 2002).   
The historical evidence also suggests that organised labour – especially those 
employed in state sector – widely utilised the informal channels made available to 
them in the period (see e.g. Talas et al., 1965; Guzel, 1996; Mahirogullari, 2005; 
Celik, 2010b). However, it appears that such interactions did not completely work 
in favour of the Turkish trade union movement, for while on the one hand, these 
interactions brought with them as Celik (2010b: 304) put it “moderate unionism”, 
whereby collaboration and informal networking constituted the basis of the 
employment relationship, on the other hand, they introduced the labour movement 
to the practice of the materialisation of their interests not through mobilisation of 
their traditional power resources, but through going into informal interactions 
with the political powers that be (see Rosen, 1962; Guzel, 1996; Celik, 2010b). 
That is, entering into interactions in this way, although at the outset assisted the 
trade unions in having their economic interests met, in fact, facilitated the parties’ 
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 By making use of this mechanism, according to Makal (2002), trade unions became able to exert 
more influence on working conditions. However, as Makal (2002) rightly pointed out, the 
majority of the members on arbitration boards were officials directly appointed by the state; the 
law restricted raising of disputes to only at the workplace level and trade unions were 
inexperienced with limited resources. Given all these factors, the influence of unions on the 
decisions of these boards was somewhat limited. However it is worth noting that, according to 
calculations of Makal (2002), out of 725 total arbitrations resolved between the years 1951 and 
1958, 67 per cent were decided in favour of workers.  
78
 It should be noted that the number of collective bargaining agreements concluded in the period 
remains undocumented. However, some scholarly research reveals that a very insignificant 
number of collective agreements were concluded in the period and these were rather short-lived 
(see e.g. Talas, 1976; Makal, 2002). 
79
 According to Celik (2010a, 2010b), throughout the multi-party years, despite the fact that trade 
unions were put under strict control of the government with regards to their relations with 
foreign unions, Turkish union leaders established friendly relations with American unionists. In 
fact, these interactions were, according to him, were the result of Turkish union leaders 
recognising the need to address their “inexperience, isolation and weakness” (Celik, 2010a: 183). 
For an excellent review of these relations see Celik, 2010b.  
80
 In order to supplement their revenues, as the available sources reveal, some unions in the period 
organised lotteries, balls and concerts (Rosen, 1962; Akkaya, 2002; Celik, 2010a).  
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control over them and introduced what is commonly termed “tutelage unionism” 
in Turkey’s industrial relations literature81. 
Yet, not all the interactions led by labour took place within the legal and practical 
framework of the industrial relations that was established by the more powerful 
actors. Indeed, the period also witnessed some antagonisms, conflicts and strains 
between the actors, which manifested themselves mostly in the form of work 
stoppages and illegal strikes. While the number of these collective actions 
remained low due to the imposition of heavy sanctions
82
, the period still witnessed 
one demonstration organised by a trade union to protest against unemployment 
and the socioeconomic policies of the government in 1949 (see Guzel, 1996; 
Isikli, 2005) and at least 43 work stoppages and strikes, most of which were 
spontaneous and unorganised to protest at low wages, bad working conditions and 
unjust decisions of employers and administrators
83
 (see Makal, 2002).  
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 The word tutelage and the phrase tutelage unionism has a wide use in Turkey’s industrial 
relations literature, see e.g. Koray, 1994; Makal, 2002; Mahirogullari, 2005; Koray and Celik, 
2007; Celik, 2010. 
82
 Kemal Sulker (1983: 1844), witness of the period and a prominent labour activist, reported that 
sanctions for workers when they protested against bad working conditions, included not only 
losing their jobs, but also three years of imprisonment and following this three years of not being 
re-employed. 
83
 The numbers of such spontaneous and unorganised actions directed against unfair practices by 
the employers might be higher than what can be derived from the available resources, for 
according to Karpat (1966:319 brackets added), “[i]t [was] rather difficult to obtain reliable 
information on this subject because of a certain reticence on the part of the press, at that time, to 
give publicity to such “dangerous” events as workers’ strikes”. 
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Figure 7: Changes in and differences between the nominal wages in public and 
private sectors in the multi-party period. 
 
Source:  Bulutay, 1995: 296, 297. 
Subsequently, the policy and practices implemented when merged with the 
political actors’ and employers’ attitudes towards industrial relations produced at 
least three policy outcomes for organised labour in the period. First, they 
disproportionately distributed the power resources between the actors of industrial 
relations placing the labour to a highly disadvantaged position in defining and 
defending its interests. This while on the one hand reduced the labour’s chances to 
act as an independent socioeconomic actor on the other, increased other actors’ 
influence over formulation and management of labour’s organisational and 
representational activities. Second, the political economy implemented in the 
period generated income inequality amongst organised labour. This could be 
observed in the wage differences between public and private sector industrial 
establishments throughout the period (see Figure 7 above). Third the policies 
formulated and practices implemented steered the behaviours of workers in 
direction of social peace. This was achieved mainly by meeting the economic 
demands of workers in public sector and by maintaining the power imbalance 
between the actors in private sector. Interactions developed between labour, the 
employers, and the state became an important factor in the making of the political 

















5.3 Discussion & Conclusion 
The multi-party period represents Turkey’s first serious experiment with 
democratisation and a turning point for its political, economic and social 
development. Introduction of competition to political life offered the actors of 
industrial relations a more democratic environment for interest representation, 
whereby all the relevant actors would have their interests respected, at least on the 
paper. Economically, the political actors’ gradual abandonment of statist 
economic policies allowed for a push towards liberalisation of the economy, with 
a prominent role being assigned to private sector initiatives in the domain of 
industry. Socially, increasing levels of labour migration flowing into the urban 
labour markets triggered the gradual emergence of an industrial working class. 
However, all these changes did not bring with them an instant shift in the 
distribution of power amongst the socioeconomic actors and the way industrial 
relations was institutionalised. Instead, throughout the period the state continued 
with its strong interventionist role in this area and the ruling parties made every 
effort ward off any possible deviance from the dominance of the, so-called, 
superior national interests. Capital, on the other hand, emerged as an important 
actor in the economic and political arenas, with its interests almost completely 
overlapping with those of the state in the realm of industrial relations. In an 
environment where two powerful actors shared similar interests, labour, despite its 
growing numbers, initially failed to establish an independent existence that was 
away from the constraints and pressures of the political parties. However, the 
second half of the 1950s witnessed the rise of labour as a socioeconomic actor, 
when it started to formulate its interests on class-based concerns and to voice 
them in a way that, hitherto, was not possible.  
The legal and practical framework set by the political actors and employers 
regarding industrial relations together with the power positions of actors vis-à-vis 
each other in the political and economic domains, forged the patterns of 
interactions between them in the multi-party period. In the case of state sector, the 
interactions between labour and the state were mostly developed on grounds of 
reciprocity and harmony and this situation, not only provided the political actors 
adequate means to take control of the trade union movements in this sector, but 
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also helped them to broaden their constituency. This relationship also yielded 
benefit to the state sector workers, for it provided with favourable opportunities to 
materialise their interests via informal channels, thus rendering the utilisation of 
formal-legal channels as less of an imperative. However, although at the outset the 
interactions forged between the trade unions and the state benefited both parties, 
this situation subsequently facilitated the parties’ control over the trade unions and 
introduced “tutelage unionism” to the Turkey’s industrial relations through which 
trade unions were divided into partisan groups and their unity was damaged. In 
contrast to the interactions established on the basis of cooperation and reciprocity 
in the state sector, those developed in the private sector echoed the power 
imbalances between labour and capital and the former, as an actor, could barely 
mobilise its power resources in the face of the employers’ strong position in the 
politico-economic domain.   
The interests pursued and the interactions developed between the actors of 
industrial relations, accordingly, shaped the political economy of industrial 
relations in the focal period. That is, this was built on the strong logic of 
perpetuation of the capitalist-democratic politico-economic order, and was 
facilitated by appropriate policies and practices, which while significantly limiting 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, completely 
eliminated the right to strike. This resulted in the political economy pursued in the 
domain of industrial relations having three policy outcomes. In the first instance, 
it institutionalised the distribution of power between the actors highly in favour of 
the state and employers, thus putting labour in a very disadvantageous position 
regarding industrial relations. Second, it created income inequalities between the 
workers working in state and private sector in favour of the former. And third, it 
steered the behaviours of labour in the direction of the interests of the more 
powerful actors. Accordingly, throughout the period the trade unions’ activities 
remained exhibited virtually no left-wing tendencies and instead,  they – 
especially those operating in state sector establishments – established good 
relationships with the state, rarely organised collective action or mobilised their 
power resources in order to materialise their interests.  
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Against this background, resultantly, what I posit is that insecurity operated as the 
institutional rationale in the political economy of industrial relations during the 
multi-party period as it had done during the mono-party one. Indeed, throughout 
this era the workers were not provided with adequate and necessary rights to 
define and defend their interests, whereby the possibilities of mobilisation of their 
main power resources were reduced, which placed them at a highly disadvantaged 
position vis-à-vis the more powerful actors in industrial relations. The inadequacy 
or lack of labour’s secondary power resources subsequently reduced its chances to 
act as an independent social agent with distinct interests and agendas. It also 
created income inequalities between the workers and made it easier for capital and 
the state to steer the behaviours of workers as a group. This situation, as I contend, 
empowered the more powerful actors to maintain, and extend their capabilities 
vis-à-vis labour, thus paving the way for the pursuit of a political economy of 
insecurity in the domain of industrial relations. Whether or not this insecurity was 
again adopted and pursued when Turkey ushered in a new era with different 













 THE PLANNED ECONOMY PERIOD  CHAPTER 6:
6.1 Introduction 
The multi-party period was brought to an end with a military coup staged on 27 
May 1961 and with it Turkey ushered in a new era that lasted until 1980. This 
new period, which is commonly called the planned economy period  in the wider 
literature, witnessed the country’s second experience with a democratic political 
order within a multi-party system and saw some remarkable transformations in its: 
political, economic and social structure. Politically a new constitution was 
introduced, the principles and fundamental rules of which shaped the political 
structure of the country for the coming two decades. Economically, the country 
was involved in import substitution industrialisation, the effects of which 
facilitated fast progress in national industry. Socially, Turkey entered into an era 
of rapid change that paved the way for the emergence of a vociferous working 
class. All these changes, which happened almost simultaneously, introduced a 
greater dynamism to the social, political and economic domains and necessitated 
improvements to be made in the structures governing the socioeconomic domain. 
It was against this background of developments that re-institutionalisation of 
industrial relations appeared as one important issue to be dealt with by the 
political actors and the planned economy period marked the beginning of intense 
interactions between the actors of industrial relations.  
This chapter deals with the changes that occurred in the role and position of the 
state, capital and labour in the politico-economic domain, generally and in 
industrial relations, in particular, analysing the way the political economy of 
industrial relations was institutionalised in the planned economy period. Section 
6.2 examines the political economy of industrial relations in detail. It scrutinises 
the actors of industrial relations namely the state, capital and labour and looks at 
the specific political, economic and social conditions in which they developed. 
Following this, the section investigates the interests of the actors and their 





6.2 The Political Economy of (In)security in Industrial Relations 
The planned economy period witnessed a significant transformation in the way 
power was distributed between the actors of industrial relations, in the way they 
defined and defended their interests and in the patterns of interactions established 
between them. Understanding the political economy of industrial relations 
pursued in the planned economy period in this respect requires a thorough 
explanation of the actors, their interests and the actual process of 
institutionalisation of industrial relations, all of which are investigated in the 
subsections that follow. 
6.2.1 Actors 
The actors of industrial relations in the planned economy period displayed 
somewhat different characteristics compared to the previous one. The state, 
having retained a powerful position in the political and economic domains, began 
to be more receptive to the demands of labour. Employers, who gained even 
further political and economic power thanks to the industrial development policies 
of the era, started to consider labour as an actor, the demands and needs of which 
needed to be taken care of. Finally, labour emerged as a powerful socioeconomic 
actor and began to voice its interests on a more equal footing with the state and 
the employers and to enter into meaningful interactions with other actors. All of 
these are probed in the subsections that follow.   
6.2.1.1 State  
The ten years of the DP’s rule ended with a military intervention in May 196084, 
with the military regime closing it down and bringing its leaders to trial for 
violation of the constitutional order (Ahmad, 1993). A combination of four key 
interrelated factors can be attributed this military coup, which was highly solicited 
by the emerging middle class groups that included the: intelligentsia, civilian and 
military bureaucracy and business circles
85. First, the DP’s economic policies, 
designed to prioritise rural economic groups, created a wide level of discontent 
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 For a brief account of the political and social unrest that triggered the military intervention of 
1960 see e.g. Dodd, 1969; Cohn, 1970.  
85
 For the socioeconomic background of the oppositional groups to the DP’s rule see e.g. Dodd, 
1969; Karpat, 1973b, 1973a; Keyder, 1979.  
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amongst the urban economic groups (Keyder, 1979) led by the industrial 
bourgeoisie, but also including military officers and civil servants (Dodd, 1969, 
Savran, 1992). This economic dissatisfaction aroused amongst the urban groups 
gradually led to the creation of an urban coalition of economic, cultural and social 
interests (Yerasimos, 1976; Keyder, 1979; Savran, 1992) in search of a new 
political and economic order in the country (Dodd, 1969; Karpat, 1973b; Savran, 
1992). Second, growing political, social and economic discontent amongst the 
more vocal and well-educated members of the Turkish society finally pushed the 
political dissent onto the streets, which led not only to violent clashes between 
demonstrators and police, but also considerable social and political upheaval 
across the country. Third, the DP started to take repressive measures against 
dissenting opinions and activities and their use by the party leaders gradually 
increased towards the end of the multi-party period posing a threat – at least in the 
eyes of oppositional groups – to the democratic order of the country (Dodd, 1969; 
Cohn, 1970; Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 1993). Fourth, a strong awareness arose 
amongst the military bureaucrats who engineered the military coup of 1960, as 
they started to consider socioeconomic inequalities being not only open threats to 
the political and economic security of the country (Kucuk, 1964), but also 
fundamentally unfair. Therefore they started to embrace the view the state should 
play an active role in their alleviation (Dodd, 1969; Ozbudun, 1976; Ahmad, 
1993).  
The military coup, which was effected on 27 May 1960, thus occurred as a result 
of a coalition established between the urban economic groups composed of the 
industrial bourgeoisie, civil servants, military officers and their cause was 
supported by the urban intelligentsia (Ulman and Tachau, 1965; Yerasimos, 1976; 
Savran, 1992). Hence, as many scholars seem to agree, rather than having grown 
out of a simple drive for power on the part of armed forces (Devereux, 1962; 
Kucuk, 1964; Karpat, 1973a; Kongar, 1998; Cem, 1999), the coup stemmed from 
the desire of
86
 “reinstating the democratic order on a firmer basis”, (Karpat, 
1973a: 323) and “bringing Turkey’s institutions in line with the requirements of 
the post-war world” (Ahmad, 2008: 240). To achieve this, as soon as they seized 
the power the generals went into action and initiated the process of what Ahmad 
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 For critiques of the 1961 military revolution see e.g. Avcioglu, 1996; Cem, 1999; Cizre, 2008.  
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(1993: 127) called “an institutional revolution” (see also Kongar, 1998; Cem, 
1999). The immediate outcome of this so-called institutional revolution was the 
1961 Constitution, which provided for a more pluralistic and liberal democracy 
that would build on a sound checks and balances system with the establishment of 
a constitutional court and the creation of a bicameral parliament
87
 (Ahmad, 1977; 
Erogul, 1987; Zurcher, 2004; Ozbudun and Genckaya, 2009). The new 
constitution gave a substantial degree of autonomy to the universities and mass 
media, provided better protection for fundamental human rights and guaranteed 
more rubust civil, social and economic rights for citizens, including the right to 
unionise and strike. It, what is more, adopted the principle of the social state, 
charging the state with the task of, amongst other things, to regulate economic and 
social life “in a manner consistent with justice, and the principle of full 
employment, with the objective of assuring for everyone a standard of living 
befitting human dignity”88. That is, the principles and fundamental rules of the 
constitution were expected to facilitate “the gradual development of a genuinely 
pluralistic and democratic society” (Ozbudun and Genckaya, 2009: 16) and as a 
result to “enlarge the sphere of participation and brought equality by allowing for 
the free expression of different opinions, and for the parliamentary representation 
of various social groups” (Karpat, 1973b: 73). 
The generals leading the military coup transferred political power to the civilian 
politicians when free elections were held in October 1961. From this election until 
the one held in October 1965, political life in Turkey was characterised by loose 
and fragile coalitions many of which were headed by the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP) (Tachau, 1991; Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998). After 
the 1965 election, the Justice Party (AP) – Adalet Partisi – which according to 
many scholars followed in the footsteps of the DP (Keyder, 1979; Erogul, 1987; 
Ahmad, 1993; Sunar and Sayari, 2004; Zurcher, 2004), emerged as the strongest 
party, winning more than 50 percent of the votes (Keyder, 1979; Ozdemir, 1992; 
Kongar, 1998). The AP’s victory in the polls also marked the re-ascendance of the 
bourgeoisie to political power, yet this time with the decisive influence and 
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178 
 
precedence of the industrial bourgeoisie (Laciner, 1975; Ahmad, 1993; Aksin, 
1997; Zurcher, 2004).  
The AP ruled the country at a time when political, economic and social 
transformations were in full swing. Indeed, the second half of the 1960s witnessed 
rapid industrialisation accompanied with a swift proletarianisation and 
urbanisation process, as explained in detail in later subsections. These 
developments came into being in an environment where the political and social 
mobilisation of different interest groups created deep ideological schisms (Erogul, 
1987; Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 1993; Aksin, 1997; Kongar, 1998), with left-right 
polarization between the major parties soaring to new heights (Sunar and Sayari, 
2004; Cizre, 2008). If these were not enough the populist economic policies of the 
AP faced with a worsening global economic crisis and this brought the country’s 
economic development to a standstill (Erogul, 1987; Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 
1993). Through to the end of the 1960s, these events when combined with the 
AP’s inability to deal with the demands of a changing society, gave way to the 
emergence of a period of violence and social turmoil centred around ideological 
conflict (see Tachau and Heper, 1983; Erogul, 1987; Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998; 
Sunar and Sayari, 2004; Cizre, 2008). All these events eventually led to further 
military intervention in 1971, the so-called 12 March Military interregnum, which 
started with the generals’ submission of an ultimatum to the then president of the 
Turkish state, to the Grand National Assembly and to the Senate, in which they 
accused parliament and the government of putting the country’s future in danger 
(see Laciner, 1975; Keyder, 1979; Ahmad, 1993; Zurcher, 2004).  
The military forces suspended Turkey’s fragile multiparty democracy until the 
general elections held in October 1973 and during this timespan it was governed 
by a series of non-party civilian governments, which were established under the 
auspices of the army
89
. As many observers seem to agree, this intervention rather 
than having been aimed at the protection of the so-called institutional revolution 
of the 1961 intervention, was made against the rising power of the left-wing 
forces (Ozdemir, 1992; Kongar, 1998; Zurcher, 2004) and was backed by the 
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establishment of a non-party civilian government. For an informed account of the non-party 
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national and international bourgeoisie (for various accounts see e.g. Keyder, 1979; 
Ozdemir, 1992; Kongar, 1998). In this respect some of the most conspicuous 
activities of the non-party civilian governments’ in this period there was the 
restriction of some of the most sought after civil liberties that were granted by the 
1961 constitution (see Ahmad, 1993; Zurcher, 2004; Ozbudun and Genckaya, 
2009), suppression of all kinds of left-wing movements (Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 
1993; Aksin, 1997; Kongar, 1998; Zurcher, 2004) and repression of trade union 
activities, including strikes (Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 1993). 
The return to multi-party democracy in 1973 opened the era of feeble and short-
lived coalitions, which were either headed by the CHP or the AP (see e.g. 
Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 1993; Aksin, 1997; Kongar, 1998). During this period, 
while fragmentation between parties made it virtually impossible for one party to 
rise to power alone, the ideological divisions and conflicts of interests that 
appeared between them almost paralysed the normal functioning of the parliament 
(Sunar and Sayari, 2004; Zurcher, 2004; Aydin, 2005). If these were not enough, 
during the years between 1973 and 1980, Turkey was plunged into a serious 
political and economic crisis, with extremist groups both from right and left 
factions engaging in deadly armed clashes on the streets (Benhabib, 1979; 
Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998; Zurcher, 2004). Furthermore, soaring 
unemployment, shortages of consumer goods and rapidly increasing inflation 
added to the volatility of the situation (see e.g. Ahmad, 1993; Kepenek and 
Yenturk, 1995; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009). The year 1980, in this regard, 
marked the high point of economic catastrophe and socio-political turmoil, which 
paved the way for another military coup, staged on 12 September 1980, which, 
bringing with it anti-democratic measures that opened a new era in the nation’s: 
political, economic and social life.  
The political and economic climate of the planned economy period, while having 
led to a severe breakdown of the democratic regime in 1980, at the same time laid 
the background for the sharing of power, the dissemination of different ideologies 
and for the formulation and implementation of new economic policies, the details 




6.2.1.1.1 Power, Political Atmosphere and Ideology in the Era 
The planned economy period that started with the coup d’état of 1960, which by 
many scholars was considered to be a revolution (Devereux, 1962; Dodd, 1969; 
Karpat, 1973b; Ahmad, 1993; Aksin, 1997; Cem, 1999), displayed at least five 
defining characteristics in terms of the share of power, political atmosphere and 
ideology. The first was the influential role of the military on the country’s 
political life, which pursued the aim of preservation and/or restoration of 
democracy (Devereux, 1962; Karpat, 1973b; Tachau and Heper, 1983; Kongar, 
1998) and the protection of national security (Cizre, 2008). To achieve this, as has 
been pointed out by observers, they assumed the role of guardianship of the 
Kemalist state (Ahmad; 2008, Cizre, 2008), which when considered necessary by 
the generals – as was the case in the 1960, 1971 and 1980 interventions – went as 
far as intervening in parliamentary democracy
90
.  
The second characteristic of this period was the continuation of the political 
influences of the two major parties, namely the CHP and the AP, the heir of the 
DP. Yet this time the ideological positions that they adopted differed significantly 
from each other, which thus represented a discernible shift from the previous 
period. Indeed, the leaders of the CHP, starting from the mid-1960s, embarked on 
the search for a new identity and a different political stance, motivation for which 
was probably derived from the realisation by the party managers that the party 
was losing its electoral base (see Erogul, 1987; Ozdemir, 1992; Sunar and Sayari, 
2004). The answer to this quest seem to have come in the form of a leftward shift 
led by Bulent Ecevit, the rising new leader of the CHP, who served as the party’s 
secretary-general from 1966 to 1971 and who succeeded Ismet Inonu as party 
chairman in 1972. This new ideological position of the CHP (see e.g. Sayari, 
1996; Zurcher, 2004) which was dubbed by its architect Ecevit as “left-of-centre”, 
emerged as a political movement upholding the principles and values of social 
democracy amongst which social justice, equality of opportunity and social 
security came to the fore (for a detailed discussion see Ecevit, 1966). As a 
practical consequence of this ideological re-orientation, the CHP identified its 
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interests with those of industrial workers, small peasants and labourers of the 
urban marginal sector and throughout the 1970s held a leading position among the 
left-wing political parties (Sunar and Sayari, 2004).  
On the other hand, the AP assumed the heirship of the DP and became the major 
party of the centre-right during the period (Sayari, 1996; Cem, 1999; Ahmad, 
2008; Cizre, 2008). The party, was led by Suleyman Demirel after his election to 
its chairmanship in 1964 until the party’s closure in 1980 and relied on the 
electoral support of different interest groups including but not limited to 
industrialists, large land owners, the small peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the 
new urbanites (see Zurcher, 2004; Demirel, 2005). Sunar and Sayari, (2004) 
neatly summarised the AP’s political stance and its links to the wider masses as 
follows: 
“... the AP stood to the right of centre, identified with business 
and landed interests, but as an interclass, mass party, its appeal 
extended to the popular sector as well, largely through its skilful 
use of party patronage and manipulation of clientelist ties. Its 
pragmatic outlook was interspersed with strident anti-
communism, an appeal to religious and nationalist sentiments, 
and a diffuse sentimental populism.” 
 However, despite the political influence of the CHP and the DP under the guise 
of the AP continuing, the planned economy period witnessed the entrance of new 
political parties to the electoral arena. That is, the third characteristic of this era 
came in the form of fragmentation and ideological polarization between the 
political parties (Sunar and Sayari, 2004; Cizre, 2008), the number of which 
steadily increased with the adoption of the 1961 constitution (Ozdemir, 1992). 
This situation, without a doubt, paved the way for the creation of an 
unprecedented vitality to the country’s political life. However, at the same time it 
produced two immediate consequences. For one thing, the escalating ideological 
confrontation and polarization in parliament gave way to the emergence of weak 
coalition governments – with the exception of AP’s rule of power between 1965-
71 – through which the small extremist parties achieved political power at the 
governmental level (see Kongar, 1998; Zurcher, 2004). For another, it created a 
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strained political atmosphere, where none of the governments could produce 
effective solutions to the political and economic problems that the country faced 
(Sunar and Sayari, 2004; Zurcher, 2004; Aydin, 2005). In order to understand this 
constant instable political situation, the political tension between the CHP and the 
AP should particularly be emphasized. Zurcher (2004: 262-263) briefly explained 
the uncompromising behaviour of these two parties as follows:  
“The political system gradually became paralysed because the 
two major parties, the AP and CHP, were unable to cooperate 
after the restoration of democracy in 1973, thus giving small 
extremist groups disproportionate influence. The polarization of 
the big parties was due partly to ideological factors (the parties 
were now far more 'ideological' than for instance the DP and 
CHP during the 1950s), and partly to personal rivalry between 
the leaders.  [...] This paralysis meant that no government was 
able to take effective measures (and even more importantly see 
them carried out) to combat the two overwhelming problems 
Turkey faced in the 1970s, political violence and economic 
crisis.” 
The fourth aspect of the planned economy period was the politicisation of the 
society and the resultant growing ideological polarisation between extremist left 
and right groups. The bourgeoning of different political currents certainly owed 
much to the societal changes that went parallel with the economic and social 
modernisation of Turkish society against the background of a constantly changing 
world. However, by way of explanation of the growing political awareness in 
Turkish society, the importance of the 1961 constitution, which offered greater 
freedom for expression of different ideas, should also be accentuated given that, 
as noted by many scholars, this opened the way for the organisation of various 
associations centred around ideological concepts (see Karpat, 1973b; Agaogullari, 
1990; Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 1993; Zurcher, 2004). Yet again, such political 
freedom was not without its shortcomings, for as Karpat aptly put it (1973a: 327) 
“for the first time in Turkish politics the right and left extremes appeared in full 
clarity”, which triggered a bitter ideological dispute between the clusters of 
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militant left and right and which came up to the surface in the form of bloody 
armed struggles between the radical rightist political factions that identified 
nationalism with anti-communism and traditionalism/conservatism (see e.g. 
Yerasimos, 1976; Keyder, 1987; Agaogullari, 1990; Ahmad, 1993) and the 
extremist leftist currents that stood up for a left-wing revolution (see e.g. 
Benhabib, 1979; Belge, 1990; Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 1993) 
Concomitant to this, comes the fifth characteristic of the era, which became 
apparent in biased state repression against the extremist left-wing groups that 
came into being at both formal and informal levels. At the formal level, repression 
carried out by state against left-wing activities culminated in restriction of some of 
the constitutional freedoms following the military interregnum of 1971, which, as 
was emphasised by observers, gave the government an upper hand in dealing with 
the issue of the so-called danger of communism (Ozdemir, 1992; Aksin, 1997; 
Kongar, 1998). Following these changes being made to the 1961 constitution, 
many left-leaned associations, including the Turkish Labour Party were closed, 
many leading left-wing intellectuals arrested and many left-aligned books and 
journals banned (see Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998; Zurcher, 2004). At the 
informal level, repression of left-wing groups by the state occurred in the form of 
surreptitious support being offered to the right-wing militants (see e.g. Benhabib, 
197;, Keyder, 1987; Ozdemir, 1992; Zurcher, 2004), which created a pathway 
towards political terror, which, as has been already noted, resulted in deadly street 
clashes between left and right wing militants throughout the 1970s
91
.  
The share of power between the political parties, the effect of different ideological 
positions on political and social life and the hostile political atmosphere within 
which democratic freedoms were exercised in the era, when merged with the 
economic policies of the period, paved the way for the creation of a unique 
background against which the political economy of industrial relations was 
determined. The economic policies of the period are investigated briefly next.  
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6.2.1.1.2 Political Economy of Industrialisation 
The leaders of the military intervention of 27 May 1960 not only opened a new 
era in Turkey’s political life, for their revolutionary ideals exceeded far beyond 
political objectives (Devereux, 1962; Kucuk, 1964; Karpat, 1973a; Kongar, 1998; 
Cem, 1999). In their zeal for creating a profound transformation in the social and 
economic structures of the country, they also laid the foundations of a new kind of 
political economy of industrialisation. Being shaped by five year economic plans 
drawn up by the State Planning Organisation
92
, this new political economy, as 
pointed out in scholarly literature, came out as a result of pressures coming from 
both the national bourgeoisie, which sought higher protection for native industry 
(Waldner, 1999) and from international creditors, who demanded a much better 
strategy by Turkey regarding the governance of its economy (Kazgan, 2006; 
Unay, 2006). Thus, starting from the early years of 1960s, the country entered into 
a period of inward-looking industrialisation with an emphasis on private industry. 
In this highly protected economic environment, private industrial establishments 




Table 15: Number of manufacturing establishments employing 10 or more people 
and the number of employees employed in these establishments during 




Annual average number of employees 
State Private Total 
State Private 
Total 
Number % Number % 
1960 219 5,284 5,503 127,988 43.2 168,001 56.8 295,989 
1965 299 2,944 3,243 157,288 
 
43.4 
204,875 56.6 362,163 
1970 254 4,566 4,820 185,444 36.8 318,610 63.2 504,054 
1975 392 5,676 6,068 239,805 35.3 438,775 64.7 678,580 
1980 408 8,302 8,710 287,189 36.5 499,806 63.5 786,995 
Source:  TUIK, 2010: 249, 250, 251 
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 For information about the functions of the State Planning Organisation and the aims of the five 
year plans see e.g. Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995; Owen and Pamuk, 1998; Aydin, 2005. For 
critiques of the economic planning system see e.g. Milor, 1990; Avcioglu, 1996. 
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 For the economic policies of this period see e.g. Keyder, 1987, Celasun and Rodrik, 1989, Onis, 
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Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the state’s prioritisation of private 
initiatives in the period by no means signified that it withdrew its investments 
from the industrial sector. On the contrary, the political economy of 
industrialisation pursued by successive governments involved adopting a strategy 
to be materialised in the framework of a mixed economy (see Aydin, 2005). Thus, 
as indicated by Table 15, throughout the era the state sector grew parallel to 
private sector in industry and as pointed out by scholars, its investments mostly 
concentrated on intermediate goods (Keyder, 1979; Owen and Pamuk, 1998). 
Turkey’s new political economy of industrialisation, succeeded well until the mid-
1970s (see e.g. Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Zurcher, 2004; Kazgan, 2006; Pamuk, 
2008; Boratav, 2009). As a result of the positive trends witnessed in economic 
development, the share of industry in the GNP displayed a constant increase in the 
period and rose to 17.5 per cent in 1970 and 20.5 per cent in 1980 from that of 
15.7 in 1960 (see Table 16). 
 Yet, this impressive progress in economic development proved to be 
unsustainable in the long-term for the native private industry developed behind 
the protective walls and it almost entirely relied upon the importation of raw 
materials, capital and intermediate goods (Keyder, 1987; Zurcher, 2004; Unay, 
2006; Boratav, 2009). What brought the industrial leap forward to a standstill, 
first at the end of the 1960s and then more seriously during the second half of the 
1970s, was the vulnerability of foreign exchange reserves which were excessively 
dependent on foreign debts, agricultural exports and remittances of Turkish 
migrant workers in Germany (Avcioglu, 1996; Zurcher, 2004; Aydin, 2005). The 
first economic challenge that the country faced at the end of 1960s, however, was 
overcome by devaluing Turkish lira against the American dollar and by making 
use of the remittances of Turkish migrant workers (Aydin, 2005; Kazgan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, a serious balance of payments problem in the economy started to 
make itself felt beginning from the mid-1970s onwards (Keyder, 1979; Celasun 
and Rodrik, 1989; Aydin, 2005; Boratav, 2009). Yet, this was not all, for the 
balance of payment crisis was accompanied by a deep political and economic 
crisis through the late 1970s, which came into open in the form of escalating 
social and political tensions (Keyder, 1987; Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995), soaring 
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inflation, rising unemployment and acute shortages in consumer goods and energy 
supply (Yalpat, 1984; Ahmad, 1993; Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995; Aydin, 2005). 
Table 16: Shares of GNP by major sectors 1960-1980 
Agriculture as % of GNP Industry as % of GNP Services  as % of GNP 
37.5 15.7 46.8 
30.9 19.4 49.8 
30.7 17.5 51.7 
24.5 20.6 55.0 
24.2 20.5 55.4 
Source:  TUIK, 2010: 647, 682. 
The governments that held power in the late 1970s remained incapable of finding 
any kind of effective solutions to the burning political and social causes of this 
catastrophic situation. However, the solution they came up with to overcome the 
economic implications of the foreign exchange crisis was drastic: a 
comprehensive structural adjustment programme prescribing a neoliberal 
restructuring of the country’s economy94 in line with the demands of international 
organisations, international banks (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Kazgan, 2006; 
Unay, 2006) and the interests of a group of the industrial bourgeoisie (Aydin, 
2005). This was put into action through a 1980 stabilisation programme, which is 
widely known as the “24 January measures”. This economic reform package, had 
the aim of switching Turkey’s economy from one of inward-looking import-
substitution industrialisation to an outward-oriented and export-led 
industrialization one, encapsulated, amongst other aspects, devaluation of the 
Turkish lira, elimination of controls on product prices of state economic 
enterprises, abolishment of checks on imports and exports, repression of workers’ 
wages, extensive cutbacks in government expenditures and subsidies and 
promotion of exports and foreign investments (Onis, 1992; Sayari, 1996; Owen 
and Pamuk, 1998; Unay, 2006; Pamuk, 2008).  
Nevertheless, as one could expect, carrying out such a radical economic 
transformation was bound to present many serious challenges especially when the 
vested interests of different segments of society were at stake (see Owen and 
Pamuk, 1998; Pamuk, 2008; Boratav, 2009). It was against this background of 
                                                          
94
 For the economic solutions preceding the adaptation of this IMF-led stabilisation programme see 
e.g. Yalpat, 1984; Owen and Pamuk, 1998; Zurcher, 2004; Boratav, 2009. 
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events that Turkey experienced its third coup d’état on the 12th of September 
1980. The military intervention suspended all kinds of democratic freedoms, 
including those of labour and in doing so, as many observers seem to agree, 
created a suitable environment for the implementation of the structural adjustment 
programme (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Ahmad, 1993; Sayari, 1996; Unay, 2006,; 
Pamuk, 2008; Boratav, 2009). However this was not all, for the 1980 military 
interregnum while providing those who implemented the 24 January measures 
with what Ahmad (1993: 179) called a “period of tranquillity [...] marked by an 
absence of politics and dissent in all forms” at the same time brought the planned 
economy period to an end.  
6.2.1.1.3 The State as a Rule Maker in Industrial Relations 
The state continued to be an important actor shaping and steering the political 
economy of the industrial relations of the period. Its role as a lawmaker in the 
domain of industrial relations, however, differed significantly from that of the 
previous period, at least in the first half of the era, in that it it put into practice a 
new legal framework for industrial relations, which was more democratic and 
participatory in nature. The first step that the lawmakers took in this regard was 
the incorporation of the right to establish trade unions, right to bargain 
collectively and the right to strike into the 1961 constitution. Two years later, the 
lawmakers took another step with the aim of developing a modern legal 
framework that would accommodate the changing needs of the socioeconomic 
actors. That is, the Trade Unions’ Law no. 274 and the Collective Agreements, 
Strikes and Lockouts Law no. 275 were enacted and both entered into force on the 
24
th
 of July 1963
95
. 
 The Trade Unions’ Law defined trade unions, regional union organisations 
(birliks), federations and confederations as occupational associations established 
by employees and employers with the aim of the protection and improvement of 
their shared: economic, social and cultural interests (Article 1/1). It stipulated that 
the establishment of the mentioned occupational associations was free and 
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voluntary (Article 1/2). Moreover, the law defined all persons working under an 
employment contract and all persons working in a workplace with their physical 
or intellectual labour as workers (Article 2/1). However, it did not include civil 
servants in the workers’ category and clearly stated that their right to unionise and 
features of their occupational associations would be regulated by special 
legislation
96
 (Article 2/2). Further, the Trade Unions Law allowed those 16 years 
or older to join occupational associations freely (Article 5/2), rendered 
establishment of occupational associations completely voluntary and free (Article 
1/2) and made becoming member of (Article 5/1) and resigning from membership 
(Article 6/1) of these bodies voluntary. In addition, the law prohibited 
occupational associations from providing for or receiving financial assistance 
from political parties and banned participation in or the establishment of 
occupational associations within the institutional structure of political parties 
(Article 16). The law left the trade unions’ free to decide to set their membership 
fee levels (Article 23/1) and introduced the check-off system, whereby employers 
were charged, upon the request of the trade union, with the responsibility 
deducting the membership fees and the solidarity contributions from the wages of 
employees (Article 23/2).  
The Collective Agreements Strikes and Lockouts Law (no.275), on the other 
hand, entitled federations and trade unions (Article 7/1) to make collective 
agreements with employers or their associations (Article 1). Moreover, it allowed 
the parties to conclude collective agreements at the level of workplace or at the 
level of the branch of activity (Article 7/1) and rendered strike actions legal when 
they were called for by workers with the aim of safeguarding or improving their 
economic and/or social positions (Article 17/2). Further, it rendered lockouts legal 
when they are ordered by employers with the aim of safeguarding, changing or re-
establishing the working conditions (Article 18/2) and also specified the situations 
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and areas where strikes and lockouts were prohibited. These bans included work 
related to, for example, life or property saving, public notaries, educational and 
training institutions and day nurseries as well as covering crisis situations, such as 
war, full or partial mobilisations and the proclamation of martial law  (Article 20). 
In addition, the law prohibited strikes conducted for political reasons (Article 55), 
sit-down strikes (Article 24) and slow downs (Article 58). Again on the restrictive 
side, it entitled the council of ministers to postpone a legal strike or a legal lockout 
for up to ninety days on the condition that these actions were considered 
dangerous for national health and security (Article 21). 
The Trade Unions’ Law (no.274) and the Collective Agreements, Strikes and 
Lockouts Law (no.275) replaced the Law on Employees and Employers’ 
Organisations and Associations of trade unions (no 5018) that was enacted in 
1947. These laws remained in force until the coup d'état of 1980 and together 
represented a novelty in Turkey’s industrial relations system. Indeed, according to 
Dereli (1968: 137) they constituted “an elaborate legal framework designed to 
meet the emergent needs of the present state of the Turkish industrial relations 
system” and according to Mumcuoglu (1980: 383) “marked the beginning of true 
trade unionism in Turkey”. What is more, this legislation, in words of Celik 
(2010: 324), “encouraged workers to unionise” and “seriously increased the trade 
unions’ political significance and activities”. In its final analysis the Trade 
Unions’ Law together with the Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts Law, 
as Talas (1992: 180) succinctly put it “opened a new era in Turkey’s social policy 
and rescued the working class from narrow frameworks of regulations as well as 
from their excessive interventions.”  
Nevertheless, not all the steps taken by the policy makers could be perceived to be 
progressive in terms of provision of collective rights to labour, for following the 
1971 military intervention, with the changes made to the constitution
97
 the 
political actors provided themselves with the right to bring any perceived 
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necessary restrictions to establish trade unions in order to protect “the integrity of 
state with its territory and its people, national security, public order, and public 
morality”.  Despite the fact that planned economy period also witnessed some 
steps backwards from the progressive agenda that the political actors pursued in 
the domain of industrial relations, the improvements made in the legislative 
framework governing these when merged with the social, economic and political 
transformations that the period saw, brought about a discernible shift in the 
political actors’ re-definition of their own interests as well as their role in shaping 
the interests of and interactions between the socioeconomic actors, which are 
scrutinised further in this chapter. However, before this the state of private 
industry and employers as collective entities in the period will be analysed below. 
6.2.2 Capital 
The social, economic and political circumstances that prevailed during the focal 
period provided the national bourgeoisie with plenty of opportunities to 
accumulate capital and to further increase its political influence (Pamuk, 1981; 
Bugra, 1994; Avcioglu, 1996; Aydin, 2005; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009). 
Underpinning this, lay the continuation of the state’s role in the economy, which 
can be summarised by referring to three factors. First, throughout the period the 
state made a respectable contribution in the fuelling of the industrial boom by 
carrying out investments in the industrial sector, which in reality accounted for 
almost half of the total investments in manufacturing industry until the end of the 
1970s (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Owen and Pamuk, 1998; Kazgan, 2006). 
Second, it provided private industry with favourable opportunities for the 
accumulation of capital and for yielding profits by producing intermediary goods 
for the use of native industry, which it under-priced (Pamuk, 1981; Boratav, 
2009).  Third, it protected the native industry and domestic markets against 
foreign competition through putting into practice many different policy 
instruments, such as: overvalued exchange rates, high tariff walls, cheap credit, 
tax rebates and high wages (Pamuk, 1981; Keyder, 1987; Sayari, 1996,; Zurcher, 
2004).  
As a natural consequence of these policies and practices, the planned economy  
era saw a substantial increase in number of industrial establishments owned by 
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private capital (see Table 17). The period also saw a rising awareness amongst 
employers towards the importance of collective interest representation, which are 
briefly analysed below.  
Table 17: Scale of manufacturing establishments and their share in total value 












Years Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small 
1963 3,012 157,759 2 98 - - 73 27 
1970 4,820 170,479 3 97 4,750 630 88 12 
1980 8,710 177,159 5 95 6,797 1,010 88 12 
*In this table, establishments employing between 1-9 workers were considered as small and those 
employing more than 10 workers were considered as large scale. 
Source:  Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995, p. 325. 
6.2.2.1.1 State of the Private Industry 
The planned economy period witnessed a remarkable development of private 
industry and six key features, as an overview of literature reveals, characterised 
the state of private-led industry in the period. First, the large-scale modern 
industrial establishments, most of which revealed a monopolistic character 
(Yerasimos, 1976; Tekeli and Mentes, 1982; Ahmad, 1993), took the lead in the 
economy (Ahmad, 1993; Avcioglu, 1996; Kazgan, 2006; Pamuk, 2008). Second, 
despite the economic predominance of the large-scale industrial establishments, 
the great majority, as indicated Table 17, comprised small scale industrial 
workplaces employing up to nine employees. Third, the private-led native 
industry predominantly concentrated on the production of consumer goods 
(Pamuk, 1981), leaving the investment for capital and intermediary items to the 
state (Keyder, 1979; Pamuk, 1981; Owen and Pamuk, 1998; Unay, 2006). Fourth, 
industrial production made by the private sector targeted the consumers of 
domestic markets and grew highly dependent on the importation of: capital and 
intermediate goods, raw materials and technology (Avcioglu, 1996, Boratav, 
2009). Fifth, foreign capital firmly established its existence in Turkey’s industrial 
structure in the focal period (Keyder, 1987; Avcioglu, 1996; Owen and Pamuk, 
1998; Unay, 2006), which came in the form of patent and licensing agreements 
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(Keyder, 1987; Owen and Pamuk, 1998). Sixth, the growth and profitability of 
private-led industry remained highly reliant on political and bureaucratic 
decisions (Keyder, 1987; Onis, 1992; Bugra, 1994; Unay, 2006), which in the 
final analysis, politicised the economic decision making process and created 
clientelist relations between the owners of big capital and the political actors, 
where political support was exchanged for easy access to economic resources (see 
Keyder, 1987; Unay, 2006).  
The state of private industry also exerted considerable effects on the way 
employers defined and defended their interests, which is the subject of the 
subsection that follows. 
6.2.2.1.2 Employers as Collective Entities 
Thanks to the political and economic developments of the era, which unfolded 
against the background of the political economy of industrialisation pursued by 
successive governments starting from the inception of republic of Turkey, the 
planned economy period witnessed further empowerment of the business 
community as a socioeconomic class, with the consolidation of its position as a 
powerful and vociferous actor in industrial relations (see Esin, 1974; Bugra, 1994; 
Avcioglu, 1996).  Although one could argue that reinforcement of the industrial 
bourgeoisie’s existence in the politico-economic domain was also witnessed in the 
preceding periods, the planned economy period differed significantly in that this 
time the national industrial bourgeoisie displayed an increased interest towards 
organisation around associations in order to articulate and materialise its interests. 
Indeed, the years following the enactment of Trade Unions Laws and the Law on 
Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts Laws saw a steady growth in the 
number of employers’ associations together with a remarkable surge in 
membership of these organisations. Despite the fact that they were predominantly 
established in particular sectors of industry where the workers were highly 





 (Koray, 1996; Tokol, 1999), in 1978 their number exceeded a 
hundred, with membership in excess of ten thousand (DPT, 1978).  
A number of observers have agreed that the employers’ determined efforts 
channelled towards organisation during the period were born out of an immediate 
necessity to voice and protect their interests in their interactions with the state and 
labour (see Lok, 1966; Esin, 1974; MESS, 2000; Koray and Celik, 2007). At least 
two reasons can be cited to explain this particular requirement. In the first place 
there was the impact of the new legislative framework governing industrial 
relations, which, by introducing a system of collective bargaining and agreements 
to the domain of industrial relations, established the base for their 
institutionalisation. This change, while having brought with it an unprecedented 
degree of vitality to workers’ organisational activities (see the subsection on 
labour), at the same time impelled employers to gather around occupational 
organisations in order to face the demands of workers at the same institutional 
level so as to maintain the balance of power between them and the latter in the 
process of collective bargaining (see Lok, 1966; Esin, 1974).  Concomitant to this, 
the second reason was the flourishing representation and organisation capacity of 
workers thanks to which they became able to voice and materialise their interests 
in: social, political and economic matters. This, in turn, gave way to a remarkable 
shift in employers’ perceptions towards organisational activities and helped them, 
in the words of the Turkish Employers’ Association of Metal Industries, “to 
understand that they had to start establishment of similar organisations as soon 
as possible.” (MESS, 2000: 53-54). 
Employers, in their efforts to give voice to their interests in process of their 
interactions with the state and labour, clustered around two different levels of 
associations. At the industrial level, they established and joined employers’ 
associations, which were formed in accordance with the provisions of the Trade 
Unions Law. These establishments, as Lok (1966) pointed out, aimed to offset the 
power of the workers’ trade unions with which they interacted. At the national 
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 In this period the public sector employers also established and/or joined employers’ 
organisations, but according to Tokol (1999), their organisational activities remained limited 
compared to those of private sector employers. For a more detailed narrative see Esin, 
1974;Tokol 1999.  
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level, on the other hand, employers’ grouped around the TISK and the TUSIAD, 
set up with the aim of representing their members’ interests at the top institutional 
level and nationwide. The Confederation of Employers’ Associations of Turkey, 
known by the acronym TISK–Turkiye Isveren Sendikalari Konfederasyonu –, was 
established in 1961
99
 in accordance with the provisions of the Trade Unions Law 
and represented interests of their members, in business and working life (Esin, 
1974). To achieve this, as Esin (1974) reported, TISK established relationships 
with parliament, governments, governmental organisations and the Confederation 
of Turkish Trade Unions as well as working as a pressure group.  The Association 
of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen, which is known under the acronym 
TUSIAD – Turk Sanayicileri ve Isadamlari Dernegi –, on the other hand, was 
established in 1971 in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Associations 
by a group of wealthy businessmen and big industrialists. Since its establishment, 
it has represented the particular interests of its members at the highest political 
level (Altun, 2008; Berker and Uras, 2008). In order to do so, it acted as a 
powerful and vociferous pressure group (Oncu, 1980; TUSIAD, 2013), kept close 
contact with political actors and politicians (Altun, 2008) and claimed partnership 
in formation of national economic policies (Unay, 2006). 
The planned economy period, which drew the attention of employers to the 
importance of gathering around associations in order to give voice to and 
materialise their interests, at the same time opened the way for the ascendance of 
workers as a powerful interest group and their transformation into a stronger 
socioeconomic actor is studied in the subsection that follows.  
6.2.2.2 Labour 
The Turkish working class started to emerge as an actor in Turkey’s 
socioeconomic and political life during the multi-party period and continued to 
grow in numbers as well as in political and economic influence thanks to the 
transformations, which, since the 1960 military revolution, helped to substantially 
change labour’s appearance and character. Moreover, as the working class gained 
                                                          
99
 TISK was originally established under the name of the Union of Employers’ Associations of 
Istanbul, but changed its name to TISK in 1962 in an attempt to represent the interests of its 
members nation-wide (see Lok, 1966; Esin, 1974).  
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power, a remarkable development took place in working class consciousness and 
the labour movement.  However, the social, political and economic circumstances 
in which these shifts occurred also posed some challenges to the advancement of 
working class consciousness and the development of the labour movement of the 
period, which are the focus of the subsections below.  
6.2.2.2.1 Labour Migration and Urban Labour Markets in the planned 
economy period 
Against the background of the socioeconomic transformation, which started to 
change the basic structure of centuries old Turkish rural life during the multi-party 
period, the years following the 1960 military interregnum witnessed a rapid phase 
of urbanisation accompanied by an on-going process of proletarianisation that was 
unprecedented in the history of the country. Having been predominantly shaped 
by waves of migration that swept many peasants from rural areas to urbanised city 
centres, these developments significantly altered the occupational activities that 
the country’s labour force was involved in as well as the demographic profile of 
the country.  Indeed, for example, the percentage of urban dwellers in the total 
population increased from 31.9 in 1960 to 43,91 in 1980 (see Table 18). In 
parallel to this change, the proportion of workers engaged in agricultural work 
decreased from 74.1 per cent in 1960 to that of 63.2 in 1970 and on to 53.2 in 
1980 (see Table 19). In a similar fashion, between the years 1960 and 1980, the 
total number of workers working in non-agricultural activities nearly tripled, 
growing from 2.7 million in 1960 to 7.1 million in 1980 (see Table 20).   
Table 18: Share of the urban and rural population in the mono-party, multi-party 




Population Percentage Population Percentage 
1927 3,305,879 24.2 10,342,391 75.8 13,648,270 
1945 4,687,102 24.9 14,103,072 75 18,790,174 
1960 8,859,731 31.9 18,895,089 68 27,754,820 
1980 19,645,007 43.9 25,091,950 54.7 44,736,957 
Source:  DIE, 2002: 46.  
As an expected outcome of this, the urban population grew more than two times 
between the years 1960 and 1980 (see Table 18). This growth, what is more, 
according to the calculations of Danielson and Keles (1980), displayed an even 
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more notable upsurge in major trade and industrial centres, such as: Istanbul, 
Izmir, Adana and Bursa, with an average annual increase of nine per cent. 
Regarding the migratory movements that took place in planned economy period, it 
should be noted that it also witnessed waves of mass labour migration from 
Turkey to different European countries
100
 (see e.g. Koc, 1979; Keyder, 1987; 
Icduygu and Sirkeci, 1999; Kirisci, 2008).  
Table 19: Sectoral distribution of employment in Turkey the in mono-party, multi-
party and planned economy periods 
Years Agriculture Industry* Services 
1923 89.9 4.3 5.8 
1945 85.4 8.9 5.7 
1960 74.1 11.8 14.1 
1965 69.3 14.5 16.2 
1970 63.2 16.5 20.3 
1975 58.4 19.1 22.5 
1980 53.2 20.1 26.7 
*Includes construction 
  Source: Calculated from TUIK, 2010: 136-7. 
6.2.2.2.2 Labour as an Actor in Industrial Relations 
Migration of labour from rural to urban areas spurred the development of the 
country’s major trade and industrial centres, thus altering its socioeconomic 
landscape. However, an overview of the available literature reveals that this 
process had more limited repercussions regarding the advancement of working 
class consciousness among the new urbanities and a number of factors influenced 
this situation. Firstly, the rapid urbanisation process was not accompanied by an 
equally swift dispossession process of the ex-peasant migrants. Instead, the 
majority of migrants owned at least a small amount of land in the villages they left 
behind (Karpat, 1976; Keyder, 1983b; Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1987; Koc, 
1998; Owen and Pamuk, 1998; Koc, 2010), which, in the final analysis, paved the 
way for the maintenance of their links with their rural communities (see Keyder, 
1983b; Owen and Pamuk, 1998; Boratav, 2009; Koc, 2010).  
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 Despite, one might argue, the emigration of a group of the labour force from Turkey to Europe 
adding a different dimension to the proletarianisation process of the Turkish rural population, 
given that these emigrants’ transformation into a working class happened under different 
socioeconomic and political conditions, this issue remains outside the scope of this study.  
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Second, many migrant workers, in words of Tuna (1964: 421), were deprived of 
“[t]he attitudes, the ambitions and enthusiasm for self-advancement, the dexterity 
and perseverance, the occupational solidarity and class consciousness exhibited 
by the workers of industrially advanced societies.” Indeed, the overwhelming 
majority of migrant workers came to the urban areas with little or no educational 
qualifications
101
 and with little, if any, information about or experience of 
industrial work (Tuna, 1964). These people, resultantly, displayed different 
attitudes towards such work to the workers who were already urbanised and had 
gained relevant experience and thus, according to Tuna (1964) they refrained from 
joining unions. 
Table 20: Sectoral distribution of the workforce in non-agricultural activities in 
the multi-party and planned economy periods 
Years Manufacturing Construction Services Total 
1945 490,000 121,000 441,000 655,000 
1950 482,000 195,000 626,000 1,303,000 
1955 667,000 407,000 1,205,000 2,279,000 
1960 791,000 390,000 1,602,000 2,783,000 
1965 1,019,000 585,000 1,956,000 3,560,000 
1970 1,338,000 662,000 2,635,000 4,635,000 
1975 1,787,000 774,000 3,240,000 5,801,000 
1980 2,060,000 897,000 4,187,000 7,144,000 
Source:  TUIK, 2010: 136-7. 
Third, development in industrial employment lagged far behind the urbanisation 
rates (Kiray, 1972; Yalpat, 1984; Boratav, 2009). Indeed, as can be worked out 
from the Table 18 and the Table 20, between the years 1960 and 1980, although 
the population in urban areas recorded a more than ten million increase, 
employment in industry grew only by a little over 1.2 million. Given this 
slackness in growth of industrial employment, the majority of migrant workforce 
could not secure a job in the industrial sector. These workers, engaged in, just like 
the case in previous period, low-income, low-productivity and socioeconomically 
insecure activities related to the service sector, such as: street vending, petty trade 
and portage (see Kiray, 1972; Keles, 1978; Danielson and Keles, 1980; Kara and 
Kum, 1984; Boratav, 2009). The presence of large numbers of the migrant 
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 Indeed, a look at statistical data indicates that 45 percent of male population aged over 15 was 
illiterate in 1960. Literacy rates amongst men, who constituted the majority of industrial 
workforce, only gradually improved during the period, with the illiteracy rate falling from  35 
percent in 1965 to 29 percent in 1970 and to 23 percent in 1975 (TUIK, 2010: 19). 
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workforce that had to seek employment opportunities out of the industrial sector, 
as one could expect, posed an important challenge to the development of working 
class consciousness in the country, for this group of workers not only remained 
away from working environments suitable for development of working class 
awareness, but also constituted the reserve army of cheap labour for industry 
(Kiray, 1972, Gurel, 2011) with backward perceptions of industrial work.  
Nevertheless, despite all these handicaps, according to a common consensus in 
scholarly literature, the planned economy period witnessed a continuing rise in 
class consciousness amongst Turkish workers (Talas et al., 1965; Kutal, 1977; 
Mumcuoglu, 1980; Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1984; Koray, 1994; Guzel, 1996; 
Zurcher, 2004; Mahirogullari, 2005; Celik, 2010). Undoubtedly, one important 
factor triggering this development was the changes made to the legal framework 
of industrial relations spearheaded by the 1961 Constitution. Thanks to this new 
legal framework, workers and their organisations were provided with a more 
suitable environment in which they could express and exchange their ideas, 
organise mass demonstrations and engage in struggles against their employers 
(see e.g. Kutal, 1977; Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1984; Baydar, 1999b; Zurcher, 
2004; Koray and Celik, 2007). However this was not all, for equally important in 
this advancement was the arrival of left-wing political views in the domains of 
politics and industrial relations along with an accelerated rate of growth in the 
number of unionised workers.  
The years following the 1961 military intervention, indeed, witnessed the 
emergence of left-wing political thought as a rival force in the political arena and 
the gradual spreading of left-leaned doctrine amongst some labour activists and 
organised labour. One significant manifestation of this was the establishment of 
the Turkish Labour Party (TIP) –Turkiye Isci Partisi – in 1961 by a group of trade 
unionists (see Mumcuoglu, 1980; Isikli, 1983; Celik, 2010). The TIP adopted a 
left-leaning agenda (Kutal, 1977; Mumcuoglu, 1980; Tufanoglu, 1988) and set its 
sights on voicing the problems of the working class at the highest political level 
(Karpat, 1967; Landau, 1974; Mumcuoglu, 1980). Despite having shown constant 
attention to the problems of working class, the TIP, however, could not achieve 
199 
 
mass appeal among the workers’ masses throughout its political presence102. 
Nevertheless, according to Tufanoglu (1988: 25), it was “the starting point of 
political unionism” and according to Celik (2010: 371), could be regarded as “one 
of the important moves that the Turkish working class made in order to make its 
presence felt on the stage of history”. Another important indication of the arrival 
of left-wing ideals on the Turkish political scene and on labour movement was the 
establishment of Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DISK) – Devrimci 
Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu – in 1967 as a rival force to the Confederation of 
Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) that was established back 1952. Having been 
established by a group of trade unionists who were known to have close links with 
the TIP (see Dereli, 1968; Ahmad, 1995; Isikli, 2005), the DISK from its very 
beginning stood up for a class-based unionism (Mumcuoglu, 1980; Koray, 1996; 
Baydar, 1999b) and claimed that workers could acquire their rights to the fullest 
extent only if they engaged in political struggle (DISK, 1978b). The DISK, 
according to Guzel (1996: 237), constituted “the climax of revolutionary and 
socialism-related past experiences” and although throughout the period the 
number of workers organised within it remained considerably smaller than those 
in the rival confederation, Turk-Is
103
, as Mumcuoglu rightly pointed out (1980: 
394) it appealed to  “the urbanised working classes with increasingly radical 
tendencies.”  
 A review of the scholarly work providing accounts of the period indicate that the 
repercussions of the spread of left-wing doctrine appeared in the daily lives of 
ordinary workers in the form of a renewed dynamism in their understanding of 
daily politics, in expression of their ideas and in voicing of their interests (Fisek, 
1969; Ahmad, 1995; Guzel, 1996; Baydar, 1999a). One observer portrayed the 
years following the establishment of the TIP as follows:  
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 The most considerable success that the TIP enjoyed in elections was in that held 1965, when it 
sent fifteen representatives to parliament, thanks to the national remainder system in the 
elections law (Ahmad, 1995). The party could not repeat this success in the 1969 elections due to 
the removal of this system from the law and could therefore only send two representatives to the 
parliament (ibid). The TIP was closed down and its leaders were imprisoned in July 1971 by the 
constitutional court in the aftermath of 1971 military intervention. Although the party was re-
established in 1974, it never managed to resume its old position in the political domain (for 
further information on the TIP see e.g. Landau, 1974; Tursan, 2004; Ahmad 1995). 
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 Although the exact number of trade union and confederation memberships in the period is not 
known, according to Isıklı (1987), the total number of Turk-Is members floated around 800,000-
1,000,000 and DISK’s members fluctuated between 400,000 and 600,000.  
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“... left-wing thoughts after long years of suppression started to 
be discussed and published again. First time after long years, 
socialist ideas were brought up for a wide-spread and intense 
discussion. Many newly launched newspapers, journals and 
pamphlets introduced these ideas to students and workers. 
Marxist classics and socialist literature began to be translated 
into Turkish. Therefore people started to examine Turkey’s 
political, economic and social problems in the light of Marxist 
philosophy and ethos. [...] In this way, while the working class 
gradually increased its political awareness, at the same time it 
started to give a new appearance to its organisations and began 
to make political demands alongside economic ones in the 
course of its actions” (Guzel, 1996: 227). 
The on-going rise in class consciousness amongst Turkish workers seems to have 
also been stimulated by an accelerating pace of growth in the number of unionised 
workers following the enactment of the laws regulating industrial relations
104
 (see 
Figure 8). As a natural consequence of this, more and more workers in the period 
became acquainted with the ideas related to working class consciousness and 
solidarity, found opportunities to meet in suitable environments to discuss their 
rights and their needs and thus became equipped with the necessary knowledge, 
skills, and confidence to define and pursue their class interests. This shift that 
occurred in ordinary workers’ lives, constituted one important factor in 
transformation from, in the words of Mumcuoglu (1980: 380), “[a] politically 
ineffective, dependent labour movement [...] into a strong and independent one”.  
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 According to a widespread consensus in Turkey’s industrial relations literature, official 
statistics related to union memberships in planned economy period do not reflect the real 
situation (Isikli, 1983; Guzel, 1996, Koc, 2003; Mahirogullari, 2005; Koray and Celik, 2007; 
Celik, 2010). In this respect, for example, although the number of trade union members reached 
5.7 millions in 1981 according to the official statistics, this number according to the estimates 
floated around 1.5 to 2 million throughout the period (Isikli, 1983; Kara and Kum, 1984; Koc, 
2003; Koray and Celik, 2007). This exaggeration seems to have mostly stemmed from the fact 
that the official statistics compiled by Ministry of Labour were entirely based on trade unions’ 
statements reporting the number of their members. Trade unions, however, according to Koc 
(2003) displayed a tendency towards overstatement of number of their members not only 
because of rivalry between them, but also because the law allowed dual memberships and 
because trade unions under-recorded the number of unsubscribed members (Koc, 2003). 
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Figure 8: Changes in number of unionised workers in the planned economy period 
 
Source: Petrol-Is, 1995: 519.  
The on-going rise in class consciousness of Turkish workers, resultantly, 
stimulated them to enhance their capability to act as an influential socioeconomic 
class and equipped them with the necessary skills to emerge as an important actor 
in industrial relations (see Guzel, 1996; Baydar, 1999b; Zurcher, 2004; Koray and 
Celik, 2007; Celik, 2010). In mentioning rise of class consciousness amongst 
Turkish workers and their transformation into a class that was able to stand up for 
its rights, however, two important points should be emphasised. Firstly, despite 
the fact that the growth in the number of unionised workers gained a remarkable 
pace, as indicated by the Figure 9, the number of unionised workers remained far 
below the number of total waged workers. To add to this, as displayed by the 
Figure 10 below, throughout the period, workers in the public sector displayed a 
greater tendency to unionisation compared to private sector workers and thus 
much of the increase achieved in number of unionised workers came from the 
former sector. The second important point that needs to be emphasised regarding 
the rise in class consciousness amongst Turkish workers is their political 
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preferences, which shifted from the AP
105
 – the centre right – to the CHP – the 
centre left – only during the second half of the focal period106. 
Figure 9: A comparison of the total number 
of waged workers and the total number of 
unionised workers in the planned economy 
period. 
 
Figure 10: Unionisation rates amongst public 
sector and private sector workers.  
 
 
Source:  Compiled from Petrol-Is, 1995: 519-523. 
Against this background of a combination of different and somewhat 
contradictory factors that influenced the rise of class consciousness amongst 
workers, the labour movement displayed a number of distinguishing features in 
the period. The first that characterised trade unionism was the existence of 
political fragmentation and ideological confrontation between the workers’ 
organisations. Having been prompted by the aim of representation of workers’ 
interests from different points of view and with different motivations, this split 
manifested itself most conspicuously at the highest level of interest representation, 
as the number of confederations soared up to seven by 1978 (Koray and Celik, 
2007). This manifested itself in a concrete way in the rivalry between the Turk-Is, 
which stood up for an above-party and conciliatory unionism (see e.g. Kutal, 
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 Indeed, for most of the 1960s, the majority of workers, in a manner similar to the previous 
period, continued to vote for the AP, in other words, for the successor of the DP (Milliyet, 1969; 
Zurcher, 2004).   
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 It seems that workers did not maintain their political support for the AP throughout the period, 
for it is well-known that the CHP drew much of its support from the major industrial cities in the 
1969, 1973 and 1977 elections (see e.g. Cumhuriyet, 1973; Ozbudun and Tachau, 1975; 
Cumhuriyet, 1977b; Milliyet, 1977a; Savran, 1992). This, in turn paved, the way for creation of a 
general consensus amongst scholars that an on-going shift in workers’ political preferences 
towards the left of the political spectrum took place during the 1970s (see e.g. Cem, 1973b, 
1973a; Tutengil, 1973; Ozbudun and Tachau, 1975; Ozbudun, 1976; Gevgilili, 1977; Keyder, 
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1977; Mumcuoglu, 1980; Tufanoglu, 1988; Koc, 2000b) and the DISK, which 
favoured class struggle, thus being inclined towards political unionism (see e.g. 
Kutal, 1977; DISK, 1978b; Guzel, 1996; Koray, 1996; Baydar, 1999b).  
Concomitant to this, the second feature of Turkish trade unionism was the rapid 
growth in the number of trade unions in the focal period and the dispersion of 
workers between these organisations (see Figure 11). This situation, which has 
been widely referred to as ‘trade union inflation’ within the mainstream industrial 
relations literature (Mumcuoglu, 1980; Isikli, 1983; Koray and Celik, 2007), 
according to Baydar (1999b), contributed its share to the fragmentation of the 
Turkish labour movement and for Koray and Celik (2007), constituted an 
important weakness. The third feature that distinguished the Turkish labour 
movement during this period was its increased dynamism, which paved the way 
for emergence of, as Kutal (1977: 298-9)  succinctly put it, “a labour movement 
with a character which was capable of making its presence felt on the political 
landscape and which was able to use its political leverage when necessary.” 
Figure 11: Trade union inflation in the planned economy period 
  
Source: The figure on the left was taken from Koray and Celik, 2007: 294, whereas that on the 
right was calculated from Koray and Celik, 2007: 294, Petrol-Is, 1995: 521. 
The fourth feature that contributed to the character of labour movement was the 
increasing politicisation of trade union activities. This process, as pointed out by 
many observers, was stimulated by the politico-economic dynamics and the legal 
framework of the era (Talas et al., 1965; Mumcuoglu, 1980; Isikli, 2005; Celik, 
2010) and became most evident in the establishment of clear and close links 
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between the trade union confederations and the political parties, which 
wielded/shared power in the period. In this respect, the ties forged between Turk-
Is and the right-wing oriented AP; between the DISK and the left-wing oriented 
TIP and the CHP; between the Confederation of Nationalist Worker's Unions 
(MiSK) and the extreme right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (NMP); and 
between the Confederation of Turkish Real
107
 Trade Unions (Hak-Is), and the pro-
Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP), have been well documented and widely 
discussed in the Turkish industrial relations literature (see e.g. Mumcuoglu, 1980; 
Guzel, 1996; Koc, 1998; Baydar, 1999b; Isikli, 2005; Mahirogullari, 2005; Koray 
and Celik, 2007; Celik, 2010).  
The transformation that the Turkish working class underwent and the peculiar 
features Turkish labour movement retained inevitably exerted a considerable 
impact on the articulation and materialisation of the interests of working people 
which are investigated in the subsequent section.  
6.2.2.3 Interests 
The interests of the actors of Turkish industrial relations in the planned economy 
period, as was the case with the previous ones, reflected their concerns in work 
and production and laid the ground for their interactions. The ruling circles, 
including the military elites, as had been the case in the previous period, deemed 
industrial relations a vital issue to be taken care of in the country’s 
democratisation and industrialisation process. Having met the challenge of a 
vociferous and a dynamic working class, industrial employers attributed a special 
importance to the maintenance of social peace and order at the workplace. 
Workers, on the other hand, having been provided with the opportunity of voicing 
their interests on a more equal footing with state and employers, placed their 
concerns over higher wages ahead of other interests. The interests of the actors’ of 
industrial relations are analysed in detail in the subsections that follow.  
 
                                                          
107
 The acronym Hak-Is stands for ‘Turkiye Hak Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyounu’ and although 
in its official translation into English the word ‘hak’ is interpreted as ‘real’,  the concept ‘hak’ in 
Turkish is used both to mean ‘just’ and ‘of Allah’.  
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6.2.2.3.1 State  
A careful review of the available resources suggests that the ruling circles, both 
civilian and military, paid considerable attention to the way power was distributed 
in industrial relations and to the way economic wealth was shared between actors. 
The high levels of importance that the political actors attributed to labour-capital 
relations, just like for the previous period, stemmed from their concerns over the 
maintenance of the capitalist economic order/capitalist industrialisation and 
multi-party democracy, which, in particular, appeared in official documents, in the 
declarations of the ruling élites and in party programmes. For example, regarding 
“private property” and “private enterprise” amongst the main elements of Turkish 
democracy (see Feridun, 1962: 213), the military élites’ commitment to preserve 
the capitalist economic order was put into words by General Cemal Gursel, who 
acted as head of state and prime minister of the military government that was 
established after the military coup. In a press conference organised in September 
1960, referring to one of the directives of Committee of National Unity
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published in  the Official Gazette
109
, which prescribed regulation of the trade and 
industry sectors, thus adhering to the principle of statism, he  stated that (Milliyet, 
1960: 5):  
“There is a section on statism in the directives of Committee of 
National Unity. I hear that this caused some worries. Our 
country, with its social and economic circumstances, displays 
all the characteristics of underdeveloped countries. Economic 
development [...] is an important matter. To deal with this, the 
state needs to intervene and exert an effort. While private 
property and freedom of economic action are the main 
principles, we intend to channel the efforts of state to the areas 
where private enterprise [...] is not able to deal with. This does 
not mean that the state will not allow private enterprise. Our 
                                                          
108
 This is the name of the military junta which seized power in the year 1961. 
109
 For the full text of this directive in Turkish see the Official Gazette, “Milli Birlik Komitesi 
Direktifi”, p. 2142, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10605.pdf
&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10605.pdf [accessed 12/08/2013]. 
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statism should not be seen as a state order which holds sway 
over a strict economic life”.   
Much in the same way as with the interests of military élites’, the civilian political 
leaders vigorously pursued the interest of safeguarding and perpetuating Turkey’s 
fragile democratic political order and of capitalist economic 
system/industrialisation throughout this period (see e.g. Bozbeyli, 1970; CHP, 
1973; AP, 1974; TBMM, 1975, 1978). For example, the AP in one of its party 
programmes, after having expressed its faith in the democratic system (Bozbeyli, 
1970: 3-4) and in the system of free economy and free enterprise (Bozbeyli, 1970: 
7), asserted that (Bozbeyli, 1970: 7-8): 
“We do not believe that an unfree society can attain continuous, 
steady and high levels of production. We are convinced that 
economic welfare and productivity can only be materialised and 
maintained in a free economic order”. 
In a similar vein to the AP, the CHP in its 1961 party programme, after having 
firmly affirmed its commitment to the materialisation of a democratic social order 
(Bozbeyli, 1970: 57), stated that (Bozbeyli, 1970: 59): 
“Our party accepts that […] state’s encouragement, protection 
and provision of necessary support of private enterprise is the 
main principle for the push for national welfare.” 
The political actors’ pursuit of protection and perpetuation of capitalist 
industrialisation and of the democratic political order as the overarching interest 
pursued in political and economic domains, reverberated to the domain of 
industrial relations in the form of two different concerns. First, as had been the 
case in the previous periods, the ruling élites attributed a central importance to 
keeping the Turkish labour movement away from the ideologies of radical left-
wing politics. Second, for the first time in the nation’s industrial relations history, 
the interest of extending scope of internal markets by making workers a part of 
them, started to shape the ruling élites’ discourses and interests in the domain of 
industrial relations.  
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The ruling élites’ pursuit of keeping the Turkish labour movement away from 
ideologies of radical left-wing politics, indeed, implied a remarkable continuity in 
the interests of all the political actors that were involved in the country’s’ 
governance throughout the period. However, the opinions of the ruling powers 
shifted during the period in accordance with the needs and priorities of the 
country’s industrial development. In this respect, during the first half of planned 
economy period when import-substituting capitalist industrialisation was in full 
swing, the ruling circles – both the military and the civilian and regardless of 
their political stance –, saw granting the workers social and economic rights 
amongst the most appropriate ways to prevent dissemination of radical left-wing 
ideals amongst the working class. However, as the maintenance of country’s 
inward-looking industrial development started to be threatened by the escalation 
of the foreign exchange crisis beginning from the late 1960s and as the capitalist 
industrialisation and the political democratisation heightened the level of class 
consciousness amongst the workers, the military élites and those political actors 
possessing right-wing views started to see taking the workers’ movement under 
their control to be the most suitable way to hinder the diffusion of extreme left-
wing ideas amongst the working class. 
A careful review of available resources, indeed, indicates that for most of the 
1960s the ruling elites, both civilian and military, deemed entitling workers with 
various social and economic rights to be a necessary means to keep the Turkish 
labour movement away from the ideals of extreme left-wing politics. The earliest 
examples showing how the political actors articulated and rationalised their 
opinions over this issue can be obtained from the official statements issued by the 
Committee on National Unity. “Social mentality”, for example, according to the 
draft constitution prepared under the watchful eyes of the committee (Feridun, 
1962: 215): 
“is not only an assurance to provide individual welfare and 
happiness, it, at the same time, in terms of the future of social 
life, is the firmest guarantee for democracy. Because the most 
influential shield against communism is social justice which 
renders it unnecessary.” 
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The military-political actors as the framers of 1961 constitution further justified 
the significance of providing the people with socioeconomic rights as preventing 
them from engaging in extreme left-wing movements in the draft constitution as 
follows (Feridun, 1962: 215, brackets added):  
 “Finally it should be also noted that states which remain 
insensitive to social justice, will not be able to prevent social life 
being carried away with extreme left or right movements and to 
drift towards totalitarian directions. [...] A democracy which is 
not social is destined to lose its essence in the face of the 
realities of social life and to eventually collapse.” 
In a similar manner with the military-political actors, for most of the 1960s, the 
CHP and the AP, being the most influential political parties in the political life of 
the country in the period, found the idea of equipping workers with social and 
economic rights to be an appropriate strategy to prevent the emergence of radical 
left-wing movements amongst them. For instance, the first Demirel government, 
which ruled the country under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel with a centre-
right stance between the years 1965 and 1969, firmly stated in its programme that 
(TBMM, 1965: 76, brackets added); 
“Our most important duty will be putting into use our laws in 
line with their aim and spirit [...] in order to provide that [...] 
dangerous movements especially activities that are headed 
towards communism cannot damage our regime and social 
order. We believe that materialisation of social justice and 
social security measures set by the constitution for the entire 
Turkish nation are the most effective remedy for this issue.” 
Just like the AP, the CHP also employed the rhetoric of the “necessity of 
socioeconomic rights and freedoms” in articulation of its interest over the political 
consciousness of the workers’ movement. In his well-known book, where he 
introduced the idea of a left-of-centre Turkish politics, Ecevit justified the 
necessity of socioeconomic rights in industrialising countries as follows (Ecevit, 
1966: 21, brackets added): 
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“If measures to emancipate people from injustice, poverty, 
repression and [the measures] to provide development with 
social justice are not taken, rebellious feelings might increase 
and come to the point of tipping amongst people who are 
repressed and suffer from poverty. This danger is more serious 
in industrialising societies. It is in this case that, extreme left-
wing movements might turn these rebellious feelings into a 
destructive and widespread flood.” 
However, the opinions of the political actors who pursued a right-wing political 
agenda and of the military élites as to the most appropriate ways through which 
the Turkish labour movement would be kept away from extreme left-wing ideals 
gradually changed with the shifting politico-economic and social circumstances, 
which, as already mentioned above, began to make themselves felt beginning in 
the late 1960s. The 1969 government programme of the AP gives the early signs 
of this change in interests taking place for a group of ruling elites. In the 
programme it was announced that (TBMM, 1969: 52): 
“In order to establish and maintain unity of the workers [and] 
to help Turkish trade unionism to gain power within the 
democratic system, necessary amendments will be made to the 
relevant legislations.” 
One of the eye opening explanations to the underlying intentions of the AP 
placing these amendments in the agenda of the party came from Turgut Toker, an 
ex-labour minister and an AP Deputy. In his speech delivered at Turk-Is’ eighth 
general assembly that was held in May 1970 he declared that (Milliyet, 1970a: 1):  
“After the amendments made to the laws 274 and 275 enter into 
force, no Confederation will remain in Turkey apart from Turk-
Is.” 
In his speech, Toker (Milliyet, 1970a: 1) also noted that “the DISK whose 
situation does not comply with the amendments to be made will be liquated”, 
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further elaborating upon his views about the extreme left as follows (Milliyet, 
1970a: 11):  
“Those who think like Mao, Lenin, those who were trained with 
the ideas of Che Guevara, want to destroy freedom in order to 
bring a dictatorial regime. They attempt to use the masses as a 
lever for their aims.” 
Heightened class awareness amongst workers seemed also to have led to a 
discernible shift in the interests of the military political actors towards a restrictive 
and repressive position. In a speech by General Memduh Tagmac, the chief of the 
general staff, delivered a few days before he and his colleagues issued the military 
ultimatum of 12 March 1971, reveals the military élites’ discontent with the 
growth in class awareness. “Social awareness” said Memduh Tagmac, addressing 
young commanders of the Turkish army, “has surpassed economic development” 
and he continued, “Turkey can never be left unattended [...] We are responsible 
from protecting the state and republic” (Ozturk, 1993: 165).  
The pursuit of the interest of keeping a tight rein on the labour movement in order 
to prevent them from engaging in radical left-wing activities and to establish 
stability and order in politico-economic domain would appear to have become 
more apparent in 1970s amongst the political actors possessing right-wing views. 
The words of Nihat Erim, who assumed the premiership of the non-party 
government that was established upon the demand of the generals who staged the 
military intervention of 1971, neatly illustrate the changing views of the political 
actors taking part in or supporting this government. He was an ex-CHP deputy 
known with his right-wing political stance (Zurcher, 2004), who in a press 
conference where he addressed a number of foreign journalists, pointed out 
regarding extreme left and right wing movements in the country which grew up 
following the adoption of 1961 constitution (Milliyet, 1971: 1):  
“The constitution of Turkey is more liberal than the 
constitutions of many European countries. Turkey cannot deal 
with such a luxury.” 
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Another speech by Nihat Erim made in the parliamentary session where the report 
on the  death penalty imposed on Deniz Gezmis and his friends was discussed 
sheds light on the ideas of right-leaning political actors who considered the 1961 
constitution provided certain so-called luxuries that could. Erim, by referring to 
Deniz Gezmis and his colleagues, the leaders of a radical left-wing student 
movement and by addressing the martial law, which became effective in eleven 
cities following the announcement of the 12 March military intervention, stated 
that (TBMM, 1972: 179-180, brackets added):  
“There are people who have been engaged in armed struggle 
with the aim of dividing and disintegrating [sic] Turkey, of 
overturning the democratic regime [and] the Turkish state. 
Martial law was announced in order to find out and overpower 
these [people] and to judge the offenders.” 
At this point it is important to emphasise that the frustration that Nihat Erim and 
his colleagues felt over the growing left-wing opposition in Turkish society and 
their commitment to confronting and containing this so-called threat did also 
include the left-leaning factions of the workers’ movement. The statement in the 
programme of the second Erim government in this respect provides a good 
example of the right-leaning political actors’ shifting opinions in the domain of 
industrial relations starting from the early years of the 1970s. In the programme, 
probably referring to the DISK and other workers’ organisations with left-wing 
profiles, it was stated that (TBMM, 1971: 439, brackets added) “[t]he activities of 
associations that provoke disturbance in our social order will be prevented.” 
The aim of putting the labour movement under the state’s firm discipline in order 
to channel them away from left-wing extremist movements was also pursued by 
the Demirel governments throughout the 1970s. This interest, as a review of the 
AP party programmes indicates, was mostly revealed through the employment of 
a discourse with the “aim of establishing peace in working life” (TBMM, 1975: 
318, 1977: 128, 1979: 89), and as the sixth Demirel government’s programme 
made it explicit, was intended to be materialised through “making best use of 
available laws and resources” (TBMM, 1979: 89). In this respect, it is worth 
citing the views of the sixth Demirel government as it offers some useful clues as 
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to the most suitable way he and his supporters saw fit to management and reform 
labour-capital relations. In this programme, after having firmly stated that “there 
can be no party, no association, no trade union, no occupational organisation 
which support the movements that the constitution has prohibited” (TBMM, 1979: 
88), it was enunciated that amendments were in train to change the laws on trade 
unions and on associations as these were amongst the “measures that needed to be 
taken in order to strengthen the state’s democratic authority” (TBMM, 1979: 88). 
Moreover, the AP declared its stance on matters of labour-employment relations 
as follows (TBMM, 1979: 89):  
“Smooth operation of the liberal democratic regime and of the 
economic order will be provided. The atmosphere of security 
that the production and investment are seeking for will be re-
established. [...] It will be ensured that Turkish citizens [....] can 
engage freely in economic activities. [...] For our country’s 
economic life, we consider peace in the workplace to be vitally 
important and indispensable. [...] Rather than domination of 
labour over capital or capital over labour, it will be provided 
that they will reconcile on equitable basis.” 
Despite a marked shift being witnessed in the interests of the political actors who 
leaned towards the right-wing of political spectrum and of the military-ruling 
élites, not all the factions of political actors seemed to be of the same idea with 
regards to labour rights in the 1970s. Indeed, a careful look at the CHP’s party 
programmes that were issued in the 1970s, indicates that it continued to regard 
granting Turkish workers social and economic rights as being one of the most 
appropriate ways to prevent the dissemination of radical left-wing ideals and thus 
to hinder the emergence of extreme left-wing movements amongst the working 
class (CHP, 1973: 121-122, 1976: 95-96). For instance, in the CHP’s manifesto 
prepared for the 1973 elections, the party’s views over the virtues of equipping 
workers with socioeconomic rights were summarised as follows (CHP, 1973: 
121); 
“Entitlement of workers to enjoy democratic rights and enabling 
them to use these rights is healthy not only in social and 
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economic terms but also in political terms. Because in this way 
[...] democracy will be realised; at the same time, workers’ 
gravitation towards movements which are not compatible with a 
democratic regime or infiltration of these kinds of movements 
and ideas between workers will be prevented.”   
An overview of available resources indicates that the interest of keeping the 
Turkish labour movement away from the ideologies of radical left-wing politics 
was not the sole one that the political actors pursued in the domain of industrial 
relations. That is, for most of the period the CHP and the AP also set their sights 
on boosting the domestic markets by increasing workers’ purchasing power. This 
interest was materialised through allowing substantial wage increases in the 
industrial sector (Pamuk, 1981; Keyder, 1983a; Zurcher, 2004; Aydin, 2005) and 
according to a widespread consensus in scholarly literature, constituted one main 
element of policies directed towards the development and maintenance of inward 
looking industrialisation in the period (Keyder, 1987; Aydin, 2005; Kazgan, 2006; 
Unay, 2006; Boratav, 2009). However, at this point it should be noted that despite 
the political actors, for a long time during the period, permitting high wage rises 
in the industrial sector, especially in state-led industrial establishments and even 
tolerated workers’ contestation over their wages (see Keyder, 1987 and below 
sections), they rarely made this interest explicit. Instead, they tacitly supported the 
idea of the importance of wage rises/fair income distribution in the achievement 
of social justice and invoked the rhetoric of democracy as the system as being 
compatible with collective bargaining in matters of wage increases. For example, 
the CHP (1969), in its manifesto prepared for the 1969 general elections, started 
its chapter on working life by pointing out the importance of the provision of 
social justice for working people (p. 73) and amongst the progress it promised in 
the quality of working life, mentioned the introduction of a “wages and incomes 
policy which make a fair and a balanced development possible” (p. 77). 
Regarding collective bargaining, the CHP (1976: 134), in its 1976 party 
programme deemed it “amongst the principle means of provision of justice on 
continuous basis in income distribution through democratic ways”. In a similar 
vein, the AP also made use of the concepts of social justice, democracy and 
collective bargaining in matters of wage increases and fair income distribution. 
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For example, in the programme of the first Demirel government it was asserted 
that (TBMM, 1965: 82):  
 “In order to obtain social justice, the social state has many 
instruments such as progressive tax systems, public services [...] 
wage setting through free trade unionism and collective 
bargaining.” 
Demirel, much in a similar manner, in an interview with Abdi Ipekci, a respected 
Turkish journalist stated that (Ipekci, 1969: 5):  
“System of progressive taxes and the right to collective 
agreement is the most effective solution that western democracy 
could have found to ensure that the welfare is spread across 
society.” 
One of the most clear-cut manifestations of the economic meaning of this interest, 
however, comes from the CHP in the early 1970s. In its manifesto prepared for 
the 1973 general election, the CHP, besides having pointed out the instrumentality 
of increased purchasing power for the wider population in widening the scope of 
domestic market of national industry (CHP, 1973: 85), called attention to the 
virtues of the pressures for wage increase demands coming from workers 
following the implementation of the law on collective agreements as follows 
(CHP, 1973: 118);  
 “Employers who firstly went into panic because of the increase 
that they had to make in workers’ wages exceeded what they 
were used to, saw, in a short time, that their worries were 
unnecessary. Because the purchasing power of hundred 
thousands of workers, number of whom make millions with their 
families were also increased.  The economy gained vitally also 
from this aspect; sales and profits of both the industrial and 




Nevertheless, towards the end of the planned economy period, as Turkey’s 
economy took a significant downturn, the instrumentality of high wages in the 
creation of buoyant internal markets proved to be unsustainable and this led a 
remarkable shift in the interests of the political actors. For example, in a press 
conference held in May 1978, Bulent Ecevit complained about the excessive 
demands and irresponsible behaviours of some trade unionists and claimed that 
the “system of collective bargaining is about to get out of hand because of this 
mentality”. In this speech he also, when pointing out the wage demands of trade 
unions, asserted that “meeting these kinds of demands is impossible” and added 
“we expect all trade unions to make sacrifices” (Milliyet, 1978a: 9). Much in a 
similar way, in an interview conducted by Abdi Ipekci, Ecevit complained about 
wage increases in the industrial sector as follows (Ipekci, 1978: 13):  
“Regardless of the country and the political regime they are 
coming from, today, if the most well-educated, the most 
competent experts are called for as witnesses, I believe that they 
will say that there is no country other than Turkey where the 
highest wage increases are seen.”  
Demirel, likewise, in one press conference asserted that wages need to be 
increased within “reasonable limits”, which could be compensated by the 
economy (Cumhuriyet, 1977: 1). An eye-opening explanation to what he implied 
by saying “reasonable limits”, on the other hand, could be found in one of the 
letters of intent that the sixth Demirel government submitted to the International 
Monetary Fund in mid-1980. According to this letter, as was reported by a 
respected journalist Mehmet Ali Birand (1980: 6), the government, after having 
promised to ensure that wage increases would remain below the level of inflation, 
declared that it would pass on nearly all increases in the cost of production to 
consumers. 
The interests of the ruling elites in the domain of industrial relations, revolved 
around their overarching concern regarding the perpetuation of capitalist 
industrialisation and the democratic political order, whereas the interests of 
employers and workers in this domain were built on different concerns, which are 




The interests that the industrial employers pursued in the domain of industrial 
relations reflected their urgent needs in their economic activities, i.e. 
establishment and preservation of stability and order in the economy and in 
labour-capital relations, and determination of wages in line with their own 
interests. In this respect, for example, in a meeting held with Ismet Inonu in early 
1962, Vehbi Koc, a leading Turkish industrialist said: “before anything else, we 
need peace and stability”: and continued: “[o]ur country needs to work a lot [...] 
We need to industrialise” (Milliyet, 1962). Industrial employers’ concerns over 
peace and stability in workplace were also made manifest in various publications 
and meetings of the Confederation of Employers’ Associations of Turkey (TISK, 
1972, 1977, 2012). In its working report prepared for its ninth ordinary meeting of 
the general assembly, for instance, it stated that (TISK, 1972: 13): 
“...besides the need for the establishment of political and 
economic stability, it is important to refer to the importance of 
the factor of peace and tranquillity in the workplace for our 
economic development. The entrepreneurs, who are in the 
position of making new investments in the area of industry, will 
seek for, before anything else, the precondition of peace and 
tranquillity in workplace. Prevalence of illegal actions in 
workplaces which occur in the forms of occupations, boycotts, 
unlawful strikes and even damage to property, while on the one 
hand will not provide encouraging environments for new 
investment, on the other, will cause  serious problems in 
production for existing investment.” 
In a similar manner, Halil Kaya, the then president of the TISK, in an executive 
meeting held in 1974, having pointed out the on-going economic and social 
problems across the country, gave voice to the employers’ concerns over the 
establishment and preservation of stability and order in economy as well as in 
labour capital relations, as follows (Isveren Bulteni, 1974b: 3): 
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 “The circumstances which deteriorate day by day, the 
pressures which increase day by day, push the industrial sector 
into an insecure and unstable environment. In the case that 
development in industrial sector ceases, it is certain that, 
together with numerous companies, our country will suffer from 
this situation. Under these conditions, the problems of 
employment and investment confront us as subjects which are 
worth considering with regards to the interests of the country.” 
When it comes to the wages policy, industrial employers throughout the period 
firmly held the idea that excessive wage demands would lead to a decrease in their 
demand for labour and would eventually precipitate inflation (TISK, 1965: 146; 
Milliyet, 1970b; Isveren Bulteni, 1972, 1973, 1974a, 1976b; Milliyet, 1978b). 
Their views regarding the most suitable wages policy seem to have taken its shape 
as early as the mid-1960s (TISK, 1965: 148-149, brackets added): 
“Given that the biggest employer in Turkey is the state, 
determination of a wage policy should be the state’s duty. This 
policy should not be in conflict with the position of private 
sector employers and should be based on the same principles 
[pursued by the private employers] as much as possible [...] 
There will be no pressure of inflation if the increase in wages 
does not exceed production levels. In this regard, currently one 
of the most important problems is the pressure on employers 
and on the economy, which stems from [...] unrest triggered by 
the provocation of trade unions about fair wages. These 
pressures […] need to be removed especially because of their 
negative effects on companies.” 
The industrial employers’ concerns over the “establishment and preservation of 
stability and order in the economy and in labour-capital relations” and 
“determination of wages in line with their own interests” remained as their 
overarching concerns in the domain of industrial relations. However, similar to 
the political actors, their views regarding how their interests could be materialised 
changed during the period in accordance with the rising power of the working 
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class and with the shifting demands and priorities of the country’s industrial 
development. In this respect, during the first years of planned economy period 
when the import-substituting capitalist industrialisation was in the process of 
gaining its momentum and when the labour movement was still in its infancy, 
industrial employers deemed developing harmonious relationships with workers 
to be the most suitable way to establish and maintain stability and thus were 
regularly willing to come to agreements on wage increases with workers. 
However, starting from the late 1960s, as the country’s inward-looking industrial 
development strategy began to slow down with the onset of economic problems, 
and as a group of workers started to reveal a heightened level of class 
consciousness, especially under the leadership of the DISK, industrial employers 
began to see the establishment of strict state control over wage demands of trade 
unions and over the labour movements through the introduction of pro-capitalist 
changes to the laws regulating industrial relations, as being the most appropriate 
method for the materialisation of their supreme interests.  
A careful analysis of the employers’ publications, in fact, reveals that at least until 
the mid-1960s, they deemed the establishment of a harmonious relationship with 
the working class important. In the year 1965, TISK for example, explained the 
views of its members with respect to labour-capital relations and wage bargaining 
as follows (TISK, 1965: 145):  
“... we have an unshakable belief that the establishment of a 
principle of social justice in a peaceful way can only be 
achieved through implementation of a system of collective 
bargaining. As the system of collective bargaining develops and 
spreads across our country, the role of the state in the 
organisation of labour-capital relations, especially in the 
determination of wages, will gradually decrease and the parties 
will gain a fairer private mechanism.”  
The then president of TISK Sahap Kocatopcu’s speech at the Confederations’ 
fifth ordinary meeting held in 1966, likewise, offers some revealing hints about 
the employers’ commitment to the establishment of a harmonious relationship in 
industrial relations. In his speech he asserted that (Isveren, 1966: 4): 
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“As guardians of social peace, we assume a mutual 
responsibility with Turk-Is, and in order to carry out this mutual 
responsibility together [sic], we are open to any kind of 
cooperation.” 
In contrast to the industrial employers’ favourable attitudes towards the 
establishment of harmonious relationships with labour in the first half of the 
planned economy period, throughout the 1970s, they called for more and stricter 
state control over labour, by defending the necessity for the introduction of pro-
capitalist amendments to the laws regulating industrial relations (see e.g. 
Cumhuriyet, 1970; Milliyet, 1970b; Isveren Bulteni, 1973; 1974a, 1974b, 1976a, 
Milliyet, 1977; Ibrahimoglu, 1979, 1980; Altun, 2008). For example, at a press 
conference, the then president of the TISK, Halil Kaya, explained the importance 
of the establishment of state control over the collective bargaining process in 
relation to the provision of peace and stability in the country with the following 
words (Cumhuriyet, 1970: 7):  
“Excessive wage demands and other reasons restrain the 
employers’ tendencies towards developing their establishments 
and opening new workplaces. It should be also emphasised that, 
the government either is late in taking measures or takes 
inadequate measures against this issue. This attitude 
encourages those who want anarchy”. 
In a letter addressed to Bulent Ecevit in 1975, Vehbi Koc, who, besides being a 
prominent industrialist, held the chairmanship of the TUSIAD’s presidential board 
throughout the 1970s, on the other hand, put forward the industrial employers’ 
demand for the introduction of pro-capitalist amendments to the legal framework 
of industrial relations in a very straight forward manner. In his letter, Koc (1987: 
193), after having stated that “if the government does not seriously deal with and 
put in order the current collective bargaining system, I doubt that the 
industrialisation process of Turkey will be able to reach to its expected levels” 
and added:  
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“Workers’ wages have increased much more than the cost of 
living in Turkey. This situation intensifies the pressure of 
inflation [and] low income citizens on the one hand, workers on 
the other run into financial difficulties [...] Attitudes of trade 
unions have a considerable impact on the economy of the 
country. If industrial relations are not carefully regulated, 
considerable damage might be caused because of strikes. It is 
even possible that many industrialists might have to step out of 
their business because they cannot make a profit.” (Koc, 1987: 
193). 
Another example as to the employers’ increasing demands for the assertion of 
state control over labour and the introduction of amendments to the legal 
framework of industrial relations that favoured employers can be seen in the then 
president of the TISK, Halit Narin’s speech delivered at the 1978 annual meeting 
of TUSIAD. In his address to the general assembly, after having pointed out the 
CHP’s plans to take measures against employers’ misuse of their right to lockout, 
he criticised the party’s attitudes towards the labour movement as follows 
(Milliyet, 1978c: 6):  
“Government needs to fight against and strictly prevent 
unlawful strikes, irresponsible strikes, and ideological strikes. 
By adopting single-sided and deliberate attitudes, no service can 
be given to this country, peace in workplace cannot be 
established, economic development cannot be promoted, and 
welfare cannot be spread.” 
Against this background, it should come as no surprise that the interests of 
employers that were pursued in a politico-economic environment where labour 
emerged as a powerful actor, conflicted with the interests of the working class and 






A careful overview of the relevant material reveals that the interest that the 
workers championed in the domain of industrial relations echoed their most 
urgent economic concern, namely, higher wages and this, despite some political 
claims made by especially the DISK
110
, remained as the overarching interest of 
the trade unions throughout the period paving the way forward to, as Koray and 
Celik  (2007: 266) rightly pointed out, the  pursuit of a “wage unionism” by 
majority of the labour’s organisations (see Koray, 1994, 1996; Koc, 1998; Koray 
and Celik, 2007). At this point it is important to note that despite the existence of 
ideological and discursive ruptures between the DISK and the Turk-Is, and despite 
the existence of other trade union confederations, it had been these two 
organisation that came out as the single-minded spokesmen and the genuine 
representatives of the Turkish working class (Mumcuoglu, 1980; Guzel, 1983; 
Isikli, 1987; Guzel, 1996; Koc, 1998; Baydar, 1999b; Koc, 2000a; Mahirogullari, 
2005). Consequently, this study in this context follows in the footsteps of 
mainstream Turkish industrial relations literature and exclusively focuses on the 
supreme interests pursued by the Turk-Is and the DISK during the planned 
economy period. 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that higher wages appeared as the supreme 
interest pursued by the workers lies in the fact that improvements in wage and 
benefit levels, as has been repeatedly pointed out in the literature, came out as the 
most important issue which the workers raised during collective bargaining 
negotiations and which they voiced during industrial action throughout the era 
(Tuna, 1969, 1970; Kutal, 1977: 132; Talas, 1992; Koray and Celik, 2007). This 
particular concern that they showed about their wage levels could also be seen in 
statements of workers’ associations and in the discourses of their leaders. For 
example, the working report prepared for the Turk-Is’ seventh ordinary meeting of 
its general assembly was opened with an address expressing the executive board’s 
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 Indeed as has been mentioned earlier, the DISK, unlike the Turk-Is, stood in favour of a 
political unionism and in this respect made its presence felt by the political actors and employers 
through the protests and demonstrations it organised against political actions and decisions of 
these actors, especially in the second half of the planned economy period (for an overview see 
e.g. Guzel, 1996; Koc, 1998; Mahirogullari, 2005). 
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concerns over workers’ financial hardship due to rising inflation levels. In the 
report it was stated that (Turk-Is, 1968: 166, brackets added):  
“Today those who live on small incomes constitute the majority 
in our country and [these people] do not know what to do in the 
face of the high cost of living [...] Prices are on a continuous 
rise and the pain of citizens does increase day by day.” 
The particular attention that workers paid to their wage levels can be also 
followed in the publications of the DISK (1973, 1978a, 1980). For example, in 
one of its declarations issued 1975, it compiled a list of demands composed of 
fourteen items and called for “all progressive, revolutionary and national powers 
and organisations to come together and fight for these claims” (DISK, 1978a: 
132). The first two items of the list were as follows (DISK, 1978a: 132 brackets 
added): 
 “1. Enabling wage increases to run ahead of price increases 
and determination [of wages] in accordance with a cost of 
living index calculated for families.  
2. Creation of a growth in purchasing power and in so doing 
obtainment of an increase in domestic consumption and 
production directed at this [domestic consumption].” 
In mentioning the supreme interests of workers in the planned economy period, 
which were predominantly championed by the Turk-Is and the DISK, it should be 
especially noted that although these two associations pursued almost the same 
interests, as many scholars pointed out, a fierce rivalry had grown between them 
(Mumcuoglu, 1980; Koc, 1998; Koray and Celik, 2007). This rivalry had its roots 
in their ideological orientations and went as far as the Turk-Is’ support for the 
amendments brought to the trade unions law in the 1970, which were aimed at, 
amongst other infringements of the essence of freedom of association, closure of 
the DISK (see below and Isikli, 2005; Mahirogullari, 2005). 
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The interests that the actors of industrial relations pursued exerted a remarkable 
impact on the patterns of interactions established between them in the period, 
which is investigated next.  
6.2.2.4 Interactions 
Industrial relations during planned economy period developed in a more dynamic 
and complex environment, where the politico-economic and social circumstances 
surrounding and influencing it paved the way for the arrival of more powerful 
socioeconomic actors with divergent and sometimes contradicting interests to 
pursue. This, compared to the previous periods, brought about different patterns of 
interactions amongst the actors, which resulted in more dynamic progress in the 
relationships being built in the domain of industrial relations. 
The early years of 1960s witnessed the ruling élites’ ambitious efforts directed 
towards re-institutionalisation of industrial relations with an aim to provide a 
more equitable distribution of power between capital and labour. To achieve so, 
they firstly, as was already mentioned above, justified their steps taken towards 
the re-building of the institutional structures of industrial relations with the 
argument that workers need to be integrated within the existing politico-economic 
order, if capitalist development was to be sustained within a democratic 
parliamentary system. To this end, the articles 46 and 47 were incorporated into 
the 1961 Constitution which guaranteed the right to establish trade unions and the 
right to bargain collectively as well as the right to strike. The efforts of the 
political actors, directed towards re-shaping of the institutional framework of 
industrial relations, culminated in the Trade Unions’ Law (Law no.274) and the 
Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts Law (Law no.275), both of which 
entered into force 1963 and together provided labour with the freedom of 
association, the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike. 
On the basis of these legal arrangements, the actors of industrial relations 
interacted with each other at both the political and politico-economic levels and 
these interactions laid the ground for the political economy of industrial relations 
pursued during the period. At the political level, an overview of the relevant 
resources indicates that interactions between actors made themselves felt check in 
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relationships that the Turk-Is and the DISK established with particular political 
parties
111
. Indeed, the Turk-Is, despite its so-called above party political position, 
with which it claimed it would remain outside the influence of political parties 
(see Kutal, 1977; Isikli, 2005), forged a strong alliance with the AP (Guzel, 1983; 
Bianchi, 1984; Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992; Isikli, 2005) and a less strong, but a still 
visible one, with the CHP (Isikli, 2005), which mostly became evident in the 
election of a number of Turk-Is leaders to parliament on the AP and the CHP 
candidate lists during the focal period (Isikli, 1987, Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992). In a 
similar manner, the DISK built a close alliance with the TIP (Mumcuoglu, 1980; 
Isikli, 1983) and after the TIP’s closure under martial law in 1971, it forged a 
loser, but noticeable, alliance with the CHP (DISK, 1975; Isikli, 1983). The 
DISK, as was the case in Turk-Is’ relationship with the political parties, 
throughout the period sent a number of its leaders to parliament under the tickets 
of the TIP and the CHP (Isikli, 1987, 2005). However, unlike the Turk-Is, it did 
not adopt an above party approach to politics and instead offered its open support 
to the CHP in the general elections of both 1973 and 1977 (DISK, 1975, 1977) by 
encouraging its members to vote for the CHP.  
The relationship established between the workers’ confederations and the political 
parties, however, was only one part of the interactions forged between the actors 
in the period. At the politico-economic level, there took place collective labour 
relations, which having involved forging relationships at the formal level, 
contributed significantly to the interactions developed between the actors in the 
period. Collective labour relations were developed initially in public enterprises 
by the leadership of the Turk-Is starting from the early years of the 1960s. 
However, private sector workers also made use of their collective rights and they, 
again supported predominantly by the leadership of the Turk-Is, started to 
negotiate collectively their working conditions with their employers (see Dereli, 
1968; Tuna, 1969; Kutal, 1977; Koray, 1994). Subsequently, the organizational 
and representational activities of workers’ associations from the inception of the 
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 As has been mentioned earlier, labour confederations were not confined with the DISK and the 
Turk-IS in the planned economy period and there were close political ties between the other 
trade unions confederations and the political parties. However, given that in this study I am 
concentrating on the DISK and the Turk-Is, I found unnecessary to point out the political 
interactions beyond those established by the DISK and Turk-Is.  
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collective bargaining system in 1963 to the end of 1967 significantly increased 
both in the private and public sectors, witnessed by the number of workers 
covered by collective agreements jumping from 9,000 to 189,000, the annual 
number of collective agreements displaying a respectable increase (see Table 21) 
and the workers obtaining a steady increase in their real wages (see Figure 12 and 
Figure 13). 
The newly framed rules together with the actors’ approach towards industrial 
relations in the planned economy period produced two immediate outcomes for 
labour. First, the way the new institutional framework of industrial relations 
distributed the power between the actors placed it on a more equal footing vis-à-
vis the others and this paved the way for the institutionalisation of collective 
labour relations with the aim of determining working conditions in the large 
industrial establishments (see Table 21). Second, despite the fact that collective 
agreements covered many different aspects of working conditions (see Koc, 
1998), one the most visible results of this shift in the distribution of power 
between the actors came out as the constant wage increases obtained by the 
collective bargaining (see Figure 12 and Figure 13). 
Figure 12: Changes in real wages 
during the planned economy period 
 
 
Figure 13: Differences in nominal wages 
between the public and private sector in 
the planned economy period 
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And third, the new polices implemented together with employers and the ruling 
circles’ changing approach towards industrial relations proved highly effective in 
exerting control over the interactions of all workers in the direction of stability 
and order. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 22 below, from 1963 until the end of 
1966, 179 strikes and 54 lockouts took place in Turkey, which when compared to 
the industrial action organised in the second half of the 1970s was highly modest. 
What is more, as the available literature reveals, most of these industrial actions 
took place in small-sized (Dereli, 1968) private sector enterprises (Dereli, 1968; 
Tuna, 1969) and thus had a little effect, if any, on the wider economy
112
. 
Resultantly, it could be safely argued that the policies and practices implemented 
between the years 1963 and 1967 in the domain of industrial relations created an 
environment in which peace and stability as well as harmonious relations between 
the actors became a defining feature of the industrial relations (see Dereli, 1968; 
Kutal, 1977; Koray, 1994; Koray and Celik, 2007), with labour cooperating with 
the other actors to this end.  
Table 21: Number of collective agreements concluded and number of workers 





Number of workers covered 
Public sector Private 
sector 
Total 
1963 96 3,000 6,000 9,000 
1964 1.078 264,000 173,000 437,000 
1965 872 122,000 50,000 172,000 
1966 1,152 159,000 175,000 334,000 
1967 2,339 110,000 79,000 189,000 
1968 1,332 254,000 164,000 418,000 
1969 1,429 108,000 136,000 244,000 
1970 1,516 335,000 216,000 551,000 
1971 1,443 189,000 154,000 343,000 
1972 1,603 278,000 148,000 426,000 
1973 1,921 250,000 193,000 443,000 
1974 1,724 427,000 175,000 602,000 
1975 1,893 91,000 209,000 300,000 
1976 2,408 221,000 255,000 476,000 
1977 2,173 369,000 221,000 590,000 
1978 2,225 280,000 204,000 484,000 
1979 2,914 266,000 48,000 314,000 
1980 1,813 237,000 93,000 330,000 
Source: CSGB, n.y.-c. 
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 There are no official statistical data providing the division of the strikes between the private and 
public sector for the first half of the planned economy period .  
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Starting in 1967, however, the political actors and industrial employers found 
steering the behaviours of the workers, especially those in private sector and their 
associations, more difficult. While one reason for this occurring was the 
escalation of the foreign exchange crisis, which squeezed profit levels in the 
manufacturing sector and thus made it more difficult for private sector employers 
to meet the wage demands of their workers, another explanation was the 
establishment of the DISK and the growth of its influence over the workers of this 
sector. Indeed, as was mentioned above, starting from its establishment, it mostly 
recruited its members from the private sector enterprises (Koc, 1979; Guzel, 
1983) and unlike its rival the Turk-Is, which drew its members predominantly 
from the public sector and which stood in favour of social peace in exchange for 
semi-official status and acceptance of its members’ economic demands (Ecevit, 
1973; Bianchi, 1984; Koray, 1996), it placed class consciousness and political and 
economic struggle for the materialisation of class interests at the top of its agenda 
(Koray, 1996; Baydar, 1999b). Thus, the years 1967 and 1968 marked the 
beginning of the dissolution of the so-called ideological and material harmony 
established between the state and the socioeconomic actors during the previous 
five years. This became visible not only in the increasing number of strikes, 
boycotts and workplace occupations (see Koc, 1979; Guzel, 1996; Mahirogullari, 
2005), most of which took place in private sector enterprises (Tuna, 1969; Guzel, 
1996), but also in the increasingly hostile and intimidating undertones that began 
to manifest themselves in private sector employers’ attitudes towards labour-
capital relations.  













1963 8 1,514 19,739 - - - 
1964 83 6,640 238,261 2 608 13,188 
1965 46 6,593 336,836 52 1,051 22,071 




179 26,161 1,024,940 54 1,659 35,259 
1967 101 9,499 350,037 - - - 
1968 54 52,89 174,905 71 727 14,397 
1969 77 12,601 235,134 1 18 180 
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301 43,400 980,265 76 2,134 112,806 
1971 78 10,916 476,116 3 2,064 95,730 




126 25,795 1,135,478 13 5,303 241,115 
1973 55 12,286 671,135 10 3,278 90,578 
1974 110 25,546 1,109,401 17 1,941 170,935 
1975 116 13,708 668,797 7 1,776 67,949 




339 58,780 2,775,163 64 8,443 574,831 
1977 59 15,682 1,397,124 13 596 126,467 
1978 87 9,748 426,127 33 7,591 521,454 
1979 126 21,011 1,147,721 15 968 141,848 




492 131,273 4,274,225 82 10,219 1,472,612 
Source: CSGB, 1997. 
One important repercussion of this increasing antagonism in the domain of 
industrial relations arrived in the form of rising demands for a substantial change 
to be made to the institutional framework of labour-capital relations (see e.g. 
Isveren, 1966; 1967). In response to these demands, the law no 1317
113
 
introducing amendments to the Law on Trade Unions, was discussed in 
parliament in June 1970. These amendments, constituted a serious infringement 
upon the essence of freedom of association one of which having been the aim of 
closure of the DISK under the pretext that it did not represent one third of the 
workers nation-wide (Milliyet, 1970a; Talas, 1992; Kutal, 1996; Isikli, 2005). 
This act was passed after a very short parliamentary debate (Koc, 1998; Isikli, 
2005) with the support of the CHP and of the deputies who were at the same time 
members of the Turk-Is (see Isikli, 2005). 
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 For the full text in Turkish see, Official Gazette, 12/08/1970, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/13577.pdf
&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/13577.pdf [Accessed 03/02/2013]. 
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Despite the fact that the law no 1317 was passed with a majority vote of the 
participants, in their efforts to put this law into force, the political actors failed to 
realise that the provisions in the 1961 Constitution had already placed labour at a 
more equal footing vis-à-vis capital and state whereby they had increasingly 
mobilised their power resources to become involved in the institution building 
process and would be hard to dislodge by simply passing new laws. This was 
exactly the case following the passing of this law, which, in the Turkish industrial 
relations literature is widely referred to as the “15-16 June events” (Sulker, 1987; 
Koc, 1998; Isikli, 2005; Mahirogullari, 2005; Koray and Celik, 2007). During 
these two days, which in words of a Turkish trade union activist Kemal Sulker 
(1987) “shook Turkey”, the country witnessed for the first time in its history 
thousands of workers, the majority of whom were private sector employees 
(Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1984) rallying to voice their interests the scope of 
which exceeded the economic boundaries of factories and workplaces (Ahmad, 
1995; Koc, 1998). The 15-16 June events began spontaneously and turned into a 
massive workers’ demonstration in Istanbul and the Marmara region. Having been 
intimidated by this immediate reaction of the workers, the political actors 
responded to these demonstrations by sending in the police and military forces. 
However, they could only quell this massive workers demonstration by declaring 
martial law in Istanbul and in the cities surrounding it on the night of 16 June
114
 
(see Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1984; Ahmad, 1995; Koc, 1998; Isikli, 2005). 
The 15-16 June events proved unsuccessful in stopping the implementation of the 
amendments made to the Trade Unions Law and law no 1317 entered into force in 
August 1970. However, these amendments were rather short-lived for the 
Constitutional Court cancelled many of those changes in 1972, on the grounds 
that they were in conflict with the constitution. Even though the workers, with the 
15-16 June events, failed to discourage the ruling circles from implementation of 
law no 1317, it is important to note that these events represent a critical juncture 
in Turkish labour history as they, according to Ahmad (1995: 154) “may be 
considered the high point of class consciousness achieved by the workers of 
Turkey” and according to Margulies and Yildizoglu  (1984: 17, brackets added) 
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  For a detailed account of these events see e.g. Arinir and Ozturk, 1976; Sulker, 1987.  
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were the “first [...] political actions of the working class in Turkey [that] signalled 
the coming of age of this class and of the DISK”. 
In shorter than a year following the 15-16 June events, the military élites stepped 
once again into the political arena (Yerasimos, 1976; Koc, 1979; Ahmad, 1995; 
Guzel, 1996). Following this swift action by the military in the March 1971, the 
political actors started to exert a strict control on the labour movement. As an 
initial step, political actors declared martial law
115
 in April 1971 in eleven 
provinces, most of which were the industrial centres of the country
116
 and they 
legitimised their action by claiming the need for the protection of the 
“fundamental order and the integrity of state” (Official Gazette, 1971: 1). 
Following declaration of martial law, the leaders of military government enacted a 
special law, the Law on Martial Rule no. 1402
117
 – Sıkıyönetim Kanunu –, through 
which they entitled the commanders of martial rule to terminate the 
implementation of some fundamental provisions of laws no 274 and 275
118
. As 
the final step, the political actors made amendments to Article 46 of the 
Constitution that guaranteed the right to establish trade unions and thus, as was 
already discussed above, entitled the authorities the right to bring necessary 
restrictions to this right in order to protect “the integrity of state with its territory 
and its people, national security, public order, and public morality”. 
The laws and the ruling élites approach to the industrial relations during the 
military interregnum of the 12 March, subsequently, produced at least three 
outcomes for labour’s rights and position in industrial relations. First, by 
restricting workers’ collective rights, they intervened in the way power was 
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 Official Gazette, 27/04/1971, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/13820.pdf
&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/13820.pdf [Accessed: 05/05/2013]. 
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 Martial law was declared in 11 cities: Istanbul, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Zonguldak, Izmir, Eskişehir, 
Ankara, Adana, Hatay, Diyarbakır and Siirt, all of which, except for Diyarbakır and Siirt, were 
important industrial centres of the country.  
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 Official Gazette, 15/05/1971, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/13837.pdf
&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/13837.pdf [Accessed: 05/05/2013]. 
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 In this respect, for example, the Law on Martial Rule no. 1402 entitled the commanders of the 
martial rule the right to suspend strikes and lockouts or to subject them to permission. The law 
also allowed them to cease operation of associations or subject their operation to permission. To 
add to this, the Law on Martial Rule enforced the authorities to ban, prevent or to take preventive 




distributed between labour, capital and the state in a way that placed labour in a 
highly disadvantaged position (see Keyder, 1979; Aksoy, 1980; Talas, 1992; 
Boratav, 2009). Second, a decline in workers’ real wages for the first time in the 
focal period was observed (see Figure 12). 
Third, they assisted those political actors whose interests appeared to be highly in 
consonance with those of the employers to steer the behaviour of labour in the 
direction of so-called social stability and order. To achieve this, the ruling elites in 
the first instance ensured that the law on martial rule was efficiently implemented, 
the success of which became evident in the decreasing amount of industrial 
actions (see Table 22) especially when compared to the post 1973 period. To 
complement this step, the political actors directed a great deal of their attention at 
the suppression of all kinds of left-wing movements (Ozdemir, 1992; Ahmad, 
1993; Aksin, 1997; Kongar, 1998; Zurcher, 2004), in which harassment of leaders 
and members of the DISK occupied an important place
119
 (Guzel, 1996; Isikli, 
2005).  
Military rule came to an end in October 1973, with the transition of power to civil 
political actors following the 1973 general elections. With Turkey’s return to a 
democratic political order the laws no 274 and 275 again became effective and 
they continued to provide labour with the necessary collective rights to define and 
defend their interests. Yet despite the institutional framework remaining almost 
the same, the years following the free elections of 1973 did not provide a similar 
politico-economic and social setting to industrial relations as earlier in the period. 
Indeed, the second half of the planned economy period witnessed a remarkable 
shift in the political actors and employers’ approaches towards labour-capital 
relations in favour of a more authoritarian order, a serious slackening in economic 
development and a continuous rise in the power of the workers – especially for 
those organised under the DISK. The institutional framework of the industrial 
relations when merged with all these factors produced at least two important 
outcomes for labour up until 1977. First, the way power was distributed between 
the actors by the legal framework of industrial relations continued to place labour 
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 During these years, DISK members and leaders were taken into custody, arrested and were 
subjected to various legal proceedings. For an overview see Isikli, 2005.   
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on a more equal footing vis-à-vis capital and the state and this paved the way for 
continuation of its mobilisation of its power resources in order to negotiate 
collectively its working conditions. In fact, between 1973 and 1977 the 
organizational and representational activities of the workers’ associations 
continued to increase which became evident, for instance, in the increasing 
number of collective agreements, in number of workers these agreements covered 
(see Table 21) and in the growth obtained in wage levels  
Second, steering the behaviours of private sector employees towards social peace 
and order turned out to be a challenge for the employers and the political actors 
because labour, in the face of employers’ increasingly uncompromising stance 
regarding their own demands during the process of collective bargaining, began to 
adopt a more proactive position in mobilisation of its power resources (see e.g. 
Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1984; Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992; Savran, 1992; Koc, 
1998). Subsequently, as illustrated in Table 22, the number of strikes, days lost 
and workers involved in strikes displayed a marked increase when compared to 
earlier years in the era and much of this industrial unrest, as displayed in Table 23, 
hit the activities of private sector. To add to this, as can be inferred from Table 22, 
the years 1973-76 witnessed a gradual rise in weight of lockouts with regards to 
workers involved and days not worked in comparison to their sphere of influence 
in the earlier years of the period. When it comes to the distribution of these 
lockouts between the public and private sector enterprises, it should be noted that 
no clear information appears available in the accessible literature. Yet, after 
referring to Table 23, it would not be too far-fetched to argue that those called at 
this time wielded their influence mostly on the workers of the private sector, but 
contributed substantially to disturbance of social peace between the years 1973 
and 1977 across the whole of industry. 
Despite the fact that steering the behaviours of workers of private sector towards 
social peace and order in the workplace became increasingly difficult for the 
employers and for the state between the years 1973-1977, those employed by the 
state-led industrial establishments displayed more conciliatory attitudes regarding 
the establishment of social peace in the workplace. An overview of literature 
reveals that two factors played an important role. First, the Turk-Is, right from its 
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inauguraration stood in favour of social peace in exchange for a semi-official 
status and acceptance of its members’ economic demands (Ecevit, 1973; Bianchi, 
1984; Koray, 1996). Second, for most of the period the political actors found 
offering compromises to the Turk-Is-affiliated unions an effective method for 
maintaining social peace and order in the domain of industrial relations (Bianchi, 
1984; Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992). As an expected consequence of these factors, 
despite the existence of  industrial actions in the state sector (see Table 23), the 
years 1973-1977, as was pointed out by a number of observers, did not witness 
distortion of the harmonious interactions established between the state and the 
workers this sector’s enterprises (see Bianchi, 1984; Cizre-Sakallioglu; 1992, 
Koray, 1994). 
Table 23: Share of public and private sectors strikes that took place after 1973 in 




Public sector share of total 
industrial action 


















1973 31.8 42.2 44.9 68.2 57.8 55.1 
1974 48.8 73.1 54.3 51.2 26.9 45.7 
1975 14.4 23.0 21.0 85.6 77.0 79.0 
1976 21.0 38.6 22.6 79.05 79.0 77.4 
1977 17.4 30.7 22.8 82.6 69.3 77.2 
1978 15.4 11.0 9.6 84.6 89.0 90.4 
1979 24.2 54.8 32.2 75.8 45.2 67.8 
1980 13.2 25.2 25.0 86.8 74.8 75.0 
Source:  (DIE, 1983): 208.  
Starting from the year 1977, however, as the economic crisis tightened its grip on 
the country and as the approaches of the political actors and employers towards 
industrial relations took an even more authoritarian direction, the collective rights 
provided to labour by the laws no 274 and 275 not only failed in assisting it in the 
materialisation of its interests, but also in helping the political actors to steer 
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 It should be noted that the data compiled by the Turkish Statistical Institute (DIE, 1983) and the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security (CSGB, 1997) regarding number of strikes that took 
place in the period are not compatible. However, because the data provided by the latter is a 
widely cited source in industrial relations literature, I found it more appropriate to use in my 
study. The reason that I used data published in the DIE 1983 was because the Ministry of Labour 
did not make a distinction between public and private sector strikes in its publications pre-1980. 
Therefore, the data given by DIE 1983 should be taken as indicative rather than  a definitive 
statement of strike actions that took place in the focal period.  
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behaviours of the workers of both private and the state sectors. Indeed in the first 
place, despite the fact that the organizational and representational activities of 
workers’ associations continued, as can be seen in Table 22, the workers, as 
indicated by Figure 12, began to experience a marked decline in the rise they 
annually obtained in their wage packets. What is more, as can be ascertained from 
Figure 13, this decline was more remarkable in the wages of private sector 
workers, for those in the in public sector managed to protect their living standards 
much better during the late 1970s. To add to this, despite the organisational and 
representational activities of labour continuing, smaller numbers of workers, as 
shown by Table 21, were covered by collective agreements in the private sector, 
especially in the last two years of the planned economy period. That is, the 
conflicts of interests between employers and labour rendered negotiations over 
collective agreements more difficult to conclude (for the examples of these 
interest conflicts see e.g. Cumhuriyet, 1980d, 1980c, 1980a; Milliyet, 1980f, 
1980g, 1980c; Koray, 1994).  
Indeed, intensification of conflicts of interests between labour and capital became 
one of the main features of the final years of the planned economy period, which 
made steering the behaviours of the former towards social peace more and more 
difficult for the other actors. The interest conflicts came to be mostly visible in 
radicalisation and politicisation of the labour movement in the private sector 
(Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1992; Baydar, 1999b; Waldner, 1999), with increasing 
numbers of and expansion of influence by strikes (see Table 22) and other kinds 
of industrial action. These actions that were initially mostly planned and put into 
action by the workers of private sector who were organised under the DISK-
affiliated trade unions, what is more, gradually spread across the entire industry, 
involving public sector workers, albeit with a lesser degree of radical and political 
dissent (for an overview see e.g. Koray, 1994; Guzel, 1996; Koc, 1998; 
Mahirogullari, 2005).  
Except from one incidence, political actors’ response to this socio-political 
awakening of labour was aggressive and included various forms of repressive 
measures. The so-called Social Pact – Toplumsal Anlasma –, signed between 
Ecevit government and the Turk-Is in July 1978 constituted this exception. 
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Covering only workers in the public sector, the Social Pact laid out the principles 
for wage policy and collective bargaining to be followed (Talas, 1982; Koray and 
Celik, 2007). However, this deal reached between the state and representatives of 
the public sector workers was rather short-lived, for the Turk-Is in just 14 months 
withdrew from the agreement arguing that the state had not fulfilled its promises. 
The DISK, on the other hand, did not involve itself in this deal and registered its 
disapproval on various occasions (see Koray and Celik, 2007).  
Apart from the Social Pact, which failed to achieve what it aimed to (see also 
Koray and Celik, 2007), the reaction of the political actors against labour’s 
mobilisation of its power resources appeared to be hostile and mostly worked in 
favour of the state and capital owners. Indeed, for example, the political actors did 
not hesitate to use the police and military forces in dealing with the labour 
movement on many occasions. In this respect, the strike organised at Tariş – a 
large-scale and state-owned enterprise processing agricultural outputs – in 
January 1980, which in a short time turned into a massive labour mobilisation in 
Izmir province (see Yukselen, 1996) and the so-called Taksim Square massacre, 
which happened in 1 May 1977 where 34 people were killed and hundreds injured 
(Mavioglu and Sanyer, 2007)
121
, stand out as important examples where the 
armed forces were used by the state authorities to put down the labour movement.  
Yet, use of the armed forces was not the sole method employed to contain and 
reduce labour unrest. The state authorities, especially during the final four years of 
the planned economy period, increasingly resorted to their right to postpone 
strikes as granted to them by Law no. 275 and they predominantly, according to 
the data provided by Topalhan (2009), based their decisions on grounds of 
national security or national security jointly with national health
122
. In this respect, 
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 A detailed overview of the Taksim Square massacre can be obtained from a series of articles by 
Mavioglu and Sanyer, published in the Turkish daily newspaper Radikal between 29/04/2007 
and 07/05/2007.  
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 According to the data compiled by Topalhan (2009), out of 157 strike postponement decisions 
given between the years 1963-1980, 87 of them were issued between the formation of the fifth 
Demirel Government on 21 July 1977 and the coup d’état of 12 September 1980. These 
postponement decisions announced by political actors appeared to affect public and private 
sector workers almost on an equal basis, for according to the information provided by Celik 
(2008), in the years 1979 and 1980, while 53 strikes of the Turk-Is affiliated trade unions were 
postponed, this number appeared as 48 in the case of DISK affiliated ones. Moreover, according 
to this data, 52 out of these 87 postponement decisions were renewed after the period of strike 
postponement expired (Topalhan, 2009). See Celik, 2008; Topalhan, 2009 for more details. 
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postponed strikes, for example, those called at Diyarbakir Meat and Fish 
Foundation – Diyarbakır Et Balık Kurumu, at some flour mills in Istanbul, and at 
some of the big hotels located in Ankara and Izmir, stand out (Celik, 2008).  
Nonetheless, the gravity of the situation affecting industrial relations increasingly 
worsened as Turkey entered the 1980s, a year which became stuck in memories of 
many Turkish people with its turbulent politico-economic and social history (for 
an overview see e.g. Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998; Zurcher, 2004). However, at 
this point it is worth pointing out that the state of unrest that emerged in the 
domain of industrial relations was only one factor that contributed to the politico-
economic and social instability that occurred in this year. Indeed, as has been 
already mentioned in the study, as the planned economy period came to a close, 
the operation of parliamentary democracy was paralysed by ideological divisions 
and conflicts of interests that appeared between the political parties (Sunar and 
Sayari, 2004; Zurcher, 2004; Aydin, 2005), daily life was fraught with the fear of 
anarchy and terror (Benhabib, 1979; Ahmad, 1993; Kongar, 1998) and the 
economy was overburdened with unemployment, shortages of consumer goods 
and rapidly soaring inflation (see e.g. Ahmad, 1993; Kepenek and Yenturk, 1995; 
Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009).  
It was against this background of unfavourable circumstances that the political 
actors launched a wide-ranging economic reform programme – the so-called 24 
January decisions to restructure the economy in the direction of the interests of 
the powerful economic groups in early 1980 (see e.g. Owen and Pamuk, 1998; 
Unay, 2006; Pamuk, 2008; Boratav, 2009). However, the way workers mobilised 
their power resources to voice and materialise their interests and the resultant 
social conflict that had occurred in the domain of industrial relations during the 
previous few years appeared to have made one thing clear: little could be achieved 
if the current institutional structures continued to provide labour with power 
resources that placed it on an equal footing vis-à-vis the political actors and the 
employers in the process of collective negotiations. To remedy this problem, the 
latter, following their introduction of 24 January decisions, took some decisive 





. They, in this regard, firstly, proposed to introduce a sliding scale of 
wages with increases to cover inflation levels (Cumhuriyet, 1980b). Following 
this step, they established the Committee for Coordination of Collective 
Agreements in March 1980, with the aim of “supporting the progress of the 
economic stability programme to achieve what  it aimed at” and “finding a 
balance between the interests of workers and employers” (Milliyet, 1980b: 9). As 
was reported by Milliyet (1980b: 9), the committee was charged with the duty of 
setting out the main principles of collective bargaining to be followed by both 
state and private sector employers and thus in the decree establishing this 
committee it was stipulated that “no collective agreement shall be concluded 
without  the committee being informed” (Milliyet, 1980b: 9).  
Yet, the efforts of the political actors towards steering the behaviours of labour 
proved largely unfruitful. Regarding this failure, an overview of newspapers of 
the period indicates that labour’s uncompromising attitudes played an important 
role. Indeed, for example, as many negotiations for collective bargaining 
agreements remained inconclusive in public sector enterprises in the mid-1980s, 
the Turk-Is proclaimed that it would organise a strike with involvement of 
330.000 workers nation-wide unless collective agreements were concluded soon 
(Milliyet, 1980g).  On another occasion, in April 1980 the Turk-Is appealed to the 
Council of State against the government’s decision to change the rules regulating 
severance pay (Milliyet, 1980g). These changes, which reduced the amount of 
severance money that workers received and increased the tax burden on it 
(Milliyet, 1980e), were reversed with a pro-labour law in July 1980 after strong 
pressure from the Turk-Is (Milliyet, 1980d). In May 1980, Prime minister 
Demirel, after having attended the extraordinary general assembly of the Turk-Is, 
announced that the proposal for a sliding scale system would be withdrawn from 
parliament (Cumhuriyet, 1980f). In July 1980, the then secretary general of the 
Turk-Is pronounced that collective bargaining would be concluded between 
representatives of workers and the employers without involvement of the 
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 Here, I am going to focus on strategies of the political actors that they put into action on 
national level in order to change the political economy pursued in the domain of industrial 
relations. However, it should be noted that the political actors also took some measures at the 
level of workplace with the aim of empowering employers vis-à-vis the workers’ associations 
starting in 1978. For an overview see Koc, 1982.  
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Committee for Coordination of Collective Agreements and added  “there is no 
such thing as the Committee for Coordination of Collective Agreements anymore” 
(Cumhuriyet, 1980e: 9). 
 However it was not only the Turk-Is that adopted an uncompromising stance on 
the issues related to labour-capital relations in the final year of the planned 
economy period and the extent of the disputes that erupted in the domain of 
industrial relations became increasingly serious and widespread as the calendar 
turned to September 1980. The general picture of labour unrest was as follows. 
More than 53 thousand workers in 214 workplaces were on strike and around 48 
thousand of these workers were members of the DISK affiliated trade unions. 
More than two thousand workers were about to call a strike and more than 57 
thousand were waiting for expiry of the strike postponement decisions taken by 
the government. If these were not enough, in September 1980, around 150 
thousand workers were waiting for the collective bargaining process to be 
concluded (Milliyet, 1980a), which, at least in the eyes of the political actors, 
added up to the volatile situation that prevailed in industrial relations. 
In the autumn of 1980, the political actors and employers, having been 
unsuccessful in taking control of labour’s mobilisation of its power resources 
seem to have fully comprehended the idea that the institutional structures, when 
the power resources between actors are distributed such that they place labour on 
a more equal footing vis-à-vis the state and employers, this is likely to enhance 
foremost’s power in the decision-making process. It was for this reason that the 
military takeover of 12 September, which lasted three years and effectively 
brought an end to workers’ resistance, was used by these actors, whose interests 
had been severely harmed by the way power was distributed under the existing 
system, with a unique opportunity to reform the institutions in ways that would 
reverse this trend. The 12 September military takeover and the succeeding will be 
scrutinised in Chapter 7. The subsection that follows, briefly discusses the type of 




6.3 Discussion & Conclusion  
The planned economy period, which started with the military intervention of 27 
May 1960 and ended with the military intervention of 12 September 1980, 
witnessed the introduction of a more pluralistic and liberal democracy, further 
advancement of national industry and the spread of left-wing doctrine amongst the 
ordinary people. The planned economy period also witnessed a dramatic surge in 
urbanisation, a substantial growth in the number of waged workers and a 
remarkable increase in the number of unionised ones. Subsequent to the years 
following the 1960 military interregnum a remarkable shift in the ruling élites’ 
approach to labour-capital relations occurred, there was continuation of the 
industrial bourgeoisie’s influence on political and economic issues, and 
ascendance of workers as a powerful interest group in the politico-economic 
domain and as an important actor in the domain of industrial relations was 
witnessed.  
It was against this background of events that the planned economy period set the 
stage for the configuration of more complex and dynamic interactions regarding 
industrial relations. The interactions between the actors were built on different and 
sometimes conflicting interests. Indeed, for example, the political actors, 
including the military élites, placed perpetuation of capitalist economic order and 
of the multi-party democracy on top of their agenda and in order to materialise 
this, they attributed a great deal of importance to the integration of workers within 
the existing politico-economic system in the best way possible. Their methods for 
doing so shifted in accordance with the politico-economic climate of the different 
stages of the era and with the political orientation of the political actors, 
increasingly taking on an authoritarian orientation as the period drew to a close 
owing to the increasing unrest.  The industrial employers, on the other hand, were 
mostly concerned about social peace at the workplace and the level of wage 
increases. As was the case with the political actors, their opinions in relation to the 
appropriate ways through which their interests could be materialised changed over 
time, taking on a more oppressive direction from the 1970s onwards. Finally, the 
workers, despite there being a prevalence of partition and rivalry between their 
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associations, echoed almost the same economic concerns and throughout the 
period sought higher wages.  
The social, political and economic circumstances surrounding industrial relations 
when merged with the interests pursued by the state and the socioeconomic actors, 
led to the implementation of different types of political economy of industrial 
relations in the period. In the first half of the period, the political actors saw 
granting workers social and economic rights as amongst the most appropriate 
ways to maintain capitalist industrialisation and multi-party democracy. Having 
employed this idea as their rationale in the institution building process, the ruling 
élites designed the legal framework of industrial relations in a way that entitled 
the workers to have: freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and 
the right to strike. The policies adopted and practices implemented in the domain 
of industrial relations during the first half of the period paved the way for at least 
three policy outcomes for labour. First, they distributed the power between actors 
on a more equal basis by providing organised labour in the industrial sector 
enough power to define and defend its class-based interests. Second they 
generated income security for organised labour in industrial sector given that trade 
unions managed to achieve a constant wage rise between the years 1963-1967 
through collective agreements in industry. And third, they created a politico-
economic environment in which organised labour displayed consent towards 
social peace and order in the workplace. All these, in my view, indicate that 
security operated as an institutional rationale in industrial relations and a political 
economy of security was pursued in industrial relations in the first half of the 
planned economy period.  
However, in the final years of the 1960s, the political economy of security 
pursued in the arena of industrial relations started to be challenged by slackening 
industrial development, changing attitudes of the political actors and employers 
towards labour-capital relations and the rising power of the workers of private 
sector, with the establishment of the DISK. One significant intervention in the 
political economy of industrial relations came during the 1971 Military 
interregnum grounded on the belief that there was an urgent need to protect the 
fundamental order and integrity of the state. The political actors, by employing 
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this strong rationale, legitimised both the amendments made to the article 
regulating industrial relations in the constitution and the termination of the 
implementation of the laws regulating industrial relations. The policy and 
practises they implemented during this nineteen-month period produced at least 
three outcomes for the labour. First, they shifted the way power was distributed 
between the actors of industrial relations in favour of the state and capital by 
reducing labour’s possibilities to mobilise its power resources. Second they 
generated income insecurity for labour as workers experienced a noticeable 
decline in their real wages. And third, they created a politico-economic 
environment in which labour was forced towards social peace in the workplace. 
That is, the ruling élites’ imposed heavy restrictions on freedom of association, 
the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike, resultantly, reducing their 
chances to act as independent social agents with distinct interests and agendas as 
well as empowering capital and the state vis-à-vis labour, thus creating a suitable 
environment in which insecurity operated as an institutional rationale, i.e. 
allowing for a political economy of insecurity to be embedded in the arena of 
industrial relations.  
The military rule ended with free elections held in October 1973. With Turkey’s 
return to a multi-party democratic political order, the laws regulating industrial 
relations again became effective and the actors continued to interact with each 
other under the conditions that the fragile democratic order provided. However, 
the politico-economic environment in which the actors of industrial relations 
interacted in this period displayed somewhat different characteristics than that of 
the beginning of the planned economy period. Indeed for one thing, starting from 
the mid-1970s, industrial development and the economy plunged into a deep crisis 
making the wage rise demands of workers more difficult to meet for the 
employers and the state. For another, the workers of private sector, who were 
organised under the umbrella of the DISK, launched a labour movement which 
became increasingly radicalised and politicised as the country’s political and 
economic situation deteriorated.  What is more, to this politico-economic uprising, 
state sector workers contributed their share, albeit with less politicised undertones, 
as the planned economy period drew to a close. Last but not least, and as a 
consequence of these factors, the political actors and employers’ attitudes towards 
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industrial relations became more hostile and aggressive against the rising demands 
of the workers. 
Against this background, the second half of the planned economy period 
witnessed a remarkable shift in the way the political actors legitimised their 
intervention in the domain of industrial relations, as they started to consider 
placing labour under the state’s firm discipline, seeing this as a more appropriate 
way to protect and maintain the democratic-capitalist politico-economic order as 
opposed to granting workers social and economic rights.  The policy and practises 
they implemented underpinned by this strong rationale produced at least three 
outcomes for organised labour in the second half of the planned economy period. 
First, they increasingly shifted the way power was distributed between the actors 
of industrial relations in favour of the state and capital by facilitating political 
actors’ interventions against organised labour’s mobilisation of its power 
resources. This situation, while having affected firstly and foremostly the 
activities of private sector workers, came to be the lot of the workers of public 
sector, despite the Turk-Is’ claiming to be above party politics. Second it started 
to generate income inequality between private and public sector workers, which 
especially became discernible towards the end of the period. And third, they 
triggered a serious politico-economic upheaval in the arena of industrial relations, 
where, while labour, initially private sector workers and later public sector 
workers found it increasingly necessary to intensify the level of their struggle 
aimed at the materialisation of their economic interests, the political actors in 
close alliance with the employers, did not hesitate to increase the degree and 
extent of the oppressive measures they put into practice in the domain of 
industrial relations.  
The intervention that the political actors made to labour-capital relations in the 
second half of the planned economy period, resultantly, prevented proper 
functioning of freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and  the 
right to strike, thus, gradually decreasing the capabilities of labour to 
independently pursue it economic interests, empowered the state and capital vis-à-
vis the labour and in doing so creating a suitable environment in which insecurity 
operated as an institutional rationale and in which the political economy of 
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insecurity started to be pursued. However, insecurity as a rationale fell short of 
steering the behaviours of labour towards social peace in the workplace given that 
the legal framework which was the result of the initial rationale of the political 
actors was still in operation. That is: these policy and practices which were 
designed in order to empower labour vis-à-vis state and capital, legitimised the 
social agency of labour. 
It was for this reason that, as I contend, a political economy of insecurity despite 
having made itself felt in the domain of industrial relations in the second half of 
the planned economy period initially for the private sector workers and then 
gradually extended to public sector workers, required further actions by the 
political actors in order to become a robust institutional feature. The changes 
made in policies and practices shaping and steering the industrial relations that 
came with the 12 September 1980 Military intervention, in this respect, 
complemented the actions of the political actors and employers in their concerted 
effort directed at bringing insecurity back to the political economy of industrial 
relations, the legacy of which can be traced back as early as the first years of 












 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CHAPTER 7:
THE 1980S: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSECURITY? 
7.1 Introduction  
In this final empirical chapter, I will briefly overview the series of events in the 
domain of Turkish labour markets and industrial relations that unfolded following 
the military takeover of September 1980. This chapter aims at bringing the 
narrative to the post-1980s and in doing so providing some additional conclusive 
evidence to the argument I will put forward in my concluding chapter, that is, 
chapter 8. Social, political and economic circumstances that laid the foundation of 
political economy of industrial relations in the post-1980 period were discussed in 
detail in the previous chapters. Therefore this chapter will concentrate on the 
explanation of the issues arising from the insertion of Turkey within the neoliberal 
global economy, socioeconomic transformations that played an important part in 
transformation of Turkish labour markets in the post-1980 period and interests 
and interactions of actors in the early-1980s. In other words, this chapter will 
explain how these occurrences shaped and influenced the political economy of 
industrial relations in the period. Section 7.2 discusses the neoliberal economic 
policies introduced to Turkey in the post-1980 era. Section 7.3 provides an 
overview of state of industry and economy in the period. Section 7.4 presents a 
review of main social and economic changes that Turkey underwent in the post-
1980 period. Section 7.5 outlines the interests of the actors who were involved in 
re-institutionalisation of industrial relations in the period. Section 7.6 lays out the 
interactions of the state, capital and labour. Section 7.7 finishes the chapter with a 
conclusion. 
7.2 Economic policies in the Era  
Against the background of the socioeconomic and political turbulence that 
characterised the late 1970s, in the autumn of 1980, political leaders seem to be 
caught in middle with fires on both sides. On the one side, there were the interests 
of international financial organisations and a group of industrialists who stood in 
favour of effective implementation of the 24 January measures, which in its final 
analysis were aimed at initiation of Turkey’s integration with the neoliberal global 
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economic order. On the other, stood the interests of the workers as socioeconomic 
actors of industrial relations, who lent their full support to the maintenance of the 
existing socioeconomic order and who, in order to materialise these interests, 
mobilised their power resources. However, the political leaders clearly favoured 
interests of the former, for the period of unrest came to an end with another 
military coup, which, with its anti-democratic measures, created a suitable 
environment for the implementation of the 24 January measures. Indeed, the 
generals leading the coup d'état of 1980 on 12
th
 of September with the so-called 
aim of restoring law and order
124
, assumed power directly and thus dissolved 
parliament, suspended the constitution, closed down the political parties and 
ceased the activities of trade unions and professional associations (Sunar and 
Sayari, 2004; Zurcher, 2004; Cizre, 2008). In doing so, as repeatedly argued by 
many scholars, the leaders of the 1980 military coup provided a fertile ground for 
the execution of the 24 January measures (see e.g. Yalpat, 1984; Celasun and 
Rodrik, 1989; Ahmad, 1993; Bugra, 1994; Owen and Pamuk, 1998; Ongen, 2004; 
Boratav, 2005a; Kazgan, 2006). The 12 September process also initiated a new 
politico-economic period in Turkey, with some severe repercussions on the 
economic front.  
Indeed, the 12 September process significantly changed Turkey’s politico-
economic landscape (Keyder, 1983; Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Onis, 1991; 
Yeldan, 2003). This change, for many observers was aimed at bringing the 
economic policy and practices of the country more in line with the requirements 
of the emerging era of neoliberal globalisation, thus being able to handle to the 
pressures associated with it (see e.g. Keyder, 1987; Boratav, 1990; Aydin, 2005; 
Kazgan, 2006). And again for many this change, served the interests of owners of 
big capital and the international financial organisations (see Koc, 1982; Cizre 
Sakallioglu, 1991; Boratav, 2005a; Kazgan, 2006). Amongst the economic 
policies driving this transformation, the most conspicuous ones were Turkey’s 
transition to outward-looking and export-oriented growth and policy makers’ 
consensus on particular economic policies such as reduction of support provided 
to the agricultural sector, liberalization of imports, devaluation of the Turkish 
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currency, and decline in real wage and salaries (see e.g. Onis, 1992; Odekon, 
2005; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009).  
The transformative process, which started with the announcement of the 24 
January measures and which continued firstly under the command of the generals 
who staged the coup d’état of 12 September, progressed throughout the 1980s 
under the close scrutiny of prime minister Turgut Ozal, who in the scholarly 
literature is regarded as the architect of the 24 January measures (Yalpat, 1984; 
Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990; Boratav, 2005a). Little has 
changed, if anything, with regards to the policies and practices implemented in the 
economic domain from then onwards. Indeed, for one thing, articulation of 
Turkish economy with the global economy continued through implementation of 
neoliberal economic policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. And for another, as 
a glance at available literature suggests political leaders and industrial employers 
continued to find competition with low wages as Turkey’s comparative advantage 
in the global markets (see e.g. Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Aydin, 2005; Kazgan, 
2006; Pamuk, 2008; Boratav, 2009). Such policies inevitably exerted profound 
impacts on the structure of the economy and industry as well as the political 
economy of industrial relations. These will be analysed below.  
7.3 State of the Economy and Industry 
A careful glance at available literature reveals that the political economy being 
pursued in economic domain during the period following the 1980 military 
intervention significantly altered the structure of economy and industry in the era. 
Amongst these, a number of changes should be especially emphasised if the aim is 
to provide a background to the explanation of transformation of industrial 
relations in the period (for a general overview see e.g. Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; 
Aydin, 2005; Kazgan, 2006; Pamuk, 2008; Boratav, 2009).  
Regarding the changes that came into being in the state of industry, political 
actors’ increasing interests in privatisation of state owned enterprises (Buyukuslu, 
1995; Aydin, 2005; Boratav, 2005; Kazgan, 2006), mounting accent on 
introduction of free-market logic in operation of the state-run industrial 
establishments (Senses, 1994; Buyukuslu, 1995) and the industrial sector’s 
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growing tendency towards small scale production (Aydin, 2005; Majcher-Teleon 
and Bardak, 2011) seem to have come to forefront. Owing to these, the post-1980 
period while on the one hand, witnessed state’s diminishing role as an employer in 
the industry and transformation of employment policies in state sector (Koray, 
1994; Cetik and Akkaya 1999; Mahirogullari 2005), on the other, saw a 
substantial upsurge in the number of industrial establishments employing less than 
ten workers all of which inevitably exerted a market influence on labour-capital 
relations in the era (see the Figure 14 below). 
Figure 14: Changing structure of industry in the post-1980 period 
Figure a: Dominance of small-scale production 
in post-1980 period (+000 workers) 
 
 
Source:   TUIK, 2010: 144 
Figure b: Proportion of manufacturing workers 
employed by state and private sector in planned 
economy and post-1980 periods 
 
Source:   TUIK, 2010: 249, 250, 251   
However, these were not all for the post-1980 period also witnessed a significant 
worsening of income distribution in Turkish society, a sharp fall in share of 
agriculture in GNP, and a proportionate increase in informal sector activities. 
Regarding the income distribution, as many authors seem to agree, sharpening of 
income inequality constituted one particular characteristic of the post-1980 
policies (see e.g. Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Boratav et al. 2000; Odekon, 2005; 
Kazgan, 2006). Indeed according to Odekon’s (2005) calculations, between the 
years 1987 and 1994, the share of the lowest quintile from the total income 
decreased from 5.2 percent to 4.9 percent, while that of highest quintiles’ raised 
from 49.9 to 54.9 percent. This trend appeared to have continued from then on as 





















































“the post-1994 crisis management gave rise to significant shifts 
in income distribution, and to an intensification of the ongoing 
processes of transfer of the economic surplus from the 
industrial/real sectors and wage-labour, in particular, towards 
the financial sectors.” 
Change in distribution of GNP between the sectors on the other hand continued, as 
has been the case in the previous periods, to change in favour of industry and 
services. This trend could be followed from the Table 24 below. 
Table 24: Shares of GNP by major sectors 1960-2000 
Years 
Agriculture as % of 
GNP 
Industry as % of 
GNP 
Services  as % of 
GNP 
1960 37.5 15.7 46.8 
1965 30.9 19.4 49.8 
1970 30.7 17.5 51.7 
1975 24.5 20.6 55.0 
1980 24.2 20.5 55.4 
1985 19.4 23.6 57.0 
1990 16.3 25.9 57.9 
1995 14.4 27.7 57.9 
2000 13.1 27.8 59.0 
Source:  TUIK, 2010: 647, 682. 
Indeed, it is clear from the table that agricultural sector has suffered a drastic fall 
in its contribution to GNP, going from contributing almost one third of country’s 
GNP in 1960 to below 15 percent in the year 2000. The more astounding figure to 
emerge from the table is the rise of services as per-cent of GNP, from 46.8 percent 
(1960) to 55.4 percent in 1980, and further surging near 60 percent mark by the 
year 2000. Industry has made modest gains in the period 1960 to 1980, rising 
from 15.7 percent to 20.5 percent but has added another 7 percent points to its 
tally at the cost of agricultural sector in the next twenty years, and has sat at 27.8 
percent in the year 2000. Change in distribution of GNP between the sectors 
inevitably has made an impact on the socioeconomic structure of the Turkish 
labour markets and this will be discussed in the subsections that follow. 
Last but not least, informalisation of economic activities comes out to be another 
significant factor that has exercised a considerable influence on industrial relations 
in the post-1980 period. The widening scope of informal economy in Turkey 
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starting from the end of the 1970s has been widely accepted by many scholars of 
Turkish economy (Boratav et al., 2000; Kus, 2004; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009). 
It is estimated that the size of informal economy in Turkey constitutes more than 
30 percent of the country’s total GDP. However, the true extend of it is still 
debatable and there are various calculations available in literature (Schneider and 
Enste, 2000; Davutyan, 2008; Aktuna-Gunes et al., 2013). Regardless of the 
unknown extent of the informal economy in Turkey, what is well known is that, it 
currently employs a considerable proportion of urban workforce in the country. 
This will be further discussed in the following subsection.  
7.4 Socioeconomic Transformations in the Period  
A careful overview of available resources reveals that the political and economic 
transformations, which started to change the politico-economic landscape of the 
country during the last two decades of the twentieth century, were accompanied 
by the continuation of rapid urbanisation coupled by an on-going process of 
proletarianisation. These continuing trends were predominantly shaped by waves 
of migration that moved many villagers from rural areas to urbanised city centres 
(Icduygu and Sirkeci, 1999; Peker, 1999; Duyar-Kienast, 2005; Tekeli, 2007) and 
they continued to alter, as has been the case in the previous periods, occupational 
activities that the country’s labour force was involved in as well as the 
demographic profile of the country.  Indeed, as can be seen in the Table 25, by 
1980, urban population has grown by more than six times since 1927; 19.64 
million as compared to 3.3 million, while the growth in the rural population, by 
comparison, in the same period has been modest (from 10 million to 25 million). 
But it is in the 1980s and 1990s that urban population has seen sharp rise while 
rural population has stagnated around the 23 million, a drop of 2 million from the 
year 1980. By the year 2000, with the figure of 44 million; urban population has 
more than doubled since the year 1980. The other trend to emerge from the table 
is the drastic fall in the rural population as part of total population. While in 1923, 
more than 75 percent of the Turkish population was based in rural areas, the 
figure has come down to 54.7 percent by 1980, whereas urban share of population 
has risen from 24.2 percent in 1923 to 43.9 percent in 1980. This trend has 
continued with a sharp decline in 1980s and 1990s with rural share of population 
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at 35.1 percent of the total population in year 2000 whereas the urban population 
is at 64.9 percent and rising. 
Table 25: Share of the urban and rural population in the mono-party, multi-party, 




Population Percentage Population Percentage 
1927 3,305,879 24.2 10,342,391 75.8 13,648,270 
1945 4,687,102 24.9 14,103,072 75 18,790,174 
1960 8,859,731 31.9 18,895,089 68 27,754,820 
1980 19,645,007 43.9 25,091,950 54.7 44,736,957 
1985 26,865,757 53.2 23,798,701 46.8 50,664,458 
1990 33,326,351 59.1 23,146,684 40.9 56,473,035 
2000 44,006,274 64.9 23,797,653 35.1 67,803,927 
Source: Calculated from TUIK, 2010: 10.  
In parallel to this change, as well as to that of distribution of GNP between 
sectors; the proportion of workers engaged in agricultural work displayed a 
continuous decline. Indeed, as could be followed from the Table 26 below, while 
in 1923 the sector employed almost 90 percent of country’s workforce, by the 
1980 it came down to 53.2 percent and sank further to 36 percent by the year 
2000. While it could be argued that 36 percent is still a substantial figure, it 
represents the trends of changing distribution of sectors in creation of GNP as 
well as that of employment tilting towards industry and services. Indeed, industry 
and services sectors jointly made up for 64 percent of employment by the year 
2010, which could be considered as a giant leap from the meagre 10.1 percent in 
1923. However, as could be observed from the table, the employment in services 
sector has outpaced that of industry in terms of growth as while industry sector 
has seen a modest growth of 1 – 3 percent every five years since 1970s, services 
sector has grown at an accelerated pace and by the year 2000, it  accounted for 






Table 26: Sectoral distribution of employment in Turkey the in mono-party, multi-
party, planned economy and post-1980 periods 
Years Agriculture Industry* Services 
1923 89.9 4.3 5.8 
1945 85.4 8.9 5.7 
1960 74.1 11.8 14.1 
1965 69.3 14.5 16.2 
1970 63.2 16.5 20.3 
1975 58.4 19.1 22.5 
1980 53.2 20.1 26.7 
1985 47 20 28.1 
1990 46.8 20 33.2 
1995 44.1 21.4 34.5 
2000 36 23.5 40.5 
*Includes construction 
Source: Calculated from TUIK, 2010: 136-7. 
Indeed, as could be also seen from the Figure 15 below, services sector has been a 
main employer for the workforce in Turkey since the multi-party period indicating 
that industry has always remained inadequate in creating jobs for the increasing 
numbers of working population. This situation appeared to have become even 
more problematic with regards to employment trends in Turkish labour markets in 
the post-1980 period, as according to the calculations of the World Bank (2006), 
while the working age population increased by 23 million between the years 1980 
and 2004; only 6 million jobs were created (see Figure 16), making the 
employment rate
125
 in Turkey one of the lowest in the world
126
. 
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Figure 15: Sectoral distribution of the workforce in non-agricultural activities in 
the multi-party, planned economy and post-1980 periods 
 
Source:  TUIK, 2010: 136-7. 
What is more, as a careful glance at the available studies reveals; low employment 
rates appear to be the only one part of the problem facing the Turkish labour 
markets that are resulted from socioeconomic transformations that Turkey 
underwent in the post-1980 period. Low labour force participation rates, ever-high 
unemployment rates, lack of adequate formal flexible work arrangements and 
soaring informal employment need to be equally taken into consideration if the 
aim is overviewing the challenges related to world of work in Turkey in the post-
1980 period (for a similar overview of labour markets see World Bank, 2006; 

















Figure 16: An overview of labour markets in the post-1980s Turkey 
 
 
Source:  World Bank, 2006: 12 
 
Labour force participation that is working age adult population either working or 
actively searching for a job has appeared to be considerably low in Turkey in the 
post-1980 period (for a detailed overview see Senses, 1994), and this situation, 
seems to have predominantly stemmed from women’s law rate of participation in 
urban labour markets (see e.g. Senses, 1994; Adaman et al., 2008; Majcher-
Teleon and Bardak, 2011). Indeed, as could be discerned from the Figure 17 
below, women’s labour force participation rate has always remained well below 
that of the men throughout the post-1980 period and this figure barely exceeded 
20 percent towards the end of the first decade of the twenty first century. What is 
more, even the labour force participation rate for men has shown a decline 
throughout the post-1980 period making the total labour force participation rate, 
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Figure 17: Labour Force participation rate by gender in the post-1980 period 
 
Source:  TUIK, 134. 
 
Existence of high unemployment rates appears to be another important problem 
challenging the Turkish labour markets in the post-1980 period (for an overview 
see e.g. Bulutay, 1995; Dereli et al., 2006; World Bank, 2006; Adaman et al., 
2008) which, in words of Odekon (2005: 25) came out as the costs of 
“stabilisation, privatisation and structural changes”. The rising unemployment 
rates in the post-1980 era could be observed from the Figure 18 below, which 
indicates that urban unemployment rate has always exceeded that of rural in the 
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Turkey for the pre-1980 period. However, according to Bulutay (1995), unemployment rate has 
also displayed an increasing trend in the pre-1980 period and urban unemployment rate has 

















Figure 18: Unemployment rates in post-1980 period 
 
Source:  TUIK, 133, 134, 135. 
 
Extent of flexibility in Turkey’s formal labour markets, on the other hand, appears 
to be the lowest amongst the OECD countries. Indeed, until the introduction of 
2003 Labour Act, non-standard contracts were not regulated and flexible 
employment arrangements were not permitted (see Majcher-Teleon and Bardak, 
2011). However, little seems to have changed since the introduction of the new 
labour law (Dereli et al., 2006; Majcher-Teleon and Bardak, 2011), as according 
to the OECD’s classification, Turkey still ranks in the middle-range in strictness 
of employment protection with regards to individual and collective dismissals in 
regular contracts
129
 and ranks in the highest range in strictness of employment 
protection for temporary contracts
130
. To add to this, according to OECD’s 
calculations, Turkey ranks amongst the lowest in its proportion of part-time 




Despite the fact that Turkish formal labour markets seem to provide more 
employment security and thus they appear to fall behind in provision of flexible 
employment arrangements, at least according to OECD’s calculations and 
classifications, this should not come to mean that Turkish labour markets are not 
flexible. Instead, as has been rightly pointed out by Majcher-Teleon and Bardak 
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(2011) informality in Turkish labour markets appears as de facto flexibility given 
that most of the companies hire and fire through informal employment 
arrangements and make use of flexible forms of employment such as extending 
and/or shifting the working hours of their employees. What is more, flexibilisation 
of Turkish labour markets through informal employment is not a new 
phenomenon, for it, as has been mentioned in the previous empirical chapters, has 
always been a remarkable feature of them. Yet, this problem appeared to have 
even further aggravated during the post-1980 period as this era witnessed not only 
a dramatic upsurge in population and working age adults (see Table 25 and Figure 
16 above) which far exceeded the jobs created (Senses, 1994; World Bank, 2006) 
but also an ever increasing interest on part of Turkish political leaders towards 
privatisation of public enterprises (Odekon, 2005; Atiyas, 2009), broadening 
importance of subcontracting arrangements
132
 (Dereli et al., 2006) and growing 
prevalence of small enterprises in Turkish economy most of which operate, at 
least partially, informally (Adaman et al. 2008; Majcher-Teleon and Bardak, 
2011). The exact dimensions of the informal employment in Turkey is unknown, 
however, according to the estimations of the World Bank (2006), one third of 
employed persons in urban areas and three fourth of employed persons in rural 
areas work informally in Turkish labour markets.  
In sum, against the background of shifting politico-economic circumstances which 
had their roots in changing global as well as national social and economic policy 
and practices, Turkey has underwent a remarkable transformation in the post-1980 
period with regards to its socioeconomic structure which inevitably influenced the 
very fabric of the country’s labour markets. Accordingly, the post-1980s 
witnessed an upswing in large-scale privatisations, state’s ever-diminishing role as 
an employer in the industry, introduction of market logic to the state-led 
establishments, a substantial upsurge in the number of industrial establishments 
employing less than ten workers, worsening of income distribution in society, a 
sharp fall in share of agriculture in GNP and expansion of informal economic 
activities. Accompanied these were continuation of rapid urbanisation, a notable 
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change in sectoral distribution of employment against agriculture, a remarkable 
rise in working age adult that has far exceeded employment and labour force 
participation rates, persistent high unemployment rates, incapability of Turkish 
formal labour markets to provide flexible employment arrangements, and high 
rates of informal employment. All these factors inevitably exerted influence on 
industrial relations in the post-1980 period. The impacts of these socioeconomic 
changes over the labour-capital relations will be discussed below along with the 
changing interests of and interactions between labour capital and state in the post-
1980 era.  
7.5 Interests  
The changes came into being in economic policy and practices in the post-1980 
period as many authors seem to agree, necessitated, amongst other things, a 
fundamental transformation in the structures governing industrial relations (see 
Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990; Cetik and Akkaya, 1999; 
Boratav, 2009). Indeed, lowering the workers’ wages and reducing domestic 
demand in order to promote exports and make the country more competitive in 
world markets, as the literature reveals, appeared as one of the main aims of the 
new economic policies (Cetik and Akkaya, 1999; Aydin, 2005; Boratav, 2009). 
Subsequently, the institutional framework that shaped and steered the industrial 
relations in the planned economy period completely lost its legitimacy in the eyes 
of powerful stakeholders as well as policy makers for this was the product of 
politico-economic and social circumstances of the previous period. However, the 
legal structure of industrial relations was still effective given that the fundamental 
principles of it were written into the 1961 constitution. Under the influence of new 
political and economic policies, therefore, re-institutionalisation of industrial 
relations seemed to have come out as an effective solution to accommodate the 
demands of the powerful interest groups, amongst which, the IMF and owners of 
large industrial establishments came to the forefront.  
The IMF, which closely supervised Turkey’s politico-economic transformation 
that was engendered through the 24 January measures indeed was one of the most 
vociferous and influential interest groups, publicly putting forward its demands 
regarding industrial relations in the early 1980s. “Improvements in wages should 
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be closely watched”, wrote the IMF, for example, in one of its reports prepared for 
Turkey and continued “the year 1980 will be subject to new important collective 
agreements and it is essential that results of these should not make pressure on 
domestic costs” (Colasan, 1980: 7). In another IMF report again issued in the year 
1980 for Turkey the IMF stated that (Dogan, 1980: 1, 9):  
“Turkish authorities have already seen the necessity of limiting 
wage increases and started to believe that implementation of 
this is important and imperative. One of the most critical issues 
in economy is the progress in wages and it is essential that this 
should be dealt with a great care [...] Success of the economic 
measures taken in 1980 is dependent on mild attitudes and wage 
restrictions in the collective bargainings to be concluded.” 
When it comes to employers, their demands of the lawmakers surpassed the 
limitation of wage increases. Indeed, an overview of the reports issued and 
speeches delivered by employers’ representatives reveals is that in the early years 
of the 1980s employers devoted considerable attention to the issue of steering the 
looming transformation in institutional structures governing industrial relations in 
a way which would tip the balance of power between labour and capital in favour 
of themselves (see e.g. TISK, 1986, 1987). In its working report prepared in the 
year 1982, the Confederation of Employers’ Associations of Turkey, TISK –
Turkiye Isveren Sendikalari Konfederasyonu, put into words employers’ demands 
and expectations from the politico-economic transformation that the country 
underwent following the military’s seizure of power as follows (TISK, 1987: 5):  
“We have experienced, nationally, what kind of an atmosphere 
we have been swept to by the perspective maintained on our 
social problems in the pre-12 September period. For this reason 
... it is necessary to bring a solution to the social problems by 
evaluating them from another point of view. It is a well-known 
fact that in the past the view that workers need protection was 
dominant in the approach to labour-capital relations. The 
claims that workers are suppressed and exploited are not longer 
valid ... It could be said that workers employed in our country 
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constitute a happy minority. It is no longer possible to defend 
this situation in the light of the past experiences. For this reason 
in our approach to social problems, the principle of 
interpretation of acts in favour of workers should be left behind 
and national interests need to be pursued.” 
The speech of Halit Narin the then president of the TISK, delivered in the 
executive meeting of the Confederation that was held in order to discuss the new 
institutional framework of industrial relations drafted by the military government 
appears to give some more revealing hints about employers’ interests over 
influencing the changes to be made in the institutional framework of industrial 
relations in their favour. According to Narin (TISK, 1987: 27): 
“The main aim of the laws regulating working life is 
establishing and maintaining a long-term peace in the 
workplace. This, at the same time is one of the guarantees of the 
future of the democracy.  Establishment of peace in the 
workplace rests on mutual understanding and balance between 
labour and capital. In attainment of this balance, supporting 
and sustaining the business, and enabling the activities that fit 
the circumstances of national economy are as important as 
workers’ rights. This peace can never be established by 
restricting the rights of employers or by forever increasing the 
rights of employees […] The bitter experiences of the past 
should never be forgotten in making of the laws regulating our 
working life. Trade unions cannot be against the state […] 
Independence of trade unions from the state cannot be defended. 
It should be accepted that there is a limit to trade union 
freedoms and rights just like there is a limit to every right and 
freedom.” 
Against this background, many observers seem to agree that the leaders of the 
military government made various ideologically biased changes in the 
institutional framework of industrial relations in favour of the interests of large 
capital owners and the country’s international creditors (see the section below and 
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Dereli, 1982; Koc, 1982; Turk-Is, 1983; Koray, 1994; Onder, 2004; Aydin, 2005; 
Boratav, 2005a; Koray and Celik, 2007). Nevertheless, even under the guidance 
of an authoritarian military regime, which operated in an environment where all 
forms of political dissent were ruthlessly suppressed
133
, utilisation of a 
legitimising discourse became important for the aim of the leaders of military 
junta appeared to be to ensure the continuity of their policies and practices after 
the country’s transition to multiparty democracy. Indeed, the leaders of the 
military government would appear to have attributed a central importance to 
giving shape to a democratic political order and thus to ensure continuity of their 
political and ideological influence before transferring power to civilian rule. In 
order to achieve so, as a brief look at various declarations that the military 
government issued and the speeches that the leaders of the 1980 Junta delivered 
reveals, they legitimised their actions through putting into use the argument 
pertaining to the necessity and rationality of their intervention (for a 
comprehensive overview see Dinckal, 2011). According to the communiqué 
number one issued by the National Security Council
134
, for example, one of the 
primary aims of the military intervention was “removing the factors that prevent 
the functioning of democratic order” (Dinckal, 2011: 13). This same purpose was 
put into words by the leader of the 1980 military coup, Kenan Evren, as according 
to him one of the main aims of the Junta was “provision of a solid basis for the 
democracy which became unable to control itself” (Dinckal, 2011: 28).  
The language of intervention that emphasised necessity and rationality was also 
used by the military elites to legitimise the steps they took towards the re-
institutionalisation of industrial relations. In a press conference that was held 
shortly after takeover of power by the military, General Kenan Evren justified 
proposed interference by the military government in the domain of industrial 
relations as follows (Dinckal, 2011: 35, bracets and emphasis added):  
“Labour-capital relations which came close to the point of 
break off due to various especially ideological reasons will be 
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re-regulated with a perception that will protect the rights of 
workers and will be respectful to the rights of employers. We 
believe that peace in the workplace will be of advantage for the 
entire Turkish nation for it besides providing workers with their 
social and economic rights in a responsible manner, will [at the 
same time] improve productivity.” 
Review of Kenan Evren’s speeches delivered throughout the period indicates that 
the claim that provision of peace in the workplace was necessary and legitimate 
for the protection of interests of all parties was put forward on a continuous basis 
(see Dinckal, 2011). The same rhetoric was also utilised in the preamble of the 
draft law on Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts, which was discussed 
in the National Security Council towards the end of 1981. In the preamble, 
lawmakers, after calling attention to the negative influences of the institutional 
framework of the previous period on peace in workplace, stated that (MGK, 1983: 
72, brackets added):  
“In preparation of this law, before anything else, an effort was 
put into place to clear away malfunctions and to fill the gaps [of 
the previous legislation] [...] [and] provision of peace in 
workplace, improvement of relations between employees and 
employers […] enhancement of levels of productivity and 
production were taken as goals.” 
While political actors, employers and the IMF, being Turkey’s international 
creditor as an overview of the available resources indicate, voiced their interests 
on various occasions regarding different circumstances, labour’s chances of 
interest representation independently from state appeared to be highly slim. 
Indeed, for one thing, the junta suspended activities of the DISK, which, in the 
eyes of many political actors and employers, was the primary source of conflict 
and opposition in the domain of industrial relations in the previous period. By so 
doing, the managers of the military government closed the political space and 
hence any potential resistance against the changes they proposed making to the 
institutional framework of industrial relations. In addition, the junta granted 
official representation of workers’ interest to the Turk-Is, the workers’ 
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confederation, as mentioned earlier, had a reputation for supporting harmonious 
relations with governments. Thus, the managers of junta reduced even further the 
impact of any opposition being allowed against the transformation of the 
institutional framework of industrial relations that were implementing.  
In the face of a fundamental shift that was on the way to change the institutional 
structure of Turkish industrial relations, the Turk-Is, much to the expectations of 
the leaders of the military government, maintained good relations with the 
political powers that be (Cizre Sakallioglu, 1991; Koray, 1994; Cetik and Akkaya, 
1999; Boratav, 2005a). Nevertheless, this should not come to mean that the Turk-
Is remained silent and accepted all the changes that were related to domain of 
industrial relations without registering its dissent. For example, when confronted 
with a draft constitution which openly adopted an anti-labour stance, one of the 
ways it showed its opposition was by issuing a declaration through which it 
publicised its opinion regarding the proposed changes. That is, according to Turk-
Is; (Koc, 2002c: 66, brackets added): 
“The draft constitution that is placed before the Turkish nation 
[...] is far away from providing pluralist liberal democracy 
which is the political choice of the Turkish nation. The draft 
constitution bears both political and economic elements [in 
order to] introduce a system, implementation of which will 
destroy the rights and freedoms of all workers [and which will 
enable] a group of capitalists to seize control of both economic 
and political power.” 
Turk-Is also voiced its opposition to the draft laws regulating collective labour 
relations by issuing declarations, organising meetings and releasing publications 
(see e.g. Turk-Is, 1983; Koc, 2002c). In a request submitted to the National 
Security Council which articulated its views about the new legislation on 
collective labour relations, the confederation put into words its concerns as 
follows (Koc, 2002c: 69 and 72, brackets added): 
“In  examinations that were carried out on the draft laws on 
trade unions, collective agreements, strikes and lockouts, the 
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general assembly of our confederation has detected, with a 
concern, that workers and workers’ associations are confronted 
with a new system [...]. [One] source of our concern is our 
detection that the demands of employers about the restriction of 
workers’ rights and freedoms were transferred to some of the 
acts of the draft laws. Almost all of these demands are 
completely in conflict with international principles and with the 
international rules which regulate trade union freedoms [...] It 
should not be ignored that when the institution of collective 
bargaining, with the shortcomings it holds, is brought to a point 
in which it becomes unable to meet the needs, it might create an 
environment in which social peace can never be established.” 
Turk-Is, as a perusal of its declarations and publications in the period indicates, 
indeed, expressed its dissent against military government regarding those events 
which appeared to inflict serious harm on the interests of the working class (Koc, 
2002c). Yet, many observers seem to agree that the confederation throughout the 
time it was charged with the duty of representing workers’ interests remained 
within the confinements of its traditional policies, being motivated by a drive to 
establish harmonious relationships with the groups holding political power (Cizre 
Sakallioglu, 1991; Talas, 1992; Koray, 1994; Cetik and Akkaya, 1999; Boratav, 
2005a). In other words, Turk-Is, during the years of military junta, as was aptly 
put by Cizre-Sakallioglu (1991: 64), “limited its efforts to ‘correcting’, or 
‘normalizing’, the tight corset it had been forced to wear”. Whether or not Turk-
Is by pursuing such a policy succeeded in defending the material interests of its 
rank-and-file members is probed in the section that follows.  
7.6  Interactions  
The political and economic events that unfolded following the 12 September 1980 
military takeover set the stage for the interactions that took place between the 
state, capital and labour in the post-1980 period. This subsection analyses the 
interactions between the actors of industrial relations against the background of 
socioeconomic and economic changes that were discussed in previously in the 
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chapter. The subsection divides the post-1980 period into two sub-periods: the 
years between 1980 and 1983 and post-1983.  
7.6.1 The 12 September Process and Industrial Relations: 1980-1983 
The early years of 1980s witnessed political actors’ ambitious efforts directed 
towards re-institutionalisation of industrial relations. To achieve this, after having 
justified their interest in industrial relations on the basis of the importance of the 
maintenance of peace in workplace, the leaders of the military government 
embarked on a set of legislation that was devised dramatically to shift the 
institutional framework of industrial relations. To begin with, they incorporated 
articles 49, 51, 52, 53 and 54 into the 1982 Constitution
135
 through which the 
fundamental principles of collective labour relations were laid down. 
Accordingly, article 49 of the constitution charged the state with the duty of 
taking facilitating and protecting measures in order to secure peace in industrial 
relations. Article 51 affirmed the right to form trade unions and employers’ 
associations and to become a member of these organisations without prior 
permission. Article 53 asserted the right to conclude collective agreements for 
workers and employers in order to regulate their economic and social position and 
conditions of work reciprocally. Finally, article 54 of the Constitution endowed 
the workers with the right to strike.  
The 1982 Constitution, in short, at first glance, provided workers with the 
fundamental rights and freedoms necessary to mobilise their power resources in 
order to define and defend their interests in the domain of industrial relations. 
However, a closer look at it reveals that these rights and freedoms were restricted 
by the lawmakers to such a degree that insecurity for labour came out as a 
rationale. Indeed, for example, the Constitution stipulated that only those workers 
who had held a job in the same branch of industry for at least ten years could 
become executive members of workers’ associations (Article 51/7). Moreover, the 
Constitution held that the status, administration, and functioning of trade unions 
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could not be inconsistent with the characteristics of the republic as defined in that 
document or with democratic principles (Article 51/8). It also banned trade unions 
from pursuing political causes and engaging in any kind of political activities 
including receiving support from or giving support to them (Article 52/1). To add 
to this, it subjected trade unions to the administrative and financial supervision of 
the State Supervisory Council (Article 52/3), obliging them to keep all their funds 
in state banks (Article 52/4). 
Furthermore the Constitution, entitled employers with a right to recourse to a 
lockout when workers chose to use their right to strike and restricted the right to 
strike for disputes arising during the collective bargaining process (Article 54/1). 
It compelled that the right to strike and lockout should be exercised in a manner 
that was not contrary to the principle of goodwill, not to the detriment of society 
and not at the expense of national wealth (Article 54/2). In addition, it rendered 
trade unions liable when any material damage caused in a workplace where a 
strike was being held was as a result of deliberate negligent behaviour by workers 
and trade unions (Article 54/3).  Further, where a strike or a lockout was 
postponed, the constitution charged the High Court of Arbitration with the duty of 
settling the dispute at the end of the period of postponement, rather than 
permitting the parties to resume the industrial action (Article 54/5). The 
constitution also prohibited politically motivated strikes and lockouts, solidarity 
strikes and lockouts, occupation of work premises, labour go-slows, production 
decreasing, and other forms of obstruction to production (Article 54/8). 
The 1982 Constitution, however, was not the only source of politico-economic 
insecurity for labour. The Laws no 2821 and 2822
136
, both of which entered into 
force at the end of the military rule, added further details to the restrictions placed 
on the collective rights and freedoms of workers. Although it is not appropriate to 
scrutinise these regulations here in detail, some articles of these laws which have 
been widely criticised by scholars as well as national and international workers’ 
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organisations need to be pointed out. The trade unions act no 2821 permitted 
unions to be formed only on the basis of work branch (Article 3/1) and forbade 
the establishment of trade unions on the basis of occupation or workplace (Article 
3/3). Moreover, it only allowed Turkish citizens to establish a union or become a 
union officer (Article 5/1). In addition, it specified confederations as being the 
sole higher organisations of trade unions (Article 6) and thus ruled out 
federations, which had existed in previous legislation. Finally, it also bound 
acquisition of membership of a trade union to certification by a notary (Article 
22/2), which was a highly expensive procedure and it was discretionary on the 
part of the particular union as to whether the new member would be reimbursed, 
which obviously made membership less attractive. 
The Collective Labour Agreement, Strike and Lock-Out Act, Law no 2822, on the 
other hand, set a double threshold competence on trade unions in order to 
conclude collective agreements. More specifically, according to the law trade 
unions had to represent at least 50% +1 of the workers in the establishment, where 
the collective bargaining would be concluded as well as representing 10% of the 
total workers in the work branch (Article 12/1). Further, it restricted continuation 
of negotiations between parties to 60 days (Article 21/2) and in the case that they 
did not reach an agreement at the end of this period it required appointment of a 
mediator by the High Court of Arbitration (Article 22/3). It prohibited the right to 
strike in certain work branches and establishments, including, but not limited to: 
funeral parlours and mortuaries, petrochemical works, banking and public notaries 
and educational and training institutions (29 and 30). In addition, the law provided 
the Council of Ministers with the right to suspend a lawful strike or lockout for 60 
days, if they considered it likely to be harmful to public health or national security 
(33/1), but it did not permit the resumption of industrial actions at the end of this 
suspension period. Rather, in the case that no agreement was reached during the 
period of suspension, the law referred dispute to the High Court of Arbitration for 
settlement (Article 34), decisions of which were final and had the same force and 
effect as a collective labour agreement (Article 55). Finally the law punished those 
who engaged in unlawful strikes with prison sentences of between three and six 
months and/or fines (Article 59).  
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All these restrictions imposed upon trade union rights and freedoms were seen by 
many as backward steps from what had been provided to labour a decade earlier. 
Indeed, these measures, for example, widened the state’s sphere of influence over 
industrial relations, rendered pursuit of economic interests the sole legitimate 
activity for trade unions as well as decreasing the capacity and possibilities of 
workers to mobilise their power resources and in so doing, according to a widely-
held consensus, tilted the balance of power between labour and capital in favour 
of the latter (see e.g. Kepenek, 1987; Cizre Sakallioglu, 1991; Talas, 1992; Koray, 
1994; Koc, 1998; Cetik and Akkaya, 1999; Aydin, 2005; Özdemir and Yücesan-
Özdemir, 2006). Thus, it should come as no surprise that these measures have 
been widely criticised by scholars, by trade unions and by some international 
organisations on a continual basis (see e.g. Dereli, 1982; Turk-Is, 1983; Kutal, 
1987; ETUI, 1988; Cizre Sakallioglu, 1991; Talas, 1992; Koray, 1994; Koc, 
2002c, 2002a; ILO, 2005; Gulmez, 2006; Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006; 
ITUC, 2007; ETUC, 2010; EC, 2011). 
In general however, all this restrictive legislation was designed to shape and steer 
the political economy of industrial relations after the country’s return to civil rule. 
During the years of military rule the domain of industrial relations was directly 
governed by the unilateral decisions of the National Security Council, through 
which it, for instance, banned all strikes and lockouts
137
, suspended many trade 
union activities, including collective bargaining
138
 and managed wage settlements 
with compulsory arbitration
139
. The National Security Council, what is more, 
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 These were covered by Decision no.3 and Communiqué no.15 issued by the National Security 
Council. Full texts of these decrees in Turkish can be found in the Official Gazette no 17105, 
published on 14/09/1980 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/17105.pdf
&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/17105.pdf [accessed: 16/06/2013]. 
138
 For the full list of activities that were deemed legal and illegal for trade unions by the National 
Security Council see Koc 1982: 40-45.  
139
 This was entailed in the law no 2364, which ordered collective agreements to have a validity 
period, which when expired was immediately put into force again. For detailed information see 
Koc, 1982. Full text of this law in Turkish can be found in the Official Gazette, no 17203, 
published on 27/12/1980, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/17203.pdf
&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/17203.pdf [accessed: 16/06/2013].  
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closed down the DISK
140
, put it its leaders on trial in military courts, with the 
prosecution asking for capital punishment (see Cumhuriyet, 1981; Milliyet, 1981; 
New York Times, 1981). It should be noted that the prosecution of the DISK 
extended to the years of civil rule and this confederation was only allowed to 
resume its activities in 1991, when articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish penal code, 
outlawing communist and socialist activities, were abrogated (Cetik and Akkaya, 
1999; Koc, 2003). 
In so doing, managers of the military junta appeared to have obtained at least 
three policy outcomes. First, they placed labour in a highly disadvantaged position 
vis-à-vis the state and capital, which became visible by the fact that trade unions 
under the repressive military rule could only undertake very restrictive 
organisational and representational activities. Indeed, for example they could not 
freely voice the interests of their members at the political level, for representation 
of the interests of labour, as was stated above, was solely granted to Turk-Is, 
which right from its establishment functioned in close cooperation with whoever 
held power (see Bianchi, 1984; Cizre Sakallioglu, 1991). What is more, 
throughout the time that military elites held power, trade unions could not make 
use of any of their secondary power resources. Second, this situation generated 
income insecurity for organised labour as an institutional outcome for the trade 
unions could not materialise the economic interests of their members as they were 
disqualified from negotiating collective bargaining and to go on strike. Instead, 
throughout the time the military held office, collective labour relations were 
managed by the High Board of Arbitration, which was controlled by the National 
Security Council and which, according to observers, made highly biased decisions 
in favour of employers (see Koc, 1982; Ketenci, 1987; Guzel, 1996). Amongst 
these decisions, the most conspicuous one appears to be the issue of wage 
settlement as workers experienced a serious decline in their income levels 
compared to what they had achieved in the pre-12 September period under the 
system of collective bargaining (see Figure 22). 
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 Together with DISK, two other confederations, the MISK and the HAK-IS, were also closed 
down by the military government in 1980. While HAK-IS was allowed to function as 
confederation again in 1981, leaders of the MISK, like those of the DISK were put on trial at 
military courts. The MISK, as was reported by Cetik and Akkaya 1999, although it continued to 
function as confederation under the name of YURT-IS between 1987 and1991 its activities 
remained insignificant in the post-1980 period. 
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The other policy outcome that managers of military junta successfully obtained 
was steering the behaviours of labour towards what was aimed at: social peace. 
Indeed, throughout the time junta held power, labour remained silent with no 
organised strikes and no protests staged. While one might see this as a bitter 
defeat for labour, the leaders of the military government had a different view on it. 
“Tell us if these measures are unnecessary” once Kenan Evren stated and 
continued “and we will abandon them. And again, as has been the case in the pre-
12 September period, and this time even worse, [same things] will rebound. Are 
you going to accept it?” (Dinckal, 2011: 108, brackets added). 
Consequently, what could be concluded is that the policies devised and practices 
put into use in the domain of industrial relations during the years of military junta, 
contributed to creation of a political economy of insecurity in the domain of 
industrial relations. Whether or not this type of political economy was maintained 
in the years following the restoration of civilian power in the country is 
scrutinised below.  
7.6.2 Interactions after Turkey’s Transition to Multi-Party Democracy 
Turkey returned to civil rule with the general elections held at the end of 1983. 
The Motherland Party –Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) – led by the architect of the 24 
January Measures, Turgut Ozal, – won the support of the majority. This party 
maintained a majority representation in national governments established until 
1991 and it, as has been continuously pointed out by many observers, set Turkey 
on a path of neoliberal economic reforms with an emphasis on private enterprise, 
privatisation and an export-oriented free market economy (see Ahmad, 1993; 
Zurcher, 2004; Kazgan, 2006; Boratav, 2009). Little has changed, if anything, 
with regards to the economic development policies implemented by the successive 
governments that ruled Turkey after the Motherland Party and this way of 
economic development, as pointed out by Boratav (2009), left its mark also on the 
economic policies put into practice in 2000s.  
Such a development strategy, which, according to many scholars was devised to 
meet demands of national and international capital (see Koc, 1982; Cizre 
Sakallioglu, 1991; Boratav, 2005a; Kazgan, 2006), inevitably required placing the 
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demands and activities of labour under tight control. This seems to have been 
mainly achieved through formulation and implementation of policies, (1) which 
contributed to placing labour in a highly disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the 
state and capital (2) which generated income insecurity as an institutional 
outcome for labour and (3) which provided political actors with a number of 
effective instruments to steer the behaviours of labour towards a so-called social 
peace.  
Regarding disempowerment of labour vis-à-vis capital and state, and generation of 
income insecurity as an institutional outcome for labour, consideration of the 
organisational and representational activities of trade unions and the wage levels 
in industry can provide us with some subtle clues that the policies and practices 
implemented in the post-1983 period contributed significantly to these aims. In 
saying so however, it should be also noted that, these policy and practices, were 
implemented in labour markets where, as already mentioned above, majority of 
industrial workers were employed by small-scale workplaces, increase in 
population and working age adults far exceeded the jobs created, labour force 
participation rate continuously dropped, unemployment rates gradually soared and 
informal employment turned out to be the only solution for many people in the 
face of changing labour market structures. 
As a result of combination of all these, a number of changes occurred in trade 
unions’ organisational and representational activities. For one thing, as can be 
seen from Figure 19, trade union density in the country in this period, that is to 
say the number of trade union members as a percentage of the overall workforce, 
continuously decreased and this decline became even more dramatic as the 
calendar turned to 2000s.  
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Figure 19: Trade union density in the post-1980 period  
 
Source:  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=20167 [accessed 18/06/2013].   
For another, as can be seen in Figure 20, the number of trade unions, especially 
when compared to that of the pre-1980 period significantly decreased as a direct 
result of the double threshold brought to the collective bargaining system by the 
law no. 2822 (Celik, 1988; Cetik and Akkaya, 1999). This decrease in the number 
of trade unions, according to lawmakers would provide so-called strong trade 
unionism (MGK, 1983). However, this obstacle posed by the policy makers, as 
has been persistently pointed out by the ILO (2005, 2009) was in contradiction to 
the principles of the ILO’s convention no. 98, which protects workers’ right to 
organise and carry out collective bargaining.  
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Figure 20: Number of trade unions in the pre and post-1980 period  
 
Source:  CSGB, 1997, 2010, 2012. 
Last but not least, coverage of collective bargaining both for public and private 
sector employees considerably shrank. While, as shown in Figure 21, this 
decrease in the percentage of workers covered by collective agreements appears to 
have been more dramatic for private sector workers, as coverage plummeted to as 
low as 4.2 per cent in the year 2010, the same figure also indicates that public 




Figure 21: Percentage of workers covered by collective agreements in the private 





Source:  Petrol-Is, 1995: 521, DIE, 2003: 244, TUIK, 2008: 142, CSGB, 2010: 24, 2012: 35, n.y. –
b. 
The changes occurred in trade unions’ organisational and representational 
activities in the post-1980 period have also exerted a significant influence on the 
industrial workers’ wage levels in the era. Indeed, as the numbers of workers who 
represented their collective interests through trade unions and who had their wage 
levels determined through collective bargaining decreased, so did their ability to 
control their wage levels. The shifts in industrial workers’ incomes can be easily 
followed in Figure 22, Figure 23 and Figure 24
142
 below. 
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 This was calculated by dividing number of total workers working under the coverage of Social 
Security Insurance into the number of workers covered by collective agreements. Calculations 
were done separately for private and public sector workers. To calculate the number of public 
sector workers covered by collective agreements a grand total of two years was taken, such that, 
in order to calibrate this figure for the year 1990, say, the sum of 1989+1990 was taken. This 
method was developed by Celik and Lordoglu (2006) to make up for some of the shortcomings 
of the statistical data published by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. However, it 
should be noted that, some important drawbacks regarding the calculation of realistic 
percentages still remain, for instance, the greater than 100 per cent figure for public sector 
workers covered by collective agreements in the year 1987 is clearly erroneous and hence the 
contents of this graph should be taken as being indicative rather than definitive. 
142
 Despite my efforts, I could not obtain statistical information covering the entire post-1980 
period for the real wages in manufacturing industry and separately for private and public sector 
workers. These three figures were prepared by different people/institutions and based on 
different statistical data. Despite their shortcomings, I used them given that they appear to give 
an overview of fluctuations in wage levels during the period of interest, but they should be seen 




Figure 22: Changes in real wages in the  




Source: Bulutay, 1995: 306 
Figure 23: Real wage indices per hours worked 
in manufacturing industry between 
1988-2006 (1997=100) 
 
Source: TUIK, Istishdam ve ucret istatistikleri, 
http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/sanayidagitimapp/i
stihdamucret.zul [accessed 19/06/2013]. 
Figure 24: Real wage indices in manufacturing industry (2005=100) 
 
Source:  Stateji Gelistirme Baskanligi, 
http://www.sgb.gov.tr/Sayfalar/AramaSonuclari.aspx?k=%22reel%20%C3%BCcret%20en
deksi%22 [accessed 19/06/2013]. 
Three features as to the wage levels in post-1980 can be inferred from these 
figures. First, as shown by the Figure 22, real wages in the manufacturing sector 
started to show a downward trend after 1979, the year in which, according to the 
statistical data compiled by Bulutay (1995: 306), real wages in this sector hit their 
highest. The subsequent downfall in wages continued for most of the 1980s and 
reached its lowest level 1986, with 35 percent loss in real terms when compared to 
the level recorded in 1979. Second, the level of real wages took an upward trend 
towards the end of the 1980s and marked its highest level in the year 1993. This 
corresponded with a series of labour movement activity that started with the so-
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called “spring movements”, which occurred towards the end of the 1980s and 
which were greeted with a widespread positive response amongst the workers of 
public sector establishments (see Koray, 1994; Cetik and Akkaya, 1999; 
Mahirogullari, 2005). Third feature, as Figure 23 indicates, this growth in real 
wage levels did not last long, for during the following three years they declined 
and despite an upward movement after 1999, real wage levels did not change 
much in the first half of the 2000s. This trend of stability in wage levels started to 
turn into a decline for the years following 2008.  
Besides placing labour in a highly disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the state and 
capital, and besides generating income insecurity as an outcome for labour, the 
new political economy put into practice in the post-1980 period seemed to have 
also successfully steered the behaviours of the working class towards what was 
aimed at by the state and employers, namely social peace. In support of this 
perspective, four points need to be made explicit. Firstly, having kept the DISK 
closed down for about a decade, country’s leaders effectively ruled out the most 
militant section of the trade union movement from the domain of industrial 
relations for a time. What is more, the DISK when it was allowed to resume its 
operations in 1991, as has been pointed out by Baydar (1999), could never 
recapture its old position in the labour movement mostly due to the 
socioeconomic, legal and political circumstances of the post-1990 period. As a 
natural consequence of this, despite there having been many occasions when this 
organisation and its affiliated trade unions mobilised the power resources of their 
members, their actions appeared to be more tame especially when compared to the 
pre-1980 period
143
, and this, as I argue, contributed greatly to the so-called social 
peace established by political actors in the domain of industrial relations in post-
1980 period.  
Secondly, the legislative framework of industrial relations provided the state and 
employers with a number of effective instruments utilisation of which 
significantly reduced the capabilities of labour to mobilise its power resources. 
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 For an overview of the activities of DISK between 1960 7and 1995 see DISK etkinlikler dizini 
http://www.disk.org.tr/default.asp?Page=Content&ContentId=28 [accessed 20/06/2013]. For an 
overview of the activities of DISK from 2006 onwards see 
http://www.disk.org.tr/default.asp?Page=Contents&CatId=2 [accessed 20/06/2013]. 
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Amongst these, postponement of strikes and the decisions of the High Board of 
Arbitration need to particularly singled out. Regarding the former, the Law no 
2822 entitled political actors the right to postpone strikes on the grounds of 
national health and security. It would appear that such a prerogative residing in 
the hands of the political actors gained them the upper hand in further determining 
the limits of strike action, which was already strictly regulated and highly 
restricted by the same law. Indeed, according to the calculations made by Celik 
(2008), the postponement decisions given by political actors with the pretext of 
national security and general health influenced around 350,000 workers between 
1983 and 2007. These decisions have affected public and private sector workers 
almost on equal basis. As to the High Court of Arbitration, the Law no. 2822 
charged it with the duty of settling disputes in cases where calling a strike was 
prohibited or in the cases where the right to call a strike was postponed. As has 
been the case in postponement decisions given for strikes, decisions made by this 
court appeared to give further supremacy to the powerful employers and the 
political leaders as they according to observers produced highly biased outcomes 
in favour of the former (Ekonomi, 1988; Guzel, 1996; Koray and Celik, 2007).  
Third, as has been mentioned above, Turkish labour markets underwent a 
substantial transformation in the post-1980 era and this arguably assisted the 
political leaders and industrial employers in their efforts for steering the 
behaviours of working class towards social peace and order. Indeed the factors, 
such as high rates of unemployment and informal employment and low rates of 
employment and labour force participation, while having contributed their shares 
in diminishment of union density, at the same time played an important role in 
emergence of new forms of work arrangements and in escalation of the 
fragmentation between working people. All these made it even more difficult for 
trade unions to encourage solidarity amongst the working people and to mobilise 
their power resources with the aim of mounting a resistance against the adversities 
imposed by the political economy of industrial relations pursued in the post-1980 
period. (see e.g. Koray, 1994; Koray and Celik, 2007). 
And fourth, there were the employers’ practices, which significantly weakened the 
power of labour both in the state and private sectors. In the former, this was 
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mainly achieved, as an overview of the relevant literature indicates, by 
privatisation of state-led industrial establishments, by introduction of market logic 
to the state employment policies
144
, and by subcontracting certain functions or 
services of the state to private providers (see Koray, 1994; Senses, 1994; 
Buyukuslu, 1995; Cam 1999; Cetik and Akkaya, 1999; Mahirogullari, 2005). In 
the private sector, on the other hand, increased employer confrontation to efforts 
for unionization (Koray, 1996; Cetik and Akkaya, 1999) together with a marked 
tendency amongst employers towards subcontracting and outsourcing of some of 
their operations (Cetik and Akkaya, 1999; Mahirogullari, 2005; Koray and Celik, 
2007) were some of the most noticeable organisational strategies of employers 
through which they outmanoeuvred labour. All these practices, as a result, not 
only decreased the number of manufacturing workers employed in the state sector 
and large private industrial establishments, but also diminished the capabilities of 
workers to mobilise their power resources. In essence, as I argue, they contributed 
greatly to a so-called social peace both in state and private sector industrial 
establishments, the conditions of which were largely laid out by the employers.  
In contending that the policies formulated and practices implemented steered the 
behaviours of labour towards social peace in post-1983 period, it should be 
explicitly pointed out that this by no means implies that organised labour 
remained passive and compliant in the face of rising power of the state and 
employers. Indeed, when looking at Figure 25 for example, which compares the 
number of strikes that took place in the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods, an 
upward trend can be observed both for the public and private sectors for the latter 
period until the early years of the 1990s. This resurgence in the number of strikes 
from the late 1980s onwards, as rightly pointed out by Cetik and Akkaya (1999), 
was prompted by the ruling Motherland Party’s ignorant attitudes towards trade 
unions and their demands. Moreover, as Figure 26 shows, this rise in strike 
numbers, brought with it a substantial rise in the number of workers involved 
compared to the pre-1980 period. However both Figure 25 and Figure 26 also 
reveal that the number of stoppages and workers involved in these after having 
displayed another upsurge, especially when it comes to number workers involved 
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 For example in the post-1980 period state-led industrial establishments started to employ 
increasing number of workers on the basis of personal employment contracts, which provided no 
right to bargain collectively or to strike ( see e.g. Cetik and Akkaya, 1999). 
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in the first half of the 1990s
145
, in the mid-1990s a downward trend was 
experienced and this decline was especially dramatic for public sector workers. 
Therefore, the conclusion can be safely drawn that state leaders and employers 
despite having experienced some difficulties in steering the behaviours of labour 
towards a so-called social peace in industrial relations for about a decade that 
started from mid-1980s, they appear to have overcome this challenge by the 
second half of the 1990s.  
Figure 25: Number of strikes that took place between 1973 and 2001 
 
Source: For the number of strikes that took place between 1973 and 1980 the public-private 
difference was calculated by using the data from DIE,1983: 208 and from CSGB, n.y. For the rest 
of the period, data from CSGB, n.y. –a was used.  
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 This rise occurred in the mid-1990s, following the Ciller government’s announcement of an 
economic reform package which involved, amongst other matters, a tight control on the wages of 
public sector workers (see Cetik and Akkaya, 1999). 
279 
 
Figure 26: Number of workers involved in strikes between 1973 and 2011 
 
Source:  For the number of strikes took place between 1973-1980, public-private difference was 
calculated by using the data from DIE, 1983: 208 and from CSGB n.y. For the rest of the period, 
data from CSGB n.y. –a was used. 
Trade unions in Turkey also started to consider, albeit very slow, different 
resistance strategies such as social movement unionism in the post-1980 period. 
Indeed, just like the many other industrialising countries, the debate around social 
movement unionism as well as the trade union activities related to this new effort 
gained momentum beginning from the 1990s in Turkey (see Dogruer, 2004, 
Sazak, 2006; Yücesan-Özdemir and Özdemir, 2007; Adaman et al., 2008; Burkev, 
2010; Sevgi, 2012). However, what a brief review of available resources reveal is 
that, despite a limited number of cases such as strike of Zonguldak miners in 1990 
(Yukselen, 1998), strike of Novemed workers in Antalya in 2004 (Fougner and 
Kurtoglu, 2011), resistance of Tekel workers in Ankara in 2009 (Akbudak, 2011), 
where the workers and their trade unions received a strong support from various 
national and international organisations (see Akbudak, 2011; Fougner and 
Kurtoglu, 2011; Sevgi, 2012), Turkish trade unions are yet to embrace the 
meaning and importance of social movement unionism. To add to this, 
organisation of workers out of the traditional terrains of trade unions such as those 
working in informal sector still remains a challenge for the Turkish trade unions. 
Indeed “given the constraints of the environment in which labour unions operate” 
as has been succinctly put by Adaman et al. (2008: 4) trade unions in Turkey are 
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currently “compelled to follow a short-sighted strategy in an attempt to protect 
their ever-diminishing membership base”. According to them; 
“Unless [the trade unions in Turkey] make a serious effort to 
improve the circumstances of all workers, to combat, in 
particular, informal employment practices, […] it would be 
easier for employers to present unionised workers as a labour 
aristocracy that does not share the concerns of the rest of the 
workforce. This would make it impossible for unions to 
consolidate their basis of social legitimacy, which they need to 
do to be able to lead a public campaign against certain problems 
that lead both to a deterioration of labour standards and to the 
decline in union density” (Adaman et al., 2008: 13, brackets 
added). 
In the face of mounting socioeconomic and political challenges that have faced 
trade unions in the post-1980 period, the policies and practices in the domain of 
industrial relations therefore disempowered labour vis-à-vis the state and capital, 
generated income insecurity as one institutional outcome for organised labour and 
provided political actors with some effective instruments to steer their behaviours 
towards social peace. What is more, these policies and practices, at the same time 
enabled political actors and employers to influence the institution building process 
and hence, to reinforce the institutional structures against change. Two significant 
occurrences provide subtle evidence in support of this argument. In the first 
instance, despite some articles of the laws no 2821 and 2822 together with some 
of the provisions of the 1982 constitution related to trade union rights and 
freedoms having been amended with the aim of complying with international 
legal commitments, as Gulmez (2006), an expert on the legal structure of 
Turkey’s industrial relations pointed out, these changes remained short of 
achieving compliance with international legislation. This situation had arisen 
because the demands of employers were generally acceded to throughout the 
1990s, as has been indicated by Koray and Celik (2007), for they were highly 
vociferous in putting forward strong objections over any potential pro-labour 
amendments in the institutional framework of industrial relations. Therefore, it 
should come as no surprise that the fundamental principles that constituted the 
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most important sources for labour’s disempowerment by the institutional 
framework of industrial relations, for instance, the double threshold placed on the 
collective bargaining process for trade unions, notary obligation for trade union 
membership, restrictions imposed upon free organisation of trade unions and 
major limitations placed on the right to strike, were left unchanged throughout the 
time these laws were in power
146
.  
Second, and perhaps more striking, the new Law on Trade Unions and Collective 
Agreements no. 6356
147
 which became effective in November 2012, maintains, as 
the available literature indicates, insecurity as a rationale for labour which was 
embedded in the institutional framework of industrial relations by the military 
junta in the early 1980s (Council of Global Unions, 2012; Dinler, 2012; DISK, 
2012; ITUC, 2012; Celik, 2013; Gulmez, 2013). Indeed, before anything else this 
new law, according to Celik (2013), has been prepared in line with the interests of 
employers’ organisations representing small and medium-sized companies. If this 
was not enough, despite having brought some improvements in the legal 
framework of industrial relations, such as simplification of the conditions for the 
establishment of trade unions and abolishment of notary certification for union 
membership (Celik, 2013), this new law has preserved many fundamental 
principles of the previous legislation. Amongst these, some of the most 
remarkable ones that have received fierce criticism from national and international 
observers, have been its perpetuation of bans regarding the establishment of trade 
unions on bases other than work branches, its maintenance of sectoral and 
enterprise thresholds in collective bargaining under a different guise and its 
preservation of much of the restrictions imposed by the previous legislation on the 
right to strike (see Council of Global Unions, 2012; Dinler, 2012; ITUC and 
ETUC, 2012; Celik, 2013; Gulmez, 2013).  
The new Law on Trade Unions and Collective Agreements, resultantly, as perusal 
of the latest works of scholars of Turkish industrial relations suggests, is an 
important instrument for employers and political actors to sustain the same type of 
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 For a detailed list of the amendments made to the 1982 Constitution regarding trade unions 
rights and freedom and the Laws no 2821 and no 2822, together with the restrictions that have 
remained untouched in this legislation, see Gulmez, 2006, p. 65-78. 
147
 This law was published in the Official Gazette no 28460 on 18/10/2012. For full text in Turkish 
see http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/11/20121107-1.htm [accessed 21/06/2013].   
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political economy pursued in industrial relations since the beginning of 1980s (see 
e.g. Celik, 2013; Dereli, 2013; Gulmez, 2013). This type of political economy, 
with the policies adopted and practices implemented constrains the possibilities of 
labour in mobilisation of its power resources and places them in a highly 
disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the state and employers with regards to the 
voicing and materialisation of their interests. The prevailing policies and practices 
that is currently governing and steering labour-capital relations therefore, as I 
argue, has significantly contributed to the regeneration of political economy of 
insecurity in industrial relations in the 1980s and in 2000s, the legacy of which 
can be traced back as early as the first years of Republican Turkey.  
7.7 Discussion & Conclusion 
The early 1980s witnessed security’s total loss of its legitimacy as a rationale in 
the institutions that ruled relations between labour and capital. That is, under the 
influence of new political and economic policies, replacement of security with 
insecurity for labour as a rationale seemed to have come out as an effective 
solution to accommodate the demands of the powerful interest groups, amongst 
which, the IMF and owners of large industrial establishments came to the 
forefront. What is more, the socioeconomic and political turmoil that enveloped 
the country since the mid-1970s which also extended to the area of industrial 
relations, provided the political actors with a strong rationale that the country’s 
politico-economic order needed protection against harmful actions. 
It was mainly against this background of the events that the military intervention 
of 12 September 1980, followed by three years of military governance introduced 
an authoritarian constitutional basis together with a restrictive and a repressive 
institutional framework for industrial relations. In doing so, it left a deep imprint 
on the political economy of industrial relations implemented in the years 
following Turkey’s transition to multi-party democracy in the year 1983. Indeed, 
for one thing, the new institutional framework of Turkey’s industrial relations 
which was prepared during the time that the military held office prevented proper 
functioning of freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and the 
right to strike, thus, while decreasing the capabilities of labour to pursue 
independently its economic and political interests, empowered the state and 
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capital vis-à-vis labour. Second, it generated income insecurity as one institutional 
outcome for organised labour as it limited workers’ control over their wage levels. 
And third, it provided a number of effective tools to state and employers to steer 
the behaviours of labour towards their interests. 
However, it was not only the new institutional framework that diminished the 
power of the labour vis-à-vis state and employers. The post-1980s also witnessed 
Turkey’s rapid integration into neoliberal global economy and a swift 
socioeconomic transformation both of which exerted significant impacts on 
political economy pursued in domain of industrial relations. Indeed, for example 
state’s diminishing role as an employer in the industry, transformation of 
employment policies in state sector, increase in the number of industrial 
establishments employing less than ten workers inevitably exerted a marked 
influence on labour-capital relations in the era. To add to this, increasing urban 
population, low levels of labour force participation, high unemployment rates and 
soaring informal employment defined the key characteristics of the labour markets 
in the post-1980 period. These factors, while on the one hand contributed their 
shares in diminishment of union density, on the other played important role in 
introduction of new forms of work arrangements and increased the fragmentation 
between workers. All these made it even more difficult for trade unions to 
encourage solidarity amongst the working people and to mobilise their power 
resources with the aim of mounting resistance against the adversities imposed by 
the political economy of industrial relations pursued in the post-1980 period.  
Resultantly, the post-1980 period witnessed regeneration of political economy of 
insecurity in industrial relations that was implemented against the background of a 
neoliberal agenda and of significant socioeconomic transformation. Therefore, 
pursuit of a political economy of insecurity in 1980s differed from that pursued in 
the second half of the planned economy period in three important aspects. First, 
all these policy and practices took even severer forms as Turkey further integrated 
into neoliberal global economy and they were implemented against the 
background of a rapid socioeconomic transformation which, with the influence 
they exerted on labour markets and social policies, added up to the impacts of 
policy and practices pursued in industrial relations. Second, this time insecurity as 
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a rationale operating in industrial relations became more pervasive embracing the 
workers of the state sector as well as those of the private right from the beginning. 
And third, the policy and practices implemented in the period proved more 
effective and persistent in disempowerment of labour vis-à-vis capital and state. 
Therefore, the post-1980 period witnessed pursuit of a more widespread and 
influential political economy of insecurity in Turkey’s industrial relations and the 
















 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION CHAPTER 8:
8.1 Summary of the Research and Its Design 
The main aim of this thesis was to investigate whether or not the political 
economy of industrial relations that was adopted in the years following the 
establishment of the 1980 military junta in Turkey, which distributed the power 
resources between actors highly in favour of the state and employers, has its roots, 
as widely argued, within the mainstream Turkish industrial relations literature, in 
Turkey’s integration with the global economy that started to gain pace in the early 
1980s. In order to unveil this, I placed its industrial relations in a historical and 
broader socioeconomic and political environment and scrutinised 
(re)institutionalisation of the political economy of the country’s industrial 
relations in three consecutive periods: the mono-party (1923-1945), the multi-
party (1945-1960) and the planned economy  (1960-1980) periods. In analysing 
these succeeding periods, I scrutinised the political, economic and social 
circumstances surrounding the actors as well as their interests, and their 
interactions with each other in the process of institution-building in Turkey’s 
industrial relations. In doing so, I aimed at addressing the following questions: 
Q1: How can we conceptually and methodologically analyse 
and explain labour’s disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the 
state and capital in the post-1980 period in the domain of 
industrial relations? 
Q2: How did the institutional structures of industrial relations 
historically constrain and shape political behaviours and 
strategies of the state, capital and labour during the 
(re)institutionalisation of industrial relations? 
The theoretical-conceptual framework which helped me to address these questions 
was developed in the Chapter 2 in relation to a novel understanding to the concept 
security. Accordingly, I contended that security/insecurity besides being an 
institutional outcome, i.e. people’s security related senses and experiences in the 
context of our various daily practices, comes out in the forms of: 
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(i) a power resource that provides people with social agency and with suitable 
environments together which enable them to participate in the decision-
making process and to influence policies in the direction of their own 
interests. 
(ii) as a rationale in institutions providing valid grounds for the rules, 
regulations and practices formulated, which enable those who are in 
position of enforcing rules to create institutional opportunities/constraints 
for the socioeconomic actors in the materialisation of their interests. 
I also posited that when insecurity becomes an institutional rationale, this 
constitutes an important source of path dependency in the policymaking process, 
as it, by distributing the power resources between actors in a way that places less-
powerful actors in a highly disadvantaged position vis-à-vis others and by steering 
the behaviours of less-powerful actors in the direction desired by more powerful 
actors, both enhances the capacities of those who started with a more 
advantageous position to increase their power over time and leaves a very remote 
possibility for less powerful actors to restructure the institutions with alternative 
rationales. That is, these factors taken together stiffen the institutions’ resistance 
to change and enable powerful actors to increase their influence in the institution-
building process by creating a path dependency rooted in policy and practices. I 
also pointed out that in some cases security, instead of insecurity, may become an 
institutional rationale and this, again constitutes an important source of path 
dependency in the policymaking process as it empowers the less powerful actors 
vis-à-vis others giving them social agency in defining and defending their 
interests in the process of policy making.  
In the context of the conceptual-theoretical understanding I developed, Chapter 2 
continued with exploration of security/insecurity in the domain of industrial 
relations with the argument that imbalance between the power resources of actors 
comes out as one key feature of the nature of industrial relations in capitalist 
societies. This, in turn, proves highly prone to make it possible for the more 
powerful actors, especially in the absence of adequate protection for the 
vulnerable actors, to mobilise their power resources in order to materialise their 
interests and to influence the institution-building process in line with their 
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interests. Thus, what I put forward was that, workers who come out as less-
powerful actors in capitalist societies with regards to the initial power resources 
they possess need to be empowered by policies and practices that are created in 
the institution-building process in order to be able to interact with other actors on 
an equal footing. This, which displays that the society within which workers make 
their living is based on a set of democratic values, could be achieved, as I posited, 
through embedding security as a rationale in the institutional structure of 
industrial relations or in other words through pursuit of a political economy of 
security in the domain of industrial relations. In the Chapter 2, I also pointed to 
the importance of state as an actor in industrial relations and put forward the view 
that the pursuit of a political economy of security/insecurity in industrial relations 
does not predominantly or necessarily revolve around the interests of labour and 
capital as the interests of the state as a separate actor need to be equally 
considered.  
Moving on from this, I inquired what would be the minimum standards that would 
provide us with sufficient grounds to argue that security is embedded in 
institutional structure of industrial relations. Drawing on the ILO’s core labour 
standards on the freedom of association and collective bargaining as well as its 
position on the right to strike, my answer to this question was this: an adequate 
provision of freedom of association, an effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining and a sufficient guarantee of the right to strike are the 
minimum requirements to legitimise the social agency of organised labour, to 
empower it in industrial relations and to enhance its capabilities to act as an actor 
on an equal basis.  
Indeed, these rights and freedoms when configured and implemented in a way that 
protects and empowers workers, under my perspective, serve as secondary power 
resources for labour in capitalist-democratic societies, which, as I posit, are highly 
likely to (i) distribute the power resources between actors in a way that places 
labour on a more equal footing (ii) generate income security for labour and (ii) 
steer its behaviour in desired directions without, little, if any, need to use of 
repressive measures by the more powerful actors. What is more, they are also 
highly likely to create a path dependency in the policymaking process as they will 
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enable labour to influence the institution-building process by legitimising its 
social agency and by providing it with an institutional structure within which it 
can freely interact with other actors. Proper functioning of freedom of association, 
the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike, therefore, I contend, 
would indicate that security is operating as an institutional rationale in industrial 
relations, i.e. a political economy of security is pursued in this field. 
By contrast, the inadequacy or lack of labour’s secondary power resources 
reduces its chances to act as an independent social agent with distinct interests and 
agendas. It also generates income insecurity/inequality for labour and makes it 
easier for others to steer their behaviours as a group. This situation, as I contend, 
empowers the more powerful actors as well as maintaining and improving their 
capabilities vis-à-vis labour. What is more, the inadequacy or lack of freedom of 
association, the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike will also 
create a path-dependency in the institution-building process as this situation will 
enable the powerful actors to influence the law-making process and thus will 
reinforce the institutional structures against change. All these, in my opinion, 
indicate that insecurity operates as an institutional rationale in industrial relations 
and provides us with sound grounds to posit that a political economy of insecurity 
has been pursued in the focal context.  
In order to provide a time-sensitive and an actor-centred methodological tool to 
this theoretical-conceptual framework, the research drew on historical 
institutionalism, which rendered it possible: (i) to put the (re)institutionalisation of 
industrial relations in Turkey at the centre of the study (ii) to place Turkey’s 
industrial relations in a historical and a broader socioeconomic and political 
environment context, and (iii) to afford adequate emphasis on actors, their 
interests and their interactions in the process of institution building in each of the 
successive periods scrutinised in the study. To operationalize this historical-
institutional approach, the empirical chapters were designed in the same 
systematic way, investigating successive historical periods, namely, the mono-
party period (1923-1945), the multi-party period (1945-1960) and the planned 
economy period (1960-1980) by studying the actors, their interests and 
interactions, respectively. This study also covered the post-1980 period. However, 
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given that one of the objectives of was investigating the roots of the political 
economy of insecurity in the years that followed the 1980 Military interregnum, 
this empirical chapter did not provide a detailed account of the post-1980 period. 
Rather, it concentrated on the explanation of the issues arising from the insertion 
of Turkey within the neoliberal global economy, on socioeconomic 
transformations that played an important part in transformation of Turkish labour 
markets in the post-1980 period and on interests and interactions of actors in the 
early-1980s. In the context of this power-sensitive, and politically-informed 
theoretical-conceptual framework, and with the help of the actor-centred, 
historically grounded methodology and design, I endeavoured to address my 
research questions. In the section that follows, I pull together the main findings of 
this thesis, discuss its limitations and propose recommendations for future studies. 
8.2 Findings and Conclusion 
The answers to my research questions that were presented above were gradually 
constructed in the chapters 4, 5 6 and 7 of the thesis, which formed the empirical 
part of the study. Therefore, before moving on to the research limitations and 
future recommendations, this section briefly addresses the research questions, 
summarises findings, and draws the main conclusions. 
8.2.1 The Roots of Insecurity: Political Economy of Industrial Relations in an 
Historical Context  
The findings of my empirical chapters provided me with adequate evidence that 
labour’s disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the state and capital in the post-1980 
period in the domain of industrial relations needs to be analysed and explained 
through placing the state, capital and labour in a historical and a broader 
socioeconomic context, by placing adequate emphasis on the actors, their interests 
and their interactions in the process of institution-building in each of the 
successive politico-economic periods that Turkey passed through. Drawing on 
this, what I put forward is that, the re-institutionalisation of Turkey’s industrial 
relations under the administration and orders of the military government in the 
early 1980s, represents not, as has been widely accepted in the literature what may 
be termed a critical juncture in the historical institutionalist sense, but a path 
dependency in the institutional history of Turkey’s industrial relations. This path 
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was initially forged by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s national development project, 
which he devised with the aim of the creation and empowerment of a national 
industrial bourgeoisie and a national industry, was then followed, with the same 
interest, by the generations of the ruling élites to come.  
The political economy of insecurity, the roots of which can be traced back to the 
first steps towards industrialisation following the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey, was pursued nearly on continual basis in republican Turkey, and it served 
the best interests of both the political actors and the industrial employers. Indeed, 
this political economy employed the strong logic of perpetuation of capitalist-
industrialisation and the country’s political order and by making use of 
appropriate policy and practices, i.e. by placing heavy restrictions on or by totally 
abolishing freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and the right 
to strike, embedded insecurity as a rationale in the institutional structure of 
industrial relations. The insecurity operating as an institutional rationale has 
produced at least three enduring outcomes for labour starting from the early years 
of the establishment of the republic. First, it distributed the power resources 
between actors highly in favour of the state and capital putting the labour at a 
considerably disadvantaged position as an actor in the domain of industrial 
relations. Second, it generated income insecurity/inequality for industrial labour 
given that throughout the periods under investigation in which a political 
economy of insecurity was pursued, wage levels of industrial workers either 
fluctuated according to the wider economic conditions or the workers of private 
sector were paid less than what was paid to those employed in state-sector 
establishments. And third, it steered the behaviours of labour in the direction of 
peace and stability at the workplace. Before the 1980s, this was mostly achieved 
in the state sector through offering economic rewards to the workers and in the 
private sector by putting into use repressive measures and/or providing adequate 
power resources to the employers to define and defend their interests vis-à-vis 
those of labour. However, in the post-1980 period the practice of repressive 
measures and empowerment of employers and the state against labour appear to 
have been the preferred method in steering the behaviours of labour in the 
direction of peace and stability at the workplace both for private and public sector 
workers. What is more, all these policy and practices took even severer forms as 
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Turkey further integrated into neoliberal global economy and these were 
implemented against the background of a significant socioeconomic 
transformation which, with the influence they exerted on labour markets and 
social policies, added up to the impacts of political economy of insecurity pursued 
in industrial relations.  
Resultantly pursuit of a political economy of insecurity in 1980s differed from 
that pursued in the second half of the planned economy period in two important 
aspects. First, this time insecurity as a rationale operating in industrial relations 
became more pervasive embracing the workers of the state sector as well as those 
of the private right from the beginning. Second, the policy and practices 
implemented in the period proved more effective and persistent in 
disempowerment of labour vis-à-vis capital and state. Therefore, the post-1980 
period witnessed pursuit of a more widespread and influential political economy 
of insecurity in Turkey’s industrial relations and the path it established is still 
followed today. 
Insecurity as an institutional rationale, in this way, also constituted an important 
source of path dependency in the policymaking process, as it, by empowering the 
state and employers vis-à-vis labour and by helping them to steer its behaviours in 
the direction they desired, enhanced the capacities of those who started in a more 
advantageous position for subsequently increasing their power. This was exactly 
the case when the ruling élites decided to restructure the institutional framework 
of industrial relations in the multi-party period with the Trade Unions Law no. 
5018, dated 1947 and recently with the Law on Trade Unions and Collective 
Agreements no. 6356, which became effective in November 2012 and which 
currently governs the nation’s industrial relations. Indeed, both of these laws, 
which embody insecurity as an institutional rationale, were built on preceding 
institutional structures, which also embraced insecurity as an embedded rationale. 
Insecurity as an institution rationale, therefore, left very remote the possibility for 
labour to restructure the institutions with alternative rationales, stiffened the 
institutions’ resistance to change and enabled the powerful actors to increase their 
influence in the institution-building process by creating a path dependency rooted 
in policy and practices. 
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The only challenge to the political economy of insecurity pursued in domain of 
industrial relations came in the 1960s, when the political actors decided to 
materialise their supreme interest of perpetuation of capitalist-industrialisation 
and the country’s political order with different policy tools. The industrial 
bourgeoisie also lent its support to this shift in the political actors’ attitudes 
towards labour-capital relations, mostly because of the import substitution 
development model, which became the country’s industrialisation strategy in the 
planned economy period and required large dynamic domestic markets for the 
products of the national industry. In this respect the early 1960s represents, as also 
widely argued in mainstream literature, what we can interpret as a critical 
juncture in the political economy pursued in the domain of industrial relations, 
given that for the first time in republican Turkey’s history, the political actors 
considered the adequate provision of freedom of association, effective recognition 
of the right to collective bargaining and sufficient guarantee of the right to strike, 
to be important means in the protection of the country’s political and economic 
order. Such a considerable shift in the political actors’ approach to labour-capital 
relations, thus, embedded security in the institutional structure of industrial 
relations, paving the way for the pursuit of a political economy of security in the 
domain of industrial relations, for a time.  
The political economy of security adopted in domain of industrial relations in the 
early 1960s produced at least two outcomes for labour in the industrial sector. 
First, it placed organised workers – those both employed by the private and public 
sectors – on a more equal footing vis-à-vis the state and employers in defining and 
defending their interests, which became most visible in the increasing number of 
organisational and representational activities of trade unions as well as in the 
constantly rising wage levels of workers employed in industry, thanks to the 
collective agreements concluded during the period. Second, it steered the 
behaviours of workers in the direction of stability and order at the workplace by 
creating very little, if any, need for repressive measures against labour.  
Nevertheless, the political economy of security pursued in the domain of 
industrial relations started to be gradually challenged owing to slackening 
industrial development, by changing attitudes of the political actors and 
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employers’ towards labour-capital relations and by the rising power of the 
workers of private sector, with the establishment of the DISK. The first significant 
intervention in industrial relations came during the 1970 military intervention on 
grounds of the urgent need to protect the fundamental order and integrity of the 
state. During this period, implementation of the laws regulating industrial 
relations was terminated, the constitutional basis of the right to strike was 
amended in a way that empowered the state vis-à-vis labour and left-leaning 
political activities, including those pursued by trade unions, were suppressed. All 
these policy and practices shifted the way power was distributed between the 
actors of industrial relations in favour of the state and capital, and created a 
politico-economic environment in which labour was forced towards social peace 
in the workplace. The policy and practices implemented, subsequently, introduced 
insecurity as an institutional rationale shaping and steering industrial relations and 
thus paved the way for the pursuit of a political economy of insecurity regarding 
industrial relations during the years of 1971 military interregnum.  
Turkey returned to multi-party democratic political order with the free elections 
held in the October 1973. Following this, the laws regulating industrial relations, 
again, became effective and the actors continued to interact with each other under 
the conditions that Turkey’s fragile political and economic order provided. 
However, these years witnessed re-emergence of the same factors as before, but 
this time with more intensity and gravity, which challenged the maintenance of a 
political economy of security in the domain of industrial relations in the years 
succeeding 1973. Indeed, for one thing, starting from the mid-1970s, Turkey’s 
industrial development and economic progress was hit by a serious crisis, 
rendering the wage rise demands of workers more difficult to meet by the 
employers and the state. For another, the workers of the private sector, who were 
organised by the DISK, launched a strong labour movement and their protests 
became increasingly radicalised and politicised as the political and economic 
circumstances surrounding the country worsened. Furthermore, as the planned 
economy period drew to a close, state sector workers also started to become 
involved in this politico-economic uprising, but in a less politicised manner. Last 
but not least, and as a consequence of these factors, the political actors and 
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employers’ attitudes towards industrial relations became more hostile and 
aggressive against the rising political and economic demands of the workers. 
It was against this background of events that the years following Turkey’s return 
to multi-party democracy in the year 1973 witnessed a remarkable shift in the 
policy tools that the political actors saw fit to employ in the materialisation of 
their supreme interest of the maintenance of the capitalist-democratic political 
order. This shift in the political actors’ approach to labour-capital relations, which 
came to the fore in the form of increasing state discipline being imposed on the 
labour movement, produced at least two outcomes for labour. First, it increasingly 
altered the balance of power established between the actors in favour of the state 
and employers, which mostly became evident in the ruling élites’ growing 
intervention into labour’s mobilisation of its power resources. This was initially in 
relation to the private sector workers and then expanded to the public sector. 
Second, it, rather than steering the behaviours of the actors in the direction of 
social peace and order at the workplace, triggered a serious politico-economic 
upheaval in the domain of industrial relations. Indeed, as the planned economy 
period drew to a close, while on the one hand the workers of both the private and 
public sector found it a necessary measure to increase the level of their struggle in 
the materialisation of their economic interests, on the other hand, the political 
actors, in close alliance with the employers, increased the degree and extent of the 
oppressive measures they applied in the area of industrial relations.  
The intervention that the political actors made in labour-capital relations in the 
second half of the planned economy period, resultantly, rendered it increasingly 
difficult for the former to mobilise its secondary power resources, and 
consequently, while gradually decreasing the capabilities of the labour to pursue 
independently its economic interests, it empowered the state and capital. This, in 
turn, created a suitable environment for the political actors, initially in the private 
sector and gradually in the public sector, to increasingly pursue a political 
economy of insecurity, thus replacing security as an institutional rationale, but this 
fell short of steering the behaviours of labour towards social peace in the 
workplace. It was for this reason that, as I contend, the pursuit of a political 
economy of insecurity, which started to make itself felt beginning from the early-
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1970s onwards, necessitated the political actors to take further actions in order to 
properly institutionalise it. The changes made in policies and practices shaping 
and steering industrial relations that came with the 12 September 1980 Military 
intervention, in this respect, complemented the efforts of the political actors and 
employers in their concerted efforts directed towards bringing insecurity back into 
the political economy of industrial relations, the legacy of which can be traced 
back as far as the early years of Republican Turkey. 
The changes made to the institutional structure of industrial relations in the years 
following the September 1980 military interregnum, in this respect, as opposed to 
what is widely argued in Turkey’s mainstream industrial relations literature, do 
not represent, in historical institutionalist terms a critical juncture in the 
institutional history of its industrial relations. They rather, as I contend, come out 
as an outcome of a path-dependency that was followed by successive generations 
of political actors starting from the establishment of Republic of Turkey. The 
political economy of insecurity pursued in the post-1980 period however differed 
from that pursued in the planned economy period in three important aspects. First, 
all these policy and practices took even severer forms as Turkey further integrated 
into neoliberal global economy and they were implemented against the 
background of a significant socioeconomic transformation which, with the 
influence it exerted on labour markets and social policies, added up to the impacts 
of political economy of insecurity pursued in industrial relations. Second, in post-
1980 period insecurity as a rationale operating in industrial relations became more 
pervasive embracing the workers of the state sector as well as those of the private 
right from the beginning. And third, the policy and practices implemented in the 
period proved more effective and persistent in disempowerment of labour vis-à-
vis capital and state. Therefore, the post-1980 period witnessed pursuit of a more 
widespread and influential political economy of insecurity in Turkey’s industrial 
relations and the path it established is still followed today. 
8.2.2 The Institutionalisation of Insecurity as a Rationale: The State and the 
Socioeconomic actors in the Making of Industrial Relations 
The analysis of successive periods in the history of Turkey’s industrial relations, 
in the light of the conceptual-theoretical and methodological perspectives laid out 
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in this thesis, provided me with some profound insights for understanding the 
ways the institutional structures of industrial relations historically constrained and 
shaped the political behaviours and strategies of the state, capital and labour 
during the (re)institutionalisation of industrial relations. My main findings 
regarding this issue can be summarised as follows.  
First, the political economy of insecurity which was pursued almost on continual 
basis in the domain of industrial relations created a path dependency in the 
institutionalisation of Turkey’s industrial relations. This, in turn, constrained and 
shaped the political behaviours and strategies of the state and employers and 
effectively eliminated the alternative policy choices during the times when 
industrial relations needed a new institutional framework and/or different 
approaches to deal with the emerging problems. One of the most striking pieces of 
evidence in support of this view emerged in the 1970s, when the existing 
institutional structure of industrial relations became incapable of steering the 
behaviours of labour in direction of social peace and order at the workplace. This 
situation, as I have contended, led the political actors and industrial bourgeoisie to 
see placing labour under the state’s firm discipline a more appropriate way to 
protect and maintain a democratic-capitalist politico-economic order, rather than 
granting workers further socioeconomic rights and freedoms. Therefore, the 1970s 
witnessed the political actors and industrial bourgeoisie’s ambitious efforts to 
bring back insecurity to the political economy of industrial relations as an 
institutional rationale. It is in this regard that, as I have posited, the political 
economy of insecurity, although being replaced with that of security in the early 
years of the second 
 republican period, fell short of producing a new path-dependency. Rather, the 
political economy of insecurity, which was adopted by successive governments 
starting from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, constrained and shaped 
political behaviours and strategies of the state and employers during the 1970s and 
thus it eliminated any chances of maintaining the political economy of security, 
which produced outcomes in favour of labour. 
Second, the political economy of insecurity, with this as an institutional rationale 
operating within, gave shape to the framework of industrial relations in such a 
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way that it reduced the possibilities of labour acting as an independent social 
agent and in doing so, left almost no possibility for it to be involved in the 
policymaking process with the aim of restructuring the institutions with 
alternative rationales. Indeed, for instance. during the mono-party, multi-party 
periods, as well as during the years that followed the coup d’état of September 
1980, the rules and regulations governing industrial relations distributed the 
power resources between the actors highly in favour of the state and employers 
and this confined the interest representation of labour to a politico-economic area, 
the boundaries of which were drawn by the supreme interests of the two former 
entities. This, what is more, kept the interests of labour out of the policymaking 
process, effective representation of which would potentially bring alternative 
rationales during the re-institutionalisation of industrial relations. This situation 
changed little, if any, even when the power of organised labour was at its height 
during the planned economy period. True, the political economy of insecurity 
which started again to make its presence felt starting from the 1970s, legitimised 
and facilitated the state’s intervention into labour’s mobilisation of its power 
resources and in this way it, while rendering it more challenging for labour to act 
as an independent social agent with distinct political agendas and interests, at the 
same time largely eliminated their interests from the re-institutionalisation process 
of industrial relations, which rose to the top political agenda of the political actors 
at the end of the 1970s.  
Third, the political, economic and social circumstances surrounding capital and 
labour provided a suitable environment for the political actors to formulate and 
put into action the type of political economy they desired in the domain of 
industrial relations. Indeed, for example, in the mono-party and multi-party 
periods, many industrial workers’ maintenance of their links with their rural 
origins and thus their taking of the industrial jobs as a temporary means of gaining 
their livelihood, provided the ruling élites with an appropriate setting to 
implement policy and practices that they saw fit to govern the domain of 
industrial relations with the minimum risk of labour resistance. Much in a similar 
fashion, during the planned economy period, the overflow of labour to industrial 
areas and the rising working class awareness amongst the industrial workers 
offered the political actors a unique opportunity to boost the domestic markets by 
298 
 
allowing workers to negotiate their wage levels with their employers. Towards the 
end of the period, when the political and economic circumstances surrounding 
industrial relations triggered considerable labour unrest in the industrial sector, 
this provided political actors a rare atmosphere to interfere with labour-capital 
relations with a so-called rationale of removing the factors that were preventing 
the functioning of the democratic order.  
A similar situation could be also observed for employers. Indeed, during both the 
mono-party and multi-party periods, the political alliance that the political actors 
established with the socioeconomic elites, who represented the interests of a group 
of potential businessmen ready and eager to grasp the opportunities offered by the 
state, empowered the ruling élites in the policymaking process by paving the way 
for the creation and maintenance of a political economy of insecurity regarding 
industrial relations. When it comes to the planned economy period, the 
implementation of an import-substituting industrial development strategy, that 
grew highly dependent on the consumers of the domestic markets, provided the 
political actors with a suitable environment for receiving the support of the 
industrial employers in the formulation and implementation of the political 
economy of industrial relations in the period. Towards the end of the period, the 
politically and economically unstable environment, which rendered the 
maintenance of industrial production difficult, at least according to the industrial 
employers, urged the industrial capital owners to lend their support to the political 
actors in their ambitious efforts towards re-institutionalisation of insecurity as an 
institutional rationale.  
In sum, what I contend is that the policies and practices which constituted the 
institutional structures of industrial relations and which were shaped in a broader 
socioeconomic and political context, as well as having provided a suitable 
environment for the political actors to formulate and put into action the type of 
political economy they desired in the domain of industrial relations, at the same 
time historically constrained and shaped the political behaviours and strategies of 
the state, capital and labour during the (re)institutionalisation of industrial 
relations. This, in the case of the state and employers created a path-dependency 
eliminating the alternative policy choices during the times when industrial 
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relations needed a new institutional framework and/or different approaches to deal 
with the emerging problems. In the case of organised labour, on the other hand, 
this situation reduced its possibilities to act as an independent social agent and left 
almost no space for it to become involved in the policymaking process with the 
aim of restructuring the institutions with alternative rationales.  
8.3 Contributions, Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
The findings of this study make a contribution to knowledge by casting new light 
on the understanding of the roots of the political economy that shaped and 
governed industrial relations in the post-1980 period. The overall contributions of 
this study can be outlined in theoretical, empirical and methodological aspects. 
Theoretically, this thesis, firstly, brings forth new comprehension of the concept 
of security/insecurity by analysing it in relation to its different aspects, i.e. 
security as one form of power resource, as an institutional outcome, and as an 
institutional rationale. In doing so, it minimises the confusion stemming from 
generalisation of security/insecurity as a concept in the wider literature. Second, 
building on this, the study incorporates the concept of security/insecurity in the 
study of industrial relations by merging it with Korpi’s (1985, 2006) power 
resources approach. In this way, it brings a novel power/security theoretical 
approach to the study of industrial relations and thus contributes to overcome the 
theoretical shortcomings in the wider industrial relations literature, which are, by 
many, considered to be an important drawback (see e.g. Kirkbride, 1985, Martin, 
1992, Kelly, 1998).  
Empirically, firstly, by taking an historical-institutionalist approach and by 
building on a power-sensitive perspective, the thesis investigates the formation 
and (re)configuration of Turkish industrial relations and calls attention to 
historically entrenched class alliances in the (re)distribution of power resources 
between the state, employers and labour, which is still an under-researched area. 
Second, by embedding the institutional history of industrial relations in Turkey’s 
wider political economy, it traces how insecurity as a rationale was 
institutionalised in an historical context and therefore attempts to draw an overall 
picture of the political economy of industrial relations which has been on-going, 
as I contend, with the exception of a few years during the 1960s, almost on 
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continual basis. In doing so, this study not only upgrades a literature which has for 
a long time overemphasised the impacts of Turkey’s integration with the 
neoliberal global economy on the country’s industrial relations, but also opens up 
a new dimension in the understanding of the institutionalisation of political 
economy of industrial relations in Turkey, in that very few studies, if any, have 
studied this subject by taking account of all the actors, their interests and 
interactions by placing them in a socioeconomic, political and historical context as 
well as by addressing the continuity of the political economy pursued in industrial 
relations. Third, given the existence of only a very small number of studies in the 
English language on Turkey’s industrial relations, this work contributes to the 
international industrial relations literature by filling an important gap and by 
opening the door for up-to-date new comparative studies. Last but not least, 
methodologically, by examining industrial relations over a time period as an 
institution, and by inserting power and actors at the heart of its analysis, this study 
presents a detailed and power-sensitive account of institutional continuity, 
development and change that came into place in Turkey’s industrial relations 
which can contribute to the discussions about continuity, change and role of 
power in the historical institutionalist literature.  
Despite a number of theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions 
having been made, the limitations of my work should be also acknowledged. First, 
by focusing solely on (re)institutionalisation of the political economy of insecurity 
in the domain of industrial relations, this study leaves out implications of this sort 
of political economy for the daily lives of workers, consideration of which would 
provide a broader approach to the issue of insecurity that operated as a rationale in 
this field almost on continual basis in the institutional history of industrial 
relations in Republic of Turkey. Second, this thesis with its stress on the 
emergence and development of actors in a historical process is not concerned with 
individuals and their relations to the institutions. Rather, it takes the actors as 
collective agents and does not provide any insight about the way institutions shape 
individual behaviours.  
Third, this study has mainly been aimed at investigating the roots of the political 
economy of industrial relations that was adopted in the years following the 
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establishment of the 1980 military junta in Turkey. It is for this reason that the 
thesis rather than concentrating on the politico-economic and social conditions 
surrounding the state, capital and labour in the post-1980 period which, 
undoubtedly played an important role in shaping and steering the changes made to 
the institutional framework of industrial relations in the year 2012, has drawn 
largely on the pre-1980 period and thus focused on the (re)institutionalisation of 
political economy of insecurity in domain of industrial relations from an historical 
perspective. In doing so, it has largely bypassed the ways the actors of industrial 
relations defined and defended their interests, the political alliances they 
established and the strategies they used in the materialisation of their interests in 
the post-1980 period. Fourth, this study by employing historical institutionalism, 
which itself finds its roots in political science and which aims to identify and 
explain power and power resources on political level locates its argument mostly 
at the level of politics, leaving the power relationship between actors of industrial 
relations expected to established in social and economic domains mostly 
untouched. Last but not least, by exclusively drawing on documentary data 
sources, I have taken the risk of missing some different perspectives that might 
not be found in other written sources.  
The limitations of this thesis, however, do open up new avenues for the future 
research. Firstly, future research will benefit from investigation of the impacts of 
the pursuit of a political economy of insecurity in the domain of industrial 
relations on the industrial workers’ perceptions and experiences of collective 
action from an historical context. Future work also needs to analyse individual 
workers’ relations with the institutions through which they became a part of the 
collective action. Examination of all the aforementioned would, without a doubt, 
be highly insightful in relation to providing a wider perspective of the ways in 
which insecurity as a rationale operated.  
Second, future studies should take a closer look at the post-1980 period and 
examine the impacts of globalisation on the political economy of insecurity, 
which has been pursued in the country since the inception of the republic in 1923 
in the domain of industrial relations. This means, future research, besides studying 
the actors, their interests and interactions by placing them in the wider politico-
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economic and social context that the post-1980 period provided, would require 
carrying out interviews with (i) the key actors who took part in the most recent 
process of (re)institutionalisation of industrial relations, with (ii) the workers who 
experienced the changes made in the institutional framework first hand and with 
(iii) the academic experts and trade union activists, who are in position of 
identifying issues and problems related to the new institutional framework of 
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